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THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in New Mexico in
1915 and grew up in Santa Fe. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale in 1940.
During World War 1I he served as a Major
in the U.S. Army and was decorated with the
Croix de Guerre. Judge Seth has been a
director of the Santa Fe National Bank, chair-
man of the Legal Committee of the New Mex-
ico Oil and Gas Association, and counsel for
the New Mexico Cattlegrowers' Association.
f-e has also been a regent of the Museum of
New Mexico and a director of the Santa Fe
Boy's Club- In 1962 he was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit by President John F. Kennedy. He
has been Chief Judge since 1977.
JUDGE ROBERT H.
McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas in 1916 and moved to Denver in 1927
where he has lived ever since. He received his
A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the University of
Denver. In 1971, he was awarded an Honor-
ary Doctor of Law degree from the
University.
During World War II, Judge McWilliams
served in the United States Army and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He has
served as a Deputy District Attorney, a Colo-
rado district court judge, and was a member
of the Colorado Supreme Court for nine years
prior to his appointment to the Court of
Appeals.
Judge McWilliams is a member of the Judi-
cial Conference Committee on the Adminis-
tration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta Kappa,
Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta Phi, and
Kappa Sigma. He was sworn in as a Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1970.
JUDGE WILLIAM J.
HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma governor,
Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma, in 1923. He and his family moved
to Oklahoma City in 1927. He served as a
First Lieutenant in the Army during World
War II. He then returned to complete his
undergraduate studies at the University of
Oklahoma, receiving his B.A. in 1947. He
graduated from Harvard Law School in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was an
attorney with the Department of Justice in
Washington, D.C. Afterwards, he returned to
private practice in Oklahoma City where he
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit by Lyn-
don B. Johnson. He is a member of Phi Beta
Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.
JUDGE JAMES E. BARRETT
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett, who
served as Wyoming's Congressman, Governor,
and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett was born in
1922 in Lusk, Wyoming. He attended the
University of Wyoming for two years prior to
his service in the Army during World War II.
After the War, he attended Saint Catherine's
College at Oxford University. He received his
LL.B. from the University of Wyoming in
1949. In 1973 he was given the Distinguished
Alumni Award from his alma mater.
Prior to his appointment, Judge Barrett
had been involved in private practice in Lusk
and had served as County and Prosecuting
Attorney for Niobrara County; Town Attor-
ney for the towns of Lusk and Manville; and
attorney for the Niobrara County Consoli-
dated School District. In 1967 he was
appointed by Governor Stanley K. Hathaway
to serve as Wyoming Attorney General and he
remained in that position until 1971.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judicial
Conference Subcommittee on Federal Juris-
diction, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court of Review, and is a trustee of
Saint Joseph's Children's Home. He was
appointed to the Court in 1971.
JUDGE WILLIAM E. DOYLE
Judge Doyle was born in Denver in 1911
and received his A.B. from the University of
Colorado in 1940. He obtained his LL.B. and
J.D. degrees from George Washington Uni-
versity. He served as Deputy District Attor-
ney for Denver from 1938 until 1941, a
Colorado district court judge in 1948 and
1949, and Chief Deputy District Attorney
from 1949 until 1952. During 1959-61 he was
a Justice on the Colorado Supreme Court.
Judge Doyle has been a Visiting Professor
of Law at the University of Colorado and a
Professor of Law at the Westminster College
of Law (University of Denver College of Law)
in Denver. He is a former Chairman of the
Judicial Conference Committee to Implement
the Magistrates' Act and is presently a mem-
ber of the Judicial Conference Committee on
the Administration of the Bankruptcy System.
He is a member of the Order of the Coif, the
Order of Saint Ives, Pi Sigma Alpha, and Phi
Alpha Delta.
He was appointed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1971 following ten years
as a United States District Judge for the Dis-
trict of Colorado.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo, Kan-
sas, in 1929. He received his A.B. from the
University of Kansas in 1952 and was gradu-
ated magna cum laude from Harvard Law
School in 1955. He went on to be U.S. Cir-
cuit Judge Walter Huxman's law clerk in
1956 and then practiced with the Los Angeles
firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. He
became Dean of the University of Kansas
Law School in 1961 and served in the capac-
ity until 1968.
Since 1961 he has been a visiting professor
at Harvard Law School, The University of
Texas Law School, Stanford University, and
the University of Michigan. He was a com-
missioner for the U.S. District Court from
1964 until 1967 and was a candidate for the
U.S. Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a mem-
ber of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the Coif,
Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta Kappa,
Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi, and Phi
Delta Phi. He has co-authored numerous
books on estate planning and administration.
In 1977 he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929 and lives in Provo. He gradu-
ated from Brigham Young University in 1957
with high honors. He received his J.D. from
the University of Chicago and became the
law clerk for Justice Jesse A. Udall of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court in 1960. From 1961 to
1974, Judge McKay was with the firm of
Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, taking two years
out to serve as Director of the United States
Peace Corps in Malawi, Africa. He was a law
professor at Brigham Young University from
1974 until he was appointed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in 1977.
JUDGE STEPHANIE K.
SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle Creek,
Michigan, in 1940. She graduated from
Smith College, magna cum laud, in 1962 and
earned her J.D. from Harvard Law School in
1965. She was admitted to the Oklahoma bar
in 1965.
Judge Seymour has practiced law in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, 1965-1966; in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 1967; and Houston, Texas, 1968-
1969. Most recently, she has practiced with
the Tulsa firm of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders,
Daniel & Anderson from 1971 to 1979. Judge
Seymour is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and
the American, Oklahoma, and Tulsa County
Bar associations. She served as a bar exam-
iner from 1973 through 1979.
Judge Seymour was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit by President Carter in 1979.
SENIOR JUDGE JOHN C.
PICKETT
judge Pickett was born in Ravenna,
Nebraska, in 1896. He received his LL.B.
degree from the University of Nebraska in
1922. In 1920, he was a pitcher for the Chi-
cago White Sox. During World War I, he
served as a Second Lieutenant.
From 1935 until 1949, Judge Pickett was
Assistant United States Attorney for the Dis-
trict of Wyoming; in 1949, he was United
States Attorney. He is a past member of the
Judicial Conference and has served as Chair-
man of the judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law.
Judge Pickett was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in 1949 and has been a Senior Judge since
January 1, 1966.
SENIOR JUDGE JEAN S.
BREITENSTEIN
Judge Breitenstein was born in Keokuk,
Iowa, in 1900. His family moved to Boulder,
Colorado, in 1907. After graduation from the
University of Colorado, where he received his
A.B. in 1922 and LL.B. in 1924, he served as a
Colorado Assistant Attorney General from
1925 until 1929. He was an Assistant United
States Attorney from 1930 until 1933.
Between 1933 and 1954, he practiced law in
Denver. In 1954, he became a United States
District Judge.
Judge Breitenstein has served as Chairman
of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Intercircuit Assignments and is a past presi-
dent of the Denver Law Club.
A member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, and Phi Alpha Delta, Judge Breitenstein
holds LL.D. degrees from the University of
Colorado and the University of Denver. He
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1957 and became a Senior Judge
on July 31, 1970.
SENIOR JUDGE DELMAS C.
HILL (Retired)
Judge Hill was born in Wamego, Kansas,
in 1906. He received his LL.B. from Wash-
burn College in 1929. From 1929 to 1943 he
practiced law in Wamego, serving as an Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney from 1934 to 1936. He
was general counsel for the Kansas State Tax
Commission from 1937 to 1939 and Chair-
man of the State Democratic Committee from
1946 to 1948. During World War II he was a
Captain in the U.S. Army. In 1945, he
assisted in the prosecution of General
Yamashita in Manila. He was a U.S. District
Judge from 1949 until 1961 when he was
appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Judge Hill became a Senior Judge
on April 1, 1977.
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Just after the close of the survey period, the United States Supreme
Court decided Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. . Natural Resources Defense Council.'
Baltimore Gas & Elcctric is significant for two reasons. First, it is the final
pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the litigation concerning the valid-
ity of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rule that was the subject
of the landmark administrative law case Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.2 Second, while Baltimore Gas & Electric did
not make any profound change in administrative jurisprudence, it is a con-
temporary Supreme Court reaffirmation of the philosophy announced in Ver-
mont Yankee: the fundamental principle guiding judicial review of
administrative action must be one of deference. As long as a federal agency
complies with substantive and procedural statutory requirements, a review-
ing court must defer to agency decisionmaking even when "the court is un-
happy with the result reached."
'3
The Tenth Circuit did not deviate from this general rule of judicial
deference during the survey period. The court decided thirty cases involving
review of agency decisionmaking, and in only three of these cases did the
Tenth Circuit directly reverse an agency decision.4 One of these three cases
was especially important because the Tenth Circuit, apparently for the first
time, permitted the estoppel doctrine to be used against the federal
government. 5
This survey considers the estoppel case in some detail because of its nov-
elty. Another Tenth Circuit decision, which considers the propriety of ge-
neric rulemaking, is also given considerable treatment. The case, United
States v. Thompson,6 concerned the attempt of antinuclear demonstrators to
use an administrative law defense to avoid criminal prosecution under a fed-
eral antitrespassing statute. The third case given in-depth treatment in-
volved the creation of an exception to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.7
Other administrative law cases reviewed for this survey deal primarily with
judicial review of agency action, and are given less extensive treatment. Un-
1. 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
2. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
3. 103 S. Ct. at 2252 (quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 555).
4. See Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Nimmo, 695 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982) (for discus-
sion see infra notes 75-157 and accompanying text); Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407 (10th Cir.
1983) (per curiam) (for discussion see infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text); Cavitt v.
Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1983) (for discussion see infra notes 167-71 and accompany-
ing text).
5. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Nimmo, 695 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982).
6. 687 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1982). For discussion of this case see in/ra notes 8-75 and
accompanying text.
7. Mountain States Natural Gas Corp. v. Petroleum Corp. of Texas, 693 F.2d 1015 (10th
Cir. 1983). For discussion of this case see infra notes 198-236 and accompanying text.
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published decisions, and published decisions of little precedential impact, are
omitted from this article.
I. GENERIC RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: UNITED STATES V.
THOMPSON
A. The Case in Context
Probably the most notable administrative law case decided by the
Tenth Circuit during this survey period was United States v. Thompson,8 a four
to three en banc decision. Thompson upheld federal trespassing convictions
against antinuclear demonstrators at Rocky Flats (a nuclear weapons manu-
facturing facility),9 rejecting the demonstrators' assertion that their convic-
tions were invalid because the Department of Energy (DOE) did not
conduct rulemaking proceedings prior to designating the trespass area off-
limits.' 0 In so doing, the Tenth Circuit en banc reversed a previous Tenth
Circuit which had found the convictions invalid."1
The issue in Thompson was whether DOE could rely upon a generic
rulemaking,' 2 promulgated two decades earlier pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 2278a,13 as a sufficient basis for designating the area where the demonstra-
tors were arrested as off-limits. Important to this article's analysis, generic
rulemaking issues were also treated in the landmark Vermont Yankee decision
and its sequel, Baltimore Gas & Electrzc.4
Vermont Yankee established a judicial policy against imposing procedural
requirements on agencies15 in addition to the bare minimum prescribed by
either the organic statute
16 or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).17
This policy has been criticized as a major setback in the development of
administrative jurisprudence because it potentially destroys an entire body
8. 687 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1982).
9. Id at 1286.
10. Id
11. See United States v. Seward, No. 79-1711 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 1981),rev'dsubnom. United
States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1982)(en banc).
12. A generic rulemaking sets out the regulatory principles or procedures which will con-
trol a class of subsequent administrative actions.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2278a (1976). Relevant section 2278a regulations are found at 10 C.F.R.
§§ 860.1-.8 (1983).
At the time the regulations were promulgated, the Atomic Energy Commission was the
agency authorized to implement section 2278a. This authority is now vested in DOE. See 42
U.S.C. § 7151 (Supp. V 1981) (listing powers assumed by DOE). See also 687 F.2d at 1286 n.2
(McKay, J., dissenting) (tracing source of DOE power under section 2278a).
14. The issue in Thompson, in essence, was whether a generic rulemaking could be used to
implement the provisions of section 2278a. In Vermont Yankee and Baltimore Gas &Elec. the issue
was whether adoption of the generic rulemaking approach constituted an abuse of discretion.
As discussed below, the majority in Thompson should have decided the case by evaluating the
validity of the initial generic rulemaking as was done in Vermont Yankee and Baltimore Gas &Elec.
See in/ta notes 37-64 and accompanying text.
15. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated: "Agencies are free to grant addi-
tional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not
free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them." 435 U.S. at 524.
16. "Organic statute," when referred to in this article, means the statute authorizing
agency action.
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
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of judge-made administrative common law. 18 Nonetheless, Baltimore Gas &
Electric sustains the policy of deference established by Vermont Yankee. ' 9 Ac-
cordingly, the Tenth Circuit's Thompson decision (which rejects an attempt
to require DOE to engage in rulemaking not specifically required by organic
statute or APA) is in harmony with the policy of deference established by the
Supreme Court.
The Tenth Circuit did not, however, resolve the rulemaking issue in
Thompson by employing an analysis similar to that used in Vermont Yankee
and Baltimore Gas &Electric, where the Court focused on whether the generic
implementing regulation conformed with the controlling statute.2 0 The
Tenth Circuit instead became embroiled in a debate over the significance of
designating the additional property as off-limits, and accordingly failed to
focus on whether DOE's actions were taken pursuant to a valid generic
rule.2 1 As a result, Judge McKay's forcefully stated dissent 22 is more persua-
sive than it should have been. The remainder of this comment analyzes the
Thompson opinions based upon a generic rulemaking approach.
B. Statement of the Case
The dispute in Thompson stemmed from an attempt by antinuclear dem-
onstrators to use a technical administrative law defense to overturn their
criminal convictions for trespassing at Rocky Flats.23 The demonstrators
were arrested for violating 42 U.S.C. § 2278a,2 4 a federal statute prohibiting
18. See, e.g., 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6:36-:37 (2d ed. 1979).
19. Baltimore Gas &Elec., 103 S. Ct. at 2252. The trend towards greater judicial deference
to the executive branch in the area of administrative law, beginning with Vermont Yankee, is
reinforced by the recent Supreme Court decision holding that the legislative veto is unconstitu-
tional. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
20. Baltimore Gas &Elec., 103 S. Ct. at 2251-52; Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524.
21. See infia notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
22. United States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d at 1286 (McKay, J., dissenting).
23. The Rocky Flats Nuclear Plant Site, located in Jefferson County, Colorado, is owned
by the Department of Energy and operated by Rockwell International, a private contractor.
United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 789 (1983)
(companion case to Thompson dealing with another group of Rocky Flats demonstrators arrested
the same day). A number of other cases dealing with the same illegal demonstration were dis-
posed of by the Seward and Thompson decisions. See United States v. Adams, 687 F.2d 1318 (10th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Grodsky, 687 F.2d 1317 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ellsberg,
687 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1982) United States v. Rolfe, 687 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1982) cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 790 (1983); United States v. Ficurra, 687 F.2d 1314 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Gruber, 687 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Stewart, 687 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir.
1982); United States v. Hueftle, 687 F.2d 1305 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Dukehart, 687
F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Grose, 687 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Peters, 687 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1982).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2278a (1976) provides:
(a) The Commission is authorized to issue regulations relating to the entry upon
or carrying, transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be introduced any
dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrument or material likely to pro-
duce substantial injury or damage to persons or property, into or upon any facility,
installation, or real property subject to the jurisdiction, administration, or in the cus-
tody of the Commission. Every such regulation of the Commission shall be posted
conspicuously at the location involved.
(b) Whoever shall willfully violate any regulation of the Commission issued pur-
suant to subsection (a) of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable by
a fine of not more than $1,000.
(c) Whoever shall willfully violate any regulation of the Commission issued pur-
DENVER LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 61:2
unlawful entry onto federal, nuclear-related facilities.25 Several of the dem-
onstrators were arrested in an area designated off-limits pursuant to this fed-
eral statute only sixteen days prior to the arrests. 26 These demonstrators
claimed their arrests were invalid because no rulemaking proceeding was
conducted prior to the designation,2 7 as allegedly required by the APA.
28
DOE apparently argued that an additional rulemaking proceeding was
unnecessary because the designation was proper based upon earlier generic
regulations implementing section 2278a. 29 These regulations, properly
adopted in 1963 pursuant to the APA, 30 require only two acts in order to
designate an area as off-limits: 1) publishing notice of the designation in the
Federal Register,31 and 2) posting the affected area with notices setting forth
the prohibitions.32 Because DOE's designation of the arrest area satisfied
both of these requirements, the majority held that section 2278a was validly
applied to the demonstrators.
33
The dissent, written by Judge McKay and joined by Judges Seymour
and Logan, essentially characterized DOE's argument as an agency's at-
tempt to use its own regulations to circumvent the public protections pro-
vided by the notice and comment provisions of the APA. 34 The dissent's
position was that the designation of the additional property was a "rule" as
defined by the APA. 35 DOE was therefore required to follow the notice and
comment procedures of the APA prior to the designation; having failed to do
so, the off-limits designation was null and void, with the result that the con-
victions were similarly invalid.
36
suant to subsection (a) of this section with respect to any installation or other property
which is enclosed by a fence, wall, floor, roof, or other structural barrier shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not to
exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
Power to act pursuant to this statute is now vested in DOE. See supra note 13.
25. Id See also S. REP. No. 2530, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4426, 4430.
26. Thompson, 687 F.2d at 1281-83. The designation was made on April 13, 1979. 44 Fed.
Reg. 22,145 (1979). The demonstrators were arrested on April 29, 1979. 687 F.2d at 1281.
27. See United States v. Seward, No. 79-1711 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 198 1),rev'dsub nom. United
States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
28. Id Section 4 of the APA (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982)), requires an
agency proposing to adopt substantive rules to publish notice of the proposed rule in the Federal
Register at least 30 days prior to the rule's proposed effective date. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (1982).
Exemptions are found when the rule involves military affairs or the management of public
property, id. § 553(a), or when exigencies justify circumventing the notice and comment re-
quirements. Id § 553(b)(B).
For more background on the defendant's original administrative challenges of their convic-
tion and the initial decision by the Tenth Circuit, see Administrative Law, Eighth Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey, 59 DEN. L.J. 174-76 (1982).
29. 687 F.2d at 1281-82. The regulations implementing section 2278a are codified at 10
C.F.R. §§ 860.1-.8 (1983).
30. 687 F.2d at 1282.
31. 10 C.F.R. § 860.7 (1983).
32. Id
33. 687 F.2d at 1281-83.
34. According to the dissent: "An agency should not be permitted to exempt itself from
the congressionally mandated requirements of the APA through its own regulation." Id at
1291 (McKay, J., dissenting).
35. Id See also 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982) (defining rule to include agency statements
designed to interpret or prescribe law).
36. 687 F.2d at 1291-95 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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C. The MajOrity Opinion: A Critique
The majority opinion failed to show persuasively why the designation of
the additional land as off-limits was proper. While the majority initially
recognized the generic nature of the section 2278a regulations, 37 the major-
ity's analysis consisted primarily of attempts to minimize the importance of
the additional designation. 38 The majority did not clearly state that the ge-
neric implementing regulation was a legislative rule, nor did the majority
articulate that because the regulation was a legislative rule the scope of the
court's review was narrow, limited to determining whether the rule was arbi-
trary or capricious. 39 Only in one short paragraph did the majority address
whether the generic implementing regulation was legislative or interpreta-
tive. 4° The majority cited Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 41 for the proposition that
the generic regulation was the only rulemaking necessary to implement the
statute.42 Reliance upon Skidmore is difficult to understand, however, be-
cause Skidmore stands for the proposition that interpretative rules, although
not controlling upon the courts, nonetheless provide guidance that a review-
ing court may follow. 43 The generic implementing regulation at issue in
Thompson, however, is clearly legislative in character. 44 If the majority had
focused on characterizing the generic implementing regulation as a legisla-
tive rule subject to limited review, the conclusion that DOE's designation
was proper would have been more persuasive.
In the same short paragraph where the Skidmore citation appears the
Tenth Circuit cites Batterton v. Francis45 which, unlike Skidmore, deals specifi-
cally with the legal significance of legislative rules. Batlerton stands for the
proposition that if Congress delegates legislative rulemaking authority to an
agency, judicial review of the agency's legislative rules is limited to an inves-
tigation of whether the rules are arbitrary or capricious and are therefore in
excess of delegated authority, 46 or whether the agency has arbitrarily ap-
37. Id. at 1282-83.
38. For example, the majority characterized the designation as being merely ministerial,
i. at 1285, and argued that the regulations had been promulgated under the "management of
government property" exception to the APA's rulemaking requirements. Id See 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(a)(2) (1982).
39. Cf Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977) (review of legislative regulations
duly promulgated pursuant to APA limited to inquiry into whether regulations are arbitrary or
capricious and therefore in excess of delegated authority).
40. 687 F.2d at 1284. For an overview of the significance of the legislative-interpretative
distinction, see 2 K. DAvis, supra note 18, at § 7:8.
41. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
42. 687 F.2d at 1284.
43. 323 U.S. at 140. See also 2 K. DAviS, supra note 18, at § 7:10.
44. Section 2278a specifically authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to promulgate
regulations to implement the statute. (Authority to act pursuant to those regulations was later
transferred to DOE. See supra note 13). Specific statutory authorization to promulgate regula-
tions is generally treated as a delegation of authority to promulgate legislative regulations. See
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-03 (1979); 2 K. DAvis, supra note 18, at § 7:8.
Additionally, section 2278a(b) provides that violations of regulations issued pursuant to section
2278a will be punishable, clearly indicating congressional delegation of lawmaking power. See
supra note 24.
45. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
46. Id. at 425-26.
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plied the rule.4 7 Accordingly, DOE's action could only be set aside upon a
showing that use of a generic implementing regulation was an arbitrary or
capricious interpretion of section 2278a, or upon a showing that the regula-
tions had been arbitrarily applied.
Section 2278a was enacted to assist in protecting nuclear facilities
against security dangers created by unauthorized entry.48 The Senate report
accompanying the statute plainly stated that the authority conferred would
be standby authority.4 9 Section 2278a manifests this congressional intent to
create agency discretion in controlling application of the antitrespassing law:
the only limitation section 2278a places on agency discretion in promulgat-
ing regulations is the requirement that notice of designation be posted.5 °
Given the scope of agency discretion and the standby nature of agency au-
thority, use of a generic implementing regulation does not appear to be an
"arbitrary and capricious" interpretation of the statute. Given the absence
of any allegation that the section 2278a regulations were arbitrarily applied
to the Rocky Flats demonstrators, and in light of the limited scope ofjudicial
review, the agency's designation was clearly lawful.
Perhaps the reason the Tenth Circuit majority chose to focus its analysis
on the designation rather than the validity of the implementing regulation
was to refute the demonstrators' argument based uponjoseph v. United States
Civil Service Commission .5 At issue in Joseph was a regulation, 52 promulgated
by the United States Civil Service Commission (Commission), which ex-
empted government employees in certain cities from the Hatch Act. 5 3 The
Commission attempted to add the District of Columbia to the list of exempt
cities without engaging in the notice and comment rulemaking procedures
mandated by the APA.5 4 When this action was challenged, the Commission
argued that the amendment was an "interpretative" rule and that rulemak-
ing proceedings were therefore not required to add the District of Columbia
to the list. 55 The District of Columbia Circuit disagreed, finding that be-
cause the Commission's actions involved promulgation of legislative rules,
rulemaking proceedings were required prior to adding a city to the list.
5 6
The majority in Thompson attempted to distinguishJoseph on its facts.
57
The dissent, on the other hand, considered the situation in Thompson a "close
47. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (providing for judicial review of wrongful agency action).
48. S. REP. No. 2530, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprntted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4426, 4430.
49. Id
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2278a(a) (1976).
51. 554 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
52. 5 C.F.R. § 733.124(c) (1984).
53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7328 (1982). The Hatch Act is designed to prevent federal employees
from actively engaging in political campaigns. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947). The Civil Service Commission is authorized to create specified exemptions to the
Hatch Act. 5 U.S.C. § 7327(b) (1982) (as amended).
54. 554 F.2d at 1152.
55. Id, at 1152-53.
56. Id
57. The majority stated: "The point is, of course, that something entirely new, a new city,
was added injoseph which had not been considered before. This is quite different from the case
before us where all [facilities subject to designation] had been considered before . . .and the
regulation applied to all." 687 F.2d at 1284.
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comparison" 58 to the situation in Joseph and found the reasoning applied in
Joseph to be "directly applicable" to Thompson.59 Noticeably absent in either
the majority's or the dissent's treatment of Joseph was a comparison between
the statutes at issue in Joseph and Thompson. Comparison of the two statutes
shows that the analysis used in Joseph was not appropriate for Thompson,
making Joseph inapposite.
The statute at issue in Joseph gave discretionary rulemaking authority
to the Commission to promulgate rules exempting government employees in
certain cities from restrictions imposed by the Hatch Act.6" Before the Com-
mission could make such an exemption, however, the statute required the
Commission to make two findings vital to the statutory purpose: 1) the mu-
nicipality was in either Maryland or Virginia or a "majority of the voters are
employed by the Government of the United States"; 61 and 2) special or unu-
sual circumstances existed making an exemption in the "domestic interest"
of the employees or individuals in the particular municipality. 62 These two
statutorily required findings must be made for each municipality to be ex-
empted from the Hatch Act. Therefore, given the statutory requirements,
an individual rulemaking proceeding was necessary to create the record nec-
essary to ensure that the Commission had not exceeded its authority, abused
its discretion, or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in granting an exemption.
The statute in Thompson presents a different situation because there are
no such statutorily prescribed preconditions which must be evaluated in or-
der to effectuate the statute. All that is required of an agency enforcing sec-
tion 2278a is to provide the detail on where and how the statute will be
enforced. 63  Given this much authorized agency discretion, a generic
rulemaking that provides this detail satisfies the requirements of the APA.
The majority missed an important point by failing to analyze the very differ-
ent statutory requirements imposed in each case. In Joseph, a rulemaking
proceeding was needed to make a record sufficient to substantiate important
statutorily required findings.64 In Thompson, however, the generic regulation
58. Id at 1292 (McKay, J., dissenting).
59. Id. The Joseph court reasoned that because a declaration of exemption was binding on
a court, and because only legislative regulations can bind courts, the declaration of exemption
was a legislative rule subject to the APA's notice and comment requirements. 554 F.2d at 1152-
53. Judge McKay reasoned that because an off-limits designation was binding on a court, Jo-
seph's legislative rule rationale required notice and comment proceedings for all designations.
687 F.2d at 1293-93 (McKay, J., dissenting).
60. The statute interpreted inJosph reads: "The Office of Personnel Management [for-
merly the Civil Service Commission] . . . may prescribe regulations permitting employees and
individuals [covered by the Hatch Act] . . . to take an active part in political management and
political campaigns involving the municipality or other political subdivisions in which they
reside." 5 U.S.C. § 7327(b) (1982).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 7327(b)(1) (1982). InJoseph, the Court determined that the first part of the
regulation applied to the geographical areas adjacent to Washington, D.C., but not to Washing-
ton, D.C. itself. 554 F.2d at 1154-55. A regulation which exempted the District of Columbia
from the Hatch Act could therefore only be valid if a majority of the voters within the District
of Columbia worked for the government of the United States. Id at 1155.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 7327(b)(2) (1982).
63. See supra note 25 (full text of section 2278a).
64. The importance of a rulemaking record to support an exemption is shown by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit's conclusion that the then-existing record was inadequate to sustain a
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detailing how the statute was going to be implemented satisfied the statutory
mandate.
D. The Dissent
By concentrating on the designation itself rather than the nature of the
implementing regulation and the proper scope of review, the majority un-
necessarily provided the dissent with a basis for its analysis. The dissent
highlighed the significant impact the designation had upon the demonstra-
tors, turning a political protest previously free from federal strictures into a
federal crime.65 The majority's brief generic regulation discussion was criti-
cized as allowing an agency to circumvent the APA's procedural protec-
tions.6 6 Given the more than interpretative nature of these regulations and
the significant power they conferred, policy considerations required applica-
tion of the APA absent a specific statutory exemption. 6 7 Essentially, the dis-
senter believed that permitting the agency to rely upon the earlier generic




The antitrespassing statute in Thompson gave DOE the authority to
promugate legislative rules.6 9 Judicial review of those rules and any action
taken pursuant thereto is limited to investigating whether the agency has
acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 70 Section 2278a required only that agency
rules detail how the statute would be administered. The generic implement-
ing regulation promulgated by DOE appears to satisfy this statutory con-
cern. Accordingly, the generic implementing regulation is a valid legislative
rule. As such, use of a generic implementing regulation which allows addi-
tional land to be made off-limits merely by posting the appropriate signs and
publishing a notice in the Federal Register, 7 1 is a sound exercise of the
finding that the majority of the voters in the District of Columbia were employees of the United
States government. 554 F.2d at 1157.
65. Probably the best summary of the dissent's position is the following:
[Slince we deal with a difficult question in the murky field of administrative lawmak-
ing, interpretation, and administration, I believe that any doubt about the APA's ap-
plicability ought to be resolved in favor of requiring the debate and justification
procedures of APA § 553. This canon of construction is all the more urgent in the
context of this case where the inevitable consequence of the DOE's hasty actions is to
turn otherwise innocent behavior into criminal behavior. A further reason to follow
this canon of construction in this case is the real, and not fancied, ambient presence of
first amendment values.
687 F.2d at 1288 (McKay, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 1291.
67. Id. The policy basis of the dissent's position is revealed by the statement that an
agency "should not be permitted to exempt itself" from the APA. Id (emphasis supplied).
68. The dissent appears to have taken the following admonition of Kenneth Davis to heart:
"Probably every court should be alert to miss no opportunity to contribute to achievement of
the ideal that every affected person should have opportunity to pariicipate in administrative
policy making." 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at § 7:6. See 687 F.2d at 1293-94 (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
69. See supra note 44.
70. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.





The majority's opinion in Thompson was confusing and unpersuasive be-
cause it focused on the designation of the additional land as off-limits, rather
than classifying the implementing regulation and delineating the proper
scope of review. The dissent, although raising valid concerns about the po-
tential abuse of generic rulemaking, is incorrect in light of the relevant au-
thorizing statute and its legislative history. 73  The Supreme Court's
pronouncements in Vermont Yankee and Baltimore Gas & Electric effectively
ended the era in which the courts could subject agency rulemaking to proce-
dural requirements not imposed by the applicable organic statute or by the
APA. Thompson, even though its analysis can be faulted, demonstrates that
the Tenth Circuit's approach to administrative rulemaking follows that of
the Supreme Court.
II. ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS
A. Overview of Estoppel Against the Government
In 1961, the Tenth Circuit for the first time recognized, in dictum, that
estoppel might lie against the federal government. 74 Chief Judge Murrah,
writing for the court, stated that despite the strong policy against allowing
estoppel to be asserted against the government, "we will not allow the gov-
ernment to deal dishonestly or capriciously with its citizens. It must not play
an ignoble part or do a shabby thing."' '75 It has taken over two decades,
however, for the Tenth Circuit to use the estoppel doctrine against the gov-
ernment. In Home Savizgs & Loan Association v. Nimmo,76 a 1982 case, the
Tenth Circuit held that the federal government was estopped. Even then,
the decision was not unanimous.
77
The issue of whether equitable estoppel can be invoked against the gov-
ernment has caused considerable controversy. 78 The issue appeared to have
been put to rest in 1947 when Justice Frankfurter, in Federal Crop Insurance
Corp. v. Merrill,79 roundly rejected the notion that the federal government
could be equitably estopped. 80 Since Merrill, however, the concept has re-
fused to die."' The Ninth Circuit, for example, has taken a leading role in
72. This conclusion is supported by Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983), which approved the use of a generic regulation by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
73. See supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
74. Massaglia v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 258, 262 (10th Cir. 1961).
75. Id
76. 695 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982).
77. See id. at 1255 (McKay, J., dissenting).
78. See, e.g., Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub norn. Schweiker v.
Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (issue discussed by both Judge Oakes, writing for the majority, and
by Judge Newman, in a concurrence).
79. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
80. Justice Frankfurter stated: "Whatever the form in which the Government functions,
anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately
ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his
authority." Id. at 384.
81. An article discussing collateral estoppel in administrative proceedings quotes a passage
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recognizing the estoppel doctrine in cases involving the government. 82 Re-
gardless of how strongly the Supreme Court has disapproved of the use of
equitable estoppel against the government, 8 3 the doctrine survives, although
it by no means flourishes.
84
In light of the Court's recent rejection of government estoppel in
Schwetker v. Hansen ,85 the Home Savings decision, which recognizes a claim of
estoppel against the government, is a major development and a major step
within the Tenth Circuit. 86  Further, because of the analysis used by the
Tenth Circuit, Home Savings appears to be at the cutting edge of a post-Han-
sen trend. The majority ruled that the government could be estopped in this
case because the dispute involved a "commercial transaction." '8 7 In so do-
ing, the Tenth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit8 8 and the Ninth Circuit89
in relying on the private/commercial or proprietary/sovereign distinction to
avoid the prohibition against using estoppel against the government. 9°
B. Statement of the Case
A lending institution loaned a couple $34,000 to buy a house. The loan
from Shakespeare's Measure For Measure in order to characterize the state of the equitable estop-
pel doctrine as it relates to the government: "The law hath not been dead, though it hath
slept." Mogel, Resjud~ata and Collateral Estoppel in Administrative Proceedings, 30 BAYLOR L. REV.
463, 463 (1978) (quoting W. SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, Act II, Scene 2, line 90).
82. See, e.g. , Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980); Oki v. INS, 598 F.2d 1160 (9th
Cir. 1979); Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
83. The Court recently rejected an opportunity to resolve the issues raised by circuit court
recognition that estoppel may be available against the federal government. See Schweiker v.
Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
84. See Parcel, Making the Government Fight Fairly. Estopping the United States, 27A ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 41 (1982); Note, Equitable Estoppel ofthe Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 551
(1979); see also 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at § 20:6 (2d ed. 1983).
85. 450 U.S. 785 (1981). Hansen rejected a claim of estoppel, but did not categorically
reject estopping the government. See id. at 790.
86. The Tenth Circuit has reviewed several cases dealing with the issue of estoppel against
the government, rejecting the estoppel claim in each. See Sweeten v. USDA, 684 F.2d 679 (10th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971
(1981); Albrechtsen v. Andrus, 570 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 (1979);
Enfield v. Kleppe, 566 F.2d 1139 (10th Cir. 1977); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Hickel, 432 F.2d
587 (10th Cir. 1970); Massaglia v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1961); Sanders v.
Commissioner, 225 F.2d 629 (1955); United States v. Carter, 197 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1952); and
United States v. Fitch, 185 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1950).
87. 695 F.2d at 1254.
88. See Meister Bros. v. Macy, 674 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1982) (estopping administrator of
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) from asserting failure to file a form as a
defense to a settlement claim when FEMA had indicated it intended to pay the claim);
Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1982) (estopping the federal government
from disclaiming representations made by a postal worker).
89. See Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981). Laguna Hermosa
was decided three weeks after Hansen. It did not mention Hansen, but nonetheless it held that
the United States was estopped from denying an extension for a concession contract. Id at
1380.
90. Although the court did not refer to the concession contract in Laguna Hermosa as a
"commercial transaction," this characterization appears to be accurate in light of the fact that
the case involved a contract between a concessionaire and the United States for operailig a
concession on federal land. Laguna Hermosa, 643 F.2d at 1377. In both Portmann and Meister
Bros. , however, the Seventh Circuit expressly relied on the fact the subject matter of the dispute
giving rise to the issue of estoppel was a "commercial transaction." Mei-ter Bros., 674 F.2d at
1177; Portmann, 674 F.2d at 1169.
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was secured by a note and a mortgage, and guaranteed by the Veterans
Administration (VA). 9 The lending institution subsequently assigned the
note, mortgage, and guaranty to Home Savings & Loan, the plaintiff in Home
Savthgs. 92 Some years later, the couple defaulted on their loan, a foreclosure
sale was held, and Home Savings & Loan, with VA approval, 9 3 purchased
the house. 94 Home Savings & Loan, exercising an option granted by federal
regulation, 95 then conveyed the property to the VA and demanded both re-
imbursement for the amount paid at foreclosure and payment under the
loan guaranty certificate for losses incurred on the loan.
96
The significant event giving rise to the estoppel controversy occurred
when Home Savings transferred the house to the VA. At approximately the
same time as the transfer, the original lending institution, by coincidence,
informed the VA that the wife's signatures on both the note and the mort-
gage might be forgeries. 97 Instead of informing Home Savings & Loan of
this fact, the VA investigated the possible forgery, in the meantime selling
the house and processing and paying Home Savings' loan guaranty claim. 98
Twelve days after paying the loan guaranty claim the VA demanded return
of the payment, based upon regulations99 and a statute' 00 which permit the
Administrator of the VA to deny liability under a loan guaranty if a signa-
ture on the loan is forged. Home Savings returned the money to the VA, but
refused to pay an additional sum for expenses demanded by the VA, which
amount the VA subsequently offset against other amounts due Home
Savings.'o
Home Savings brought suit to recover amounts claimed under the loan
guaranty, and the trial court held that the VA was estopped from asserting
the forgery defense because of its acceptance of the deed with knowledge of
the potential forgery. 10 2 The Tenth Circuit ruled that although the failure
to disclose the potential forgery to Home Savings & Loan was inaction and
therefore not grounds for estoppel, 10 3 the VA's acceptance of the deed from
Home Savings and its subsequent sale of the house constituted "affirmative
acts" in a "commercial transaction" which would justify estopping the VA
from denying the Home Savings claim.
10 4
91. Home Sa., 695 F.2d at 1252.
92. Id
93. Lenders holding VA guaranteed mortgages can recover (with some exceptions) the
amount paid at a foreclosure sale if the VA has previously authorized the bid. 10 C.F.R.
§ 36.4320 (1983). This recovery does not affect the lender's right to recoup any losses under the
VA loan guarantee. Id.
94. 695 F.2d at 1252.
95. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4320(a)(1) (1983).
96. 695 F.2d at 1252. The guaranty certificate, which guarantees a lender reimbursement
for its loan losses, was authorized by 38 U.S.C. § 1810 (1982). 695 F.2d at 1252.
97. 695 F.2d at 1252.
98. Id
99. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4325(a) (1983).
100. 38 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982).
101. 695 F.2d at 1252.
102. Id at 1253.
103. Inaction, by itself, is generally not sufficient to establish estoppel against the govern-
ment. See Sweeten v. USDA, 684 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1982).
104. 695 F.2d at 1254.
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C. Analysis of the Decision
The majority's analysis was relatively brief. Pointing to language in
Supreme Court cases which indicated that estoppel against the government
might be proper in some circumstances, 10 5 the court proceeded to distin-
guish the Court's decisions rejecting estoppel on the basis that none of those
cases had involved a commercial transaction.10 6 No reasoning was given to
support the commercial transaction distinction. The court merely held the
distinction existed, and that Home Savings was entitled to an estoppel based
on the VA's acceptance of the deed without giving notice of the potential
forgery. 107
Judge McKay wrote a lengthy and forceful dissent, criticizing the ma-
jority's commercial transaction distinction as being "chimerical rather than
precedential."' 0 8 Estoppel against the government was not rejected out-of-
hand. 109 Instead, the dissent criticized the majority's "commercial transac-
tion" distinction and urged that a different test be used to determine if estop-
pel should lie against the government. The dissent's test contained two
questions: "(1) did misleading conduct induce reasonable detrimental reli-
ance? and (2) are there nevertheless circumstances that caution the court to
withhold the exercise of equitable powers?" ' 10 According to the dissent, the
Supreme Court's government estoppel cases could be explained as involving
a failure to satisfy these requirements: either the plaintiff had failed to estab-
lish the elements of an estoppel,' I or "circumstances"-particularly separa-
tion of powers concerns-made exercise of equitable power inappropriate.' 12
Judge McKay disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the VA had en-
gaged in detrimentally misleading conduct, the first part of his test, and
therefore found estoppel unavailable without ever reaching the second prong
of his test.' 13
105. Id at 1253.
106. Id. at 1254.
107. Id at 1254-55. The estoppel arose because once the VA received the deed, Home Sav-
ings had no way to collect its deficiency except through the guaranty. In the majority view, the
VA caused Home Savings to lock itself into a situation where it was effectively at the mercy of
the VA. Hence, the VA should have disclosed the potential fraud, thereby giving Home Savings
an opportunity to consider whether to take a chance with the VA (knowing the possibility the
guaranty might be avoided) or to dispose of the deed independently. The majority felt that the
VA's routine acceptance of the deed in the above circumstances justified estopping a fraud
defense to payment of the guaranty. Id
108. Id. at 1255 (McKay, J., dissenting). In speaking of the commercial transaction distinc-
tion, the dissent noted its concern that the majority's standard would inaugurate "a procession
of future cases that will be distinguished on the basis of 'finespun and capricious' characteriza-
tions." Id at 1258. Cf Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955) (noting that
state court decisions on the governmental/proprietary distinction are confused and
irreconcilable).
109. 695 F.2d at 1261 (McKay, J., dissenting).
110. Id at 1259.
111. Id at 1260.
112. Id. at 1260-61. Judge McKay's analysis is provocative, as it harmonizes the equitable
policy cuIsideraios if-ilitati.g t.ward an estoppc. (.g. the inequity of perit.ng a party to
profit through deceptive acts) with the policy considerations militating against holding the gov-
ernment estopped (e.g. vast demands on the public fisc). By balancing the two policy factors
against each other once the elements of estoppel have been established, the dissent's test protects
the government while preventing abuse of citizens.




Despite what appears to be a blanket refusal by the Supreme Court to
recognize estoppel against the government, the Court has not eliminated the
possibility of governmental estoppel.1 '4 The Tenth Circuit, in Home Savings,
has ventured into the uncertain area of estopping the government. In so
doing, it has joined several sister circuits in trying to find a formula that will
escape repudiation by the Supreme Court. As long as estopping the govern-
ment remains a tool of last resort, to be used only when it would be ex-
tremely unfair to do otherwise, the Supreme Court will continue to tolerate
the infrequent recognition of estoppel exemplified by the Tenth Circuit's de-
cision in Home Savings. The potentially broad reach of the Tenth Circuit's
"commercial transaction" estoppel doctrine, however, along with the diffi-
culties inherent in distinguishing commercial from proprietary transactions,
promise that estoppel issues will continue to be a lively subject within the
Tenth Circuit.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION
A. Introduction
Determining the scope of judicial review is crucial for determining the
proper role of the courts in reviewing administrative action. If the scope is
too limited, the function of judicial review is meaningless.'I15 Conversely, the
constitutional scheme of separation of powers is violated when courts substi-
tute their judgment for that of the agency.' ' 6 To strike a balance, section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 17 delineates six separate stan-
dards for determining the scope of judicial review of agency action, although
only two of these standards are frequently used by the courts. Under the
first, administrative action is illegal if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."' 18 In Ci'tiens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,' 19 the Supreme Court held that judicial review
under this standard entails determining whether all factors relevant to an
administrative decision were considered or whether decision reflects a clear
error of judgment. 120 This standard creates a narrow scope of review because
to the litigation, pointing out that Home Savings had made its election prior to the VA's receipt
of any information concerning potential fraud. Given Home Savings' independent decision, the
dissent found no evidence of the VA induced detrimental reliance. Absent such reliance, all of
the elements for estoppel were not present. Id. at 1262. Judge McKay's analysis is weakened,
however, by his failure to establish that Home Savings' election was binding.
114. Since Merrll the Supreme Court has not ruled that the government can never be es-
topped. In fact, decisions by the Supreme Court suggest that some as yet undefined government
actions may justify estoppel. For example, the Supreme Court recently stated "[t~his Court has
never decided what type of conduct by a Government employee will estop the Government . . , " Han-
sen, 450 U.S. at 788 (emphasis supplied), thereby implying that some foundation for estoppel
does exist.
115. See Schwartz, Some Recent Adminisiratwe Law Trends: Delegations andjudicial Review, 1982
Wis. L. RE%'. 208, 227 (1982).
116. See generally United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956).
117. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
119. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
120. d. at 416.
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a reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. 
12 1
Under the second often applied standard of review, agency action is
improper if it is "unsupported by substantial evidence."' 22 Unlike the arbi-
trary or capricious standard, which is applicable to all agency action, 123 the
substantial evidence standard is applicable in only two situations: 1) when
the administrative action being reviewed is formal rulemaking conducted
under the APA; 124 or 2) when the reviewed administrative action is an adju-
dication.' 25 Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."
1 26
Although these general guidelines are useful, one must look to individ-
ual cases to discern which standard will be applied and how rigorous judicial
review will be under each. Moreover, the standard of review to be used in
each case is not always clear. Often a party challenging agency action as-
serts that a more demanding standard should apply, such as substantial evi-
dence, but the reviewing court will choose a more lenient standard, such as
the arbitrary or capricious test. It is therefore important to review case law
to determine which sets of facts give rise to which standards. The following
paragraphs will review several of the decisions handed down by the Tenth
Circuit this term and will analyze the scope of judicial review applied in
each.
B. Review Utilizing the Arbitrary, Capritous, or Abuse of Discretion Standard
In order to understand how the Tenth Circuit applies the arbitrary or
capricious standard, four cases will be discussed briefly. The first is Anderson
v. Department of Housing.12 7 In Anderson, the Tenth Circuit considered which
standard to apply in reviewing a Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) mortgage assignment decision. By statute, 128 the Secretary
was authorized to prescribe regulations to implement a mortgage insurance
program designed to assist low-income families in purchasing a home. One
provision of the implementing regulations permitted HUD to accept mort-
gage assignments for the purpose of preventing foreclosures. 129 The statute
121. Id. In the recent decision of Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983), the Supreme Court noted that the arbitrary and capricious
standard articulated in Overton Park is still the correct formulation. 103 S. Ct. at 2257. The
Court also noted: "It is not our task to determine what decision we, as Commissioners [of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission], would have reached. Our only task is to determine whether
the commission has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection be-
tween the facts found and the choice made." Id
122. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982).
123. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413-14.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982).
.25. d
126. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
127. 701 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1983).
128. 12 U.S.C. § 1709(a) (1982).
129. 24 C.F.R. § 203.640(a) (1983).
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did not mention such a provision.1
3 0
HUD denied Anderson's request that HUD accept an assignment after
her default and she brought suit challenging the denial. 13 ' The Tenth Cir-
cuit characterized HUD's refusal as "informal agency action" and therefore
held that the arbitrary or capricious standard should apply.13 2 The court
affirmed the agency action, holding that because the record showed that the
agency followed its own internal guidelines and had not acted irrationally,
the refusal was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.'
33
A second case providing insight into application of the abuse of discre-
tion standard involved an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion (OSHRC) violation of its own procedural guidelines. The court in Dye
Construction Co. v. OSHRC 134 held that the violation did not constitute an
abuse of discretion, and affirmed OSHRC's decision.
The violation arose when the administrative complaint against Dye was
amended to extend the period of Dye's alleged improper behavior. 135
OSHRC was required by its regulations to set forth its reasons for amending
a complaint. 136 Although OSHRC failed to do so in this case, the court
noted that the regulation provides no sanctions for such a failure, and that
dismissal of the complaint was therefore not automatically required. 137 The
court then found that the petitioning construction company was not sur-
prised or prejudiced by the amendment; hence, the failure to comply with
the regulations was not an abuse of discretion.
138
A third case reviewed under the arbitrary or capricious standard was
American Trucking Association v. ICC,3 9 examining an ICC decision granting a
railroad company's subsidiary unrestricted authority to operate as a motor
carrier. The Tenth Circuit held that this grant of authority did not consti-
tute an abuse of discretion.14
0
By statute, the ICC is permitted to grant motor carrier authority to a
railroad subsidiary only upon a showing that the transaction is consistent
with the public interest, will enable the railroad to use its rail service to
public advantage, and will not restrain competition. 141 The Supreme Court
has held that to meet the statutory standard "special circumstances" must be
shown. 142
The plaintiffs had two separate arguments. First, they argued that one
permit lacked the required finding of special circumstances. 143 Second, they
130. 701 F.2d at 114.
131. Id. at 113.
132. Id.
133. Id at 114-15.
134. 698 F.2d 423 (10th Cir. 1983).
135. Id. at 425.
136. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.33(a)(3) (1983).
137. 698 F.2d at 425.
138. Id.
139. 703 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1983).
140. Id. at 462.
141. 49 U.S.C. § 11344(c) (1976).
142. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 355 U.S. 141, 151-52 (1957).
143. 703 F.2d at 462.
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argued that the Commission's reversal of a lower administrative tribunal's
finding of no special circumstances on a second permit was not supported by
the record. 1
44
The Tenth Circuit's decision to uphold the ICC145 is not as significant
as its delineation of the appropriate standard of review. The court relied
upon a formulation announced in an earlier Tenth Circuit case, Midwestern
Transportation, Inc. v. ICC.14 6 In both Midwestern and American Trucking the
Tenth Circuit combined the arbitrary or capricious standard and the sub-
stantial evidence standard for purposes of reviewing ICC decisions. 14 7 Such
a combining of standards, however, seems inconsistent with the leading case
of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe' 4 8 which noted that the sub-
stantial evidence standard was only applicable in statutorily defined circum-
stances.' 41 Until the Tenth Circuit establishes that those circumstances are
present in this class of cases, its hybrid standard is improper.
Finally, in another ICC case, Turner Brothers Trucking Co. v. ICC, 150 the
administrative action at issue was a denial of a request for a waiver from an
ICC rule.'' The court, relying upon Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,' 152 noted that it could not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency' 53 and upheld denial of the waiver. 154 Although the court did not
characterize the waiver denial, the holding implies that the denial was "in-
formal" agency action and therefore subject to the arbitrary or capricious
standard of review. '55 Turner Brothers also rejected a due process challenge,
holding that the Constitution did not require a hearing on a decision deny-
ing a request for a specific waiver from a rule of general application.156
144. Id at 463.
145. Id. The Tenth Circuit equated a finding of special circumstances with a finding of
action in the public interest. The administrative records supported this finding, justifying grant
of the permits. Id. at 462-63.
146. 635 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980).
147. In Midwestern Tramp., the court defined the standard of review as follows:
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) provides . . . that a reviewing
court shall set aside agency action if determined to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion. or otherwise not in accordance with law or unsupported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole.
The ICC interpretations of its regulations and the facts supporting a grant or
denial of a certificate require recognition of its expertise and our deference thereto.
Id at 774 (emphasis supplied, citation omitted).
In American Trucking Ass'n, the court defined the standard of review as follows:
It is axiomatic that the scope of review by an appellate court of a Commission
decision is a narrow one. We may not set aside Commission action unless it be arbi-
trary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or unless it be otherwise not in accord
with law or unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
703 F.2d at 462 (emphasis supplied).
148. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
149. Id. at 414. Those circumstances exist when an agency engages in rulemaking required
to be on the record, or an adjudication. 11 U.S.C. § 702(2)(E) (1982); see also id. at §§ 553(c),
554(c)(2).
150. 684 F.2d 701 (10th Cir. 1982).
151. 49 C.F.R. § 1057.12(g), (h) (1982). This regulation details billing requirements im-
posed on carriers leasing their equipment.
152. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
153. 684 F.2d at 703.
154. Id at 704.
155. Id at 703.
156. Id. at 703-04.
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In summary, plaintiffs were not successful in challenging informal
agency action during the survey period. In each of the cases reviewed which
applied the "arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion" standard, agency
action was sustained.
C. Substantial Evidence Review
The substantial evidence standard is less deferential to an agency than
the arbitrary or capricious standard. It is therefore not surprising that of the
thirty administrative law cases reviewed during the survey period, two of the
three cases where a federal agency was reversed were a result of the agency
failing to satisfy the substantial evidence test. ' 5 7 Both cases involved a denial
of Social Security benefits.
In the first case, Broadbent v. Hams,' 58 the plaintiff sought Social Secur-
ity disability benefits. Broadbent reviewed a decision by an administrative
law judge (ALJ) who had recommended that plaintiffs application for bene-
fits be denied because the plaintiff was not "disabled" as defined by the rele-
vant statute. 159 The ALJ relied heavily on the finding of no disability by the
single physician who examined the plaintiff on behalf of the Social Security
Administration,' 6° rejecting the opinions of six independent physicians who
found the plaintiff to be disabled.16' The Tenth Circuit noted that although
ALJ determinations are generally binding on a reviewing court,1 62 in this
case the ALJ had not given sufficient weight to the testimony of the six in-
dependent doctors, who had had much more experience examining the
plaintiff. 163 Considering the record as a whole, the plaintiffs prima facie
case of disability was not rebutted and the administrative decision did not
meet the substantial evidence test.164 Although the court did not expressly
articulate the basis for its ruling, the court in effect ruled that the medical
report by the one government-hired doctor did not constitute the "more
than a mere scintilla"' 65 of evidence necessary to sustain the administrative
decision. 166
The second case overturning an administrative decision under the sub-
stantial evidence test is Cavits v. Schweiker.i 6' The issue in Cavitl, as in
Broadbent, was whether an applicant was eligible for Social Security disabil-
157. These two cases Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1983) and Cavitt v.
Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1983), will be discussed immediately below. The third case
referred to is Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Nimmo, 695 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982). For a
discussion of Home Savings, see supra notes 74-114 and accompanying text.
158. 698 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1983).
159. Id. at 411. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) defines "disability" for purposes
of the Social Security laws.
160. 698 F.2d at 409.
161. Id
162. Id at 413 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971)).
163. 698 F.2d at 414.
164. Id
165. Id See also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (defining substantial evi-
dence to mean relevant evidence a reasonable mind would accept as supporting an administra-
tive conclusion).
166. See 698 F.2d at 414.
167. 704 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1983).
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ity benefits. 168 Here, as in Broadbent, the court cited Richardson v. Perales,
169
and held that a "reasonable mind" would not conclude that the plaintiff was
not disabled within the meaning of the social security laws.170 Again, as in
Broadbent, the available medical evidence weighed strongly in favor of the
applicant. 171
In Meredith Corp. v. NLRB, 172 the court reviewed a NLRB decision that
directors and production managers were not "supervisors" within the mean-
ing of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).17 3 The NLRB held that
the employees were not supervisors, and that the employer violated the
NLRA by failing to negotiate collectively with these employees.1 74 The ba-
sis of the NLRB's decision was that any control the directors or production
managers exercised over other employees was either routine or motivated by
artistic reasons, and that this control was not supervisory. 175 The court, af-
ter making a detailed review, sustained the NLRB's decision because it was
supported by substantial evidence.176 Doubt was expressed, however, con-
cerning the relevance of "artistic motivation" in determining the supervisory
status of a particular position.'
77
The substantial evidence test was also used in CCI, Inc. V. OSHRC 178 to
determine whether a citation issued pursuant to the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) 1 79 was sustainable. OSHA regulations require
shaping and shoring of excavation trenches when certain soil conditions are
present.' 8 0 OSHRC held CCI in violation of these regulations.' 8 ' On re-
view, the court focused on evidence pertaining to soil conditions.' 8 2 Because
of strong evidence that the kinds of soil conditions requiring shoring or
trenching were present, 8 3 the agency's burden under the substantial evi-
dence test was met.
18 4
IV. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION: CONTRACTS FOR INTERSTATE SALES OF
POWER
In Utah v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 1 5 the Tenth Circuit re-
168. Id. at 1194.
169. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
170. 704 F.2d at 1195.
171. Id at 1194-95.
172. 679 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1982).
173. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
174. 679 F.2d at 1335.
175. Id at 1341.
176. Id. at 1345.
177. Id at 1344.
178. 688 F.2d 88 (10th Cir. 1982).
179. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
180. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(c) (1983).
181. 688 F.2d at 89.
182. Id at 89-90.
183. Thie court licid that it-, a nwt-unaterial excavation the applicability of the trenching
regulations turned on the weakest significant component of the soil. Id at 90. The substantial
evidence inquiry could therefore be satisfied without showing the soil was exclusively of the type
covered by 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(c). 688 F.2d at 90.
184. 688 F.2d at 90.
185. 691 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1982).
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jected an attempt by the Utah Public Service Commission (PSC) to circum-
vent the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC).' 86 The specific issue in Utah v. FERC concerned a wholesale con-
tract between Utah Power, a utility under the jurisdiction of the Utah PSC,
and Sierra Pacific Power Company, a utility operating in Nevada and Cali-
fornia. 1 7 The Utah PSC asserted jurisdiction over this contract based on its
jurisdiction over Utah Power's generating facilities. 8 Finding the FERC
approved contract not in the best interest of Utah's utility customers, PSC
ordered Utah Power not to comply with the terms of the contract.' 8 9
FERC, upon Sierra Pacific's motion for declaratory relief, held that its juris-
diction over the contract was exclusive, and directed Utah Power to comply
with the contract.'9° The Tenth Circuit then addressed the conflict on a
petition for review of the FERC order.'9'
The Tenth Circuit rejected PSC's assertion of jurisdiction. Congress,
the circuit held, had given FERC exclusive jurisdiction over contracts for
wholesale interstate power sales.1 92 The PSC's argument that the FERC
approval was in effect an order to construct additional generating facilities,
and therefore not within FERC's exclusive jurisdiction, was rejected.
1 9 3
FERC's order merely approved the contract for sale of power; because it did
not mandate the manner in which the contract was to be performed, the
order remained within FERC's exclusive jurisdiction.194 As an alternate ba-
sis for upholding FERC, the Tenth Circuit characterized the PSC order as
an attempt to benefit Utah utility customers at the expense of out-of-state
utility customers, which was invalid as an attempted protectionist meas-
ure.195 Finally, given the parties' knowledge that FERC had exclusive juris-
diction over the contract, a contractual clause requiring approval by
"regulatory authorities having jurisdiction" was held to contemplate only
FERC's approval. 1
96
Summing up its decision, the court noted that Congress had placed such
contracts under the exclusive review of FERC, and had placed FERC's deci-
sions under review by the courts. If in fact the contract became unduly bur-
densome, "surely relief would be available."' 19 7 Absent such a showing
(which was not urged upon the court), the only proper course of action was
to affirm FERC's exclusive jurisdiction.
186. It has long been recognized that FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale inter-
state sales of electric power under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 794a-828c (1982). See,
e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
187. 691 F.2d at 445.
188. Id. at 446.
189. Id.
190. Id
191. Id at 445.
192. Id at 447-48. The court noted that FERC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over
tntrastate power sales, nor over interstate retail power sales. Id at 447.
193. Id at 448.
194. Id
195. Id (citing New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982)).
196. 691 F.2d at 448.
197. Id at 448-49.
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V. SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION EXCEPTION TO PRIMARY
JURISDICTION
In Mountain States Natural Gas Corp. v. Petroleum Corp. of Texas, 198 the
Tenth Circuit held that the presence of a "substantial federal question"
could circumvent the bar to original judicial review created by the primary
jurisdiction doctrine. 199 In arriving at this conclusion the Tenth Circuit ex-
tended precedent previously recognizing that plaintiffs presenting substan-
tial federal questions were not required to exhaust their administrative
remedies. 2° ° The analysis below questions the propriety of that extension.
Mountatn States began when the defendant Petroleum Corp. of Texas
(Petco) obtained a state agency 20 ' order permitting Petco to pool its leased
acreage with the acreage of Mountain States, another oil company, for the
purpose of producing an oil well. 20 2 The pooling order required Petco to
give all persons with interests in the common field, including Mountain
States, notice of drilling at least thirty days before drilling commenced.
20 3
Upon receipt of the notice an interested party had the option of paying esti-
mated well costs (provided by Petco), or of paying its share of production
costs from revenues.20 4 Failure to pay the estimated costs resulted in a risk
penalty of 200% of the required payment.
20 5
Petco sent the required notice to Mountain States, although not within
time periods stipulated by the order. 20 6 Mountain States never retrieved the
notice from its post office box.20 7 Petco was aware of this, but it took no
further action to notify Mountain States that drilling was commencing, in-
stead assessing the 200% penalty against Mountain States' share of the pro-
ceeds from the well.20 8 Litigation ensued when Petco refused to permit
Mountain States, independently apprised of the drilling, to pay its share of
198. 693 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1983).
199. Primary jurisdiction is a court-made doctrine, grounded in separation of powers con-
cerns. It allocates decisionmaking power between a court and an administrative agency having
concurrent jurisdiction over a dispute. When applicable, the doctrine mandates deferring judi-
cial consideration of an issue until the agency has given its decision. Following agency action
the court exercises a review power of varying scope. For example, administrative interpretations
of law may be subjected to de novo review, while administrative factfinding may be given great
deference. One essential feature of the doctrine is that the court upon review may not usurp the
decisionmaking power allocated to the agency. See generally 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at § 22:1
(2d ed. 1983); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 166-168 (1976).
200. See 693 F.2d at 1019.
201. Mountain States involved the interaction between a federal court and a state agency's
primary jurisdiction. The policies which underly the primary jurisdiction doctrine should apply
with equal force to both federal and state agencies. See supranote 199. Nonetheless, because
application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the federal court [state agency context may
raise different considerations than those present in the federal court] federal agency context, see
4 K. DAvIS, supra note 18, at § 26:14 (2d ed. 1983), the Tenth Circuit should have examined the
intrinsic propriety of using the primary jurisdiction doctrine in Mountain States.
202. 693 F.2d at 1017. The order permitted Petco to capture the oil from a common field
over Mountain States' objection. Id.
203. id at j0t7.
204. Id.
205. Id
206. Id. at 1017-18.
207. Id at 1017.
208. Id
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estimated costs and recover the 200% penalty. 20 9
Mountain States claimed Petco's failure to provide the required notice
constituted a denial of due process. 2 10 Petco responded by claiming that the
New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (Division) had primary jurisdiction
over the question of compliance with its orders. 2 "1 The federal district court
first ruled in Petco's favor, dismissing the complaint until the Division had
considered the issues; upon motion for reconsideration, however, the district
court set aside its dismissal and heard the case.212 The district court, holding
in favor of Mountain States, did not rest its decision on due process grounds,
instead holding that the Division's order required actual notice at least thirty
days prior to drilling, and that Petco had failed to meet that requirement.
2 13
Petco appealed on the grounds that the district court erred by failing to
recognize the Division's primary jurisdiction, that Mountain States' due pro-
cess claim was insufficient as a matter of law, and that the construction of
the notice was not raised by the pleadings. 2 14 The Tenth Circuit did not
reach the merits of the due process claim, resting its decision on the district
court's construction of the notice.21 5 In arriving at the decision on the mer-
its, however, the Tenth Circuit created an exception to the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine, allowing courts to bypass agencies when a plaintiff merely
presents a substantial federal question.2' 6 This exception, however, is so
broad that it undermines the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
The Tenth Circuit's exception was premised on the close relationship
between the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 2 17 Given that close relationship, conditions justifying excep-
tions to the exhaustion requirement were perceived to justify exceptions to
an agency's primary jurisdiction.2 18 Its reading of cases dealing with excep-
tions to the exhaustion doctrine led the court to conclude that when a sub-
stantial federal question was present, exhaustion, and therefore resort to
primary jurisdiction, was not required. 21 9 The result is the creation of an
exception to primary jurisdiction which is sui generis.
Martinez v. Richardson,220 an earlier Tenth Circuit decision, was the pri-
mary authority relied on in creating the substantial federal question excep-
tion. Martinez held that exhaustion was not required if existing
administrative remedies were inadequate and a "federal question is so plain
that exhaustion is excused."' 22' This proposition was articulated by relying
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Greene v. Uniled Slales.2 22 Greene, how-






215. Id at 1020.
216. Id at 1018-19.
217. See id. at 1018
218. See id. at 1018-19.
219. Id at 1019.
220. 472 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1972).
221. M. at 1125.
222. 376 U.S. 149 (1964). See 472 F2d at 1125 n.10.
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ever, said nothing about excusing the exhaustion requirement when a federal
question was plain. Quite to the contrary, the Court's holding in Greene was
limited to concluding that existing administrative remedies were inadequate
with respect to Greene's claim. 223 Thus, Martinez' language concerning a
federal question exception to exhaustion is not supported by Supreme Court
precedent.
Further, although Martinez referred to a federal question exception to
the exhaustion doctrine, Martinez was in fact decided upon traditional
grounds for bypassing the exhaustion requirement. Inadequacy of existing
administrative remedies is a well recognized exception to the exhaustion re-
quirement. 22 4 Administrative remedies were inadequate in Martinez because
the plaintiffs were elderly and infirm and because there was an extreme un-
likelihood of meaningful administrative relief.22 5 Accordingly, the actual
ground of decision in Martinez is consistent with Greene, and does not support
recognition of a general federal question exception to administrative review.
The Tenth Circuit in Mountaz States also sought to justify its refusal to
defer to the Division's primary jurisdiction by relying upon McKart v. United
Slates2 26 and Mathews v. E/dr dge. 22 7 McKart, while in fact holding that ex-
haustion was not an invariable requirement, was also a very narrow holding.
The Court noted that McKart did not involve mere premature resort to judi-
cial process, but involved a situation in which the plaintiff's failure to take
an administrative appeal prevented him from raising certain defenses to
criminal prosecution. 228 Plaintiff's interest therefore outweighed the consid-
erations of deference to agency jurisdiction underlying the exhaustion re-
quirement. 22 9 McKart therefore establishes only that when a substantial
liberty interest will be unfairly denied, exhaustion will not be required.
230
Similarly, Mathews recognized only that a procedural due process challenge
could be raised without exhaustion when hardship to the claimant outweighs
the benefits flowing from the exhaustion doctrine. 23 ' McKart and Mathews
clearly do not support the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that merely asserting a
substantial federal question justifies circumventing the exhaustion require-
ment and, by analogy, the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
There are a number of other considerations which demonstrate the
inappropriateness of the court's assumption of jurisdiction. For example,
there was no evidence in the opinion that the Division was without compe-
tence to decide constitutional questions concerning its alleged actions; in all
likelihood, the Division had such power. 232 Thus, traditional grounds for
223. See 376 U.S. at 163.
224. See 472 F.2d at 1125.
225. Id.
226. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
227. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
228. 395 U.S. at 197.
229. id.
230. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 491, 494 n.5 (1977) (exhaustion not
necessarily appropriate when facing criminal penalty).
231. See 424 U.S. at 330-31. See also4 K. DAvis, supra note 18, at § 22:1 (2d ed. 1983).
232. Cf 4 K. DAvis, supra note 18, at § 26:6, at 435 (2d ed. 1983) (agencies typically have
authority to decide constitutionality of their actions).
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refusing to defer to administrative remedies were not present. 2 33 In addi-
tion, under well-established principles the presence of a nonconstitutional
ground for granting plaintiff's requested relief mandated deference to the
agency.2 34 Further, deferring receipt of money, in the absence of a showing
of undue hardship, does not justify bypassing an agency.235 Given the allo-
cation of decisionmaking power reflected in the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion, with its separation of powers implications, even if exceptions to primary
jurisdiction exist arguendo, Mounlain States was clearly not a case to apply
those exceptions.
The actual relief granted by the Tenth Circuit in Mountain States also
underscores the inappropriateness of not dismissing the complaint until the
state agency had considered the issues. The Tenth Circuit's decision relied
upon the Division's own order, requiring that thirty-days notice be given
prior to drilling, to decide the case. 236 By so doing, the court prevented the
agency from enforcing its own order and ignored an important reason for the
primary jurisdiction doctrine's existence-allowing an agency to carry out its
statutory mandate.
Mountain Slates creates a rule of administrative law which deviates from
established principles. The "federal question" exception creates a large po-
tential for disturbing the proper allocation of function between court and
agency, especially because the facts of Mountain States reflect an absence of
the traditional, equitably-oriented grounds for bypassing administrative re-
view. It is submitted here that the Tenth Circuit should either repudiate the
direct holding in Mountain States, or limit it to situations akin to Martinez and
Mathews. Failure to do so may cause unforeseen increases in the federal
docket and may disrupt the legislative allocation of power between court
and agency.
VI. REJECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE MIRANDA RIGHTS
In Sorensen v. National Transportation Safey Board,237 a commercial pilot's
certificate was suspended for violation of regulations prohibiting both the
operation of an aircraft within eight hours of drinking an alcoholic beverage
or while under the influence of alcohol, 238 and the operation of an aircraft
recklessly or carelessly. 239 The pilot challenged the certificate suspension
and novelly claimed that evidence, obtained during a brief detention by air-
port security, should have been excluded from the administrative hearing
233. Cf. id § 26:1, at 414-15 (exhaustion not required where agency has no jurisdiction over
a relevant question of law, or where resort to agency would be futile).
234. Id § 26:8, at 450. See also Pub. Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40
(1958). The agency could have resolved the dispute by construing its order to require actual
rather than constructive notice, thereby precluding assessment of a risk penalty against Moun-
tain States.
235. Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976) (undue hardship from deferral of
monetary payment justified bypassing administrative proceeding).
236. 693 F.2d at 1020.
237. 684 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1982).
238. 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.11 (a)(I)-(2) (1983).
239. 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1983).
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pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 240 The Tenth Circuit rejected this assertion
on the basis that no criminal charges were contemplated at the time of the
detention, that there had been no coercive atmosphere surrounding the de-
tention, and that there had been no significant deprivation of freedom. 24 1
Given these factors, the constitutional protections of Miranda were irrelevant,
and there was no mistake in admitting evidence obtained at the
detention.
2 42
A second interesting point raised by Sorenson related to the use of hear-
say in administrative proceedings. Sorenson claimed that the agency had
relied exclusively on uncorroborated hearsay in suspending his license.
24 3
The Tenth Circuit rejected this contention, but noted that whether uncor-
roborated hearsay can constitute substantial evidence remained an open
question.
244
VII. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Only one case decided during the survey period involved the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA).245 In Avt'ation Data Servzce v. FAA ,246 the issue
considered was.whether attorney fees should be awarded to a prevailing
party if the FOIA request was for commercial purposes. Here, the complain-
ant was in the business of seeking information from the government. 247 Liti-
gation ensued when the FAA refused to provide plaintiff with names and
addresses of airmen and aircraft registrants.
248
The FOIA allows attorney fees to be awarded to a complainant who is
forced to take the government to court to obtain information under the
FOIA if the complainant "substantially prevails." '249 This provision does
not, however, create an absolute right to attorney fees. 250 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, relying primarily upon several cases extensively reviewing the legisla-
tive history of the FOIA, 25 1 held that in an FOIA case seeking information
for commercial gain, some "public benefit" or willful agency misconduct
must be shown before attorney fees will be awarded. 252 "Public benefit" was
defined in terms of information which would assist citizens in making in-
formed political decisions. 253 Finding no such benefit to the public in this
240. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See 684 F.2d at 685.
241. 684 F.2d at 685-86.
242. Id.
243. Id at 686.
244. Id.
245. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
246. 687 F.2d 1319 (10th Cir. 1982).
247. Id. at 1320.
248. Id at 1321.
249. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982) provides: "The court may assess against the United
States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under
this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed."
250. 687 F.2d at 1321.
251. The court relied on La Salle Extension University v. FTC, 627 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360
(D.C. Cir. 1977). Ste 687 F.2d at 1321-22.
252. 687 F.2d at 1322.
253. Id. at 1323.
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case and no agency misconduct, the Tenth Circuit denied an award of attor-
ney fees.
254
VIII. LIMITING AGENCY RIGHT TO INSPECT REQUIRED RECORDS
In CAB v. Fronlier Airlhnes, Inc. 255 the Tenth Circuit, on rehearing en
banc, considered whether the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) had authority
to inspect all the minutes of Frontier's directors meetings without stating a
proper investigative purpose. Frontier was required to keep those records as
a condition of its operation. 256 CAB asserted that the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958257 authorized complete access to airline company records required
by statute, regardless of investigatory purpose. 258 In the original panel deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit held that the CAB was not required to show a rele-
vant purpose in order to obtain access to the minutes.
259
Upon rehearing en banc the Tenth Circuit reversed the panel and, in a
five to three decision, held that a "rule of reason" must be applied to CAB
investigations.2 60 The basis of the decision was an interpretation of the stat-
ute granting the CAB the power to examine the records regulated airlines
are required to keep.261 The court held that the statute embodied a congres-
sional intent to limit CAB access to those records reasonably necessary to the
purpose of a particular investigation. 26 2 But the court's solution of ordering
an in camera inspection to determine what documents were necessary to
CAB's investigation is questionable. The majority went to considerable
lengths to argue that resorting to this technique should not be done on a
regular basis.263 Relying on such ad hoc solutions, however, does little to
help either an agency or a regulatee understand the limits of agency investi-
gative powers.
The dissenting judges rejected the majority's balancing concerns. Judge
McKay, dissenting alone and also joining Judge McWilliams in Judge Lo-
gan's dissent, reasoned that if welfare recipients could be required to submit
to inspection as a condition of continued benefits, 2 6 4 it was not necessary to
show any greater consideration to an airline enjoying the benefits of agency
regulation.265 All three dissenters also rejected the majority's statutory anal-
ysis, finding no congressional intent to limit CAB's right to inspect required
records.266 The dissenters viewed the majority's decision as unwarranted
(based on precedent and congressional intent) and unsound (based on the
254. Id at 1324.
255. 686 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
256. Id at 857.
257. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
258. 686 F.2d at 856.
259. CAB v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., No. 79-1584 (10th Cir. April 17, 1981), rev'd, 686 F.2d
854 (10th Cir. 1982) (en banc). See also Administrat've Law, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 59
DEN. L.J. 173, 212-15 (1982).
260. 686 F.2d at 858.
261. 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (Supp. V 1981).
262. 686 F.2d at 860.
263. Id
264. Id at 861 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971)).
265. 686 F.2d at 861 (McKay, J., dissenting).
266. Id at 862 (Logan, J., dissenting).
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foreseeable injection of the judiciary into agency/airline disputes).2 6 7
IX. CONCLUSION
The commentator in last year's administrative law comment appearing
in the Denver Law Journal's Ninth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey concluded
by stating that in the area of administrative law the Tenth Circuit's decisions
were "more notable for their evenhanded application of the law than for
equitable considerations.
268
This survey period, however, equitable considerations were apparent in
a number of decisions as the court addressed several controversial adminis-
trative law questions. Thompson provided an opportunity for examination of
the ongoing debate over the propriety of generic rulemaking; 269 Home Savings
found the Tenth Circuit recognizing estoppel against the government;
270
Mountain Stales created a new (and questionable) exception to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction; 271 and other decisions sparked controversy and dissent
among the judges. The opinions reviewed for this survey demonstrate the
volatility of administrative law and therefore the need for further evaluation
of existing administrative theory and precedent.
Richard A. Westfall
267. Id.
268. Admintstrative Law, Ninth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 60 DEN. L.J. 149, 176 (1983).
269. See supra notes 8-73 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 74-114 and accompanying text.




During the period of this survey the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals'
antitrust decisions all involved private actions brought pursuant to the Sher-
man Act.' The court was given the opportunity to address the issue of per se
versus rule of reason analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act 2 in Board of
Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. 3 In other cases surveyed
herein the court considered issues involving jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act, 4 vertical price restraints, 5 attempted monopolization, 6 and the corpo-
rate conspiracy doctrine. 7 Additionally, the court construed the scope of the
National Football League's limited antitrust exemption, 8 ruled on the ap-
propriate statute of limitations analysis for claims involving business fail-
ures, 9 and articulated the conditions necessary to state an antitrust claim
relating to a competitor's purchase of idle production facilities.' 0
I. PER SE ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATED MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS:
FOOTBALL POWERS 2, NCAA 0
In Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Assocation,'' the Tenth
Circuit, over Judge Barrett's dissent, held that exclusive broadcasting con-
tracts between the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and
three television networks were both per se and rule of reason violations
12 of
the Sherman Act.' 3 This comment will articulate the reasoning of the Tenth
Circuit and the district court, and will briefly consider the Tenth Circuit's
per se methodology in light of recent Burger Court decisions.
A. Facts
The NCAA, founded in 1905, consists of approximately 800 member
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
3. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983).
4. See Lease Lights, Inc. v. Public Serv. Co., 701 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1983).
5. See A.A.A. Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 705 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1903 (1983).
6. See Olsen v. Progressive Music Supply, Inc., 703 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 197 (1983).
7. See Holter v. Moore & Co., 702 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 347
(1983).
8. See Colorado High School Activities Ass'n v. National Football League, 711 F.2d 943
(10th Cir. 1983).
9. See Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.), cert. dened, 103 S. Ct.
576 (1982).
10. See id.
11. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983).
12. For a discussion of the distinction between per se and rule of reason violations of sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act, see infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
13. 707 F.2d at 1156, 1160.
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colleges and universities.' 4 The NCAA exercises control over diverse aspects
of intercollegiate athletic competition including playing rules, recruiting reg-
ulations, standards of academic eligibility, and amateurism.' 5 These func-
tions are consistent with the NCAA's original purposes of preserving college
sports on an amateur level and ensuring that student athletics are integrated
with a university's educational mission.
16
The NCAA has regulated football telecasts of member schools since
1953.17 Regulation was initiated in response to the concern of some NCAA
members that live attendance at their games would suffer as a result of com-
petition from televised games.' 8 Early regulations included allocation of tel-
evision revenue, limitation of the number of weekly football telecasts, and
limitation of the number of appearances permitted a team during the
season. 19
From 1953 through 1976 the specific television controls imposed upon
member schools were subject to approval by direct vote of the entire NCAA
membership, only a minority of which were schools having "major" football
programs.2 0 Since 1976, the specific details of the controls have not been
subject to direct vote.2 ' Member schools now vote only upon general guide-
lines, while the controls themselves are formulated through negotiation be-
tween the NCAA and the television networks.
22
By the mid-1970's a majority of the large schools operating successful
14. Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282
(W.D. Okla. 1982), afdinpart and rev'd in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
272 (1983).
15. 546 F. Supp. at 1284.
16. See 707 F.2d at 1163-64 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
17. 546 F. Supp. at 1283. Until 1971 authority for the control of football telecasts was
derived from the general powers granted to the NCAA in its constitution and bylaws. In 1971
the bylaws were amended to add language specifically granting authority to regulate members'
football telecasts. Bylaw I1l-l-(aa) provided in pertinent part: "The [Football Television] Com-
mittee shall be responsible for the formulation and administration of the Association's football
television policy and program, subject to the approval of the membership." 546 F. Supp. at
1284. In 1981 the NCAA issued an "Official Interpretation" of Bylaw I l-1-(aa) reaffirming its
exclusive power to control football telecasts. 546 F. Supp. at 1285. Football is the only sport in
which the NCAA has completely regulated its members' broadcast rights. Id. at 1284.
18. 546 F. Supp. at 1283. From 1952 through 1957 the Football Television Committee of
the NCAA retained the services of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of
Chicago to study the effects of televised college football games on live gate attendance. The
studies supported the belief that football attendance tended to decrease at games being played
within the television viewing region. Id. In rejecting argument by the NCAA that television
controls were necessary to protect live attendance at games, the district court questioned the
reliability of the National Opinion Research Center studies because the studies failed to give
due consideration to factors other than football telecasts which might have affected attendance
at football contests. Id. at 1295.
19. Id. at 1283. The first controls limited television exposures to one game per week, per-
mitted a team only one television appearance during the season, allowed the sponsors to select
the game to be televised, and divided television revenue between the teams playing the game
and the NCAA. Id. Under the present contracts, television network exposures have increased
to 228 games per season, schools are permitted to appear on six network broadcasts every two
years, and the number of networks broadcasting games has increased from one to three. See id.
at 1291-93.
20. Id. at 1283. Fewer than 500 of the NCAA's 800 voting members have football pro-
grams; of that number only 187 are in Division I, which is comprised of the largest schools. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id. The district court noted that the NCAA's independent negotiation power has
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football programs, including the University of Oklahoma and the University
of Georgia, had become disenchanted with the inequities of the NCAA tele-
vision regulatory scheme2 3 and joined together to form the College Football
Association (CFA) to represent their interests within the NCAA. 24 After at-
tempts by the CFA to lobby within the NCAA proved ineffective, and efforts
to negotiate a television contract independent of the NCAA were unsuccess-
ful primarily because of NCAA threats, 25 the Universities of Oklahoma and
Georgia brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma seeking to enjoin enforcement of the NCAA's television
contracts. 26 The universities alleged that the NCAA regulations precluding
member schools from independently negotiating the sale of football telecast
rights violated the antitrust laws.
2 7
B. Distrzct Court Deczszon
1. Standing
The District Court held that the plaintiff universities were subject to
both direct and threatened antitrust injury, either of which was sufficient to
confer standing to seek an injunction. 28 Injury-in-fact existed because the
contracts entered into between the NCAA and the television networks for
the years 1982-1985 threatened future revenues of the schools and the NCAA
had manifested its willingness to enforce its exclusive marketing position by
conduct harmful to the plaintiffs. 29 The fact that plaintiffs were seeking in-
creased profits did not prevent characterizing their causal economic injury as
antitrust injury. 30 Plaintiffs had therefore alleged both an existing contro-
versy and existing antitrust injury, establishing the justiciability of their anti-
trust action.
31
been demonstrated through its acceptance of contracts contradicting general principles ap-
proved by the membership. Id.
23. See id. at 1285. In particular, the major football schools objected to equal division of
television revenues with schools having less prestigious programs. For example, the
Oklahoma/University of Southern California and Citadel/Appalachian State games were both
broadcast on the same afternoon in 1981. Although the former was shown on over 200 stations
and the latter on only four, each school received an identical fee for its broadcast rights. Id. at
1291.
24. Id. at 1285.
25. In 1981 the CFA contracted with NBC to televise football games. NBC rescinded the
contract after most of the CFA members withdrew from participation in the contract under
threat of sanctions by the NCAA. Id. at 1286.
26. Id. at 1286. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) states in pertinent part: "Any person, firm, corpora-
tion, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the
United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws."
27. 546 F. Supp. at 1304.
28. Id. at 1302.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1303. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977) held that
plaintiffs must show they have can suffered "antitrust injury" before they could invoke federal
antitrust laws. See id. at 489. "Antitrust injury" is a deleterious impact on a plaintiffs ability to
reap the rewards of free competition. See id. at 486-89. Because the increased profits sought by
plaintiffs would result from restoration of competition, the NCAA's restrictions on plaintiffs'
current profitability constituted antitrust injury within the meaning of Aleblo Bowl-O-Mai. 546
F. Supp. at 1304-05.
31. 546 F. Supp. at 1304.
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2. The Sherman Act: Per Se and Rule of Reason Analysis Under
Section 1
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal."'3 2 The Court recognized early on that Congress did not
intend literal construction of section 1, because such a construction could
conceivably invalidate all contracts. 33 Instead, courts "were expected to give
shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradi-
tion."'34 Responding to Congress' invitation, the Court developed the per se
and rule of reason analytical approaches to application of section one.
35
Per se analysis is applied to "naked" restraints of trade-restraints
whose anticompetitive effects are apparent without extended analysis.
36
Proof that a defendant has engaged in a practice condemned by the per se
rule establishes a Sherman Act violation; the plaintiff is not required to show
that the defendant's use of the practice actually resulted in an unreasonable
restraint on competition. 37 Rule of reason inquiry, conversely, mandates ex-
amination of whether a restraint in fact promotes, rather than suppresses,
competition in a particular market environment. 38 Facts and circumstances
surrounding the restraint should be considered in evaluating a restraint's
effect.
39
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
33. E.g., Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
34. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
35. See, e.g., id. at 692. The per se concept of illegality under the Sherman Act was first
articulated in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The "rule of
reason" stems from early common law, see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at
687-89 (citing Mitchell v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711)), and was quickly incorporated
into section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
36. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) articulated the essence of the per
se rule: "[Clertain agreements or practices... because of their pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use." Id. at 5.
37. Id. at 5.
38. The classic formulation of the rule of reason was articulated by Justice Brandeis in
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Writing for the Court, Justice Brandeis
stated:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test,
as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regula-
tion of trade restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition."
Id. at 238.
39. To determine [the unreasonableness of a restraint] the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular restraint, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.
Id. at 238. Accord National Soc5, of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
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3. The District Court's Per Se Analysis: Price Fixing
The district court held, as its first ground of decision, that the NCAA's
television controls constituted price fixing, a per se violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.4 0 Before examining the merits of the alleged per se viola-
tion, however, the court rejected the NCAA's argument that the amateur
nature of college football required special antitrust treatment for the
NCAA's restrictions.4 1 Pointing to the huge sums involved in financing
higher education and the intense (and professional) competition for those
funds, the court found that it was "cavil to suggest that college football, or
indeed higher education itself, is not a business." '42 Hence, the NCAA's con-
duct was evaluated under general antitrust principles.
Turning to the merits of the price-fixing claims, the district court found
that the television package had literally fixed prices in two ways. First, the
plan effectively dictated the price the networks would pay for each telecast.
43
Second, the plan dictated the price each school could receive for its telecast
rights. 44 The court then observed that not all action literally fixing prices is
considered "price fixing" for purposes of per se analysis. 45 In Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc 46 the Court had emphatically distin-
guished between literal price fixing and the "categories of business behavior
to which the per se rule [against price fixing] has been held applicable."
4 7
Thus, the relevant inquiry in a case involving literal price fixing is whether
the activity resulting in a fixed price for competitors' products is one which,
on its face, leads to the reductions in competition and output which are char-
acteristic of condemned price fixing arrangements.
48
Following the guidelines of Broadcast Music, the district court proceeded
to analyze the per se nature of the NCAA's marketing program. The NCAA
likened its sale of its members' television rights to the blanket licensing
agreements Broadcast Music excluded from per se treatment. 49 The defend-
ants in Broadcast Music served as agents for licensing the performing rights to
members' copyrighted material, issuing nonexclusive blanket licenses enti-
tling licensees to unrestricted use of members' material. 50 Licensees were
charged a single fee for a blanket license, regardless of the number of compo-
sitions used by the licensee and regardless of the number of times a particu-
lar composition was performed. 5 ' The Court declined to apply per se
analysis to this licensing arrangement, despite acknowledging the presence of
40. See 546 F. Supp. at 1304-09.
41. See id. at 1288.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1305. The district court's findings of fact detailed how the exclusive features of
the plan, in conjunction with a contractually stated minimum total payment, operated to set an
identical price for each televised game. See id. at 1289-90; 1292-94.
44. Id. at 1305. See also id. at 1292-94.
45. Id. at 1305.
46. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 20. See 546 F. Supp. at 1305.
49. 546 F. Supp. at 1306.




"literal" price fixing, because use of the blanket licenses did not facially ap-
pear to be a practice that would "always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output. '52 The Court found that the blanket li-
cense was reasonably necessary to protect the federally-created right of copy-
right;53 was necessary to create an efficient market for musical copyrights;
54
was, in a meaningful sense, a unique product;55 and, importantly, the license
did not preclude copyright owners or licensees from negotiating individual
licensing arrangements. 56 Broadcast Music's joint license was therefore far
from a "naked" restraint of the trade in copyrights; the license, and its "fixed
price," were a good faith and facially reasonable response to unique market
problems.57 Per se treatment was therefore inappropriate.
58
The district court rejected the NCAA's analogy to Broadcast Music for
several reasons. Significantly, marketing exigencies did not require schools
to cooperate beyond agreeing to play a particular game.59 Joint sale of tele-
vision rights was therefore not a joint venture necessitated by marketing real-
ities, but was merely a device restricting output by limiting the number of
games available for broadcast and fixing the price for those games. 60 Addi-
tionally, football telecast rights were not a property right existing as a result
of federal law, thereby eliminating any quasi-presumption in favor of the
NCAA's restrictions.6 ' The most important distinction for the district court,
however, was the inability of NCAA members to negotiate individual sales
of their television rights.62 This feature rendered the plan more like a hori-
zontal price fixing agreement than a true joint venture.
63
Given the overwhelming marketing restrictions created by the NCAA's
price fixing program, per se treatment was required. 64 Having found per se
treatment appropriate, under Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical SoCiety65 the
NCAA's procompetitive justifications for price fixing were not relevant.
66
Quoting Maricopa County, the court stated:
The respondents' principal argument is that the per se rule is inap-
52. See id. at 20-23.
53. Id. at 18-19.
54. Id. at 20. The blanket license created an efficient market by eliminating the prohibi-
tive costs forseeable if every copyright use had to be individually negotiated, by minimizing the
risk of copyright infringement, and by providing an effective means for enforcing a copyright's
exclusivity. Id. at 20-21.
55. Id. at 21-22.
56. Id. at 23-24.
57. See id. at 24.
58. Id.
59. 546 F. Supp. at 1306.
60. Id. See also. id. at 1307 (joint license at issue in Broadcast Music was a necessary means
for marketing copyrighted musical compositions).
61. Cf id. at 1306 (noting that Broadcast Music found it anomalous to characterize a mar-
keting arrangement necessary to protect a federal property right as a per se violation of federal
antitrust law; see Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 18-19).
62. 546 F. Supp. at 1308.
63. See id Cf Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23 (freedom to sell copyright outside license
arrangement indicated that blanket license was not "simple horizontal arrangement among
competitors").
64. 546 F. Supp. at 1308.
65. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
66. 546 F. Supp. at 1308.
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plicable because their agreements are alleged to have procompeti-
tive justifications. The argument indicates a misunderstanding of
the per se concept. The anticompetitive potential inherent in all
price fixing arrangements justifies their facial invalidation even if
procompetitive justifications are offered for some. Those claims of
enhanced competition are so unlikely to prove significant in any
particular case that we adhere to the rule of law that is justified in
its general application.
6 7
Having rejected the NCAA's argument that its marketing arrangement
was facially legitimate, the district court considered the NCAA's contention
that the television controls properly escaped per se analysis because they
were merely ancillary to NCAA regulations related to player recruitment,
playing rules, amateurism, and player grants-in-aid.68 According to the
NCAA, as ancillary restraints the television marketing controls could not be
treated as intrinsically anticompetitive restraints, and were therefore not
properly subjected to per se treatment.
69
The court set forth the elements of the ancillary restraint doctrine as
1) proof that a particular restraint is reasonably necessary to accomplish an
arrangement's legitimate purposes, and is no broader than reasonably neces-
sary; 2) the absence of unreasonable anticompetitive effects; and 3) imposi-
tion by a party or parties lacking monopoly power. 70 Applying the test it
had articulated, the court rejected the NCAA's ancillary restraint argument.
As a threshold matter, the NCAA failed to provide any evidence explaining
why its marketing monopoly was necessary to effect its overall regulatory
program. 71 Further, the NCAA enjoyed sufficient noncommercial controls
to accomplish its legitimate purposes without regulating football telecasts. 72
Finally, the NCAA could not be permitted to restrain the success of some
market participants in order to ensure a viable market for others; the Sher-
man Act required that free competition rule the marketplace. 73 For all the
above reasons, the television plan did not qualify as a permissible "ancillary
restraint."7 4
4. The District Court's Per Se Analysis: Group Boycott
The plaintiffs also argued that the NCAA's television controls were ille-
gal as a group boycott.7 5 The district court agreed, holding that the controls
constituted a group boycott under several theories. First, because coopera-
67. Id. (quoting Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 351).
68. 546 F. Supp. at 1309.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1309 (citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir.
1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153,
185-92 (S.D. N.Y. 1960)). See generally Harrison, Drice Fixing, The Professions, and Ancillary Re-
straints: Coping with Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 926; Louis, Restraints Ancillary to
Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logtcally Surive Sylvania and Broad-
cast Music? 66 VA. L. REV. 879 (1980).
71. 546 F. Supp. at 1309.
72. Id. at 1310.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1311.
75. Id.
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tion among producers was necessary to compete in the market, the produ-
cers' agreement not to trade with non-NCAA producers (non-NCAA
schools) constituted a group boycott. 76 Second, the producers' agreement
not to trade with networks not selected by the NCAA constituted a horizon-
tal agreement not to deal with specified buyers.
7 7
5. District Court's Rule of Reason Analysis
Following its per se analysis of the television controls the court ex-
amined the controls under the rule of reason, in the interests of litigation
efficiency.7 8 As described above, rule of reason analysis is limited to ascer-
taining whether a restraint either promotes or suppresses competition. 79 A
restraint's impact on competitive conditions 8° is evaluated by considering
both the nature or character of the restraint and the intent underlying the
restraint, as manifested in the history and circumstances surrounding the
restraint. 8' Either inquiry may lead to characterization of a restraint as un-
reasonable. 82 The district court found the television controls unreasonable,
and therefore illegal, under both branches of the test.
83
By regulating the number of games telecast, the price for broadcast
rights, and the ability of traders (schools) to choose their trading partners,
the NCAA controls were unreasonable in character.8 4 Further, the lack of
responsiveness to consumer (i.e. viewer) preference was highly offensive; this
fact clearly illuminated the market restrictions embodied in the controls.
8 5
Given the NCAA's inability to prove that the restraints in fact had redeem-
ing procompetitive benefits sufficient to mitigate the facial unreasonableness
76. Id. at 1311-12 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)). Associated
Press involved an agreement among newspapers (producers) not to sell their product (news) to
non-combine newspapers. 326 U.S. at 8-9. The Court found the arrangement illegal under
section 1, although the agreement was not explicitly characterized as a per se group boycott. See
id. at 18-19. See also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-
60 (1961) (conspiratorial refusal to supply necessary competitive input to competitor on same
market tier of some conspirators stated per se claim).
77. 546 F. Supp. at 1313. The court recognized that most per se group boycotts involved
horizontal conspiracies affecting competitors on the conspirators' market tier, but held that be-
cause the effects of the NCAA's exclusive contract were indistinguishable from the effects of a
classic horizontal boycott the per se rule was applicable. Id Cf. Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabi-
net Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979) (per se boycott present because of market effects even
though there was no numerosity of actors on either market tier).
78. 546 F. Supp. at 1314.
79. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
80. Noneconomic justifications or effects are irrelevant in evaluating a restraint's reasona-
bleness. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-92 (1978).
81. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978); Board
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
82. National Soc5' ofProfessional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
83. 546 F. Supp. at 1315.
84. Id. at 1317-19.
85. See id. at 1319. The court stated:
Every witness who testified on the matter confirmed that the consumers, the viewers of
college football television, receive absolutely no benefit from the controls. Many
games for which there is a larger viewer demand are kept from the viewers, and many
games for which there is little if any demand are nonetheless televised.
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of the restraints,8 6 the NCAA's television program was illegal under the rule
of reason.
8 7
Similarly, the intent underlying the controls, as indicated by their his-
torical development and manner of implementation, was anticompetitive,
thereby rendering the controls unreasonable.88 The court concluded that
the purpose of the regulations was "to enhance the television revenues of less
prominent football-playing schools" at the expense of the major football
powers, and to provide income to the NCAA.8 9 The court rejected argu-
ments that the primary purpose of restricting telecasts was to maintain live
gate attendance, 9 0 and that the controls were properly ancillary to the
NCAA's noneconomic goals. 9' Finally, the NCAA's concern with establish-
ing exclusive power over its members' football television rights was not man-
ifested until CFA members attempted to exercise control over their television
rights, shedding further doubt on the NCAA's asserted altruistic purpose in
controlling football rights.
92
6. The Sherman Act: Monopolization Under Section 2
A two-step inquiry was conducted into plaintiffs' allegations that the
NCAA had monopolized the college television market in violation of section
2 of the Sherman Act. 93 After defining the relevant product market to be
college football television, 94 the court found that the NCAA had monopo-
lized the market.
95
The NCAA had contended that college football television did not con-
stitute a separate market because the economic characteristics of the alleged
market were inconsistent with a monopoly scenario, 96 and because other tel-
evision programming could be readily substituted for college football tele-
casts.9 7 Within the larger market consisting of all television broadcasts, the
NCAA would not have market power, and therefore could not have engaged
in monopolization. 98 The court rejected the NCAA's arguments.
86. The court found that the restraints had enhanced neither live viewership nor competi-
tive balance. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1317.
89. 546 F. Supp. at 1315.
90. While this purpose may have originally motivated the NCAA, the NCAA's modern
television program evinced little concern for protecting live attendance. For example, the latest
network contracts provide for up to nine hours of football telecasts on Saturday afternoons, and
also require the networks to telecast more games than would be shown in an unrestricted mar-
ket. Id.
91. Id. at 1316. The court found that the television restrictions made little, if any, contri-
bution to preserving competitive balance. Further, the television contracts restricted the com-
mercial activities of NCAA members, not the actual specifics of competition. Id.
92. See id. at 1316-17.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). This section states in relevant part "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.
94. 546 F. Supp. at 1319-23.
95. Id. at 1323-24.
96. See id. at 1319-20.
97. See id. at 1320-23.
98. See id. at 1321.
1984]
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Expert economic testimony supporting the NCAA was rejected because
production in the college televised football market was not a function of
marginal cost; games were played regardless of incremental increases in tele-
vision revenue. 99 Hence, the NCAA's micro-economically based marketing
analysis was inherently flawed. 00 Further, the market for televised football
had never existed without the presence of NCAA controls. Thus, comparing
the actual price and output behavior of televised football with behavior the-
oretically forseeable in a monopolized market was irrelevant; the significance
of actual behavior could not be evaluated except in terms of a controlled
market.'o'
Having rejected the NCAA's attempt to theoretically define the rele-
vant market, the court examined evidence of college football's actual inter-
changeability of with other television programming. The court concluded
that televised college football was a separate market because other television
programming was not in fact readily interchangeable with college foot-
ball. 0 2 The court found that the NCAA was able to increase the price for
college football telecasts dramatically without a corresponding increase in
output (zte., the number of games telecast).10 3 Similarly, advertisers allo-
cated a disproportionate share of their total advertising budgets to college
football broadcasts. 10 4 These two factors led the court to hold that the rele-
vant market was college football broadcasts. '
0 5
Once the relevant market was defined, the court had little trouble find-
ing that the NCAA had monopoly power within that market: the NCAA
99. Id. at 1319.
100. Id. at 1320.
101. Id.
102. Id. United States v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) held that the
relevant market for evaluating monopoly power should be determined by considering the de-
gree to which other products were readily substitutable for the allegedly monopolized product.
See id. at 393, 400.
1 103. In 1981, ABC paid $31 million for 24 broadcast exposures. In 1982, ABC and CBS
paid $59 million for 28 similar exposures, a 62% price increase in the cost of a broadcast. By
1985, the networks will pay S72 million for 28 exposures. 546 F. Supp. at 1322. The court
found that "no other network programming, with the possible exception of professional football,
. . . could command such a dramatic price increase with so small an increase in output." Id.
104. See id. at 1321. The court also noted the networks' belief that they would be able to
increase the price of advertising on college telecasts to correspond with the increased cost of
purchasing the football rights, and found this an additional indicium of college football's
unique market status. Id. at 1323.
105. 1d. at 1323. The court stated:
In a sense, it is difficult to understand the tremendous appeal of college football to the
networks and their advertisers. Certainly the color, pageantry and tradition of the
sport, and the interest of alumni in the sport, are significant factors. Whatever the reason,
it is clear that there is no substitute in the minds of the networks and advertisers. They pay an
enormous cost to reach an audience which is small relative to prime time program-
ming. The networks are willing to allow NCAA to substantially dictate the conditions
under which they may televise college football. The networks may even be willing to
lose money on college football in return for some intangible benefits they believe them-
selves to derive from merely being associated with the sport. It is clear that college
football does not compete with other television programming in any real sense, that it
is a market unto itself, and that it is the relevant market for determining whether




clearly exercised uncontested control of college television broadcasts. '0
6 Be-
cause the NCAA had used its monopoly power to erect barriers to entry and
engaged in other anticompetitive conduct, it had monopolized the college
television football market.
10 7
C. Tenth Circutt Decision
The NCAA appealed the substantive aspects of the district court's deci-
sion regarding standing, the illegality of the television controls under per se
and rule of reason analysis, and the existence of a group boycott.' 0 8 In a
decision written by Judge Logan, the Tenth Circuit held that the Universi-
ties of Oklahoma and Georgia suffered the type of injury conferring antitrust
standing;10 9 that the controls constituted illegal price fixing under both per
set to and rule of reason analysis;' II and that the controls did not constitute a
per se group boycott.'' 2 Judge Barrett filed a dissenting opinion.'' 3
1. Standing
The court held that the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia had
standing to attack the television controls as a horizontal price fixing conspir-
acy.' 14 Many of the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs related to restrictions
on their trading freedom, and were thus more analogous to the injuries flow-
ing from vertical restraints than to the decreased output and price enhance-
ment injuries traditionally associated with cartelization.' 15  The court
relaxed the rigors of the standing inquiry, however, because the plaintiffs
sought only injunctive relief.'' 6 Given the relaxed procedural posture and
the fact that plaintiffs' injuries were "inextricably intertwined" with the al-
leged horizontal conspiracy, plaintiff's had standing to challenge the
NCAA's practices as horizontal price fixing.'17 The Tenth Circuit also
found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the plan's other
provisions. " 8
106. Id. at 1323. Cf United States v. E. 1. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394
(1956) (monopoly power found in relevant market consisting of single product).
107. 546 F. Supp. at 1323.
108. Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 707 F.2d 1147, 1150
(10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983). The NCAA also appealed the district court's
market definition, but this issue was not addressed by the Tenth Circuit. 707 F.2d at 1159 n. 16.
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit granted the NCAA's request to modify the scope of the injunc-
tive relief granted by the court. See id. at 1162.
109. 707 F.2d at 1152_
110. Id. at 1156.
Ill. /d. at 1160.
112. Id. at 1161.
113. Id. at 1162 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1152.
115. Id. at 1151.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1152. The court rejected the NCAA's contention that the plaintiffs' participa-
tion in the conspiracy barred standing to challenge the legality of the conspiracy's restraints. Id.




2. Per Se Analysis
Like the district court, the Tenth Circuit recognized that under Broad-
cast Muszc the NCAA's literal price fixing might not be subject to per se
treatment.' 19 Judge Logan stated, however, that characterizing a horizontal
relationship as an integration necessary to effect market efficiencies was not
in itself sufficient to invoke rule of reason analysis.' 20 Rather, the proper
inquiry to determine the appropriateness of per se treatment was whether
the marketing integration's restraints, considered facially, would inevitably
tend to suppress competition.12 ' Under this standard, the television pro-
gram's price-fixing effect could escape per se treatment only if the program
could satisfy two tests. First, the underlying integration must itself be capa-
ble of increasing market efficiency.' 22 Second, the restraint must be "capa-
ble of increasing the effectiveness of [the integration] and no broader than
necessary for that purpose."'
123
The court's per se analysis began by addressing the NCAA's argument
that the television controls were ancillary to the NCAA's function as a coop-
erative rulemaking and rule-enforcing body.' 2 4  Essentially, the court
treated the NCAA as asserting that its function was to ensure the continued
viability of amateur college in order to increase viewership, which was the
"output" of the college football industry. 125 Thus, if the television restraints
protected or increased viewer interest in college football, they were properly
ancillary to the NCAA's rulemaking function.1
2 6
Viewership "output" allegedly consisted of two discrete products: the
right to view a game in person, and the right to televise the game.'2 7 By
limiting the number of broadcasts the live attendance component of output
was increased, enhancing the efficiency of the market.' 2 8 The Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the NCAA's analysis, concluding that even if viewership was
the relevant product, live viewership could not be segmented from overall
viewership. 129 No record evidence established that overall viewership was
enhanced by the controls. ' 30 Further, the record showed that serious market
distortions accompanied a system enhancing live viewership by restricting
119. 707 F.2d at 1152.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. I, 19-
20 (1979)). The Tenth Circuit rejected the United States' amicus argument that facial exami-
nation of the ancillary controls under the promotion of/suppression of competition standard
was inconsistent with per se inquiry. The potential procompetitive benefits of integrating pro-
duction activities required some degree of inquiry beyond merely identifying the objective ef-
fects of a restraint. Hence, facial consideration of pro-competitive justifications for restraints
accompanying an integration was consistent with per se analysis under Broadcast Music. 707
F.2d at 1152 n.6.
122. 707 F.2d at 1153. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21-23.
123. 707 F.2d at 1153 (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 279 (1978)).
124. See 707 F.2d at 1153.
125. Se id.
126. See id.






television viewership.131 Thus, the television program's direct viewership ef-
fects did not support characterizing the program as an ancillary restraint to
an acceptable marketing integration. 
132
Additionally, the asserted purpose of maintaining competitive balance
among the various NCAA members' football teams did not enable the televi-
sion controls to be deemed an ancillary restraint.133 Noneconomic justifica-
tions for restraints were irrelevant in assessing a restraint's competitive
consequences.' 34 Further, the Sherman Act did not countenance a restric-
tion designed to protect a market by limiting competition. 135 Finally, the
court noted that less restrictive means were available to the NCAA for pro-
moting its parity goals.' 36
The NCAA's second argument characterized the television controls as
ancillary to an integrated marketing arrangement. 137  Including price and
output restraints in the television contracts was allegedly necessary in order
to market college football as a television series in competition with entertain-
ment series like "Dallas."'1 38 In effect, the television controls "restrain[ed]
intrabrand competition (competition among football games) in order to
stimulate interbrand competition (competition between NCAA football and
other entertainment programming)."' 139 The court declined to explore this
argument, however, because it found that the marketing integration was it-
self a per se violation;140 a fortiori, the restraints accompanying the intergra-
tion were impermissible. 141
The joint marketing arrangement was impermissible because of its over-
whelming anticompetitive potential. The joint marketing program created
no new product similar to the blanket license at issue in Broadcast Music: the
NCAA license merely provided a single product on an exclusive basis.' 42
Also, unlike the license in Broadcast Music, the television plan did not permit
individual sales by the combination's members, 14 3 thereby creating a signifi-
cant risk of cartelization." Finally, the Broadcast Music joint license was
nonexclusive; the seasonal exclusivity of the NCAA's plan operated to ex-
clude forseeable purchasers for single game rights, potentially permanently
foreclosing many broadcasters from entering the televised football mar-
ket. " 5 Taken in its entirety, the NCAA's joint marketing program facially
131. Id. The television program reduced output of desired products (by restricting the
games which could be televised), and increased consumption of less desirable products (by re-
quiring minor games to be televised). Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing National Soc'y qProfes.ronal Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 687-96).
135. 707 F.2d at 1154 (citing National Socjy of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689, 696).
136. 707 F.2d at 1154.




141. Id. at 1155 n.14. See also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 1156. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21-22 (joint license was "truly greater than
the sum of its parts").





tended to reduce competition and output. 14 6 Hence, the NCAA's price-
fixing plan was one of those forms of business behavior constituting a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.
147
2. The Tenth Circuit's Rule of Reason Analysis
Although they found the television program to be invalid per se, the
majority examined the program under the rule of reason because of the pros-
pect of Supreme Court review.t 48 The analysis, which concentrated on the
controls' anticompetitive impact rather than the NCAA's anticompetitive
purpose, 14 9 began by assessing the trading irregularities resulting from the
controls.' 5 0 Market concentration resulted because participants were lim-
ited to one seller (the NCAA) and three buyers (ABC, CBS, and Turner).' 5 '
The NCAA's contracts also limited price competition among those buy-
ers.152 The contracts therefore resulted in vertical foreclosure of buyers, and
the inability of sellers (NCAA members) to freely sell their television
rights.153 The court found that these obvious results of the NCAA plan were
not, however, the plan's only anticompetitive effects. ' 5 4
The horizontal aspect of the NCAA's plan created the risk that, if the
NCAA possessed market power, the plan could result in artificial price en-
hancement.' 5 5 Similarly, the vertical foreclosure aspects of the plan would
have anticompetitive consequences among the class of potential purchasers if
college football was in fact not a readily interchangeable product. 156 By
analyzing the NCAA's market power, the court would be able to assess the
full competitive impact of the plan.'
5 7
NCAA market power was established by pointing to the large audience
share and high cost per advertising minute commanded by college football
telecasts on Saturday afternoons. 158 The NCAA's plan therefore manifested
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1157.
149. The court agreed that the two-prong rule of reason inquiry, see supra notes 79-82 and
accompanying text, was proper, but did not investigate the purposes underlying the restraints.
See 707 F.2d at 1157-60.





155. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
156. 707 F.2d at 1157.
157. The price enhancement risk would become apparent because market power involves
the power to control prices or exclude competition. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). The vertical foreclosure risk would become apparent because
market power only exists when price rises of a product do -not cause significant purchases of a
reasonably substitutable product. Id. at 404. Thus, if market power existed, vertical foreclosure
would be present. See 707 F.2d at 1157-58.
158. 707 F.2d at 1158-59. The court observed that even if its definition of the relevant
market was underinclusive, the prejudicial impact of that error could be obviated by attributing
less significance to market power when evaluating the plan's anticompetitive effects. Id. at 1159
(citing L. SULLIVAN, HANDBX)K OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 17, at 61 (1966)). Similarly, the
court noted that the degree of market power necessary to find a violation of section 1 under the




the anticompetitive risks stemming from a finding of market power.
159 In
light of the anticompetitive risks stemming from NCAA market power, the
existence of market-neutral means of preserving competitive balance,'
60 the
elimination of intrabrand price competition, 16 ' and the NCAA's coercive
seizure of its members television rights,' 62 the plan was unreasonably an-
ticompetitive and therefore illegal under the rule of reason.'
63
3. The Tenth Circuit's Group Boycott Analysis
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the issue of group
boycott. No per se boycott existed with respect to the broadcasters because
the broadcasters were not in a horizontal relationship with the NCAA mem-
bers.' 64 Enforcement of NCAA policies through threat of sanctions against
NCAA members also was not a per se boycott. 165 The court held that an
expulsion imposed as part of associational discipline was not a per se boycott
unless the expulsion was "a naked attempt to exclude competition. "166 Ab-
sent such a facially anticompetitive purpose, an associational sanction's le-
gality was assessed by examining its competitive reasonableness. 1
67 Because
the NCAA's expulsion mechanism was not facially unreasonable, the lower
court's per se ruling was reversed;1 68 because the plan had already been held
illegal, the court did not consider the reasonableness of the expulsion
mechanism. '
69
4. Judge Barrett's Dissent
Judge Barrett would have reversed the district court. ' 7 0 He argued that
the lower court erred in applying per se analysis because the NCAA's
noneconomic purposes' 7 ' required deferential treatment of NCAA regula-
159. 707 F.2d at 1159. See supra note 157.
160. 707 F.2d at 1159.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
163. See 707 F.2d at 1159.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1160-61. The court distinguished the authorities the lower court relied on in
finding a group boycott of the networks:
In KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), a retailer induced
wholesalers and manufacturers to refuse to supply its competitor. In Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), cloth-
ing manufacturers organized a boycott of retailers who dealt in the clothing of
competing manufacturers. In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
364 U.S. 656 (1961), manufacturers of gas heaters coerced an adverse "seal of ap-
proval" decision with regard to the product of a competitor. Each of these cases re-
fleets conduct by one firm inducing concerted action to deprive competing firms of
necessary trade relationships, a characteristic absent here.
707 F.2d at 1161 (emphasis supplied).




170. Id. at 1162 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
171. Judge Barrett found the NCAA's primary purposes to be maintenance of the amateur
nature of the NCAA members' sports programs and ensuring that college athletes were inte-
grated into a university's academic life. Id. at 1163.
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tions affecting its members' commercial activities. 1 72 Judge Barrett main-
tained that the television controls should have been analyzed under the rule
of reason. 173 The dissent found that the controls were properly ancillary to
the noneconomic purposes of the NCAA, and were therefore acceptable
under the rule of reason.
174
Judge Barrett's rule of reason conclusion was based on the lack of proof
that the controls injured the consumer public, 175 his finding that overall
viewership was increased by the controls, 176 and his finding that the regula-
tions operated to ensure the amateurism of NCAA football programs and the
academic achievement of NCAA members. 177 In sum, Judge Barrett found
the NCAA to be a joint venture 7 8 whose division of television revenues
among member schools was similar to the division of profits by a law part-
nership,' 7 9 and whose noneconomic motivations precluded a finding that its
television restrictions had the "pernicious effects" on competition con-
demned by the antitrust laws.' 80
D. Section / Ana'sis Under the Burger Court
Burger Court decisions have lacked consistency in their approach to sec-
tion 1 analysis.18 ' In 1972, with virtually no accompanying economic analy-
sis, the Court applied the per se rule to a horizontal allocation of territories
in United States v. Topco Association, Inc. 182 Topco was a cooperative buying
association for small and medium sized independent grocery store chains
which granted its retailer members exclusive territories in which to sell
Topco's private-label products.' 83 The Court characterized the arrange-
ment as a horizontal restraint, and therefore a per se violation of section 1,
without first considering the potential impact on competition.'
84
172. See id. at 1164 (distinguishing between amateur and professional sports); id. at 1165
(trial court's characterization of NCAA as business failed to recognize NCAA's primarily
noneconomic purpose); see also id. at 1167 (per se rule has only been held applicable to business
enterprises operated exclusively for profit; NCAA rules not within per se category because not
designed to "render greatest profit for business purpose") (emphasis in original).
173. Id. at 1165.
174. Id. at 1167 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1168.
176. Id. at 1167. But see id. at 1154 (Logan, J.) (no evidence plan enhanced overall
viewership).
177. Id. at 1167.
178. Id. at 1168.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See generaly Recent Antitrust Developments, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13-26 (1980). See also
Gehart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982
SuP. CT. REV. 319. Professor Gehart's thesis is that the Supreme Court came close to embrac-
ing the Chicago school's approach to antitrust analysis following United States v. Topco Assoc.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), but pulled back in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332 (1982). Gehart, supra, at 319-20. Under the Chicago school's analysis, per se rules
should only be applied after scrutinizing the consumer welfare effect of challenged behavior. Id.
at 321.
182. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
183. Id. at 601-03.
184. See id. at 608-09. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, stated that "the Court does not tell us
what 'pernicious effect on competition' the practices here outlawed are perceived to have; nor
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Chief Justice Burger did not agree that merely characterizing Topco's
conduct as a horizontal restraint justified application of a per se rule.1 8 5 In a
vigorous dissent, he rebuked the majority for failing to apply economic anal-
ysis, stating that "the judicial convenience and ready predictability that are
made possible by per se rules are not such overriding considerations in anti-
trust law as to justify their promulgation without careful prior consideration
of the relevant economic realities in the light of the basic policy and goals of
the Sherman Act."
1 86
Following Topco, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases in which
the per se rule either was not applied, or was applied only after injection of
economic analysis. National Society of Professional Engneers v. United States 187 is
representative of that line of cases.188 At issue in Professional Engneers was
whether a provision in the Society's Code of Ethics was unlawful suppression
of competition under section 1 of the Sherman Act.18 9 The provision pro-
hibited member engineers from negotiating the price of a project until a
prospective client had selected an engineer, rendering price comparison by
the client impossible. 190 The Society justified the restriction on the grounds
that price competition would result in inferior work, ultimately endangering
the public. 19 1 The Court rejected the public safety argument, reasoning that
the only permissible inquiry was economic, and involved examination of a
practice's competitive impact.' 9 2 Following a cursory economic analysis of
the restraint, 193 the Court held that the Code of Ethics restrained competi-
tion in violation of the rule of reason. 194
The Court's next major treatment of the role of economic analysis was
in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.' 9 5 Broadcast Music
explicitly cautioned against applying per se characterization without exam-
ining the economic reality of a challenged restraint. 196 Only after extensive
economic analysis' 97 did the Court conclude that per se treatment was
inappropriate.198
Then, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Socit t99 the Court appar-
does it attempt to show that those practices 'lack... any redeeming virtue.' " Id. at 622 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 614-15.
187. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
188. Other cases include Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 466 U.S. 63 (1980): Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
189. 435 U.S. at 683. Section 1 1 of the Code provided in part that: "The Engineer will not
compete unfairly with another engineer by attempting to obtain employment or advancement
or professional engagements by competitive bidding." Id. at 683 n.3.
190. 435 U.S. at 684.
191. Id. at 684-85.
192. Id. at 692.
193. See id. at 692-93.
194. See id. at 681, 696.
195. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
196. Id. at 8-9.
197. See id. at 10-24.
198. See id. at 23-24.
199. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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ently applied the per se rule in a manner reminiscent of Topco. Approxi-
mately seventy percent of the doctors in Maricopa County were members of
the Maricopa Foundation for Medical Care, and agreed to abide by the
Foundation's schedule of maximum fees for providing services to policyhold-
ers of specific insurance plans.2 0 0 In reversing denial of Arizona's motion for
summary judgment, the Supreme Court held that the maximum fee agree-
ments were per se unlawful price fixing, despite the fact that discovery was
incomplete. 20 ' In apparent retreat from Broadcast Music, the Court declined
to consider competitive impact once the fee schedule was characterized as
price fixing.20 2 Broadcast Music was distinguished as a case involving joint
effort creating a new product, rather than as establishing a new methodology
for examining the per se nature of a combination among horizontal market
participants.
20 3
Justice Powell dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist. 20 4 Arguing that a sufficient factual record had not been devel-
oped, Justice Powell rebuked the majority's failure to engage in the eco-
nomic analysis required by Broadcast Music.
Before characterizing an arrangement as a per se price fixing agree-
ment meriting condemnation, a court should determine whether it
is a 'naked restrain(t) of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition.' . . . Such a determination is necessary because 'de-
parture from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon de-
monstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line
drawing.'205
In light of the Burger Court's fluctuating approach to economic analy-
sis, the Tenth Circuit's holding that the television controls are per se illegal
cannot be said to reflect an inconsistency with the Burger Court's line of
cases. In Board of Regents, the Tenth Circuit's depth of economic analysis
prior to invoking the per se rule exceeded that found in Maancopa County,
following more closely the Broadcast Music methodology. On review, the
Supreme Court will have an opportunity to clarify whether the somewhat
mechanical Maricopa County approach has supplanted the more flexible anal-
ysis of Broadcast Music. Even if the Court chooses to rely on Marcopa County's
relative trivialization of Broadcast Music,206 Board of Regents clearly provides
the Court with an opportunity to clarify the scope of the ancillary restraint
doctrine and the per se rule in the context of an integrated marketing ar-
rangement involving horizontal competitors.
Two additional aspects of Board of Regents deserve mention. First, it is
unlikely that the Court will adopt Judge Barrett's "partial exemption" ap-
proach to NCAA activities;20 7 the Burger Court's decisions indicate an in-
tent to require Congress to make exceptions to the operation of the antitrust
200. Id. at 339.
201. Id. at 356.
202. Id. at 351.
203. Id. at 355-56.
204. Id. at 357 (Powell, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 362 (citations omitted).
206. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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laws. 20 Second, the Supreme Court has hinted that rule of reason analysis
may be appropriate where buyer and seller have comparable market
power.209 If the Court finds that the television networks comprised a monop-
sony, perhaps the television controls will escape per se condemnation
through a new modification of the per se rule.
II. DISCOUNT FUNDING AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: THE
COERCIVE ESSENTIAL
Midwest, the exclusive Denver area distributor for Joseph E. Seagram
and Sons, Inc.,2 10 independently decided to discount the price of Seagram
products to selected high volume liquor retailers in an effort to increase the
competitiveness of Seagram products. 2 1 Seagram subsequently agreed to
Midwest's request for reimbursement of the discounts, stipulating, however,
that the discounts be passed through to the participating high volume retail-
ers.21 2 On appeal, 2 13 nineteen small retailers who were not permitted to
participate in the discount program alleged that Seagram's agreement with
Midwest constituted illegal vertical price fixing (resale price maintenance),
which was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.214 Appellants
argument, in its essence, was that because the record established that partici-
pants on two levels of a market had entered into an agreement affecting
resale prices, a per se violation had been established as a matter of law. 2 15
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by explaining that although resale
price maintenance agreements were per se unlawful, not every vertical agree-
ment with a resale price effect constituted resale price maintenance. 2 6 The
sine qua non of a resale price maintenance agreement was coercive action by
the manufacturer or other upper tier market participant. 21 7 Unless the
lower tier participant was coerced into selling at a price dictated by the up-
per tier participant, resale price maintenance was not present.
21 8
Appellants argued that the coercion element was satisfied because Sea-
gram required Midwest to pass the funded discount through to its custom-
ers.2 19 The Tenth Circuit disagreed because the passthrough requirement
208. See, e.g., Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 355, National Soc> of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at
692.
209. Marcopa County, 457 U.S. at 354 n. 29. See also Harrison, Price Fixing, The Professions, and
Ancillay Restraints. Coping with Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 925, 943.
210. AAA Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 705 F.2d 1203, 1204 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1903 (1983).
211. 705 F.2d at 1204.
212. Id. at 1205.
213. The district court found that Seagram's conduct constituted neither a per se nor rule of
reason violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 1204, 1208.
214. Id. Combinations between suppliers and distributors setting resale prices have long
been recognized to be a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968). See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 408-09 (1911).
215. See 705 F.2d at 1205.
216. Id. Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)
(all horizontal agreements literally fixing prices are not per se price fixing violations).





did not, in and of itself, force Midwest to set a specific resale price. 220 Mid-
west was not precluded from setting a price reflecting a discount greater
than that Seagram had agreed to support, nor was Midwest required to offer
a discounted price.22 ' Further, there was no evidence that retailers receiving
Midwest's discount were required or forced to sell at a certain price.
222
Hence, Seagram had not engaged in retail price maintenance.
223
Plaintiffs then argued that even if the discount agreement did not con-
stitute resale price maintenance, it was nonetheless a per se violation under
United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co .,224 which held that a per se violation of
its antitrust laws is present when a combination is formed "for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the
price of a commodity. '225 In rejecting this argument, the court limited So-
cony-Vacuum to agreements arising in the context of a horizontal conspir-
acy.226 Vertical arrangements between manufacturers and wholesalers or
wholesalers and retailers which affected price did not manifest the anticom-
petitive dangers found in horizontal agreements, and thus were not per se
violations.
227
Having rejected the asserted bases for per se characterization, the Tenth
Circuit held that the lower court's rule of reason analysis properly found that
the discount program was acceptable.2 28 Evidence showed that the intent
and effect of the program were to increase interbrand competition by lower-
ing retail prices.229 Because the restraints created by the program tended to
increase interbrand competition and were not manifestly anticompetitive,
230
the trial court had correctly ruled that no section 1 violation was present.
23 1
III. ELEMENTS OF SECTION 2 OFFENSES: TENTH CIRCUIT DEFINITIONS
Olsen was a retailer of musical instruments who brought an action
against competing retailers, suppliers, and manufacturers of musical instru-
ments, alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade, fix prices, boycott Olsen, and
commit other unfair practices in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,
and attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of
section 2 of the Act. 232 The trial court allowed recovery only on claims that
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1206-07. The court pointed out that Seagram had guaranteed a gross margin on
certain products, not a net margin. See id. at 1206. Thus, Midwest was not coerced into offering
discounted prices by the lure of a net margin exceeding that which Seagram would have guar-
anteed. See id.
222. Id. at 1207.
223. Id. Accord Lewis Serv. Center, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 714 F.2d 842,846-47 (8th Cir.
1983). See also Butera v. Sun Oil Co., 496 F.2d 434 (lst Cir. 1974).
224. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
225. Id. at 223.
226. 705 F.2d at 1207.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 1208.
229. Id.
230. Id. The court observed that even several of the appellants had sustained increases in
sales of Seagram's products during the discount program. Id.
231. Id.
232. Olsen v. Progressive Music Supply, Inc., 703 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 197 (1983).
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a competing music store (Progressive) had conspired to restrain trade2 33 and
engaged in a boycott to deprive plaintiff of CBS brand instruments. 2 34 The
opinion is primarily devoted to an analysis of the propriety of the trial
court's factual conclusions, which the Tenth Circuit concluded were tena-
ble.235 The remainder of this section is therefore limited to a survey of the
general antitrust principles set forth in the opinion.
A. Attempted Monopohzation
In denying plaintiff's section 2 claims, the Tenth Circuit set forth the
elements necessary to establish both an attempt to monopolize and a con-
spiracy to monopolize. To establish an attempt to monopolize, a plaintiff
must demonstrate a dangerous probability that the defendant will success-
fully achieve the power to control prices or exclude competition,2 36 prove
acts in furtherance of the attempt,2 37 demonstrate specific intent to monopo-
lize,238 and establish the relevant market within which the attempted mo-
nopolization occurred. 23 9  Olsen's attempt claim failed because his
continued successful competition despite the conspiracy precluded a finding
of dangerous probability of success, 240 and because he presented no evidence
of a relevant market.
2 4
1
B. Conspiracy to Monopohize
The elements of conspiracy to monopolize are the existence of a combi-
nation or conspiracy to monopolize, 242 overt acts done in furtherance of the
combination or conspiracy, 24 3 effect upon an appreciable amount of inter-
state commerce,2 44 and specific intent to monopolize. 245 The court also
stated that proof of a relevant market is not required to establish a conspir-
233. 703 F.2d at 434. This victory was hollow because the trial court found that Olsen was
not injured by the conspiracy and did not award damages. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 435-41 (passim).
236. Id. at 436 (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951); Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375. 396 (1905)).
237. 703 F.2d at 436 (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951)).
238. 703 F.2d at 436 (citing Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 US. 594,
626 (1953); E. J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296, 306 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976)). Specific intent may be inferred from the anti-competitive nature of
the defendant's acts. E.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 180 F. Supp.
125, 140 (D. Mass.). modifrd. 284 F.2d 582 (lst Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
239. 703 F.2d at 437 & n. 1 (listing cases). See also E. J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Belle, Inc.,
525 F.2d 296, 307 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
240. 703 F.2d at 437. Another factor indicative of the failure to show a dangerous
probability of obtaining monopoly power was the absence of evidence that the defendant had a
"controlling position" in the relevant market. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 438 (citing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788 (1946)).
243. 703 F.2d at 438 (citing Cullum Elec. & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors
Ass'n, 436 F. Supp. 418, 425 (D.S.C. 1976), affd, 569 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1978)).
244. 703 F.2d at 438 (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947);
Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)).




acy to monopolize. 246 Because Olsen did not show that the alleged conspir-
acy had the requisite effect on interstate commerce, or that the defendant
had specific intent to monopolize, there was no conspiracy violating section
2.247
C. Group Boycott: Rejection of the Literal Approach
The trial court found that Progressive conspired with CBS in order to
prevent the plaintiff from receiving CBS products. 248 This boycott was inci-
dent to Progressive's plan to maintain its high mark-up on CBS products by
preventing low cost sales by the plaintiff.2 49 Progressive argued that plaintiff
was excluded from the market for CBS products as a necessary incident of a
legitimate joint marketing effort between Progressive and CBS.2 5 0 Thus,
even if the defendants had literally engaged in a "group boycott," their boy-
cott was not of the type condemned as a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.
2 5 1
Although the Tenth Circuit accepted defendant's premise that not all
activities literally characterizable as "boycotts" were per se violations, 252 it
disagreed with the defendant's conclusions about the boycott of Olsen. The
trial court determined that the motivations behind the boycott were either to
protect high profit margins or harm Olsen. 253 Given those findings, and the
absence of evidence of any procompetitive impacts flowing from the boycott,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Progressive had
engaged in a per se violation.
254
D. Price-Fixtng Damages and Duplication of Damages
The final issue antitrust issue was the trial court's refusal to award dam-
ages for Progressive's price fixing behavior. 255 The trial court originally re-
fused to award damages because it found that plaintiffs ability to sell below
the fixed prices precluded a finding of damages. 256 The Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed with this conclusion, 25 7 but held that damages could not be awarded
under the price-fixing claim because such damages would merely duplicate
the award under the boycott claim.
2 5 8
246. 703 F.2d at 438 (citing Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir.
1975)).




251. Id. E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consol. Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th
Cir. 1972),cert. den'ed, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) provides a thorough summary of the Supreme Court
decisions analyzing the anticompetitive risks found in those business arrangements constituting
a per se violation as a "group boycott." See 467 F.2d at 185-87.
252. 703 F.2d at 438-39.
253. Id. at 439.
254. Id.






IV. APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT TO INTRASTATE ACTIVITY
In Lease Lights, Inc. v. Pubhc Service C0. 25 9 the Tenth Circuit reversed the
trial court's conclusion that the commercial effects of plaintiff's business were
too localized to permit invocation of Sherman Act protections. 260 Plaintiff
was engaged in providing commercial outdoor lighting services, and alleged
that Public Service Company of Oklahoma monopolized and attempted to
monopolize a local market for commercial outdoor lighting services. 26 1 The
trial court concluded that the outdoor lighting business engaged in by both
plaintiff and defendent was essentially the "rental of illumination," which
was a purely intrastate business. 262 The trial court also concluded that al-
though plaintiff's customers were involved in interstate commerce and that
although plaintiffs lighting services were supplied with materials purchased
in interstate commerce, plaintiff had failed to introduce evidence that de-
fendant's challenged activities had adversely affected either the interstate
business of plaintiffs customers or the interstate flow of the materials used by
plaintiff.2 63 Hence, because the Sherman Act could only be invoked when
the threatened business activity was itself "in interstate commerce," or when
the challenged activities adversely affected a meaningful amount of inter-
state commerce, 264 plaintiff had not stated a claim cognizable under the
Sherman Act.
26 5
Reversing the trial court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the Tenth
Circuit held that the trial court had improperly required proof of an adverse
effect on interstate commerce.2 66 The court emphasized that the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the Sherman Act's jurisdictional require-
ments are satisfied when a defendant's activities merely have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 267 Because the lighting business involved an-
nual interstate purchases of hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of light-
ing components, 268 the defendant's activities involved a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 26 9 Accordingly, the Sherman Act afforded protection
to plaintiffs business.
270
Lease Lights also rejected two other jurisdictional deficiencies asserted by
the defendant. First, plaintiffs uncontroverted evidence showed that the
nexus between interstate commerce and defendant's activities was con-
crete, 27 1 vitiating defendant's contention that plaintiff had alleged only a
259. 701 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1983).
260. Id. at 798.
261. Id. at 796.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 797.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 798-99 (quoting from McClain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975)).
267. 701 F.2d at 796.
268. Id. at 799.
269. Id.
270. Uncontroverted evidence showed that the majority of outdoor lighting installations




speculative connection between defendant's activities and interstate com-
merce. 27 2 Second, the fact that plaintiff's injuries may have been self-in-
flicted 2 73 did not eliminate the public injury inhering in monopolistic
activities. 27 4 Hence, the Sherman Act requirement of public injury2 75 was
present.
276
V. INTRACORPORATE CONSPIRACY AND LICENSED AGENTS
The Tenth Circuit upheld a summary judgment for the defendants in
Holer v. Moore & Co., 2 7 7 finding that Colorado's statutory regulation of the
real estate brokerage business precluded the conclusion that real estate sales
personnel were economically distinguishable from their employing bro-
ker.2 78 Accordingly, the plurality of economic actors necessary to support a
section 1 claim was lacking, and summary judgment was proper.2 79
Holer involved a claim that the standard seven percent commission
Moore and Company paid its real estate agents constituted both resale price
maintenance by Moore and its agents and horizontal price fixing by the sales
agents. 280 The trial court held that Moore and its agents constituted a single
indivisible economic entity, and that Moore and its agents were therefore
incapable of conspiring among themselves. 28 1 The Tenth Circuit began its
review by noting that because corporations can only act through their em-
ployees, as a general rule a corporation's employees cannot conspire with the
corporation or with each other when corporate matters are involved. 282 Fur-
ther, legal labels characterizing the nature of an employment relationship in
non-antitrust contexts are not determinative in antitrust analysis; the actors
must be "separate economic entities in substance. '"2 8 3 Because the question
of a party's separate economic status is a question of fact, 28 4 the Tenth Cir-
cuit's inquiry was limited to whether the record created an issue of economic
separateness for jury consideration.
2 5
The Tenth Circuit's first step in the analysis was an examination of
state laws requiring the defendants to conduct their business in a specified
manner. 286 Although characterizing an agent's status as independent ulti-
mately remained a question of federal law, 28 7 "state laws limiting the scope
272. See generaloy Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980)
(en banc).
273. Defendant asserted that plaintiff's business reversal was due to internal mismanage-
ment. 701 F.2d at 800.
274. Id. (quoting Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Sys., 694 F.2d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir. 1981)).
275. Eg., Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210 (1959).
276. 701 F.2d at 800.
277. 701 F.2d 854 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 347 (1983).
278. Id. at 856-57.
279. Id. at 857.
280. Id. at 855.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. (citing Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840, 846 (lOth Cir. 1981)).
284. 702 F.2d at 855.
285. Id. at 856.
286. Id. at 856 & n.5.
287. Id. at 856.
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of a person's professional actions may effectively place that person under an
employer's supervision and control, in which event the employer will be the
only independent economic actor."288
Relevant Colorado statutory law provided that every real estate agent
must be licensed; 289 that a precondition to being licensed is securing an
agreement to work for a broker;
290 that an agent is issued only one license
29 '
which must be kept in the custody of his broker, 292 thereby precluding the
agent from simultaneously working for more than one broker. Additionally,
real estate services must be performed only in the broker's name;293 compen-
sation for the agent's services must be paid directly to the broker;29 4 and a
broker may not relinquish his authority to supervise his agents. 295 Moreover,
a broker's failure to reasonably supervise its agents may result in the revoca-
tion of a broker's license. 296 Weighing these statutory controls over an
agent's freedom against the proffered indicia of independence, 297 the court
found that Colorado's real estate laws created an employer-employee rela-
tionship between brokers and agents. 298 Accordingly, the defendants were
legally incapable of conspiring with each other.
2 99
VI. MEANING OF "GAME SITE" IN TELEVISED FOOTBALL EXEMPTION
The National Football League enjoys a statutory exemption from the
antitrust laws for its broadcast of football contests as long as the broadcasts
do not interfere with local college and high school games played during spec-
ified time periods. 3° ° To invoke this limitation on the antitrust exemption,
by August 1 of each year schools are required to give notice of the "game
sites" for local contests. 30 ' Colorado High School Acti'vit'es Association v. National
Football League,30 2 a case of first impression, required construction of the
phrase "game site" as used in the limitation to the antitrust exemption.
30 3
In 1977, 1978, and 1979, National Football League games were telecast
into the Denver market at the same time that the state high school football
championship contests were being played. 30 4 The Colorado High School
Activities Association conceded that it had not given notice of the exact geo-
288. Id.
289. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-102 (Supp. 1983).
290. Id. § 12-61-103(5).
291. Id. § 12-61-109(4).
292. Id. § 12-61-104(1) (1978).
293. 4 COLO. ADMIN. CODE 725- 1E-9 (1983).
294. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-117 (1978).
295. 4 COLO. ADMIN. CODE § 725-1E-9 (1983).
296. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-113(1)(o) (1978).
297. Real estate agents set their own hours, paid their own taxes, and only received commis-
sion income. 702 F.2d at 856.
298. Id. at 857. Accord Faith Realty & Dev. Co. v. Indus. Comm., 170 Colo. 215, 220, 460
P.2d 228, 230 (1969).
299. 702 F.2d at 857.
300. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1293 (1982).
301. See id. § 1293.
302. 711 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1983).
303. Id. at 945.
304. Id. at 944
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graphic location of the championship game sites. 30 5 The association noted
that its practice of playing the championship game at a site determined fol-
lowing an elimination tournament precluded such notice,30 6 and that
designation of championship game sites as "Denver" or "the Denver metro-
politan area" was the best possible notice which could be provided. 30 7 The
association then argued that, given the statutory purpose of protecting high
school game receipts, its geographic designations constituted compliance
with the statute.
30 8
Both the Tenth Circuit and the district court disagreed with the associa-
tion. 30 9 The Tenth Circuit resolved the dispute by concluding that the legis-
lative history evinced no intent to give the phrase "game site" other than its
plain, ordinary meaning. 310 That ordinary meaning was determined to be
the "particular football field or stadium where the game is to be played. 31 1
Because the association had not provided the NFL with the statutory game
sites, the NFL's challenged broadcasts did not violate the terms of the anti-
trust exemption.
312
VII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ANALYSIS FOR BUSINESS FAILURE AND
PURCHASE OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES
Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc. 313 affirmed a summary judgment ruling
against a plaintiff who had alleged the existence of anticompetitive conspira-
cies in portions of Oklahoma's baking business. 31 4 In affirming the summary
judgment, the Tenth Circuit set forth the ingredients necessary to recover on
a Sherman Act claim alleging that a competitor's purchase of production
facilities was anticompetitive. 31 5 Additionally, Campbell- Taggart addressed
the application of the Sherman Act's four-year statute of limitations31 6 to a
claim involving destruction of the plaintiff's business.
3 17
Curtis, the plaintiff in Campbell-Taggart, had been a professional baker
since 1947. 3 '8 His dispute with the defendants arose out of two bakery clos-
ings. The first involved the closing of Curtis' own bakery in 1969, allegedly
as the result of the defendants' conspiratorial activities. 31 9 The second clos-
ing involved a bakery owned by Curtis' employer, and gave rise to two anti-
trust claims. The first claim was that the defendants' conspiracy had forced
the closing of Curtis' employer's bakery in 1977; the second claim alleged
that defendants had conspired to prevent Curtis' purchase of the closed facil-




309. Set id. at 945.
310. Id. at 945-46.
311. Id. at 945.
312. Id. at 946.
313. 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.), cem. denied, 103 S. Ct. 576 (1982).
314. Id. at 337.
315. See id. at 338.
316. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982).





ity, which defendants eventually purchased for themselves.
320
Plaintiff's claim relating to the forced closure of his bakery was brought
more than four years after the bakery closed. 32 ' Defendants therefore sought
summary judgment based upon the four-year statute of limitations applica-
ble to private Sherman Act claims. 322 Plaintiff argued that the forced clo-
sure of his plant resulted in a continuing violation, and that the claim was
therefore timely. 323 The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Because the applicable
statute of limitations runs from the date a defendant's acts cause injury to a
plaintiff,3 24 the relevant statute of limitations inquiry when seeking to bar a
claim entirely is the last date a defendant's acts cause injury to the plaintiff.
The Tenth Circuit held that when a claim is based on the destruction of a
plaintiff's business, the last day of business is the final date upon which a
defendant's acts cause injury to the plaintiff.325 Hence, plaintiff's first claim
was barred by the statute of limitations.
32 6
The court also summarily dismissed Curtis' claim that he was entitled to
recover for the closing of his employer's plant. Because Curtis was a salaried
employee at the time of the plant closing, he lacked standing to seek redress
for anticompetitive practices harming his employer.
327
Finally, the Tenth Circuit upheld dismissal of Curtis' claim relating to
the alleged conspiracy to prevent his purchase of his employer's closed
plant. 328 The court recognized that Curtis could potentially have standing
to assert this claim, 329 but held that Curtis had not, as a matter of law,
satisfied the requirements for such "excluded entrant" standing.330 The two
elements necessary for "excluded entrant" standing are a manifested intent
to enter a particular business, and a demonstrable preparedness to effect that
entry.3 3 ' No specific indicia of the necessary intent were set forth in Camp-
bell Taggart, but the court did set forth the following indicia of preparedness:
current financial ability to enter and operate the proposed business; existing
contractual obligations concerning purchase of the business; other affirma-
tive acts taken towards entry; and the proposed entrant's background and
experience. 332 Although Curtis' evidence showed an intention to enter and
showed extensive bakery experience, his inability to demonstrate a present
financial ability to purchase the plant precluded a finding that Curtis was
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id &Se 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982).
323. 687 F.2d at 337.
324. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
325. 687 F.2d at 337 (citing Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 117,
126 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub noain. Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv.
Corp., 423 U.S. 1054 (1976)).





331. ld. (quoting Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977),cert denied,
436 U.S. 956 (1978)).
332. 687 F.2d at 338 (citing Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633-34 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied. 385 U.S. 991 (1966)).
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prepared to enter the business.33 3 Accordingly, Curtis lacked standing to
bring a federal antitrust action based on the defendants' activities surround-
ing the final disposition of the closed plant.
334
Hartley Goldstone





During this survey term the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals again con-
sidered a large number of appeals arising from actions brought under federal
civil rights statutes. One area of controversy treated by this survey was cre-
ated when two Tenth Circuit panels, hearing cases brought under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 adopted inconsistent approaches towards
evaluating the evidentiary effect of proof that a minority candidate has bet-
ter objective qualifications than a selected applicant. Another employment
discrimination opinion covered by this survey examined the use of statistical
evidence to establish a pattern of discrimination.
The majority of civil rights appeals analyzed here, however, relate to
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Section 1983 provides a civil rem-
edy for persons suffering deprivations of federally protected rights through
actions taken under color of state law. 3 Several Tenth Circuit opinions ana-
lyzed in this section involve the question of when an ostensibly private
party's joint participation with a state or municipal entity constitutes action
taken under color of state law. Other section 1983 issues surveyed include
immunity for municipal officials, prisoner's rights, the propriety of awarding
a section 1983 plaintiff nominal damages, "special circumstances" which will
preclude an award of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a section 1983
action, and due process claims.
I. EFFECT OF PROVING A MINORITY CANDIDATE'S OBJECTIVELY
SUPERIOR QUALIFICATIONS IN A TITLE VII ACTION
A. Mohammed v. Callaway: Rebuttal of an Employer's Subjective
JusizVcations through Proof of Objectively Superior ualfatons
In Mohammed v. Callaway4 the plaintiff, a Hispanic civilian employee of
the Army, applied for a supervisor's position in response to a posted job va-
cancy.5 The announcement listed specific job qualifications, which the
plaintiff possessed.6 The stipulated facts established that the job opening
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17)(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the Jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
Id
3. See id.
4. 698 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1983).
5. Id at 396.
6. Id
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was withdrawn, and less than a year later the Army posted a similar open-
ing 7 with relaxed job qualifications.8  Dyer, the non-minority applicant
hired for the job, did not possess the original job qualifications,9 nor did he
possess the technical qualifications required for the revised position.' 0 Nev-
ertheless, Dyer was hired over Mohammed and two other applicants because
of Dyer's "experience, education, ability, dedication, and enthusiasm."''I Af-
ter Mohammed brought an administrative complaint alleging procedural ir-
regularities in the selection process, the Army ordered a new selection based
on an ostensibly objective "Ranking Guide."' 2 When Dyer was selected
again, Mohammed brought suit against the Army alleging discrimination
under Title VII. 13 Following a bench trial, the district court held that Mo-
hammed was not entitled to relief on two grounds. First, he had failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.' 4 Second, even if a prima
facie case had been established, the evidence showed that the Army had
chosen between two "amply" qualified candidates on the basis of legitimate
business reasons.' 5
1. Elements of a Prima Facie Claim of Promotion Discrimination
The trial court formulated the elements of a prima facie case of promo-
tion discrimination as "1) qualified applicant; 2) racial minority; 3) unsuc-
cessful application for existing vacancy; and 4) employer continuing to seek
further applicants."' 16 This formulation precisely paralleled that of the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 17 The Tenth Circuit re-
jected the trial court's formulation, pointing out that in promotion discrimi-
nation, as opposed to hiring discrimination, the sought after position will
usually be filled following rejection of the minority's application.' 8 Noting
that the Court in McDonnell Douglas had explicitly recognized that the ele-
ments of a prima facie case of employment discrimination will vary with the
7. The evidence indicated that the two positions were identical, although this question
was the subject of conflicting testimony. Set id at 396-97 & n.I.
8. Originally, the position in dispute was at a grade level GS-13; the position was down-
graded to GS-12 the second time it was posted. Mohammed and two other finalists could have
qualified at the GS-13 level, while the applicant selected for the position could not have quali-
fied at that level. Id at 397.
9. Id
10. Id. at 400.
11. Id at 397.
12. Id. at 398.
13. Title VII of the 1969 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17)(1976 & Supp. V
1981). See 698 F.2d at 398.
14. 698 F.2d at 398.
15. Id at 399.
16. Id at 398.
17. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). McDonnell Douglas held that a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion in hiring is established when a plaintiff's evidence shows that he or she belongs to a pro-
tected class; that he or she, while qualified for an open position, applied for that position; that
he or she was rejected for the position in spite of being qualified; and that the employer contin-
ued to seek qualified applicants following rejection of the plaintiff. Id "Protected classes" em-
brace classes based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(2)
(1976).
18. See 698 F.2d at 398.
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nature of the alleged discriminatory act, 19 the Tenth Circuit held that a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of promotion discrimination by prov-
ing that the first three McDonnell Douglas criteria are present 20 and then
showing that the position has been filled by another applicant. 2 1 Because
Mohammed's evidence satisfied this test, the Tenth Circuit held that a
prima facie case of employment discrimination was established as a matter
of law.
22
2. Subjective Hiring Criteria as Proof of Discriminatory Intent in
Light of a Minority Candidate's Objectively Superior
Qualifications
Once a prima facie case of discrimination is shown, the burden of pro-
duction 23 shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a legitimate business
reason for its prima facie discriminatory practice. 24 The employer meets this
burden by articulating a nondiscriminatory justification for its hiring deci-
sion. 25 The plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the employer's alleged reasons for rejecting the applica-
tion were only a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 26 The employee can
satisfy this burden by showing that a discriminatory intent in fact motivated
the employer's decision, or by offering evidence showing that the proffered
justification is unbelievable.
27
The district court in Mohammed found that the evidence showed that
Mohammed and Dyer were both "amply" qualified.2 8 In that context, sub-
jective considerations were accepted as a legitimate business reason support-
ing the Army's selection of Dyer.2 9 The district court then concluded that
Mohammed had not shown that the proffered reasons were mere pretext, 30
and accordingly held that the Army had not intentionally discriminated in
violation of Title VII.
3 1
After reviewing the entire record, the Tenth Circuit held that the dis-
trict court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, 32 and that the district
court had applied an erroneous legal standard in evaluating the employer's
explanations. 33 The record showed that the candidate selected was not "am-
19. Id (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973)).
20. See supra note 17.
21. 698 F.2d at 398 (quoting Mortenson v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822, 823 (10th Cir. 1982)).
22. 698 F.2d at 398.
23. The employee retains the burden of persuasion throughout a Title VII action. Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The prima facie case entitles an employee to judg-
ment if the employer fails to come forward with a legitimate business reason. Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 254.
25. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
26. Id at 256.
27. Id
28. 698 F.2d at 399.
29. Ste id at 400-01.
30. Id. at 399.
31. See id. at 396.
32. See id at 401.
33. See td.
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ply" qualified. 34 More importantly, the record showed that the candidates
were not equal qualified:35 specific qualifications placed in the job an-
nouncement were met by Mohammed, but not by Dyer.36 The Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that a candidate meeting the specific requirements in a job
announcement is objectively more qualified than one who does not meet the
stated requirements. 37 Although an employer retains discretion to choose
between equally qualified candidates on the basis of nondiscriminatory, sub-
jective criteria,38 the use of those criteria when candidates are not equally
qualified substantially diminishes the credibility of the employer's justifica-
tion for using subjective criteria as the ultimate basis of its decision. 39 Given
the inferences of discriminatory intent arising from the totality of the Army's
conduct,' the Tenth Circuit found that the Army had engaged in inten-
tional discrimination and accordingly reversed the lower court.
3. Summary
Three significant principles for proving employment discrimination re-
sult from Mohammed. First, the elements of a prima facie case of employment
discrimination are flexible. 4i Second, a critical determination in assessing
whether applicants are equally qualified is the match between an applicant's
credentials and posted job requirements. 4 2 Third, a strong inference of in-
tentional discrimination arises when an employer uses subjective factors to
justify the rejection of a minority candidate who is objectively better quali-






38. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (quoted in
Mohammed, 698 F.2d at 401).
39. See 698 F.2d at 401. Adams v. Gaudet, 515 F. Supp. 1086 (W.D.La. 1981) held that
unless a selected applicant is objectively more qualified than a rejected minority applicant, the
employer does not rebut the prima facie case by explaining that its hiring decision was based on
an employer's prerogative to make a discretionary selection. Id. at 1097-98 (citing Burdine, 450
U.S. at 259). Mohammed cites Gauder for the proposition that use of subjective criteria in re-
jecting a better qualified minority candidate is indicative of discriminatory intent. 698 F.2d at
399. Mohammed, however, did not adopt Gaudetr's categorical rejection of the power of a discre-
tion-based explanation to rebut a prima facie case when an objectively better qualified minority
applicant has been rejected. See id. at 401.
40. The court observed that, in addition to reliance on subjective considerations, the Army
had engaged in inexplicable procedural irregularities in filling the position in question, had
adopted but not implemented an affirmative action program, and had never permitted a minor-
ity to hold a supervisory position in the division encompassing the disputed position. 698 F.2d
at 401.
41. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
43. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See also Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1045
(10th Cir. 1981)(subjective decision-making creates inference of discriminatory intent where ap-
plicant's protected class is significantly under-represented). In another twist on the use of sub-
jective qualifications, the Tenth Circuit recently held that failure to meet an employer's
subjective criteria could not defeat a plaintiff's prima facie case. Burrus v. United Telephone
Co., 683 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 491 (1982).
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B. Verniero v. Air Force Academy School District # 20: The Insignificance
of Superior Objecive Qualiications
Three months after Mohammed, a different Tenth Circuit panel ad-
dressed another case involving a similar set of facts, but reached its result by
using an analysis inconsistent with that of Mohammed. In Verniero v. 4ir Force
Academy School District #20, 4" the plaintiff, a female, applied for two job
vacancies within School District #20: elementary school principal and di-
rector of special education.45 The school district had posted a vacancy no-
tice for the elementary school principal position listing three job
requirements: 1) three years experience in public schools, 2) master's degree
or equivalent, and 3) a Type D administrative certificate. 46 Although the
plaintiff undisputably met all three requirements, a male applicant who pos-
sessed only two of the qualifications47 was selected over Verniero, allegedly
on the basis of certain subjective factors. 48 The job announcement for the
position of Director of Special Education listed three years experience in spe-
cial education and a Type D or special education endorsement as the re-
quired qualifications. 49 Although the plaintiff was admittedly qualified, a
male applicant was hired.50 Verniero then brought suit alleging sex discrim-
ination under Title VII.
Following a bench trial, the district court found that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of discrimination, that the defendant had ar-
ticulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's non-selection;
and that plaintiff had been unable to show the proffered reasons were pre-
text, or were overshadowed by unarticulated discriminatory purposes.
5i
Thus, plaintiff failed to carry her ultimate burden of proving that she was
the victim of intentional sex discrimination.
52
Verniero appealed to the Tenth Circuit on three grounds. First, she
argued that the district court failed to give due weight to the fact that she
had established a prima facie case of discrimination. 53 Second, she argued
that the court failed to evaluate the school board's use of subjective criteria
in its selection process as a possible pretext for sex discrimination.5 4 Finally,
Verniero argued that the trial court failed to recognize that waiver of the
Type D certificate after it had been listed as a job qualification indicated
44. 705 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1983).
45. Id. at 390.
46. Id
47. The male applicant, who came from outside the state, did not possess the required
Type D Administrative Certificate. Id at 390.
48. Id at 392. The School District presented evidence that it preferred an out-of-state
person, and that certification requirements had been waived for other out-of-state persons "in
certain circumstances." Id
49. Id at 390.
50. Id
51. Id; cf. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (plaintiff may demonstrate employer's justification was
not basis for selection decision by showing that "a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or . . . by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence").
52. 705 F.2d at 392.




that the district's reasons for failing to hire her were pretextual. 55
Judge Barrett, writing for the Tenth Circuit over Judge McKay's dis-
sent, found the plaintiffs first argument to be without merit.56 Judge Bar-
rett stated that when the trial court properly found that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case, it correctly shifted the burden to the defend-
ant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying the posi-
tion to the plaintiff.5 7 Because this was the proper treatment of a prima
facie case, plaintiff's first ground for appeal did not justify reversal.
The plaintiffs next contention was essentially that the pervasive subjec-
tivity of the articulated basis for the Board's decision precluded a finding
that the Board had not consciously or unconsciously discriminated in the
hiring process.58 While acknowledging that a decision based on subjective
opinions of a candidate's qualifications entitles a plaintiff "to the benefit of
an inference of discrimination, ' 59 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the subjective factors used by the district, such as the
quality of an employee's work experience or the employee's ability to get
along with others, were legitimate reasons for selecting one applicant over
another.60 Because the defendant had articulated legitimate reasons for the
plaintiff's non-selection, plaintiff was required to show that the ostensibly
legitimate reasons merely shrouded the employer's true discriminatory mo-
tive. 6 Deferring to the trial court's findings, the Tenth Circuit held that the
plaintiff had not shown that the school district's justifications were merely
pretextual.
62
Plaintiff's third argument, that the defendant's waiver of the Type D
certificate after listing it as a job qualification demonstrated that the Board's
justifications for its hiring decision were merely pretextual, was also re-
jected.63 Testimony indicated that the certificate requirements had been
waived for non-residents in certain circumstances in the past, and that the
Board preferred a non-resident for the position.64 Once again, the court re-
fused to reverse the trial court's finding that the defendant had acted for its
stated, legitimate reasons and without discriminatory intent.
65
Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs contention that remarks of the trial
judge demonstrating distaste for discrimination suits justified a new trial.
Although the majority found the remarks "misplaced," it viewed them as
55. Id. at 391.
56. Id
57. Id The purpose of the prima facie case is to ensure that the employment decision did
not result from a simple lack of qualifications or lack of a job opening. International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977). The prima facie case essentially
serves to identify a case as one having an inherent likelihood of discrimination, thus requiring
the presentation of substantive evidence of non-discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56.
58. See 705 F.2d at 391.
59. Id (citing Burrus v. United Telephone Co., 638 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1982)).
60. 705 F.2d at 392.
61. Id See also Burdne, 450 U.S. at 256.
62. 705 F.2d at 391.







In a persuasive dissent, Judge McKay stressed that the majority erred
by failing to engage in the method of analysis set forth in Mohammed.6 7 In
Mohammed the Tenth Circuit emphasized that when an employer rejects a
minority candidate on the basis of employer discretion (i.e. on the basis of
subjective factors), the crucial determination is whether the candidate se-
lected is as objectively qualified as the minority candidate. 68 Incident to this
inquiry, Mohammed held that candidates meeting the specific requirements in
a job announcement are objectively better qualified than those who do
not, 69 and that once the bypassed minority employee establishes superior
objective qualifications the factfinder must consider the inference of discrim-
inatory intent which results from the decision to use subjective, rather than
objective, criteria. 70  Similarly, Mohammed confirmed that employer use of
subjective factors to justify rejection of a minority candidate generally sup-
ports an inference of discriminatory intent or pretext. 7 1 Judge McKay
would have remanded because the Verntero trial court failed to consider the
relative objective qualifications of plaintiff and the successful candidate, and
because the trial court's findings failed to give due weight to the strong infer-
ence of discriminatory intent arising from the employer's ultimate reliance
on subjective hiring criteria.
72
Judge McKay also dissented from the majority's treatment of the trial
judge's disparaging remarks. Noting that judges must disqualify themselves
if their impartiality towards a particular case could be reasonably ques-
tioned,73 Judge McKay felt that the trial judge's remarks clearly demon-
strated a prejudicial lack of impartiality which, in conjunction with the
failure to follow Mohammed, mandated a new trial.
74
C. The Conflict Created by Mohammed and Verniero
One possible explanation for the difference in the appellate treatment of
Mohammed and Vermiero is the different nature of the disputed positions. The
supervisory position in Mohammed was technically oriented, rendering subjec-
tive factors of little relevance in the hiring decision. Given the technical
orientation of the position, the applicant meeting the posted requirements is
clearly the better qualified candidate. Conversely, in school staff administra-
tive positions, like those in Vernerio, subjective factors, such as the ability to
66. Id. at 393. Prior to entering his findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial judge
questioned the reasons why anyone would serve as a school board member in light of the liabil-
ity for civil rights violations, and stated that the only way a board member could be absolutely
sure of avoiding discrimination cases is by hiring "only handicapped females having as grand-
parents a Black, a Chicano, an American Indian and an Oriental, who is over 50 years of age."
Id at 393 n.2.
67. Id. at 393 (McKay, J., dissenting).
68. Id. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 40. See also Mohammed, 698 F.2d at 401.
72. 705 F.2d at 394 (McKay, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 394 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)(1982)).
74. 705 F.2d at 395 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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work with others, would be of greater importance. The Vernerto court did
not, however, attempt to articulate such a distinction. As a result, trial
courts lack guidance on whether, and to what extent, Mohammed's objective-
criteria based analysis is controlling.
75
II. THE USE OF STATISTICS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
During the survey term, the Tenth Circuit examined the admissibility
of statistical evidence to rebut an employer's reason for rejecting a minority
applicant. In Anderson v. City of Albuquerque76 the plaintiff, while employed by
the City of Albuquerque, learned that the staff director for the Human
Rights Board was planning to resign and applied for the position. 7 7 Ander-
son then voluntarily left her job with the city to accept a position elsewhere,
but did not withdraw her application for the staff director position. 78 Upon
learning that a male Hispanic was appointed to the position, Anderson insti-
tuted a class action under Title VII claiming illegal sex discrimination.
79
The trial court dismissed the class action, held the staff director's position
was exempt from Title VII, and dismissed Anderson's claim on the merits.
8 0
Anderson then appealed, contending that the court erroneously denied her
standing to maintain the class action, 8' erroneously ruled the position was
exempt,8 2 and erroneously failed to admit and consider statistical evidence
she offered to rebut the employer's articulated legitimate business reason for
its selection of another candidate.8 3 The Tenth Circuit, over Chief Judge
Seth's dissent, agreed with all of plaintiff's contentions.
8 4
A. Class Action Standing for Voluntarily Terminated Employee
The trial court ruled that the Tenth Circuit's Hernandez v. Gray8 5 deci-
sion precluded finding that plaintiff had standing to maintain a class action
representing past, present, and future female city employees. 86 Hernandez
held that former employees who had voluntarily terminated their employ-
ment could not maintain a class action based on allegations of discrimina-
75. Further confusion stems from Mohammed itself. The court noted that an Army witness
had testified that specific qualifications were listed in job announcements for the express pur-
pose of obtaining the best qualified personnel. 698 F.2d at 400. The court stated that "[tlhe
only reasonable inference to be drawn from thit evidence is that a candidate who meets the spe-
cific requirements in the job announcement is better qualified than one who must resort to
alternative criteria." Id (emphasis supplied). Thus it is unclear whether a candidate meeting
posted qualifications will automatically be deemed more objectively qualified, or whether em-
ployer testimony concerning the purpose of specific requirements will be necessary in order to
establish the superior objective qualifications of one matching posted requirements.
76. 690 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1982).





82. Id. at 800.
83. Id at 802.
84. See id at 803.
85. 530 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1976).
86. 690 F 2d at 799.
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tion towards existing employees.8 7 The reason for this holding was that the
voluntary ex-employees did not allege they were past victims of the alleged
discriminatory practice, nor did they allege they were presently victims of
the employer's discrimination.88 Thus, they were not representatives of the
putative class, and had no standing to maintain an action on behalf of the
class.8 9
Unlike the trial court, the Tenth Circuit found Hernandez distinguish-
able from Anderson .9 The court noted that Anderson had maintained an
employment application despite her voluntary termination; thus, Anderson
remained a member of the class subject to the employer's alleged hiring dis-
crimination and had standing to maintain the class action.9 1 The court also
noted that the district court had erred to the extent it premised its denial of
class certification on the merits of plaintiffs claim.
92
B. Title VI Exemption
Title VII exempts certain governmental advisory/policy making posi-
tions from the its antidiscrimination strictures. 93 The Tenth Circuit stated
that, in any event, this exemption must be narrowly construed. 94 Examining
the evidence detailing the staff director's actual advisory functions, the court
concluded that the staff director was not a policy making employee, was not
on an elected official's staff, and was not a legal advisor to an elected offi-
cial. 95 Hence, even though the staff director position was not subject to civil
service laws, it did not fall within the claimed exemption.
96
C. Use of Statistical Evidence to Demonstrate Discri'minalory Intent
The Tenth Circuit also reversed and remanded the case to the district
court with directions to admit excluded statistical evidence, 9 7 and then to re-
evaluate the evidence and make findings in terms of the three-step presenta-
tion of proof analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas.98 The court noted that
87. Hernandez v. Gray, 530 F.2d 858, 859 (10th Cir. 1976).
88. Id
89. Id
90. Anderson, 690 F.2d at 799.
91. Id
92. Id
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(0(1976). This section provides:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except that
the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any State
or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person
chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the
policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the consti-
tutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sen-
tence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State
government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
Id
94. 690 F.2d at 800.
95. Id at 800-01.
96. Id. at 801.
97. Id. at 803.
98. Id The method of proof required by McDonnetll Douglas is: 1) plaintiff establishes prima
facie case; 2) employer articulates legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its hiring decision;
and 3) plaintiff presents evidence showing employer's actual motivation was discriminatory ani-
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because upper level jobs are often filled on the basis of subjective factors,
statistical evidence of the employer's overall hiring practices becomes espe-
cially significant.99 Although the trial court had admitted statistical evi-
dence relating to the city's general female hiring practices, those statistics did
not examine hiring of females as professionals or as department heads.10 0
When plaintiff attempted to inquire about those statistics, defense objections
were made and sustained. 10 1 Given the significance of statistics concerning
professionals and department heads to plaintiffs claim, and the Supreme
Court's explicit approval of the use of statistics to rebut an employer's prof-
fered legitimate reasons for its hiring decision,'0 2 the Tenth Circuit held that
Anderson had been denied a fair trial 10 3 and ordered a new trial including
the excluded statistical evidence.' 0 4 As noted, the majority also instructed
the trial court to make its findings of fact in a manner reflecting its consider-
ation of the McDonnell Douglas three-step analysis. 
0 5
D. The Dissent
Chief Judge Seth dissented from the majority's ruling on plaintiff's class
action claim, 10 6 its ruling on the exclusion of statistical evidence,'0 7 and its
ruling requiring the trial court to make findings of fact explicitly tracing the
McDonnell Douglas three-step analysis.'0 8 The dissent reasoned that the
plaintiff had been discriminated against (if at all) only for a nonclassified
supervisory position, precluding her from being considered a representative
of a class including all female city employees.' 0 9 Further, because a class
including all future female city employees was "really not a description of a
class at all,"" 10 the class action claim should have been rejected for failure to
identify a true class."'1 Similarly, Chief Judge Seth would have upheld the
trial court's rejection of plaintiffs "statistical evidence" concerning profes-
sional employment because the lack of any supporting data made the evi-
dence meaningless."' 2 Finally, the dissent found no support in Supreme
Court rulings or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for requiring the trial
court to present its findings in a manner exactly paralleling that of the Mc-
mus rather than the proffered legitimate justification. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
99. 690 F.2d at 802 (citing Bartholet, Apphcation of Title VIIftoobs in High Places, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 947 (1982)).
100. 690 F.2d at 802.
101. Id.
102. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
103. 690 F.2d at 803 (citing Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 833 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977)).
104. 690 F.2d at 803.
105. Id
106. Id at 804 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id at 805.
109. Id. at 804.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 805.
112. Chief Judge Seth noted that the plaintiff offered no evidence relating the numbers of
female professionals or department heads to the labor market, the number of applicants, or
"anything else which would make the numbers relevant." Id at 804.
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Donnell Douglas evidentiary scheme. t
13
III. SECTION 1983: DUE PROCESS AND THE DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
The fourteenth amendment 1 4 entitles a person to protection of prop-
erty rights against state interference without due process of law. 1 5 Persons
acting under color of state law who interfere with this fundamental protec-
tion without due process of law are subject to a federal civil rights action
under section 1983.116 This section surveys several Tenth Circuit decisions
involving property rights and section 1983 claims.
A. Requirement of Notice Prior to Sale of Property
McKee v. Heggy 117 began with McKee's arrest for kidnapping.1 18 While
searching McKee's car the police found what they thought was marijuana
and, consequently, seized the car as potential evidence. 19 Two weeks later,
after deciding against using the car as evidence, the police treated the car as
abandoned and sold it at a public auction without directly notifying the
plaintiff.120 Alleging that the police knew he was an interested party and
had failed to notify him of the sale, McKee brought a section 1983 action
claiming that he was deprived of a property interest without due process of
law when the police sold his car.' 2 ' Deciding the merits of the section 1983
claim, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city and
the police chief on the basis that the notice provided through police compli-
ance with Oklahoma's abandonment statute
122 satisfied due process. 123
In light of the fact that the plaintiffs car was seized and not abandoned,
the Tenth Circuit held that compliance with the Oklahoma abandonment
statute's notice procedures was irrelevant.' 24 The court then assessed the
adequacy of the notice provided against the standard announced in Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. :125 notice reasonably calculated to reach
113. Id. at 805.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment prohibits governmental ac-
tions which deprive "any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id
115. Id. The traditional forms of possessory interests in real and personal property clearly
fall within the fourteenth amendment's definition of property. Eg., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972). Since the 1972 decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the four-
teenth amendment's definition of property has been extended by the concept of "entitlement."
This concept includes interests, such as governmental benefits, which are unlike traditional
property but which are entitled to fourteenth amendment protection because persons justifiably
rely on the continued existence of those benefits. Id at 577. Seegenerally Monaghan, Of"Liberty"
and "Property", 62 CORNELL L.J. 405 (1977).
116. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 927 & n.18 (1982); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
117. 703 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1983).
118. Id at 480.
119. Id
120. Id. at 481.
121. Id. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434(1982).
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 908 (1981). This statute provides for notice to an abandoned
car's registered owner, id. § 908(l), and also requires public notice of a proposed sale. Id.
123. 703 F.2d at 481.
124. Id. at 482.
125. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
1984]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
all interested parties in time to afford them a reasonable opportunity to be
heard.' 26 The court of appeals found that the posted notice given by the
police was not "reasonably calculated" to inform the plaintiff of the sale
127
and thus did not afford him an adequate opportunity to present his objec-
tions. 128 Therefore, McKee was deprived of a property interest without be-
ing afforded due process of law. 129 The court also noted that because the
sale was not explicitly authorized by statute or rule, McKee would have to
prove that the sale was pursuant to the department's customary informal
procedure in order to establish action under color of state law.
130
B. Salzs fzg Due Process Through Providing A Post-deprivation Tort Remedy
The Supreme Court, in Parratt v. Taylor,131 held that a prisoner is de-
prived of property under color of state law when prison personnel negli-
gently lose or destroy a prisoner's property.' 32 Parrait further held that due
process is not violated by deprivation of property simpliciter; rather, there
needed to be a shortcoming in the state procedures which resulted in inade-
quate procedural protection of the prisoner's property interest.' 33 Hence,
due process is satisfied if circumstances preclude providing a prisoner with
meaningful predeprivation process and the state provides a meaningful post-
deprivation remedy. 1
34
In Wizams v. Morris 135 the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action alleg-
ing that because prison employees had negligently lost his property, which
had been stored in the prison during his incarceration, he had been deprived
of property without due process. 136 The district court dismissed Williams'
suit as frivolous because, although the state could not have predicted the
negligent loss of plaintiff's property and therefore could not have provided a
meaningful predeprivation hearing, the state had provided a meaningful
post-deprivation remedy through a state prison grievance procedure.
13 7
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, but differed
with the district court's analysis of the source of Williams' meaningful post-
deprivation remedy. The court noted that the prison grievance procedure
could only afford partial relief, perhaps unconstitutionally, because it did
126. Id. at 314. The Supreme Court stated that provision for a hearing satisfies due process
only when notice is given which is "reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." d. See 703 F.2d at 482.
127. 703 F.2d at 482. The Oklahoma City Police Department knew McKee was an inter-
ested party because he had informed an interrogating police officer that the car was his, and
because his parents and lawyer had repeatedly inquired about the car at the police station. Id
128. Id. at 482.
129. Id
130. Id. at 482-83.
131. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
132. Id. at 536-37.
133. See id. at 537-41.
134. Id
135. 697 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1983).
136. Id. at 1350.
137. 697 F.2d at 1351.
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not provide a prisoner a chance to prove his entire loss.138 Turning to state
tort law as a source of post-deprivation relief, the court of appeals acknowl-
edged that although the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 139 precluded an
action against the state, the warden, or other supervisors, Williams could
proceed against those prison employees whose alleged negligence caused his
claimed loss.' 40 Because the state, via its tort law, provided Williams with a
post-deprivation remedy providing the possibility of full compensation for
his alleged loss, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Wil-
liams' section 1983 claim.
14 1
C. Due Process Considerations in Terminatn1g a Pubh'c Employee
In M'ller v. City of Mssi'on, 142 a newly elected mayor fired the plaintiff,
an assistant police chief and member of the police force for over fifteen years,
on the grounds that the plaintiff was responsible for the low morale and high
turnover in the police department. 1 3 At the time of his termination plain-
tiff was informed that he was entitled to a hearing, but was not in fact pro-
vided a pretermination hearing. 144 Nine days later, the plaintiff received a
letter from the mayor informing plaintiff of his right to a public hearing and
listing seven reasons for his termination. 145 Miller was eventually granted a
post-termination hearing, at which a list of additional, previously undis-
closed reasons for termination were presented. 146 Following the hearing the
mayor refused to reinstate Miller who then sought, unsuccessfully, law en-
forcement employment in several nearby cities as well as local employment
unrelated to police work. 14 7 Miller subsequently brought suit against the
city, the mayor, and several city council members under section 1983 claim-
ing that the termination of his employment as assistant police chief had de-
prived him of liberty and property interests without due process of law.148
In a pretrial hearing the district court ruled that the discharge proce-
dure had unconstitutionally deprived Miller of a property interest unless the
city could show that the failure to provide a pretermination hearing was
based on extraordinary circumstances, existing at the time of termination,
which justified denial of a hearing. 149 After trial, the court found that no
such circumstances existed.15°
The district court also determined, on a motion for summary judgment,
that the hearing officer presiding over the termination hearing was biased,
138. Id The grievance procedure did not allow a prisoner to recover for items not listed in
the prisoner's "property book"; it was the use of this conclusive presumption that was poten-
tially unconstitutional. Id (citing \:landis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)).
139. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 1983).
140. 697 F.2d at 1351.
141. Id
142. 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983).





148. Id at 370.
149. Id. at 371.
150. Id at 372.
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thereby denying the plaintiff due process. 1 ' In addition to the violations of
due process found by the court, the jury found that the plaintiff had been
deprived of a liberty interest without due process of law.
152
On appeal, the defendants contended that the district court erred in
holding that the hearing was defective, 153 that the evidence did not support
the conclusion that the plaintiffs liberty interests were denied, 154 and that
the city council members were not liable for plaintiff's injuries. 155 The
Tenth Circuit rejected these contentions.
1. Pretermination Hearing Requirements
The Tenth Circuit held that the hearing actually accorded petitioner
violated due process in three ways. First, due process requires an impartial
tribunal and pre-hearing notice of the charges which will be asserted at the
hearing. 156 Because the plaintiff first learned of many of the reasons for his
dismissal at the hearing itself, due process was violated. 15 7 Second, absent
the presence of an emergency, only a pretermination hearing satisfies due
process.' 58 Because no emergency existed justifying the failure to provide
plaintiff a pretermination hearing, due process was violated.' 5 9 Finally, the
court rejected the defendants' argument that the Rule of Necessity rendered
the hearing adequate, even though the hearing officer may have been
prejudiced. 60 Under the Rule of Necessity, due process is not violated when
a tribunal has an interest in the matter to be decided if the matter cannot
otherwise be heard. 16' The court of appeals found that the defendants' evi-
dence did not demonstrate the unavailability of an unprejudiced hearing
officer. 16 2 Thus, the Rule of Necessity was irrelevant, and due process was
violated by use of a biased hearing officer.
16 3
2. Deprivation of Public Employee's Liberty Interest
A public employee's liberty interest is deprived without due process of
law when the manner of termination either stigmatizes the employee or fore-
closes comparable employment opportunities. 164 In Miler, the irregularity
of the termination proceedings 165 failed to provide plaintiff the fair hearing
necessary to protect his liberty interests.' 66 Further, the mayor responsible
151. Id
152. Id at 372-73.
153. Id at 372.
154. Id at 373.
155. Id at 374.
156. Id at 372 (citing Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 434 U.S. 907
(1977)).
157. 705 F.2d at 372.
158. Id (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972)).
159. 705 F.2d at 372.
160. Id
161. Id (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980)).
162. 705 F.2d at 372.
163. Id.
164. Id at 373.
165. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
166. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
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for the termination extensively publicized both the fact of termination and
the reasons therefore.16 7 Plaintiffs inability to obtain similar employment
could reasonably be traced to the defendants' due process violations.' 68 The
court therefore upheld the jury's conclusion that plaintiffs liberty interests
had been violated. 1
69
3. Immunity for City Council Members
Several defendants also appealed on the grounds that their actions as
city council members had not deprived Miller of property without due pro-
cess, and that they could not be individually liable because of their qualified
immunity.' 70 The court held that even if these defendant's had not initiated
the unconstitutional termination proceedings, they had both ratified the de-
cision to proceed and failed to take steps to prevent unconstitutional ac-
tion. 17 1 Accordingly, they were responsible for the injuries caused by the
municipality's actions.1 72 Further, the city council officials had not acted
pursuant to a good faith, reasonable belief that the termination proceedings
were constitutional. 73 Hence, they were not entitled to immunity from per-
sonal liability. 1
74
IV. STATE ACTION THROUGH NOMINALLY PRIVATE PERSONS
This section examines the extent to which a private entity must inter-
face with the government in order for seemingly private actions to constitute
state action for the purpose of section 1983 liability.
A. Prvate School Discipline as State Action
In Milonas v. Williams 175 former students of the Provo Canyon School
for Boys brought a class action alleging that their constitutional rights had
been violated by the school's use of a behavior-modification program which
administered polygraph tests, monitored and censored students' mail, used
isolation rooms, and used excessive physical force. 1 76 The district court
found that the school's behavior modification program was carried out
"under the cloak of state action."' 77 This conclusion was based on the fact
that various state agencies charged with supervision over juveniles sent stu-
167. 705 F.2d at 373.
168. Id at 374.
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id at 374-75.
172. Id at 375 (citing McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 697 (10th Cir. 1979)).
173. Id at 375-76. The court noted that the defendants' conduct violated well established
principles of constitutional law, and that therefore they could not have had a reasonable belief
in the propriety of their actions. Id at 375 n.6. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982)).
174. 705 F.2d at 376. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)(discussing personal liability of municipal officers).
175. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1524 (1983).
176. Id at 934. The school's behavior modification program allegedly involved cruel and
unusual punishment and denied plaintiffs' right to due process of law. Id.
177. Id. at 939.
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dents to the school, the fact that the school received significant state funding,
and the extensive state regulation of the school. 178 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's conclusion that the owners and operators of the
Provo Canyon School were acting under color of state law.1
79
The Tenth Circuit stated that the essential inquiry in determining when
private action is action under color of state law is "whether the alleged in-
fringement of Federal rights is fairly attributable to the state."' 80 The court
held that the extensive state involvement in funding the school, the knowing
acquiesence of state agencies in Provo Canyon's use of the behavior modifi-
cation program, and the state practice of mandating attendance at the
school rendered the behavior modification program action under color of
state law.' 8 ' In reaching its decision the court distinguished Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn,' 82 a Supreme Court decision holding that state funding and regula-
tion of a private school were insufficient, in and of themselves, to support a
finding of action under color of state law when the school discharged em-
ployees.' 8 3 In Rendell-Baker, the parties bringing the section 1983 action
were discharged employees, not students. 184 The Supreme Court observed
that because the state regulations did not compel or influence the decision to
discharge the employees, 185 the school's action could not fairly be character-
ized as state action. 186 Thus, although state funding and regulation were
not enough to create state action, the Tenth Circuit held that because the
state agencies had approved of the practices challenged in Mionas, and had
sent students to the school knowing they would be subjected to the chal-
lenged practices, use of the practices constituted state action.1
87
B. Determhzing When a State Actor's Actions are "State Action"
Gi/more v. Salt Lake Communzy Action Program 188 arose when Gilmore was
terminated from his position as Fiscal Director of the Salt Lake Community
Action Program (SLCAP).' 89 The plaintiff filed suit alleging that his termi-
nation involved state and federal action depriving him of a property interest
without due process of law. 90 Gilmore asserted that because SLCAP was a
state organized "community action agency" funded and regulated by Con-
178. Id. at 940.
179. Id at 941.
180. Id. (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)).
181. 691 F.2d at 940.
182. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
183. Id. at 840-41.
184. Id at 830.
185. Id at 841.
186. Id. at 842. See also id. at 838 n.6.
187. 691 F.2d at 940. The First Circuit, in Rendell-Baker, had observed that students placed
in the private school by state agencies "would have a stronger argument than do plaintiffs that
the school's action towards Men is taken 'under color of' state law, since the school derives its
authority over them from the state." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 1981),
affd, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)(emphasis in original).
188. 710 F.2d 632 (10th Cir. 1983).
189. See id at 632-33.
190. Id at 633.
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gress' 9 1 its actions necessarily involved state and federal action. 192
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that no federal
action was present by likening federal involvement in Gilmore's firing to the
state involvement in Rendell-Baker.'93 Thus, although there was extensive
federal funding and regulation of SLCAP, the lack of federal involvement in
SLCAP's personnel policies and decisions precluded a finding of federal
action. 1
94
The court also held that Gilmore's termination did not involve state
action. 195 This decision was reached after applying the two-part test for
state action articulated in Lugar v. Edmondson O1l Co. ,196 a recent Supreme
Court opinion. Under Lugar, state action is present when the alleged uncon-
stitutional conduct results from a rule, policy, or decision attributable to the
state, and when the defendant is a person who may be fairly characterized as
a state actor. 19 7 The court found that although SLCAP was a state actor,19 8
there were no allegations that its personnel policies or decisions reflected or
embodied state policies or objectives.' 99 Thus, although SCLAP was a state
actor, the decision to terminate Gilmore did not involve state action20 0 and
accordingly could not be the subject of a section 1983 action.
V. LIMITING PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY DURING PERFORMANCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS
In Coleman v. Turpen,201 the Tenth Circuit heard a case which deter-
mined whether a plaintiff, who was deprived of property by a private party,
could maintain an action under section 1983. In connection with Coleman's
arrest, the Oklahoma City Sheriffs Department had seized Coleman's truck
and camper worth $8,000, some tools worth $500, and $210 cash. 20 2 After
seizing Coleman, the Sheriff's Department hired a private wrecker to tow
and store the camper.20 3 The company subsequently presented the Sheriffs
Department with a substantial bill for storing the vehicle.
20 4
191. SLCAP was organized under the aegis of Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2781-2837 (1976) (repealed 1981). 710 F.2d at 634.
192. See 710 F.2d at 635.
193. Id at 636.
194. Id
195. Id at 639.
196. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
197. Id at 937.
198. See 710 F.2d at 637. The court found that SLCAP was a state actor because the state
was responsible for SLCAP's existence, and because many of SLCAP directors were public offi-
cials. Id Gilmore indicates that the mere presence of public officials in a policymaking position
may be sufficient to render an agency a state actor. See id. at 637 n.12.
199. Id at 638-39.
200. Id. at 638. The Tenth Circuit explicitly recognized the apparent paradox of finding
that the actions of a state actor were not "state action," but reasoned that a state should not be
charged with responsibility for all actions taken by independent (i.e. nominally private) state
actors. See id. at 638 n.13. The court recognized, however, that actions taken by state officials
under state authority are undeniably "state action." Id.
201. 697 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1983).
202. Id at 1343. The ultimate disposition of the tools was unclear, see id.; for the purpose of





Coleman was convicted of murder and received a death sentence. 20 5
None of the seized property, with the possible execption of the cash, 20 6 was
used at Coleman's trial.20 7 After his conviction, Coleman tried to recover his
property and learned that his camper had been sold, with police permission,
to cover the storage bill. 208 The authorities also refused to return the cash,
alleging that they had a statutory duty to retain all evidence used at Cole-
man's trial until the death penalty was exacted. 20 9 Coleman then brought a
section 1983 action against the sheriff, the public prosecutor, and the wreck-
er service. 2 l0 The district court dismissed the suit as frivolous and also found
that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from Coleman's suit, and that
the sheriff was immune because of his statutory duty to retain the evi-
dence.2 1' Additionally, the district court held that the private wrecker was
not acting under "color of state law" when it sold the camper, and that
therefore that action could not subject any of the defendants to liability
under section 1983.212
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit examined the alleged deprivation of cash
separately from the deprivation of the camper and tools, in order to deline-
ate the contours of the asserted due process violations and the asserted im-
munity defenses.
2 13
A. Immunity for Retention of .Possible Evidence
As noted, the prosecutor and sheriff claimed to be keeping the cash in
accordance with an Oklahoma statute.21 4 Coleman alleged, however, that
the money was not used as evidence in his trial.2 15 The court of appeals held
that because Coleman was not given an opportunity to show that the money
was not used as evidence at trial, and therefore was not subject to retention
under Oklahoma law, he had stated a claim of deprivation of his property
without due process. 2 16 Thus, the trial court had erred in ruling that Cole-
man's section 1983 claim was frivolous with respect to the retained cash.
21 7
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the public
prosecutor was absolutely immune for his role in keeping the cash. 2t 8 The
205. Id
206. See id at 1344.
207. Id at 1343.
208. Id
209. Id The prosecutor and sheriff claimed to be acting pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 1327(1981 & Supp. 1983), which requires retention of all exhibits in capital cases until the
death penalty has been carried out. See id § 1327(A).
210. 697 F.2d at 1343.
211. Id
212. Id
213. See id See also infra notes 214-33 and accompanying text.
214. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1327 (1981 & Supp. 1983). See supra note 210.
215. 697 F.2d at 1344.
216. Id
217. Id
218. Id The Tenth Circuit found that absolute immunity was required by Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), which confers absolute immunity on a public prosecutor for his
conduct in "initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state's case." Id at 431. The court
found that retention of possible evidence was part of the prosecutor's presentation of his case.
697 F.2d at 1344.
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court, however, rejected the categorical grant of immunity for the sheriff.
The sheriff was only entitled to immunity if he did not know or could not
reasonably have known that he was depriving Coleman of his constitutional
rights. 2 19 Because Coleman claimed that his money was not introduced as
evidence, the Oklahoma statute might not have been applicable. If the trial
court found that Coleman's claim was true, it would be required to consider
the sheriffs conduct to determine whether qualified immunity was avail-
able.220 Hence, the trial court had improperly granted immunity to the
sheriff.
2 21
B. Immunity for Admnistrative Dsposition of Prisoner's Property
Before reaching this immunity issue, the Tenth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's finding that the private wrecker service's sale of the camper and
tools was not action under color of state law.2 22 The court once again relied
heavily on Lugar's two-part test 2 2 3 for ascertaining the presence of state ac-
tion. 224 The court of appeals held that by enacting a statute225 which al-
lowed a good faith purchaser of the truck and camper to take them free of
Coleman's claims, Oklahoma had created the right to sell the truck exercised
by the wrecker service. 226 This satisfied the first prong of the Lugar test.
2 27
With respect to the second prong, because the state expressly permitted the
wrecker service to hold and sell the camper, the state had jointly partici-
pated with the private wrecker service in depriving Coleman of his property,
rendering the sale action by a state actor.2 28 Further, because Coleman had
not received notice of the sale, and because there was no exigency precluding
a predeprivation hearing, Coleman had stated a claim of unconstitutional
state action.
229
With respect to the immunity issue, the court of appeals found that the
prosecutor, in participating in the disposition of property which was not
used as evidence, had been acting in an administrative capacity and not as
an advocate. 230 Therefore, the prosecutor had only a qualified immunity,
which would shield him from liability only if he neither knew or should have
known that the sale violated Coleman's constitutional rights. 23 1 As with the
money, the sheriff enjoyed only a qualified immunity.
232
219. 697 F.2d at 1344 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-20 (1982)).
220. 697 F.2d at 1344.
221. See id. at 1347.
222. Id at 1345.
223. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
224. See 697 F.2d at 1345.
225. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 7-210 (1981).
226. 697 F.2d at 1345.
227. Id. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
228. 697 F.2d at 1345. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
229. 697 F.2d at 1345 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981)).
230. 697 F.2d at 1346.
231. Id The Tenth Circuit's decision resolved a question left open by Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976), where the Supreme Court distinguished between a prosecutor's roles as
advocate and as administrator or investigator, but did not decide whether that difference justi-
fied different levels of immunity. Id at 430-31.
232. 697 F.2d at 1347.
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VI. PRISONER'S RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 1983
A. Standards for Section 1983 Actions Involving Violence to Pretrial Detainees
Smith v. Iron County 233 established the proposition that a prison guard's
use of force against a prisoner is not always a constitutional violation. The
plaintiff was a detainee-prisoner who was awaiting disposition of a burglary
charge.2 34 During the detention the jailer, who was on duty alone, heard a
loud noise coming from the vicinity of plaintiff's cell. 235 The jailer saw the
plaintiff on the floor under a bunk and, after inquiring what plaintiff was
doing and providing plaintiff several opportunities to cooperate, sprayed the
plaintiff with mace. 236 The jailer later recovered a six-pound iron drain
cover with a jagged edge, which the plaintiff was allegedly using to dig
through the cell wall.237 After the incident, the plaintiff brought suit under
section 1983 alleging that the macing incident constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment, 238 and constituted a dep-
rivation of liberty in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 239 The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the undis-
puted facts did not support the conclusion that the defendant's conduct con-
stituted a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights.
240
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 24' Prior to
considering the merits, however, the court reaffirmed its statement in Little-
field v. De/and242 that a pretrial detainee's claim of unconstitutional punish-
ment is to be evaulated through a due process analysis, rather than an
analysis focusing on the "cruel and unusual" nature of the punishment.
2 43
Under the due process analysis, unconstitutional action is present when a
jailer uses unreasonable force, or when a jailer uses force maliciously.
244
Turning to the merits, the court noted that in most circumstances the
use of mace would constitute excessive force giving rise to a valid section
1983 claim. 245 The court held, however, that the particular circumstances
surrounding this macing incident-the jailer was on duty alone, there had
been previous trouble with the plaintiff, there were two prisoners in the cell
with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had a dangerous object-were sufficient
to prevent the guard's use of mace from violating the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights.
2 46
233. 692 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1982).
234. Id at 685.
235. Id.
236. d. at 686.
237. Id
238. U.S. CONST. amend VIII. This amendment provides that "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" shall not be inflicted. Id
239. 692 F.2d at 686.
240. See id at 685.
241. Id at 688.
242. 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1981).
243. 692 F.2d at 687.
244. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub norm. Em-
ployee-Offlcer John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
245. 692 F.2d at 686.
246. Id. at 687.
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B. Standards for Prisoner Section 1983 Actions Claiming Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
In Sampley v. Ruettgers24 7 two inmates at the Wyoming State Peniten-
tiary alleged they were beaten by a guard who was giving them haircuts.
248
Plaintiff Sampley alleged that a guard, without provocation, grabbed him
by the throat, strangled him, slammed his head against a steel window, and
then struck him several times with barber clippers, leaving an inch deep
cut.
2 4 9 The guard was then alleged to have cut Sampley's hair, spit on the
hair clippers, pushed plaintiff Martinez, and cut Martinez' hair without
washing the saliva from the clippers.2 50 The plaintiffs claimed in their sec-
tion 1983 actions that the prison guard's conduct subjected them to cruel
and unusual punishment and deprived them of liberty without due pro-
cess. 2 5 1 An internal prison investigation concluded that no unnecessary
force was used against the plaintiffs. 2 52 The district court dismissed the com-
plaint on the basis of the prison report, despite the submission of conflicting
pleadings and affidavits by plaintiffs.
253
The circuit court treated the trial court's dismissal as a summary judg-
ment for the defendants, thus requiring construction of the pleadings and
affidavits in the plaintiffs' favor. 254 With this review posture, the court re-
versed the district court as to Sampley, but affirmed as to Martinez. 255 In
reversing the district court's ruling on Sampley's complaint, the Tenth Cir-
cuit relied on Estelle v. Gamble256 and held that a "prison guard's unauthor-
ized beating of an inmate can violate the eighth amendment. '257 The court
stated, however, that a prison guard's use of force against an inmate is cruel
and unusual only if it involved "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain." 258 This standard required that a section 1983 claim alleging an
eighth amendment violation include three elements. 259 First, the complaint
must allege wanton conduct, which is shown by an intention to harm the
inmate. 2 6 0 Second, the complaint must allege unnecessary conduct, which is
the use of force exceeding that which appeared reasonably necessary, in the
circumstances, to maintain or restore discipline. 26 ' Third, the inmate must
have suffered pain exceeding momentary discomfort; the guard's attack must
result in either severe pain or a lasting injury.
262
247. 704 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1983).





253. Id The Tenth Circuit noted that reliance on the prison report was improper because
administrative findings could not be permitted to usurp the court's factfinding obligation. Id at
493 n.3.
254. Id. at 493 n.2.
255. Id at 496.
256. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
257. 704 F.2d at 495.
258. Id (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).






The circuit court found that Sampley's complaint satisfied these three
requirements and, because disputed issues of fact remained, reversed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the complaint. 263 The court held that Martinez,
although he may have had state tort actions against the guard, had not
stated a claim of cruel or unusual punishment under the Sampley test, and
also held that the guard's conduct had not deprived Martinez of liberty.
264
Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of Martinez' complaint was
affirmed.
265
VII. PROPRIETY OF AWARDING NOMINAL DAMAGES
In Lancaster v. Roarguez2 6 6 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether a nominal damage award is appropriate under section 1983 when a
plaintiff proves a violation of his rights but is unable to prove actual in-
jury.267 Lancaster sought actual damages for violation of his eighth amend-
ment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.2 68 The trial court
found that there was an eighth amendment violation without actual injury
and, relying on the Supreme Court's Care v. PzihUS 2 6 9 decision, awarded
only nominal damages.
270
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that
damage awards in section 1983 actions are governed by the principle of com-
pensation.2 7 ' The circuit court refused to distinguish ipthus, which involved
a procedural deficiency,2 72 from Lancaster's substantive constitutional
claim, stating that when no damages were shown to have resulted from the
constitutional claim, the nature of the violation was insignificant.
2 73
VIII. MAXIMUM AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN SECTION 1983
ACTION
The civil rights attorney's fees statute 274 provides that in the enforce-
ment of a section 1983 action, the court, in its discretion, may award reason-
able attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 275 In Cooper v. Snger,2 76 the
district court denied the plaintiffs an award of attorney's fees, despite their
263. Id at 496.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 701 F.2d 864 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3121 (1983).
267. Id at 864.
268. Id.
269. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
270. 701 F.2d at 864.
271. Id In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Court recognized that compensation
principles, which generally control the award of damages in the American legal system, were
applicable to section 1983 actions. See id at 254-57. See generally Note, Damage Awardsfor Consti-
tutional Torts: A Reconsideration Afier Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980).
272. See 435 U.S. at 248.
273. 701 F.2d at 866.
274. 42 US.C. § 1988 (Supp. V. 1981). This statute provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n
any action . . . to enforce a provision of [section 1983] . . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs." Id
275. See id
276. 689 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1983).
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successful section 1983 action, because plaintiffs had a contingent fee agree-
ment with their counsel. 277 The district court stated that the contingent fee
arrangement made any award of attorney's fees unnecessary, because the
arrangement fulfilled the purpose of the civil rights attorney's fees statute,
which was to encourage plaintiffs to vindicate their civil rights by ensuring
compensation for attorneys.2 78 Any award in excess of the contingent fee
would be an unnecessary "windfall" for the attorney.
279
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court. 280 Stating that the dis-
cretion allowed in awarding fees under the attorney's fees statute is ex-
tremely narrow, the court held that fees could be denied only when "special
circumstances" were present. 281  Under this rule, a prevailing party will re-
cover attorney's fees "unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust. ' 28 2 The court then held that the existence of a contingent fee
arrangement does not itself constitute a "special circumstance" precluding
an award of attorney's fees.283 Rather, the contingency arrangement or any
other contractually stipulated amount would be treated as the maximum fee
permitted in the case, with attorney's fees awards used to harmonize the
agreed on figure with the amount actually obtained through judgment.
28 4
In a well-reasoned partial dissent, Judge Holloway disagreed with the
majority's ruling that a fee arrangement establishes the maximum allowable
fee. 2 8 5 Judge Holloway argued that neither the statute nor its history called
for such a limitation.28 6 The judge urged that the statute required the court
to grant a fee sufficient to attract competent counsel, with that determina-
tion to be made on an objective basis, rather than by reference to the plain-
tiff's agreement with the lawyer.
28 7
Lenore A. Martinez
277. Id. at 932.
278. Id. at 931.
279. Id
280. Id. at 932.
281. Id at 931 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
282. See 689 F.2d at 931.
283. Id
284. Id. at 932. The court noted that the district court could benefit a plaintiff by setting off
the contingent fees amount through an award of statutory attorney's fees. Id
285. Id (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
286. Id.
287. Id at 934. Judge Holloway noted that lawyers may frequently accept low con-
tingency fees for worthy reasons. Id.
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NOTE, STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS-A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE OF TENTH
CIRCUIT DECISIONS
OVERVIEW
Congress' failure to specify a statute of limitations for cases brought
under the Civil Rights Acts' has presented numerous difficulties for the fed-
eral courts. The Supreme Court in O'Sullivan v. Fehx2 approved the applica-
tion of state statutes of limitations to civil rights actions.3 In Board of Regents
v. Tomanzo, 4 the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 19885 required application of
state statutes of limitations.6 The Court, however, has provided little gui-
dance to the lower courts as to which state statute of limitations is most
appropriate.7 This lack of guidance8 has led to divergent approaches among
the circuit courts9 and, in some instances, to the application of different ap-
proaches within the same circuit.1 0
1. During the the Civil War era, Congress enacted a series of civil rights statutes which
are collectively referred to as the Civil Rights Acts. See Comment, Statutes of Liitattin in Federal
Civil Rhts Litiation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 98, 98 & n.l. The four Civil War civil rights statutes
relevant to this comment are codified in title 42 of the United States Code. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1976) guarantees all citizens the right to contract, and the protection of the legal process, on
the terms enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) guarantees all citizens the prop-
erty rights enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) creates a civil remedy for
persons deprived of federally secured rights by other persons acting under color of state law. 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (Supp. V 1981) creates a civil remedy for injury caused by conspiracies to deprive
a person's civil rights, or to interfere with the equal administration of the law.
2. 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
3. Id. at 321-25. Felix held that because civil suits under the Civil Rights Acts are reme-
dial in nature, a federal statute governing civil actions imposing fines or penalties was inapplica-
ble. Given the absence of an explicit limitations period in the Civil Rights Acts, the district
court properly applied a state limitation period. Id.
4. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981).
6. The court held that section 1988 requires application of state statutes of limitation
unless the state law is "inconsistent with the constitution and the laws of the United States."
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-85 (1980). One commentator has concluded
that section 1988 has been misinterpreted by the courts and that Congress never intended to
incorporate state rules into federally created actions. Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights
Cases.- The Proper Scope of Section /988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1980).
7. In the leading case of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975),
the Court stated that the limited grant of certiorari foreclosed consideration of which state
statute of limitation should be applied to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 421 U.S. at 462
n.7. In another section 1981 case, the Court also declined to examine the statute of limitations
issue, stating: "We are not disposed to displace the considered judgment of the Court of Appeals
on an issue whose resolution is so heavily contingent upon an analysis of state law. Run-
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 181 (1976).
8. The Court has stated that the federal courts should adopt the most analogous state
statute of limitations. Tomano, 446 U.S. at 483-84. This statement has failed to provide direc-
tion to the lower courts, however, because there is an ongoing debate as to which categories of
state statutes of limitation are most analogous. For example, some circuits find tort statutes of
limitation most analogous, while others find such statutes inherently inappropriate for federal
civil rights actions. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
9. See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 458 (1979); Annot., 29 A.L.R. FED. 710 (1976).
10. Various panels of the Eighth Circuit had taken inconsistent approaches to the applica-
tion of state statutes of limitation. This conflict was finally resolved in Garmon v. Foust, 668
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During this survey period, the Tenth Circuit grappled with statute of
limitations issues, but did not articulate a precise standard. Accordingly,
this comment will examine recent Tenth Circuit decisions involving the stat-
ute of limitations to be applied in civil rights actions. The analysis will focus
on two issues: whether the Tenth Circuit is using a consistent standard for
selecting the appropriate statute of limitations, and whether the problems
associated with the Tenth Circuit's approach can be alleviated by adopting
of a different analysis.
I. ALTERNATIVE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPROACHES
A. The Direct Analogy Approach
The methods adopted by the various circuit courts for selecting the
analogous state statute of limitations in civil rights cases can be divided into
two general categories: the direct analogy approach and the uniform anal-
ogy approach. The courts in the first category analogize the alleged viola-
tion of federal rights to a common law tort or contract claim based upon the
specific facts pled in the complaint. The practical application of this method
is typified by the view of the Third Circuit that federal courts hearing cases
under the Civil Rights Acts determine the analogous cause of action under
state law, and then apply the limitation period which would have been ap-
plied had that action been brought in a state court. "
A direct analogy can be drawn with relative ease to intentional torts
such as false imprisonment, assault, battery, and malicious prosecution.'
2
Many cases arising under the civil rights statutes have no readily apparent
common law counterpart, however, forcing the courts to draw contrived
analogies. For example, in Pennick v. Florala '3 the Fifth Circuit considered a
suit, based on sections 1982 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Acts, 4 alleging a
lack of notice and opportunity to be heard prior to a zoning change which
allowed a sanitary landfill to operate in the plaintiffs' neighborhood.' 5 The
court held that the alleged due process violations were analogous to a state
court action for trespass on the case (subject to a one-year statute of limita-
tions), rather than an action for trespass (subject to a six-year statute of limi-
tations). 16 Obviously, both analogies were questionable characterizations of
a due process violation. Further, because the direct analogy between the
violation of a constitutional right and an action under common law is inher-
ently imprecise, Pennick demonstrates that this approach allows the federal
F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dented, 456 U.S. 998 (1982), which rejected the use of tort
statutes of limitation, instead requiring the use of state statutes of limitation provided for liabili-
ties created by statute, or similar generalized limitations statutes. 668 F.2d at 406 & nn.I 1-12.
11. Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1216 (3d Cir. 1977).
12. In some states, even these analogies can be problematic. InJennbngs, the federal court
was forced to choose between a Pennsylvania statute providing a one-year limitation for mali-
cious prosecution or false arrest, and a two-year limitation for claims based on false imprison-
ment and abuse of process. Id. at 1216.
13. 529 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1976).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).




courts considerable flexibility in determining when a suit is barred by the
statute of limitations.
B. The Uniform Analogy Approach
While the approach described above necessitates an individualized ex-
amination based on the facts of each case, the courts which employ the uni-
form analogy approach avoid this task by applying one statute of limitations
to all civil rights actions. These courts view federal civil rights actions as
intrinsically similar, and seek the state analogue for that intrinsically similar
class of actions. Several different types of statutes have been utilized by
courts employing this method. Some circuits apply general state "catch-all"
statutes of limitations, which govern actions not otherwise provided for. 7
Another alternative used by some circuits is the uniform application of a
state statute of limitations for actions based upon a liability created or im-
posed by statute. 8 Other courts have adopted the state limitation for suits
involving injury to a person or her rights. 19 Finally, some states have en-
acted statutes of limitation which apply specifically to civil rights actions.
2 0
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE
DIRECT ANALOGY APPROACH
A. Early Cases
Until recently, the Tenth Circuit had not developed a cogent approach
to the problem of determining the appropriate statute of limitations in civil
rights actions. In several early opinions, the court applied state statutes pro-
viding for a two-year limitation on "actions for injury to rights of another
not arising on contract. '2 1 These opinions, however, do not include any sub-
stantive discussion of the court's rationale for using this two-year statute of
limitations.
22
17. See, e.g., Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998
(1982), Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1971); Franklin v. City of Marks, 439 F.2d 665
(5th Cir. 1971).
18. See, e.g., Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981); Shouse v. Pierce
County, 559 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1977).
19. See, e.g., Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972) (concluding that every
well-founded civil rights cause of action under section 1983 results in a "personal injury")-
20. See, e.g., Harrison v. Wright, 457 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1972), where the court applied
TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (1955) (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980)), a
statute of limitation explicitly applicable to federal civil rights actions. Buz cf. Johnson v. Davis,
582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978), where the court refused to apply VA. CODE § 8-24 (1950), a one-
year statute of limitation specifically governing section 1983 actions. The court characterized
this limitation as an impermissible discrimination against a federal cause of action, 582 F.2d at
1319. This discriminatory provision has been eliminated from Virginia's current statutes of
limitations framework. See VA. CODE. § 8.01-243 (1977); Steward v. Norfolk, F. & D. Ry., 486
F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1980), affd, 661 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1981).
21. Crosswhite v. Brown, 424 F.2d 495, 496 (10th Cir. 1970) (applying 12 OKLA. STAT.
§ 95 (1951)) (current version at 12 OKLA. STAT. § 95 (1981)); Wilson v. Hinman, 172 F.2d 914
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 970 (1949) (applying KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-306 para. 3 (1935))
(current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)4 (1976)).
22. The opinions in both of these cases devoted only one paragraph to the statute of linuita-
tions issue. See Crosstwha, 424 F.2d at 496; Wilson, 172 F.2d at 915.
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The case of Zuniga o. Amfac Foods, Inc. 23 marked the first time that the
Tenth Circuit provided an in-depth analysis of the statute of limitations is-
sue in civil rights actions. In this 1978 case, the plaintiff brought an action
under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act 24 against his employer, alleging
that the plaintiff was refused reinstatement because of his national origin.
25
The employer argued that because more than four years had elapsed since
Zuniga's cause of action accrued, the suit should be barred under either a
two-year statutory limitation for federally created actions or a three-year
"residuary" statute.26 In the decision the court discussed, for the first time,
the various approaches used in deciding which state statute of limitations
was applicable to section 1981 actions. The court rejected the Seventh Cir-
cuit's method of applying a uniform limitation for all statutory claims,
27
instead adopting the Third Circuit's approach of analyzing the particular
allegations of a civil rights claim and determining the comparable state ana-
logue.28 Utilizing this approach, Zuniga held that the appropriate Colorado
statute of limitations was a six-year period for "[ajll actions of assumpsit, or
on the case founded on any contract or liability, express or implied" and for
"[aJll other actions on the case, except for slander and for libel."
29
Zuniga selected the direct analogy approach because the court found
that approach more consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in UAWv.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp. ,30 which articulated the appropriate statute of limita-
tions inquiry for actions brought pursuant to collective bargaining agree-
ments. Hoosier Cardinal held first that Congress' failure to include a specific
limitation period indicated an intent to adopt the "appropriate state statute
of limitations. '" 3 1 Courts were therefore required to determine how state law
would characterize the federal action, and then adopt the statute of limita-
tions provided for the state analogue. 32 Further, although the question of
the appropriate characterization was ultimately a question of federal law,
33
a state's characterization of the action was to be accepted unless unreasona-
ble or inconsistent with federal policy. 34 Although the Tenth Circuit did not
find Hoosier Cardinal controlling, they found that its analysis dictated use of
the direct analogy approach under section 198 1.3 Applying that approach,
they found Zuniga's action viable.
36
Brogan v. Wiggins SchoolDistrct3 7 was another civil rights case decided by
23. 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
25. 580 F.2d at 381, 387.
26. Id. at 382, 387. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-106, -108 (1973).
27. 580 F.2d at 383.
28. Id. (citing Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n., 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.
1977)).
29. 580 F.2d at 386 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-1 10(l)(d), (g) (1973)).
30. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
31. Id. at 703-05.
32. Id. at 706.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 580 F.2d at 383.
36. Id. at 386-87.
37. 588 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1978).
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the Tenth Circuit in 1978. Brogan involved an employment discrimination
case brought under section 1983.38 The court noted that Zunga had estab-
lished the appropriate analogy for section 1981 actions, but did not engage
in an analysis of the state law analogue to the employment discrimination
claim. 39 Instead, the court declared that because section 1983 is based on a
policy of protecting fundamental rights, when there is a choice between two
statutes of limitations, the longer statute should be applied.
40
In 1979, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's choice of a state
statute of limitations in two cases. The first of these cases, Hansbury v. Regents
of the University of California ,41 was a section 1983 employment discrimination
case in which the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs claim as barred by New
Mexico's four-year limitation for actions "founded on unwritten contracts
. . . and all other actions not otherwise provided for." ' 42 The second case,
Spiegel v. School District No. 1,43 involved a Wyoming school teacher who
sought damages under section 1983 for the termination of his employment in
violation of his first amendment rights.44 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's application of Wyoming's two-year limitation for "actions upon
a liability created by a federal statute.
'45
In a 1980 case, Brown v. Bigger,46 the Tenth Circuit in a per curiam
opinion affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a civil rights action brought
by an inmate at the Kansas State Penitentiary. 47 The plaintiff, Brown, al-
leged that the prison guards subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment
during his incarceration. 48 The district court held that Brown's section 1983
suit was barred by Kansas' two-year statute of limitations for unenumerated
injuries to the rights of another.49 The Tenth Circuit, without discussion,
agreed with the trial court's choice of the statute of limitations.
50
Two months after Brown the Tenth Circuit decided Shah v. Halliburton
Co. 5 In that employment discrimination action under section 1981 the
court rejected the district court's application of Oklahoma's two-year limita-
tion for "injury to the rights of another ' 5 2 and applied Oklahoma's three-
year statute of limitations for actions on an unwritten contract and actions
38. Id. at 410.
39. Id. a 412.
40. Id. Under Colorado law a court will always be presented with two possible statutes of
limitations, because COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973) provides that actions brought on
liabilities created by federal statute must be brought either within two years or within a longer
period provided for a comparable state action, if any. Id.
41. 596 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1979).
42. Id. at 949. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978)_
43. 600 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1979).
44. Id. at 265.
45. Id. See WYO. STAT. § 1-3-115 (1977).
46. 622 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1980).
47. Id. at 1026.
48. Id.
49. Id. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976).
50. 622 F.2d at 1026. Brown's status as a prisoner tolled the statute of limitations, and
therefore his claim was timely under section 60-513(a)(4). See 622 F.2d at 1026.
51. 627 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1980).
52. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 3 (1981).
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upon a liability created by statute. 53 Judge Seymour, writing for a unani-
mous court, applied the reasoning of Brogan, which stated that when there is
a choice between two statutes of limitations in a civil rights action, the
longer limitation should apply as a matter of policy.
54
In the following year, 1981, the Tenth Circuit considered a section 1982
housing discrimination action brought by a black purchaser of a home in a
predominantly white development. 55 Although the court in Denny v. Hutchin-
son Sales Corp. 56 held for the defendant, it did state that the plaintiff's action
was timely. 57 Addressing the limitations issue, the court first held that the
time limitations of the Fair Housing Act58 do not apply to a section 1982
suit. 59 The court, however, failed to indicate what the appropriate statute of
limitations should be, concluding only that under Colorado law the applica-
ble statute of limitations could not be less than two years, and the action was
therefore timely.
6 °
In Childers v. Independent School Distrct No. 1,61 a 1982 case, the Tenth
Circuit held that the six-month limitation period of the Oklahoma Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act 6 2 was not applicable to claims brought under
section 1983 because the short period was "inconsistent with the broad reme-
dial purposes of the federal civil rights acts."' 63 The procedural posture of
Childers did not require the court to articulate the applicable statute of limi-
tations.64 The decision remains significant, however, because in rejecting the
statute of limitations claim the Tenth Circuit accentuated the intrinsic dif-
ference between a state tort action and the alleged deprivation of a constitu-
tional right.
65
53. 627 F.2d at 1058. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 2 (1981).
54. Id. at 1059. See Brogan, 588 F.2d at 410.
55. See Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816, 819 (10th Cir. 1981).
56. 649 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 820.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
59. 649 F.2d at 820.
60. Id. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973). As explained above, Colorado sets a
two year minimum statute of limitations for actions based on federally created liabilities. See
supra note 40.
61. 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982).
62. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-170 (1981). The six-month limitation period is located at
id. § 156.
63. 676 F.2d at 1343. The court also observed that states generally cannot require plain-
tiffs to "jump through procedural hoops" in order to assert a federal civil rights claim. Id.
(quoting Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
64. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act was offered only as an alternate ground for
upholding the trial court's FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiffs suit. 676 F.2d at
1342.
65. 694 F.2d at 1342-43 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (deprivation of constitutional right different from, and more serious than, mere
tort); Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1977) (limitation periods must be gener-
ous to preserve Act's remedial purposes); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 454 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1976) (civil rights plaintiffs not subject to state "procedural hoops"); Donovan v. Rein-





1. Jones v. Hidebrant
In January, 1983 the Tenth Circuit decidedJones v. Hidebrant,66 an ap-
peal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
Ruby Jones brought suit under section 1983 as special administrator of the
estate of her son, who was killed by a Denver police officer. The district
court's decision to hold that the claim was barred by the statute of limita-
tions was reached by characterizing the facts of the complaint as analogous
to the torts of assault and battery, which are subject to a one-year statute of
limitations under Colorado law. 67 The court then applied a Colorado stat-
ute creating a two-year limitation for a federally created liability unless the
period for comparable actions under Colorado law is longer.68 Because the
limitation for the comparable action (assault and battery) was only one year,
the two-year period was deemed appropriate. Mrs. Jones' action was dis-
missed by the district court, however, because more than five years had
passed since the death of her son.
69
The Tenth Circuit reversed this ruling on the ground that the plaintiff's
cause of action was more properly characterized as analogous to the tort of
reckless misconduct, and thus subject to a six-year limitation. 70 In addition,
the court found that application of the longer statute of limitations "com-
ports more favorably with the intent of Congress when it enacted civil rights
remedies."'" The court reiterated the policy expressed in Shah v. Halliburton
Co. that when there appears to be a choice between two different characteri-
zations, the longer statute of limitations should be applied "to effectuate the
broad purpose of civil rights legislation."
'72
2. Clulow v. Oklahoma
Clulow brought suit under sections 1983 and 1985 against the State of
Oklahoma and various individual defendants for alleged violations of his
due process rights resulting in involuntary commitments to mental institu-
tions and suspension from the Oklahoma Bar Association. 73 In his appeal to
the Tenth Circuit, Clulow conceded that the trial court's application of a
two-year statute of limitations was correct, but argued that a tolling provi-
sion should apply.74 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit discussed and deter-
mined which Oklahoma statute of limitations was appropriate in this case.
The court stated that the only two available limitations periods were a one-
66. No. 80-2220 (10th Cir. January 27, 1983). Althoughfjones was not selected for official
publication, it retains precedential value equal to a published opinion. 10TH CIR. R. 17(c).
67. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102 (1973).
68. Id. § 13-80-106.
69. No. 80-2220, slip op. at 5.
70. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110 (1973). See also Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals,
Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 525 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979) (applying section 13-80-110
to claim of reckless misconduct).
71. No. 80-2220, slip op. at 7.
72. Id. at 8.
73. Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1293 (10th Cir. 1983).
74. Id. at 1299. The court rejected Clulow's tolling argument after finding that his claims
did not involve continuing torts and that there was no showing of concealment. Id. at 1300-01.
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year period provided for intentional torts, or a two-year period provided for
"injury to the rights of another. ' 75 Following the Zuniga approach, which
requires a determination of the analogous action under state law, the court
found that the applicable limitation was Oklahoma's two-year period for
"injury to the rights of another." 76 The court justified its choice, by stating
that "most of plaintiffs claims can be characterized as specific torts such as
false imprisonment only by rather loose analogy. The more general tort of
interference with individual rights . . .is a better analogue."
'77
3. Garci'a v. University of Kansas
Garcia's section 1981 and section 1983 employment discrimination suit,
Garcia v. Universy of Kansas,78 was dismissed by the district court as barred
by a Kansas two-year limitation for actions based on injury to the rights of
another. 79 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that the courts, by character-
izing the cause of action as an alleged violation of the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights, should not be concerned with either how the rights were
violated, the status of the defendant, or the manner in which the cause of
action was created.8 0 The court concluded "that the nature of the cause of
action is the fundamental consideration."8' Citing Crosswhte v. Brown82 and
Wzilson v. Hinman,83 two previous Tenth Circuit decisions addressing the ap-
plicable statute of limitations in section 1983 actions, the court stated that
"injury to the rights of another" most nearly described the nature of plain-
tiff's cause of action.8 4 Hence, the two-year limitation was applicable. 85
Judge Seymour dissented, stating that the majority opinion could not
be reconciled with Shah and Zuniga .86 The dissent expressed the view that
both Shah and Zuniga require an analysis of the particular allegations of the
claim, rather than the "rote utilization of a single type of limitations stat-
ute." 87 Judge Seymour further asserted that the standard adopted by the
majority may present difficulties in some of the states in the Tenth Circuit
because of the diversity among the state statutes of limitations. She observed
that Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico laws, for example, did not contain a
provision similar to the Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming limitations period
provided for injury to the rights of another.8 8 Judge Seymour recognized
that varying limitations periods between states were permissible under the
75. Id. at 1299. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 3 (1981) (two-year period for injuries to
rights of another); id. § 95 para. 4 (one-year period for intentional torts).
76. 700 F.2d at 1299. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 3 (1981).
77. 700 F.2d at 1299. The court also noted that the two-year limitation was not "so unrea-
sonably short as to defeat federal policy." Id. at 1300 n.12.
78. 702 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 850. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976).
80. 702 F.2d at 850.
81. Id.
82. 424 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1970).
83. 172 F.2d 914 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 970 (1949).
84. 702 F.2d at 851.
85. Id.
86. Id. (Seymour, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 853.
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Civil Rights Acts,8 9 but felt that a consistent analytical framework for choos-
ing the most analogous state limitation was nonetheless necessary. 90 Apply-
ing the framework adopted in Zuniga, Judge Seymour concluded that
Garcia's claim could be characterized as either an action for injury to the
rights of another (two-year limitation),9 1 or an action upon a liability cre-
ated by statute (three-year limitation).92 Under the rationale of Shah, the
longer statute should have been applied.
9 3
III. CRITIQUE
A. Consistency Within the Tenth Circuit
Judge Seymour correctly observed that the majority opinion in Garcia
has deviated from the direct analogy approach announced in Zunga. Zuniga
emphasized that the analogous state statute of limitations should be selected
after "analysis of the particular allegations of the claim," 9 4 that "critical
analysis of the particular claim" was necessary, 9 5 and that prior Tenth Cir-
cuit decisions had pointed the way to the direct analogy approach by "de-
tailing the allegations of unconstitutional acts. ' '9 6 Further, Zuniga rejected
the uniform analogy approach, which requires a court to determine the state
analogue for an entire class of civil rights violations.9 7 Thus, Chief Judge
Seth's majority opinion, insofar as its emphasis on ascertaining the nature of
the civil rights violation98 is indicative of the use of a uniform analogy ap-
proach,99 has created an inconsistency within the Tenth Circuit.
Although Judge Seymour's dissent in Garcia highlights the majority's
failure to follow Zuniga, her criticism fails to acknowledge that the Tenth
Circuit had previously deviated from the direct analogy approach in Spiegel,
Hansbury, and Brown. These three decisions are indicative of the uniform
analogy approach because no attempt was made to analogize the civil rights
claim to its comparable state analogue.i°0 Thus, it would appear that Garcza
crystallizes two inconsistent lines of precedent which had previously arisen in
the Tenth Circuit: Zuniga, Shah,Jones, and Clulow adhere to the direct anal-
ogy approach, while Hansbury, Spiegel, Brown, and Garcia follow the uniform
approach.'0 1 The state of law in the Tenth Circuit is even more complex
89. Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 489 (1980)).
90. 702 F.2d at 853 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
91. Id. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976).
92. 702 F.2d at 853 (Seymour, J., dissenting). See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-512(2) (1976).
93. 702 F.2d at 853 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
94. 570 F.2d at 383.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1977). Zunga explicitly rejected the
Robinson approach. 570 F.2d at 383.
98. See 702 F.2d at 850.
99. Cf. Garcia, 702 F.2d at 852-53 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (Tenth Circuit precedent re-
jects an approach failing to analyze particular allegations of a claim; therefore "rote utilization"
of a particular limitations statute is improper).
100. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
101. The difference in approach cannot be explained solely by the make-up of the panels
hearing the cases. In fact, the same judges have participated in opinions following both ap-
proaches. For example, Judge Barrett joined the opinions in Brown and Spiegel as well as Zuniga.
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than indicated by the existence of conflicting precedents, however, because
there are numerous inconsistencies within each line of precedent.
The uniform approach requires the court to designate one characteriza-
tion which will serve as the state analogue for all civil rights actions. This
characterization should apply uniformly to all states within a circuit.
10 2
Rather than select one statute as appropriate for civil rights actions, the
Tenth Circuit cases following the uniform analogy approach have vacillated
among various possibilities and applied three different types of statutes of
limitations. Hansbury utilized New Mexico's statute for actions founded on
unwritten contract or not otherwise provided for.10 3 Spzegel was decided in
the same year as Hansbuy, yet the court selected a two-year limitation period
for actions based on liabilities created by federal statute.' 0 4 Several months
after Spiegel, Brown ignored the Kansas limitation for liability created by
statute and applied the limitation period for injury to the rights of an-
other.' 0 5 Thus, there is clearly a lack of uniformity among the cases which
apparently follow the uniform approach.
10 6
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has also misapplied the direct analogy ap-
proach. This approach requires the court to examine the facts underlying
the complaint and then select the most comparable common law tort or con-
tract action.'0 7 In applying this approach, the Tenth Circuit has often
found the most analogous state cause of action to be a general characteriza-
tion, which is indicative of the uniform approach, rather than a specific com-
mon law tort. For example, Judge Seymour's dissent in Garcia suggests that
the appropriate state analogue is "an action upon liability created by stat-
ute"' 0 8 rather than an action upon an implied contract.' 0 9 In Shah, Judge
Seymour also held that a section 1981 claim "can clearly be construed as one
based upon a liability created by statute."'tO These statements are indica-
tive of the uniform analogy approach, despite the fact that the direct anal-
ogy approach is purportedly being followed.
Finally, Childers adds to the difficulties facing litigants involved in civil
Chief Judge Seth also joined the opinion in Zun'ga before he embraced the uniform analogy
approach in Garcia.
102. The fact that all states in a circuit do not have identical statutes does not preclude
application of the uniform approach. For example, the Ninth Circuit has uniformly applied the
limitation for liabilities created by statute. Washington has no such statute. Therefore, the
circuit court examined Washington's statutes of limitation and found that the limitation gov-
erning injury to the person or rights of another best serves the interests which section 1983 was
designed to protect. See Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1981).
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978).
104. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-115 (1977).
105. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976).
106. Ironically, Spiegel's claim would have been timely if the Wyoming limitation for "inju-
ries to the rights of the plaintiff," WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1977), had been applied. Similarly,
Brown's claim would have been timely if the court had applied Kansas' limitation period for
actions upon a liability created by statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-512(2) (1976).
107. Zuniga adopted the Third Circuit approach, which requires the court to "assess the
similarity of the various state law torts." Meyers v. Pennpack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n,
559 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1977), adopted in Zuntga, 580 F.2d at 383.
108. 702 F.2d at 853 (Seymour, J., dissenting); see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-512(2) (1976).
109. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-512(1) (1976). Although both provisions have identical lim-
itations periods, the problem with Judge Seymour's dissent is her methodology, not her result.
110. 627 F.2d at 1059.
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rights actions in the Tenth Circuit. By emphasizing the intrinsic difference
between federal civil rights actions and state tort actions,' ChtlIders in-
creases the uncertainty in determining the appropriate state analogue.
Moreover, Childers rejected the limitations period of the Oklahoma Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act by citing authority which contradicts the con-
ceptual framework of the direct analogy approach.' 12
B. Problematic Aspects of the Direct Analogy Approach
Despite the inconsistencies in the Tenth Circuit opinions, the direct
analogy approach remains the only method the court has explicitly ap-
proved for determining the applicable statute of limitations in a federal civil
rights action. This section examines some problems inherent in the direct
analogy approach, and then discusses the implications of those problems in
terms of the policies served by the federal civil rights acts specifically, and
statutes of limitations generally.
1. State Court Decisions in Civil Rights Actions
Federal courts using the direct analogy approach must give deference to
a state court's characterization of that state's statute of limitations ana-
logue."13 Essentially, unless the state court's characterization is unreasona-
ble or inconsistent with federal policy, federal courts must follow the state
decision. I4 Several recent state court decisions have rejected analogues se-
lected by the Tenth Circuit and the federal district courts within its jurisdic-
tion,' 5 thereby creating a possibility of increased inconsistency within the
Tenth Circuit.
In De Vargas v. State ex tel. New A4exzco Department of Corrections,' 16 the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that the two-year limitation period of the
New Mexico Tort Claims Act'' 7 was applicable to a section 1983 suit
against a New Mexico state employee."1 " DeVargas rejected the analysis set
out by the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico in an
earlier case, which had held that state tort claims acts are based on state
concepts of sovereign immunity alien to the purposes to be served by the
111. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
112. See Chdlders, 676 F.2d at 1343 (citing Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.
1977); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Donovan
v. Riebold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring), cited in Childers. 676 F.2d at 1343.
113. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1965), quoted in Zuniga, 580
F.2d at 383.
114. Hoosier Cardinal, 383 U.S. at 706, quotedin Zuniga, 580 F.2d at 383.
115. DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 97 N.M. 450, 640 P.2d
1327 (1981), cert. dismissed as nprovtdently granted, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 167 (1982); Miller v.
City of Overland Park, 231 Kan. 557, 646 P.2d 1114 (1982). Federal and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction under the federal civil rights statutes. S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 16 (1979).
116. 97 N.M. 447, 640 P.2d 1327 (1981), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 97 N.M. 563,
642 P.2d 167 (1982).
117. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to-29 (1978). The two-year limitation period is located at
§ 41-4-15.
118. 97 N.M. at 451, 640 P.2d at 1331.
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Civil Rights Acts, and therefore cannot provide the statute of limitations in a
section 1983 action."1 9 The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected this rea-
soning and held that the tort claims act is consistent with the purposes of
section 1983, because the act is based on a waiver of immunity which sub-
jects law enforcement officials to liability, consistent with the purposes of
section 1983.120 The New Mexico Supreme Court later dismissed DeVargas'
petition for certiorari, finding no fault with the analysis used by the Court of
Appeals. 121
Miller v. City of Overland Park,122 a 1982 Kansas Supreme Court decision,
held that plaintiffs section 1983 suit was comparable to a state suit for false
arrest and thus subject to a one-year statute of limitations.1 23 Although the
Kansas Supreme Court recognized that in Wilson v. Hnman and Brown v.
Bigger the Tenth Circuit had applied Kansas' two-year statute of limitations
to section 1983 actions,12 4 the supreme court concluded that "when our leg-
islature has specifically adopted a lesser period of time for certain specific
types of action, we believe such time limits should also apply to a § 1983
cause of action .... "125 Although the court justified its decision by distin-
guishing Hinman and Brown,' 2 6 it clearly rejected the Tenth Circuit's policy
of using the longer of two possible limitations periods.
127
Both DeVargas and Miller reject federal precedent, DeVargas explic-
itly 1 28 and Miller implicitly. 129 According to the rationale of Zuniga the
Tenth Circuit should accept the state courts' characterizations and apply
Kansas' one-year statute of limitations if similar civil rights actions similar to
the Miller case arise in Kansas, and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act's two-
year limitation for New Mexico cases similar to DeVargas. Thus, the analogy
approach might require the circuit to abandon its own precedent, and in-
stead adopt the rulings of the state courts. 30
119. See Gunther v. Miller, 498 F. Supp. 882 (D.N.M. 1980).
120. 97 N.M. at -, 640 P.2d at 1331. One commentator, however, after analyzing Gunther
and DeVargas concluded: "[Tlhe thrust ofstate tort law, with its immunity doctrines, is in direct
opposition to the purposes of section 1983." Kovnat, Constitutnal Torts and the New Mexico Tort
Clathns Act, 13 N.M.L. REV. 1, 50 (1983).
121. See DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d
167 (1982). DeVargas has been criticized by New Mexico commentators as failing to accomo-
date the federal policy concerns present in federal civil rights actions, Kovat, supra note 120, at
45-50, and as a source of confusion and inconsistency for New Mexico civil rights litigants.
Comment, Federal Civil Rights Act-The New Mexico Appellate Courts' Choice of the Proper Limitations
Periodfor Civil Rights Actions Filed Under 42 US C § 1983" DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 13 N.M.L. REV. 555, 561-65 (1983).
122. 231 Kan. 557, 646 P.2d 1114 (1982).
123. Id. at 562-63, 646 P.2d at 118. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-514(2) (1976).
124. Kansas provides a two-year limitation period for actions based on injuries to the rights
of another, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976).
125. 231 Kan. at 562, 646 P.2d at 1118.
126. Id. at 560, 646 P.2d at 1118.
127. See, e.g., Shah, 627 F.2d at 1059; Brogan, 588 F.2d at 410.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19. DeVargas also implicitly rejected Hansbugi,
which had applied a four-year statute of limitations to a section 1983 action brought in New
Mexico district court. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying note 125.
130. Miller stated that its characterization of the state law analogue was binding on the
federal courts, 231 Kan. at 559, 562, 646 P.2d at 118. This statement is incorrect. See supra
notes 6 and 31 and accompanying text.
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2. Minimal Time Period
In determining the appropriate statute of limitations for a civil rights
action, the court should take account of policy considerations relating to the
federal civil rights statutes. The Tenth Circuit has stated that when there is
a choice between several seemingly appropriate statutes of limitations, the
longer statute should apply in light of the policy protecting fundamental
rights.13' Additionally, the Tenth Circuit has stated that the state statute of
limitations must be "sufficiently generous in the time periods to preserve the
remedial spirit of federal civil rights actions."' 32 The court, however, has not
clearly defined the minimal time period which would be consistent with the
policy of the civil rights statutes.
Some circuits have applied a general rule that a federal court should
not select a state statute of limitations shorter than two years in a civil rights
action. 133 The Tenth Circuit has not officially adopted this principle, but
there has never been a case in which the circuit approved the application of
a limitation period of less than two years. There are states within the Tenth
Circuit, however, which have time limitations of less than two years for cer-
tain tort actions which are most analogous to some civil rights claims. For
example, several states in the Tenth Circuit provide a one-year limitation for
intentional torts such as false imprisonment, assault, and battery, which
might be applicable to a civil rights action. 134 Many section 1983 actions
resulting from wrongful conduct by police officers will be comparable to
these torts. Thus, the circuit court might be faced with the option of apply-
ing a one-year limitation, or of deviating from the approach of selecting the
comparable cause of action under state law. This problem does not arise
under the uniform analogy approach, because the applicable limitation pe-
riod is selected after consideration of the appropriate minimal time
period. 135
3. Fragmentation of the Civil Rights Claim
Another problem that often arises in civil rights cases is that the allega-
tions of the complaint may be comparable to several actions, which are sub-
ject to different statutes of limitations under state law. Again, this problem
131. See Shah, 627 F.2d at 1059; Brogan, 588 F.2d at 412.
132. Childers, 676 F.2d at 1343 (citing Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th
Cir. 1977)).
133. Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 862 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000
(1982) (stating that the two-year limitations of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(h) (1976) are an
expression of federal policy which should establish a floor for section 1983 suits).
134. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-514(2) (1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 4 (1981);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-29(4),(5) (1953). Note, however, that Utah provides a two-year limi-
tation for actions brought against peace officers for injuries caused in their official capacity.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(1) (1953). New Mexico does not provide a one-year limitation for
intentional torts. Both Colorado and Wyoming provide at least a two-year limitation for ac-
tions based on liabilities created by federal statute, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973);
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-115 (1977), although under a pure direct analogy approach those statutes
would be irrelevant. Cf. supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (criticizing Tenth Circuit
for failing to analogize claim to its particularized state analogue).




often arises in cases based on the wrongful conduct of law enforcement
officers.
The Tenth Circuit has never addressed the issue of whether fragmenta-
tion of a federal civil rights claim is consistent with the policy of the Civil
Rights Acts. The direct analogy approach would require that "each aspect
of the complaint . . . be given separate statute of limitations treatment de-
pending on the nature of the specific act or acts complained of."'1 36 The
District of Columbia Circuit recently followed this approach, characterizing
each of the plaintiffs allegations separately and then applying the statute of
limitations for the analogous common law action. 137 This resulted in a dif-
ferent limitation period for the seizure and conversion, false-arrest, and as-
sault components of the claim. 138 It is questionable whether the federal
policy behind the civil rights statutes is promoted by dividing a claim for the
violation of constitutional rights into components according to their com-
mon law counterparts. 1
39
4. Compatibility of the Direct Analogy Approach with the Policies
of the Civil Rights Acts
Another policy question which the Tenth Circuit has not adequately
addressed is whether the very method of drawing an analogy between the
deprivation of a civil right and a common law tort or contract claim is con-
sistent with the purpose of the civil rights laws. Childers observed that
"[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations period with national inter-
ests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the impor-
tation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of
national policies." 4° While this statement is particularly apt in a situation
like that of Childers, where the defendant argued for application of the excep-
tionally short limitation period provided in a state tort claims act, the ration-
ale could easily extend to other instances in which specific state statutes of
limitations do not adequately reflect the interests protected by federal civil
rights statutes.
Rather than directly confront this problem, the Tenth Circuit has
evaded the issue by rationalizing its rejection of analogies to certain state
causes of action. For example, in Clulow the court was apparently convinced
that Oklahoma's one-year limitations period for intentional tortsi 4t was too
short in light of the purposes of section 1983. The court resolved this conflict
by concluding that the plaintiffs claim, which arose from his involuntary
136. Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1977)
cited in Zurnga, 580 F.2d at 383.
137. McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 370.
139. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit has declared:
Inconsistency and confusion would result if the single cause of action created by Con-
gress were fragmented in accordance with analogies drawn to rights created by state
law and the several differing periods of limitation applicable to each state-created
right were applied to the single federal cause of action.
Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962).
140. 676 F.2d at 1342 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977)).
141. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 4 (1981).
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commitment to a mental institution, was not comparable to the tort of false
imprisonment because the analogy was too "loose."' 4 2 The ultimate policy
consideration which must be examined, however, is whether common law
tort and contract actions are indeed comparable to civil rights violations.
143
In rejecting the limitations of Oklahoma's state tort claims act, Childers
quoted Justice Harlan's famous statement: "[A] deprivation of a constitu-
tional right is significantly different from and more serious than a violation
of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the
same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitu-
tional right."' 144 In a similar vein, the Eighth Circuit has rejected the tort
analogy because it "unduly cramps the significance of section 1983 as a
broad, statutory remedy."' 145 The Seventh Circuit has also held that the
analogy approach is inappropriate because of the "fundamental differences
between a civil rights action and a common law tort."' 14 6 Aside from the
practical difficulties in finding a common law analogy for some civil rights
claims, such as those in Spiegel involving the violation of first amendment
rights, it is clear that serious doubts exist as to whether the very process of
comparing a civil rights claim to a common law action is compatible with
the spirit of the civil rights statutes.147
5. Compatibility of the Analogy Approach with the Policies of
Statutes of Limitations
In addition to policy considerations relating specifically to the Civil
Rights Acts, there are pervasive social policies implicated by statutes of limi-
tation. The Supreme Court stated in Board of Regents v. Tomanio 148 that
"[s]tatutes of limitations are not simply technicalities. . . . [t]hey have long
been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system."' 49 The
Court went on to observe that state statutes of limitation serve two primary
purposes. First, they represent a legislative judgment about the point at
which delay in bringing a claim will impair the accuracy of the fact-finding
process. 150 Second, they prevent undue delay in bringing claims, thereby
142. See 700 F.2d at 1300.
143. Zunqga recognized that there are differences between a civil rights claim and a tort or
contract action, but concluded that these differences did not preclude application of the direct
analogy approach. 580 F.2d at 386.
144. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). See 676 F.2d at
1343.
145. Garmon v. Foust. 668 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir.) (en banc). cert. dented, 456 U.S. 998
(1982).
146. Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.), cert. detied, 438 U.S. 907 (1977).
147. This view is not supported by Supreme Court cases. The Court has stated that there is
nothing peculiar to civil rights actions that would justify special reluctance in applying state
law. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975). Despite this statement, the
Supreme Court has continually refused to rule on questions involving the choice of an applica-
ble statute of limitations in civil rights actions, leaving the resolution of the issue to the discre-
tion of the circuit courts. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
148. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
149. Id. at 487.
150. Id. The accuracy of the fact-finding process is impaired because testimony becomes
increasingly unreliable as time passes. Id.
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settling expectations and preventing litigation of stale claims.15'
Several circuit courts have addressed the relevance of the evidentiary
problem in selecting the appropriate statute of limitations in a civil rights
action. For example, the Third Circuit noted that because a section 1981
violation typically involves documentary proof and a section 1982 claim de-
pends heavily on statistical evidence, a longer statute of limitations is less
likely to impede the proof of facts in section 1981 actions.152 In contrast, the
District of Columbia Circuit has declared that in a civil rights suit against
police officers there are no unique aspects which would make general judi-
cial policies inapplicable to civil rights actions.
153
The Tenth Circuit has never discussed the relationship between the
statute of limitation in a particular civil rights action and the type of evi-
dence necessary to prove the allegations of the complaint. Nor has the
Tenth Circuit examined the possibility, suggested by the Third Circuit, that
evidentiary considerations may require a different standard for determining
a section 1981 or section 1982 statute of limitations than would be required
for a section 1983 claim.
154
The second purpose of statutes of limitation is to protect defendants
from the burden of defending against stale claims and to promote finality
and order in the judicial system. 155 It has also been suggested that statutes
of limitations benefit plaintiffs by providing "a sure knowledge of the time
after which a suit would be futile."' 56 One commentator has observed that
in jurisdictions which have adopted the direct analogy approach the uncer-
tainty regarding the applicable statute of limitations in civil rights actions
has served to encourage plaintiffs to bring suits which might not otherwise
be brought and to appeal adverse decisions.157 A prospective plaintiff could
be advised to litigate a claim if there is any conceivable statute of limitation
under which his suit would be considered timely. Because the Tenth Circuit
standard is so amorphous, there is always a possibility that a claim will not
be barred if the limitation period has not run for some tort or contract action
arguably comparable to the plaintiff's civil rights claim. 158 Similarly, liti-
gants are encouraged to appeal, due to the chance that the Tenth Circuit
151. Set id.
152. Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 903 n.26 (3d Cir.
1977).
153. See McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
154. Set supra note 149 and accompanying text.
155. United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922). See also Tomanio, 446 U.S.
at 487.
156. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV, 1177, 1186 (1950).
157. Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litzation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 97,
112 n. 116.
158. An additional source of confusion is the fact that the Tenth Circuit rarely provides an
unequivocal statement of the analogy which is drawn between the state action and the civil
rights suit. This lack of precision is typified by the court's statement in Shah: "'Zuniga appropri-
ately defines a section 1981 claim for discriminatory discharge from employment as having the
elements of both a contract and a tort claim .... [flurthermore, the cause of action can clearly
be construed as one based upon a liability created by statute." 627 F.2d at 1059. The court in
Shah ultimately applied the Oklahoma statute applicable to contract actions and actions upon a
liability created by statute, but never indicated which of these provided the appropriate anal-
ogy with the civil rights claim. Id.
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might disagree with the trial court's characterization of most analogous ac-
tion under state law. Thejones decision is illustrative of this situation.' 59
Under the Zuntga approach, then, litigants can never be certain whether or
not the limitation has expired on a particular claim because one cannot pre-
dict which analogy the Tenth Circuit will deem most appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Zuniga's direct analogy approach allows greater flexibility in determin-
ing whether an action is barred than does the uniform analogy approach.
Shah requires a court to apply the longer limitation when a substantial ques-
tion exists over which state statute applies.160 This method seems to weigh
in favor of protecting the interests of plaintiffs who may have valid claims
rather than the interests of defendants in having to defend against stale
claims.16  The danger of this method, however, is that a court might-
either consciously or unconsciously-manipulate the statute of limitations
according to its evaluation of the merits of a claim.
Additionally, although the Tenth Circuit has ostensibly adopted the di-
rect analogy approach for determining the applicable statute of limitations
in civil rights cases, the court's inconsistent application of this standard has
led to a confusing line of precedent. I62 This confusion has produced an
intolerable situation in which civil rights litigants have no meaningful
grounds for determining whether or not an action is barred by the statute of
limitations. The situation has been further complicated by state court deci-
sions in Kansas, and New Mexico, which will force the Tenth Circuit to
decide whether to accept a state's designation of the appropriate statute of
limitations in certain civil rights cases as binding on the federal courts.
16 3
The optimal solution to this problem would be a congressional enact-
ment 164 providing a uniform statute of limitations for all civil rights ac-
tions. 6 5 Absent any legislative action, and in view of the Supreme Court's
refusal to set a standard in this area, the responsibility for developing reason-
able guidelines rests with the circuit courts.
After a period of inconsistent opinions, both the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits decided that the uniform approach is the most compatible with the
policies of the civil rights statutes. 166 The Tenth Circuit, which has never
159. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
160. 627 F.2d at 1059.
161. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
162. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
164. Precedent for congressional action is found in the antitrust area, where the federal
courts had traditionally applied state statutes of limitations. E.g., Englander Motors Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 293 F.2d 802, 804 (6th Cir. 1961). In 1955, Congress enacted a four-year
limitation period to govern all antitrust actions. See Pub. L. No. 138, 69 Stat. 283 (1955) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982).
165. In this regard, one commentator has stated: "Congress should enact at once a period of
limitation to make uniform throughout the country the time when suits can be brought under
§ 1983." C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS: CIVIL PRACTICE § 241 (2d ed. 1980).
166. See Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dented 456 U.S. 998 (1982);
Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 438 U.S. 907 (1977).
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adequately addressed these policy considerations, should follow these cir-
cuits 16 7 and abandon the direct analogy approach, which has become a
source of uncertainty and confusion.168
Marcze Bayaz
167. An authority on civil rights actions has observed: "Inasmuch as tort principles do not
and should not invariably determine 1983 liability in other areas, Beard represents the better
rule." NAHMOD, supra note 115, at 128.
168. In a decision received after this issue went to press, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
uniform analogy approach for section 1983 actions. Henceforth, those actions will be subject to
the statute of limitations provided for injuries to personal rights. Garcia v. Wilson, No. 83-1017,




Once again this year, most Tenth Circuit commercial law decisions ad-
dressed procedural and substantive areas of bankruptcy. There was also an
unusual case in which the Tenth Circuit reinforced the notion that an In-
dian tribe is on the same plane of sovereignty as a governmental entity and
thus not subject to suit absent tribal consent. In that decision, the court
determined specifically that without tribal consent an entity established by a
tribe cannot obligate the tribe for the entity's debts. Additionally, the Tenth
Circuit considered questions arising under the Uniform Commercial Code
concerning security interests, parol evidence, and damages.
I. BANKRUPTCY PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO AMEND EXEMPT PROPERTY
LIST
In Redmond v. Turtle, t the Tenth Circuit considered two bankruptcy is-
sues. The first was whether bankruptcy petitioners have an absolute right to
amend their exempt property schedules when new assets are discovered
before the bankruptcy is closed.2 The second issue was whether, given peti-
tioners' right to amend, the exemption can be denied upon timely objection
by the bankruptcy trustee.
3
The Tuttles filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition which included a
schedule of federal exemptions. 4 More than two months later the bank-
ruptcy trustee learned that the Tuttles owned a checking account which had
not been declared as an asset of their estate and which had not been in-
cluded on their exemption schedule.5 Following an objection to discharge
based on the allegedly fraudulent concealment of the checking account, the
Tuttles requested that the proceeds from the account be added to their
schedule of exemptions, contending that they had been unaware of the ac-
count's existence. 6 The trustee objected to the amendment because the Tut-
ties had not challenged the exemption schedule within fifteen days from the
date of the creditors' meeting, as required by the local bankruptcy rules.
7
1, 698 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1983).
2. Id at 416.
3, Id
4, Id at 415. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982) sets forth the categories and amounts of property
which may be exempted from the bankruptcy estate.
5. The First National Bank of Quinter, Kansas notified the bankruptcy trustee of the
existence of a joint personal checking account owned by the Tuttles which had a $4,563.80
balance. 698 F.2d at 415.
6. In re Tuttle, 15 B.R. 14, 15 (Bankr. D. Kan.), affd, 16 B.R. 470 (D. Kan. 1981), affd in
part, 698 F. 2d 414 (10th Cir. 1983). See II U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1982) (barring discharge where a
debtor intentionally conceals assets).
7. 15 B.R. at 17. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (1982) states that "[w]ithin a reasonable time after
the order for relief in a case under this title, there shall be a meeting of creditors." The local
rule required objections to the exemption schedule to be filed within fifteen days of the credi-
tors' meeting held pursuant to section 34 1(a). 15 B.R. at 18.
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The bankruptcy court disallowed the amendment, asserting three bases
for its action. First, the Tuttles had not complied with the relevant local
rule.8 Second, the requested amendment could not be permitted as an exer-
cise of discretion because interested parties (the creditors) had relied on the
finality of the exemption schedule, as evidenced by the lack of creditor objec-
tions prior to expiration of the fifteen day period. 9 Finally, the bankruptcy
court held that the voluntary transfer of the money into the bank account
prevented the petitioners from using the statutory provision 10 which permits
an exemption when the trustee recovers property which has been involunta-
rily transferred from the bankrupt's estate.'I The district court affirmed,
1 2
reiterating the need for finality of the exemption list and concluding that the
bankruptcy court's denial of a discretionary amendment was not unreasona-
ble in light of the Tuttles' inexcusable neglect in failing to ascertain the exist-
ence of the bank account.1 3
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the lower courts concerning the right
to amend the exemption schedule, 14 but refused to allow the exemption it-
self. 15 In upholding the Tuttles' right to amend the court followed Rule 110
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,1 6 which permits amendment
of the voluntary petition "as a matter of course at any time before the case is
closed . ,,17 The court noted that permitting amendments as a matter of
right would not prejudice creditors, because under Rule 40318 any party in
interest retained the right to object to the amendment within fifteen days. 19
On the question of whether the exemption itself should be allowed, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the exemption was sought on the basis that the
money had been involuntarily transferred from the estate. 20 The debtors
argued that the transfers were involuntary because the bank had indepen-
dently placed funds in a checking account which the petitioners thought
they had closed. 2' Because the debtors had included no deposit instructions
on the checks, however, the court held that responsibility for the deposits
ultimately rested with the debtors. 22 The funds were therefore in the bank
account as a result of voluntary transfers out of the debtor's estate, and such
8. 15 BR. at 17.
9. Id. at 18.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (1982).
11. 15 B.R. at 19-20. The bankruptcy court ruled that although the Tuttles had intended
to deposit the money in their personal checking account, the act of voluntarily depositing the
money precluded a finding of involuntary transfer even though the bank, on its own decision,
credited the money to a business account. Id at 20.
12. In re Tuttle, 16 B.R. 470 (D. Kan. 1981), affd in part, 698 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1983).
13. 16 B.R. at 472.
14. Redmond v. Tuttle, 698 F.2d 414, 417 (10th Cir. 1983).
15. Id at 417-18.
16. FED. RULE BANKR. P. 110. The Bankruptcy Rules were revised effective August 1,
1983. Rule 110 was replaced by Rule 1009.
17. FED. R. BANKR. P. 110.
18. FED. R. BANKR. P. 403. Rule 403 has been replaced by Rule 4003.
19. 698 F.2d at 417.
20. Id See II U.S.C. § 5
2 2
(g)(1) (1982).
21. 698 F.2d at 417.
22. Id at 418.
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funds were not exempt.
23
The result in Tutile is sound law. It is reasonable to allow an amend-
ment by right, because an automatic exemption does not accompany the
amendment. Questionable transfers may be objected to under Rule 403,
with hearings required when there is a dispute as to the propriety of granting
an exemption.
II. GOOD FAITH PURCHASER STATUS FOR AFFILIATES OF DEBTOR'S
GENERAL PARTNER
In Tompki'ns v. Fre; (In re Bel Air Associates, Ltd. ),24 the Tenth Circuit
determined the conditions under which Rule 80525 good faith purchaser sta-
tus can be accorded to an affiliate of a debtor's general partner.
26
Bel Air Associates, Ltd. (Bel Air) was a limited partnership organized
by Frey, Tompkins, and others to purchase and operate an apartment com-
plex owned by Leroy Properties and Development Corporation (Leroy) and
managed by PM & M Company (PM & M), a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Leroy. 27 The partners agreed that Frey would be the general partner of Bel
Air and that PM & M would manage the purchased complex. 28 Prior to
completing the sale, Frey revealed his controlling interests in PM & M and
Leroy to Tompkins and the other limited partners. 29 The limited partner-
ship nonetheless purchased the apartment complex, assuming the first mort-
gage, paying some cash, and giving Leroy a second mortgage as security for
the remainder of the purchase price.
30
Subsequently, because of financial failure, Frey, in his capacity as gen-
eral partner of Bel Air, filed a bankruptcy petition listing Leroy and PM &
M as the principal creditors.31 The approved reorganization plan required
selling the complex by auction and paying the creditors with the proceeds.
32
Leroy submitted the bid with highest present value. The bid included as-
sumption of the mortgage, satisfaction of Bel Air's debts to Leroy and PM &
M, and payment of Bel Air's administrative expenses. 33 Tompkins, a limited
partner of Bel Air, objected to the plan and requested that the bankruptcy
court stay any further proceedings, including the sale of the property to Le-
23. Id
24. 706 F.2d 301 (10th Cir. 1983).
25. FED. R. BANKR. P. 805. This rule stated in pertinent part:
Unless an order approving a sale of property or issuance of a certificate of indebted-
ness is stayed pending appeal, the sale to a good faith purchaser or the issuance of a
certificate to a good faith holder shall not be affected by the reversal or modification of
such order on appeal, whether or not the purchaser or holder knows of the pendency
of the appeal.
Id.
26. See 706 F.2d at 305-06 & n.17.




31. Id at 303-04.




roy.34 The bankruptcy court granted the stay, subject to Tompkin's pay-
ment of a supersedeas bond. 35 When Tompkins failed to post the bond the
bankruptcy court allowed the reorganization plan to proceed, and the prop-
erty was sold to Leroy as the highest bidder.
36
When Tompkins appealed the sale the district court held that the ap-
peal was moot because Leroy's status as a good faith purchaser precluded
setting aside the sale.37 The issues addressed by the Tenth Circuit were
whether Leroy could be a good faith purchaser in light of either the make-up
of its bid or Frey's simultaneous interests in Leroy and Bel Air. 38 In holding
that Leroy was a good faith purchaser, the Tenth Circuit adopted a recog-
nized two-prong test. A good faith purchaser is one who buys in good faith
and who gives value. 39 The court found that Leroy's purchase satisfied both
conditions.4° Leroy had clearly given value; because its claims against Bel
Air were valid, and because Leroy's use of a present value analysis in valuing
its bid was not misleading, Leroy had acted in good faith.
4 '
The next argument Tompkins asserted was that Frey's status as a fiduci-
ary of Bel Air should prevent his direct purchase of the apartment complex,
and that a similar restraint should be imposed on Leroy because it was Frey's
controlled corporation. 4 2 The court held that, even assuming that Leroy
was Frey's alter ego, 43 Leroy was a secured creditor of Bel Air, and secured
creditors had the right to bid for collateral at a bankruptcy sale.4 4 While a
different result might have been reached if Frey had concealed his interest in
Leroy,45 full disclosure of that interest prior to Leroy's becoming a secured
creditor entitled Leroy to assert all rights inuring to secured creditors.
46
Tompkins continues the recent trend of more favorable treatment to
creditors in the area of bankruptcy litigation. 4 7 Because it is now settled in
the Tenth Circuit that transactions involving affiliated secured creditors are
not necessarily excluded from the good faith purchaser protections, Tompkins
may encourage the extension of credit.
III. BANKRUPTCY COURT JURISDICTION
The Tenth Circuit case of General Electrtc Credit Corp. v. Montgomely Mall
34. Id.
35. Id. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 805, providing that a sale may take place to a good faith
purchaser unless there is a stay of the action.
36. 706 F.2d at 304.
37. Id. If Leroy had not been a good faith purchaser Rule 805 would have been inapplica-
ble, and the sale could have been modified or voided.
38. See 706 F.2d at 305-06.
39. Id. at 305. The Tenth Circuit had not previously defined the elements establishing a




43. Id at 306.
44. Id
45. Seeid at 306 n.17.
46. Id at 306.




Limited Partnershzip (In re Montgomey Mall Lnited Partnership) 48 presented two
issues concerning the limits of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. The first issue
addressed was whether bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction to grant summary
judgment in state foreclosure proceedings, or whether bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion was limited to full hearings. 49 The second issue addressed involved the
effect of the bankruptcy judge's failure to comply with the notice require-
ments incident to a motion for summary judgment.
50
Montgomery Plaza Shopping Center was owned by Montgomery Mall,
a limited partnership.5 The partnership owed a debt to General Electric
Credit Corp. (GECC), which was secured by mortgages and an assignment
of leases and rent payments. 52 When the partnership defaulted, GECC filed
a foreclosure action in state court and moved for summary judgment.
5 3
Prior to a hearing on the motion the partnership filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy, thereby staying the foreclosure action. 54 GECC then moved the
bankruptcy court for emergency relief under section 362(0 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code,55 requesting that the bankruptcy court remove the automatic
stay 56 imposed on the foreclosure proceedings.57 The next day the bank-
ruptcy judge granted GECC's motion, terminated the stay of the bankruptcy
proceedings to the extent of allowing GECC to foreclose, and entered sum-
mary judgment on the foreclosure action. 58 At a rehearing several weeks
later the partnership objected to the summary judgment primarily because
the plaintiffs had not provided the notice required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c). 59 The district court, apparently rejecting this argument,
reaffirmed its grant of summary judgment. 60
As indicated above, the partnership's first argument on appeal was that
section 362(0 did not invest the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction to grant
the requested summary judgment.6 1 The Tenth Circuit resolved this con-
tention by examining the temporal relationship between the bankruptcy
court's action and the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Oil Co .62
At the time Northern Pziehhe was decided, Montgomery Mall was pending
48. 704 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 104 S. Ct. 108 (1983).
49. Seeid at 1175.
50. Seeid. at 1176.
51. Id at 1173.
52. Id at 1173-74.
53. Id at 1174.
54. Id
55. 11 U.S.C. § 362(f) (1982) This section provides:
The court, without a hearing, shall grant such relief from the stay provided under
subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the inter-
est of an entity in property, if such interest will suffer such damage before there is an
opportunity for notice and a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section.
Id
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
57. 704 F.2d at 1174.
58. Id.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides in part that a summary judgment motion "shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing."
60. 704 F.2d at 1174.
61. Id at 1175.
62. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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appeal.63 Northern Pipelne deemed unconstitutional the broad grant of juris-
diction delegated to bankruptcy judges, at least insofar as the bankruptcy
court exercised jurisdiction over suits between two private litigants involving
rights created by state law.64 The Tenth Circuit pointed out that Northern
Pipehne's narrowing of bankruptcy court jurisdiction was prospective only.
65
Accordingly, cases on appeal when Northern Pipeline was decided on June 28,
1982, such as Montgomery Mall, were unaffected by the Northern Pipehne hold-
ing.66 Thus, the scope of jurisdiction for such cases was determined by refer-
ence to Congress' original intent. 67 The Tenth Circuit held that Congress
had intended bankruptcy courts to have the power to grant summary judg-
ments in state foreclosure suits pursuant to section 362(0, 68 and the bank-
ruptcy court had therefore properly exercised its jurisdiction in Montgomery
Ma/I. 69
The Tenth Circuit then rejected the partnership's lack of notice objec-
tion to the summary judgment, holding that the partnership's knowledge of
the stayed state summary judgment proceedings should have alerted it to the
probability that GECC would request summary judgment in the bank-
ruptcy court. 7 0 Because the partnership could therefore show no prejudice
flowing from the lack of the statutorily required notice, reversible error had
not been committed. 7 Supplementing its position, the court pointed to case
law holding that removing a case from state court to federal court does not
affect the state court's procedural schedule. 72 The court read this case law to
implicitly recognize that notice given in state court proceedings provides no-
tice in proceedings removed to federal court.
73
The last issue determined by the Tenth Circuit in Montgomery Mall was
whether the bankruptcy court's grant of emergency relief to GECC under
section 362(o was substantively correct.7 4 The court concluded that because
emergency relief was necessary to prevent irreparable damage to GECC, the
bankruptcy judge had acted properly.
75
Montgomery Mall clarifies the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction both
before and after the Northern Pipehhe case. The case also points out that even
after Northern Pipeline, ten days notice prior to a summary judgment hearing
will not be required in all circumstances.
63. See 704 F.2d at 1175.
64. See 458 U.S. at 69-70 (resolution of private rights disputes fundamental attribute of
judicial power); 458 U.S. at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (bankruptcy court jurisdiction
unconstitutional insofar as it reaches state law disputes between two private litigants).
65. 704 F.2d at 1175 (citing Northern Pizehne, 458 U.S. at 88).





71. Id (citing Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc., 639 F.2d 386,
391 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 136 (6th
Cir. 1979)).






IV. TRIBAL ENTITY AS SEPARATE FROM TRIBE
In Navajo Tribe v. Bank of New Mexico, 76 the Tenth Circuit analyzed the
circumstances in which an entity established by an Indian tribe can obligate
the tribe for the entity's debts. The entity, Navajo Housing and Develop-
ment Enterprise (NHDE), was created by the Navajo Tribe (Tribe) in con-
formance with tribal law. 77 When NHDE failed to repay promissory notes
for money borrowed from the Bank of New Mexico (Bank), the Bank offset
the amount due against a certificate of deposit held in the name of the
Tribe. 78 The Tribe challenged this action, arguing that NHDE was distinct
from the Tribe and that therefore the Tribe could not be charged with
NHDE's debts. 79 The district court agreed and ordered return of the off-
set.80 On appeal, the Bank argued that the Tribe lacked power to create a
semi-governmental entity distinct from the Tribe, and that even assuming
that capacity the tribe's conduct estopped it from asserting NHDE's
separateness.
8'
Recognizing that the Tribe, as a sovereign, has the power to create a
semi-governmental entity,8 2 the court noted that the relevant inquiry was
whether the Tribe had created an independent entity. 83 Tribal control of
NHDE was not determinative in characterizing NHDE's separate status.
8 4
The inquiry used by the court essentially assumed that the tribe had created
a distinct entity, and then analyzed the extent to which the entity could be
considered separate without impinging on the sovereignty of the government
creating the ostensibly distinct entity.8 5 Because tribal sovereignty was not
threatened by holding NHDE responsible for its own debts, NHDE was an
independent enterprise.
8 6
The court also noted two other factors militating towards NHDE's sepa-
rateness. White Mountaih Apache Indian Tribe v. Shel/ey 87 was cited for the
proposition that "the right to sue a tribal enterprise was exclusively within
the inherent power of the Tribe to establish."88 Thus, to impute a breach in
tribal immunity in the absence of express consent would unreasonably inter-
fere with tribal sovereignty.8 9 The Tenth Circuit then surveyed a number of
cases recognizing the notion that tribes and tribal entities are to be treated
separately where tribal sovereignty is not in issue. 9°
76. 700 F.2d 1285 (10th Cir. 1983).
77. Id at 1286.
78. Id at 1286-87.
79. Id. at 1287.
80. Navajo Tribe v. Bank of New Mexico, 556 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.M. 1980), affd, 700 F,2d
1285 (10th Cir. 1983).





86. Id. at 1288.
87. 107 Ariz. 4, 480 P.2d 654 (1971).
88. 700 F.2d at 1288.
89. Id
90. Id. (citing Navajo Tribal Util. Auth. v. Arizona Dep't of Revenue, 608 F.2d 1228 (9th
Cir. 1979); R.C. Hedreen Co. v. Crow Tribal Hous. Auth., 521 F. Supp. 599 (D. Mont. 1981):
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From these premises the circuit court concluded that the Tribe could
not be liable for NHDE's debts unless a threat to tribal sovereignty existed or
the Tribe in creating NHDE had intended to assume its debts; any other
treatment would nullify the power of the tribal government to create a gov-
ernmental corporation.9 ' Because neither of these conditions were present,
the Tribe could not be held liable through an organizational analysis.
92
The court also rejected the argument that NHDE could be deemed the
alter ego of the Tribe due to the Tribe's conduct in NHDE's dealings with
the Bank.9 3 Examination of the record revealed no affirmative conduct by
the Tribe which would lead the bank to conclude that NHDE was not a
separate and distinct entity.94 In fact, the record indicated that the Bank
had actual knowledge that the Tribe did not intend to honor NHDE's
debts. 95 Thus, there was no right to charge the Tribe's. account with
NHDE's debts. Such a right exists only where there is a creditor-debtor rela-
tionship, which was not present between the Tribe and the Bank with re-
spect to NHDE's debts.
96
The result of this case illustrates to creditors that if a tribal entity exists,
"piercing its veil" and looking to the tribe for payment of the entity's obliga-
tions will meet significant judicial resistance. Hence, only the assets of the
entity itself should be relied on in making a loan determination.
V. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DECISIONS
A. Lease as Security Interest
Adelman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Tulsa Port Warehouse Co.,
Inc.) 9 7 arose out of a lease of automobiles to Tulsa Port Warehouse, a firm
which later filed a petition in bankruptcy.98 General Motors Acceptance
Corporation (GMAC), the assignee of the leases, claimed a priority interest
in the cars.9 9 The trustee in bankruptcy objected, claiming that the leases
were actually unperfected security agreements, and that GMAC therefore
lacked a priority interest. 1° ° If the purported lease was actually a security
interest, the effect would have been subordination of GMAC's claims be-
Namekagon Dev. Co., Inc. v. Bois Forte Reservation Hous. Auth., 395 F. Supp. 23 (D. Minn.
1974), af'd, 517 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1975)).
91. 700 F.2d at 1288.
92. See id.
93. d at 1289.
94. Id. at 1288.
95. Id The court pointed out that two senior vice-presidents of the Bank were on NHDE's
board, and also found that the Bank knew it had the ability to procure financial guarantees
from the Tribe, but took no steps to secure such guarantees. Id at 1288 & n.2. The district
court had held that the Bank's knowledge of NHDE's separate nature estopped the bank from
denying NHDE's separate existence, in a reverse application of the "corporation -by-estoppel"
doctrine. Navajo Tribe v. Bank of New Mexico, 556 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.M. 1980), afd, 700 F.2d
1285 (10th Cir. 1983).
96. 700 F.2d at 1289. Because NHDE was separate from the Tribe, the creditor-debtor
relationship was between the enterprise and the Bank.
97. 690 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1982).





cause its interest was admittedly unperfected. 10 1
The bankruptcy court and the district court both ruled in favor of the
trustee and concluded that the leases in the instant case constituted security
interests. 10 2 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, relying in large measure on Steele v.
Gebetsberger (In re Fashion Optical, Ltd.),103 a Tenth Circuit decision on the
same general question decided just one year earlier. In Fashion Optical the
court stated that even when there was no purchase option, a lease would be
deemed one intended as security "if the facts otherwise expose economic re-
alities tending to confirm that a secured transfer of ownership is afoot."
10 4
Tulsa Port pointed to a number of factors which other courts have used in
determining the economic reality of a purported lease. These factors in-
cluded: 1) whether the lessee obtained an equity interest; 2) whether the
lessee was required to provide insurance with benefits running to the lessor;
3) whether the lessee paid sales tax; 4) whether maintenance and annual
taxes were the lessee's responsibility; and 5) whether the lessee bore the risk
of loss. '
0 5
Because nearly all of the factors were present in Tulsa Port's leases, the
lessee held all incidents of ownership save legal title, and the leases consti-
tuted secured transactions.' 0 6 The court added that there was no economic
difference between these leases and secured transfers of property, and con-
cluded that a buyer and seller should not be allowed to " 'masquerad[e] their
secured installment sale as a 'lease', thereby placing it beyond the reach of
the UCC provisions governing secured transactions.' "107
Tulsa Port reiterates that courts will look beyond the form of a lease
agreement to determine whether the provisions of the contract reflect the
parties' underlying objective of effecting a sale. The case also outlines the
criteria which should be taken into account when one wishes to enter into a
true lease in order to avoid a later determination that the lease is a secured
transaction.
B. Parol Evidence and Damages
In United States ex rel. Federal Corp. v. Commercial Mechanical Contractors ,i08
the seller, Federal, had submitted a bid to supply underground fuel storage
tanks to the buyer, Commercial Mechanical Contractors, which was to use
these tanks in conjunction with a contract with the United States Army.' 0 9
Included in the seller's quotation form was an exculpatory clause which
stated that the seller would not be liable for any delays arising from causes
beyond its control. i ° This quotation form, along with a letter amendment
101. Id.
102. Id
103. 653 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1981).
104. Id at 1389.
105. 690 F.2d at 811.
106. Id at 811-12.
107. Id (quoting Fashion Optical, 653 F.2d at 1388).
108. 707 F.2d 1124 (10th Cir. 1982).




and an invoice, were the only documents involved in the sales transaction 11
Trial testimony supported the conclusion that Commercial would not
have accepted Federal's bid if Federal had not assured Commercial that the
tanks would be delivered within a specified time.' l2 The tanks were deliv-
ered late, and as a consequence Commercial was required to incur added
expenses for maintenance and excavation of the holes prepared for the
tanks. 1 13 A jury awarded Commercial both actual and consequential dam-
ages for Federal's breach of contract.'
1 4
The Tenth Circuit considered three issues in this case. The first issue
was whether parol evidence concerning the essentiality of timely delivery
was correctly admitted in the trial court, or whether the contract, the
amendment, and the invoice constituted the entire agreement of the par-
ties. 1 15 The court noted that the posture of Commercial's claim 116 made it
unclear whether federal or state law controlled construction of the contested
contract.T1 7 Finding that there was no conflict between applicable state law
and general principles of contract law,118 the Court resolved the parol evi-
dence issue by reference to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).1 19
The court began its analysis by noting that the UCC recognizes con-
tracts which include both oral and written terms. 120 Given the incomplete
nature of the extant written terms, the trial court's determination to admit
evidence of oral terms was permissible.' 21 Because the record supported a
determination that the parties had intended to include a term that "time
was of the essence," the jury could have properly found that Federal had
breached this contractual duty.'
22
The second issue was whether the seller was estopped from asserting the
exculpatory clause as a defense to late performance.' 2 3 The Tenth Circuit
found that the jury could have reasonably concluded that Federal had delib-
erately misrepresented its ability to effect timely delivery.' 2 4 Because the
111. Id
112. Id.
113. Id Because the tanks were late, the walls of the holes began to collapse and had to be
re-excavated. Additionally, overhead costs continued to accumulate because of the extended
time needed for completion of the contract. Both of these complications resulted in added ex-
pense for Commercial. Id.
114. Id at 1125-26.
115. Seeid at 1126.
116. Commercial's contract claim was asserted in a proceeding Federal had brought pursu-
ant to the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270f (1982). The Miller Act provides a remedy for
persons who have not been paid for materials used in a public works project. Id. § 270b. Com-
mercial had failed to pay Federal the entire amount due for supplying the fuel tanks. 707 F.2d
at 1125.
117. 707 F.2dat 1126 n..
118. Id
119. Seeid at 1126-28.
120. Id at 1127 (citing U.C.C. § 2-204).
121. 707 F.2d at 1127-28.
122. Id at 1128.
123. Id As noted, the exculpatory clause excused the seller from liability for delays beyond
its control. See supra text accompanying note 110.
124. 707 F.2d at 1128. Commercial alleged that it had begun excavation in reliance upon




elements of estoppel were otherwise supported by the record, 125 the Tenth
Circuit upheld the jury's finding of estoppel.
12 6
The final issue on appeal was whether the trial court had correctly rec-
ognized the elements of Commercial's damages.1 2 7 Following the historical
case of Hadlev v. Baxendale,12 8 the circuit court reaffirmed that a buyer can
recover all damages which are reasonably foreseeable to the parties at the
time they enter into a contract.129 Thus, damages could include extended
overhead expenses and expenses for maintenance of already excavated sites
which the buyer incurred as a result of the seller's delay in completing its
side of the contract.1 30 Because the evidence supported the conclusion that
all the contested damages were foreseeable, and were attributable to Fed-
eral's breach, the damage award was upheld. 
131
Commercial Mechanical Contractors seems to imply that an exculpatory
clause may be used only by one who exhibits good faith in performing his
part of a contract, and who does not induce reliance on timely performance
and then seek to use the exculpatory clause to escape liability. This case also
reaffirmed the proposition that any written contract should explicitly state
that it is the full and final expression of the parties, if that is their intent.
Finally, the circuit court continued the trend of including as consequential
damages those damages which may be somewhat remote as long as the dam-




127. See id at 1129. Specifically, Federal objected to including both Commercial's extended
overhead expenses and maintenance expenses for a second hole as elements of damages. Id
128. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).







During the period covered by this survey the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered a wide range of issues in the area of constitutional law.
This overview first analyzes the court's activity in three important areas:
ballot access, freedom of speech, and justiciability of tort claims stemming
from operation of nuclear facilities. Finally, there is a brief review of the
court's opinions dealing with other questions of constitutional law.
I. MINOR PARTY BALLOT ACCESS: THE TENTH CIRCUIT REJECTS
STRICT SCRUTINY
In Arutunoffv. Oklahoma State Election Board' the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered a constitutional challenge to those portions of
Oklahoma's election act which affect ballot access by minor parties. The
first portions challenged provided for decertification of previously recognized
political parties whose nominees for President, Vice President, or Governor
failed to receive ten percent of the votes cast.2 Decertification denied candi-
dates sponsored by decertified parties the automatic ballot access provided
to candidates affiliated with recognized parties.3 Additionally, the party af-
filiation of members of decertified parties was changed to Independent.
4
The second portion of the election act which was challenged permitted bal-
lot access to independent candidates under requirements less stringent than
those imposed on party candidates. 5
A. Oklahoma's Election Act Under Fre
In the 1980 general election, the Oklahoma Libertarian party's nomi-
nees for electors for President of the United States failed to receive the per-
centage of votes required for continued official recognition. 6 Members of the
Libertarian party brought suit to enjoin Oklahoma election officials from
decertifying the party and changing the affiliation of party members to In-
1. 687 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1892 (1983).
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 1-109 (1981) provides: "Any recognized political party whose
nominee for Governor or nominees for electors for President and Vice President fail to receive at
least ten percent (10%) of the total votes cast for said offices in any General Election shall cease
to be a recognized political party ... "
3. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-102 (1981) provides automatic ballot position to recog-
nized political parties complying with statutorily mandated primary procedures. See Craig v.
Bard, 160 Okla. 34, 15 P.2d 1014 (1932) (interpreting predecessor to section 1-102).
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 1-110 (1981) provides: "The secretary of each county election
board shall . . . change to Independent the party affiliation on the registration form of each
registered voter of a political party which ceases to be a recognized political party."
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 5-112 permits independent candidates to be listed on the ballot
either through presenting a petition signed by five percent of all registered voters or by simply
paying a filing fee.
6. The Libertarian presidential electors gained only 1.2% of the total votes cast in the
1980 general election, far short of the required 10%. 687 F.2d at 1377. See supra note 2.
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dependent. 7 The district court denied the plaintiffs' request for relief and
dismissed the action.8 The Tenth Circuit, over Judge Seymour's dissent,
upheld the district court. 9 The Supreme Court has refused to consider the
Tenth Circuit's decision.l°
B. The Arutunoff Opinion
The Arutunoff'plaintiffs claimed that Oklahoma's decertification scheme
unduly burdened their rights to freely cast their votes and to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs, in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments. The independent candidate access requirements were chal-
lenged solely on equal protection grounds.I' The Arutunoff opinion does not
set forth the precise basis for plaintiffs' first and fourteenth amendment
claims. While the opinion is therefore an inadequate vehicle for analyzing
the court's treatment of these particularized claims, the dialogue between
the court and the dissent concerning the proper standard of review does pro-
vide an opportunity for a brief analysis 12 of the methodological problems
existing in this area of constitutional law.
Methodological problems stem from the fact that although the Supreme
Court has written extensively on state regulation of ballot access,' 3 no une-
quivocal standard of review has emerged from its decisions.' 4 The discussion
below limits itself to the standard of review issue in the context of the decer-
tification challenge. The challenge based on easier independent candidate
access is not addressed because the court properly held that controlling pre-
cedent permits disparate treatment for independent and party candidates. 5
C. Difring Interpretations of Supreme Court Precedent
The majority essentially viewed the Court's decisions as creating no
fixed standard of review. Rather, the Supreme Court opinions were read as
requiring the judiciary to evaluate ballot restrictions on an ad hoc/sui
generis basis.' 6 Restrictions judicially deemed "unduly oppressive" are
struck down, with lesser restrictions permitted as a proper exercise of the
7. 687 F.2d at 1377.
8. Id.
9. Arutunoffv. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 687 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1892 (1983).
10. Arutunoff v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 103 S. Ct. 1892 (1983), denying cert. to 687
F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1982).
11. 687 F.2d at 1378.
12. For fuller discussion of Supreme Court cases dealing with ballot access, see Elder, Access
to the Ballot by Potitical Candidates, 83 DICK. L. REv. 387 (1979); Rada, Cardwell, Friedman,
Access to the Ballot, 13 URB. LAw. 793 (1981).
13. In chronological order the relevant cases have been: Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Illinois State Bd. of Elections
v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); and Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
14. Compare Antunoff, 687 F.2d at 1379 (McWilliams, J.) (Supreme Court's decisions do not
reveal "hard-and-fast" rule or standard for measuring state ballot access laws) with Arutunoff, 687
F.2d at 1381 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (Supreme Court's decisions clearly mandate use of strict
scrutiny in evaluating ballot access laws imposing more than de minimus burdens).
15. See 687 F.2d at 1380 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. .724, 725 (1974)).
16. 687 F.2d at 1379.
[Vol. 61:2
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
state's interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process. 17  This
approach emphasizes the need to examine challenged election laws to deter-
mine whether, as a practical matter, the laws operate to exclude minor party
ballot access.
Applying its test in Arutunoff, the court concluded that the Oklahoma
decertification procedures did not unduly burden ballot access. The major-
ity concluded (without reference to the record) that the requirements for
continued certification were not unreasonably high, and that decertified par-
ties could easily become recertified.' 8 The fact that ballot access was easier
under prior laws was deemed irrelevant; the court stated that the relevant
inquiry was the effect of existing law.' 9 Given the reasonableness of the bur-
dens.created by the existing laws, the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.
20
Judge Seymour, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's interpretation
of the Supreme Court's ballot access cases. Under her reading, once a minor
party established that ballot access restrictions were not de minimus a court
was required to apply strict scrutiny and strike down restrictions not reflect-
ing the least restrictive means of protecting ballot integrity.2 1  Finding
Oklahoma's certification/decertification framework to impose substantial
burdens on minor party access (albeit without citation of evidentiary sup-
port for this conclusion), Judge Seymour easily found a less restrictive
scheme in Oklahoma's previous certification procedures.2 2 Hence, the re-
quired application of strict scrutiny mandated reversal of the district court's
decision to deny plaintiffs their requested relief.
2 3
D. Sources of Methodological Confusion
The Supreme Court's first contemporary encounter with minor party
ballot access restrictions came in Wiliams v. Rhodes.24 In Williams the Court
held that two fundamental rights were implicated by state laws affecting
minor party ballot access: the right to associate for advancement of political
beliefs, and the right of a qualified voter to cast his or her ballot effectively.
2 5
Ballot access restrictions burdening these fundamental rights could only be
justified by compelling state interests.
2 6
17. Id. The state's interest in protecting the electoral process from fraud, voter confusion,
and similar antidemocratic effects provides the basis for permitting ballot access restriction. See,
e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
18. 687 F.2d at 1379-80. Under OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 1-108 (1981), any non-certified
party presenting a petition signed by five percent of the voters in the immediately preceding
gubernatorial or presidential election must be certified.
19. 687 F.2d at 1380.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1380-83 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1381. Judge Seymour found further support for her contention that the new laws
were unnecessarily restrictive in the lack of evidence of ballot confusion or fraud under the prior
statutory provisions. Id. at 1382-83.
23. Id. at 1383.
24. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
25. Id. at 30-31.
26. Id. The Court did not explictly articulate a "least restrictive means" requirement in




Bullock v. Carter27 was the first case to limit Williams, doing so in two
ways. The first, explicit limitation was the recognition that not every ballot
access restriction invoked strict scrutiny; only when meaningful restriction
was present would the rigorous strict scrutiny be imposed. 28 The second,
implicit limitation is found in Bullock's delineation of strict scrutiny method-
ology. Instead of defining the judicial task as an investigation into whether
the legislative restrictions were the "least restrictive alternative," Bullock de-
fined the inquiry as an examination of whether the challenged restrictions
were "reasonably necessary" to accomplish state goals. 29 Since Bullock, the
Court has used both a "reasonably necessary" and a "least restrictive alter-
native" standard to test ballot access restrictionsa 0 A situation has therefore
been created in which a version of "middle-tier" scrutiny (legitimate state
interest combined with reasonable means) coexists with strict scrutiny (com-
pelling state interest combined with least restrictive means).
E. Resolving the Confusion by Favoring Democratic Participation
While the divergence in Supreme Court holdings may justify the Arulu-
nof majority, Aruntunoff clearly lies outside the spirit of the Court's ballot
access opinions. The thrust of the Court's decisions has been directed to-
wards reducing access requirements, with antagonism shown towards regula-
tions increasing the numerical requirements for ballot access.3 ' The Court
also recently noted the honorable and vital role minor parties have played in
the moral and political progress of the American polity.3 2 Further, ballot
access limitations impact directly on core first amendment rights of political
expression, clearly justifying judicial apprehension towards state action re-
stricting those rights.
The state in Arutunoif did not present even a modicum of proof that its
increased restrictions were necessary.33 Given that evidentiary void, the
Tenth Circuit, even if reluctant to apply strict scrutiny, should have found
Oklahoma's increased restrictions unnecessary and unduly burdensome and
reversed the lower court. Federalistic concerns may justify deference to state
legislative programs, but such deference should not override the fundamen-
tal philosophy of democratic participation embodied in the Constitution.
Absent proof that increased ballot access restrictions are in fact necessary to
27. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
28. Id. at 143.
29. Id. at 144.
30. Compare Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 719 (1974) (reasonable restrictions permissible);
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974) (restrictions valid unless "signifi-
cantly less burdensome" alternatives available) wtth Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979) (least drastic means required).
31. Cf Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974) (expressing concern over ballot access
requirement which would effectively increase petition signature requirement, especially if such
increase resulted in requirement that signatures of more than five percent of electorate be
obtained).
32. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979)
(noting important role of Abolitionist and Progressive parties).
33. Judge Seymour cogently observed that there was no evidence that Oklahoma's prior,




protect ballot integrity, 34 such increased regulations should be struck down.
II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A. Libel Characterizing a Statement as Fact or Fantasy Falls Wz'thin the Province
ofthe Court: Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd.
In the heavily publicized case of Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd ,"5 a
divided Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel overturned a jury verdict
finding Penthouse magazine liable for libel.36 The Penthouse article por-
trays the thoughts and acts of a Miss Wyoming at a Miss America contest.
3 7
The article describes Miss Wyoming as performing fellatio with several male
companions, thereby causing them to levitate, with several of the acts unwit-
tingly performed during a national television broadcast. 38 In the article
Miss Wyoming also performs fellatio-like acts with her baton and thinks she
might save the world by performing similar acts with various world
leaders.
39
The court utilized a two-part test in its treatment of this defamation
action. The threshold question was whether the publication was about the
plaintiff.40 The jury specifically found that the plaintiff was the Miss Wyo-
ming about whom the article was written. 4 ' The court of appeals found that
the jury's determination was supported by the record, and accepted the
jury's conclusion that the publication was about the plaintiff.
4 2
The second element of the two-part analysis was whether the story
could reasonably be understood as describing actual facts or events about
the plaintiff or actual conduct of the plaintiff.43 Two Supreme Court opin-
ions were drawn on in articulating the "reasonably understood" require-
ment, and in holding that the fantastic nature vel non of a statement was a
question of law. In both Greenbelt Cooperative Pubhhtng Association v. Bresler 
44
34. The court stated that plaintiffs were effectively arguing that any party receiving 1.2%
of the popular vote is entitled to retain ballot position. Id. at 1380. This contention is not well-
taken. Plaintiffs did not challenge increased access requirements on the basis of their quantita-
tive showing, but rather on the qualitative nature of their showing. Essentially, plaintiffs ar-
gued that under the previous certification program they would have been treated as having
sufficient popular support to retain ballot position, and that absent a showing that the old
system violated ballot integrity increased restrictions were improper.
35. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983).
36. 695 F.2d at 440-41.
37. Id. at 441.
38. M.





44. 398 U.S. 6 (1970). In Greenbelt the plaintiff had certain property which the city wanted
to buy and other property which he wanted rezoned. Both matters were before the city council
at the same time. Various speakers at council meetings referred to the plaintiff's bargaining
position as blackmail. A newspaper article reporting on the city council proceedings referred to
those statements. After an independent review of the record, the Court held that the newspaper
article was not defamatory as a matter of law because no reader could understand the article to
mean that the plaintiff had actually been charged with blackmail. Id. at 13-14.
1984]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
and National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin,45 the Supreme Court held
that liability for defamation could not be imposed because the challenged
articles involved expressions of opinion which could not reasonably be inter-
preted as describing a real state of affairs concerning the plaintiffs. 4 6 Al-
though Greenbelt and Letter Carrters factually involved constitutional
protection for opinion, the Tenth Circuit read both cases as requiring an
appellate court to determine whether any type of statement was capable of
constituting an assertion of fact.4 7 In doing so the Tenth Circuit properly
rejected the suggestion that the factual nature of a statement was a question
for the jury. The constitutional imperative to protect freedom of expression
requires judicial characterization of a statement as ideaistic (and therefore
nonactionable) or factual (and therefore potentially actionable). 48 Thus, al-
though Pring involved fantasy and not opinion, the Tenth Circuit properly
delineated the allocation of functions between the judge and jury.
Turning to the merits, the court of appeals found the challenged por-
tions of the Penthouse article to be "impossibility and fantasy within a fanci-
ful story. ' ' 49 According to the court, it would have been impossible for a
reader not to have understood that the article was pure fantasy. 50 Because
the court considered the Penthouse article to be pure fantasy which could
not be taken to imply facts concerning the plaintiffs actual activities, it re-
versed the lower court, and held that the story could not be defamatory.
51
Judge Breitenstein's dissent argued that Penthouse should not be al-
lowed to escape liability by embellishing fact with fantasy. 52 He viewed the
article as describing factual incidents (performance of fellatio) and fanciful
events (public performance of fellatio, levitation as a result of fellatio). 53 Be-
cause the jury was able to identify the plaintiff as the subject of the article,
and because they could reasonably conclude from the article that plaintiff
had committed fellatio, an act of "sexual deviation or perversion," the dis-
sent found sufficient evidence to support a finding of libel.
54
Essentially, the two opinions debate the degree to which a potentially
ideaistic statement can be severed from its context and treated as factual,
and therefore independently actionable. In Pr'ng that debate is more aca-
demic than real. Plaintiffs amended complaint limited the libelous imputa-
45. 418 U.S. 264 (1974). In Letter Carrers a union publication referred to the plaintiffs as
"scabs" and asserted that as scabs plaintiffs were traitors to God, country, family, and class. Id.
at 268. The Court cited Greenbelt in disallowing recovery for defamation, and stated that there
was no libel because the statements concerning treason could not, as a matter of law, be taken as
suggesting plaintiffs were in fact traitors. Id. at 285-86. While the Letter Carriers holding is based
on labor law policies, the grounding of these policies in first amendment concerns, see id. at 277-
83, makes the decision relevent to first amendment analysis.
46. See supra notes 41-42.
47. 695 F.2d at 442.
48. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (first amendment oriented
primarily towards protecting expression of ideas).
49. 695 F.2d at 441.
50. Id. at 443.
51. Id. Appellate power to review lower court rulings on the ideaistic nature of a statement
is well established. See Greenbelt, 418 U.S. at 282.
52. Id. at 444 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting).




tions to either creation of the impression that plaintiff performed fellatio
while on national television, creation of the impression that plaintiff per-
formed fellatio with a named individual, or the imputation that plaintiff
performed fellatio-like acts with her baton at the Miss America pageant.
55
The dissent's emphasis that the article was libelous in imputing that Miss
Wyoming engaged in fellatio in and of itself is therefore misplaced, as plain-
tiffs did not (apparently for tactical reasons) 56 plead that libel. Given the
limited scope of the alleged libel in the context of a fanciful, ostensibly hu-
morous57 article, the majority's decision seems correct.
B. Invasion of Privacy: Application of Defamation Standards
In Rinsley v. Brandt 58 the court of appeals affirmed the district court's
entry of summary judgment against plaintiff Rinsley in his action for inva-
sion of privacy. Rinsley alleged that a book written and published by the
defendants had invaded his privacy by placing him before the public in a
false light. 5 9 The book in question, Reality Polce: The Experience of Insanity in
America, sharply criticized Dr. Rinsley's treatment of patients in mental insti-
tutions. The trial court found that the challenged portions of the book were
either true, or were opinions and therefore not actionable.
6 °
The court, in considering Rinsley's appeal, analogized false light pri-
vacy actions to defamation actions.61 Essential to both actions is a determi-
nation that the matter published is not true.62 Because a false statement is
required, truth is an absolute defense to both actions. 63 Additionally, be-
cause opinions are not assertions of fact and are therefore not actionable,
64
statements which are opinion do not create liability for invasion of privacy.
65
Rinsley first challenged the propriety of the district court making a
summary determination that certain statements in the book were true. The
Court of Appeals noted that whether a statement is true or false is a question
of fact, 66 and upheld the district court's decision regarding the truth of the
statements because Rinsley failed to raise a genuine issue of fact. 6 7 Addi-
tionally, Rinsley's own testimony confirmed the accuracy of the challenged
passages, 68 making the trial court's summary determination altogether
55. Id. at 441.
56. See id.
57. Penthouse labeled the article as a "humorous" piece. Id. at 444 (Breitenstein, J., dis-
senting). This labeling is insufficient to determine liability, however. See Bindrim v. Mitchell,
92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979).
58. 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 1305.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1307.
62. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment a (1977)).
63. 700 F.2d at 1307.
64. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). See also supra notes 43-48
and accompanying text.
65. 700 F.2d at 1307.
66. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 617 (1977), which states that the
truth of statement is a question for the jury in defamation actions).





In reviewing the district court's finding that particular portions of the
book were opinion, the Tenth Circuit noted that the determination as to
whether a statement is an assertion of fact or an opinion is a question of
law. 69 The court concluded that the challenged passages were not actiona-
ble'because they did not suggest any undisclosed facts that might be false,
70
but were merely exaggerated expressions of criticism.
7'
C. State Power to Limit Broadcast Advertising of Alcohol Under the Twenty-First
Amendment
In Oklahoma Telecasters Association v. Crisp72 the Tenth Circuit considered
the constitutionality of portions of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Act. The act prohibited television broadcasters and cable television op-
erators from advertising alcoholic beverages. 73 Telecasters and cable
operators filed separate suits against Crisp, the director of the Oklahoma
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, claiming that the law violated their
rights to free speech. 74 The district court granted the plaintiffs' separate mo-
tions for summary judgment, ruling that the state's power to regulate liquor
pursuant to the twenty-first amendment 75 did not override the first amend-
ment rights of the telecasters and cable operators. 76 Crisp appealed from the
summary judgments rendered by the district court; his appeals were consoli-
dated for consideration by the Tenth Circuit.
The critical issue on appeal was the precedential effect of the Supreme
Court's dismissal of the appeal in Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control
Commission7 7 for want of a substantial federal question. 78 Beginning with
Hicks v. Miranda79 the Supreme Court has consistently held that summary
dispositions are decisions on the merits, and as such are binding on lower
federal courts.80 Although summary dispositions are binding, the preceden-
tial value of summary dispositions are limited. Only when the constitutional
questions presented in an earlier case's jurisdictional statement are clearly
the issues before a lower court is the lower court bound by a Supreme Court
summary disposition.
8 1
69. Id. at 1309 (citing National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283-
84 (1974)).
70. 700 F.2d at 1309 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
71. 700 F.2d at 1309.
72. 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.), cert. grantedsub noa. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S.
Ct. 66 (1983). A more extensive analysis of Oklahoma Telecasters appears zh_/ra in Comment, The
Substantive Fallacy of the Twenty-fist Amendment A Critique of Oklahoma Telecasters Association v.
Cr~p, 61 Den. L.J. 239 (1984).
73. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 516 (1981).
74. 699 F.2d at 492.
75. U.S. CONST. amend XXI, § 2 provides: "The transportation or importation into any
state, territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
76. 699 F.2d at 493.
77. 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N.E.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 902 (1982).
78. Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 456 U.S. 902 (1982).
79. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
80. Id. at 344-45.
81. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curium). See also Oklahoma Telecasters,
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The court of appeals examined the jurisdictional statement in Queensgale
and concluded that the constitutional issues presented there were substan-
tially identical to those present in Oklahoma Telecasters.82 The Tenth Circuit
characterized the plaintiffs in both cases as arguing that liquor advertising
was protected commercial speech, that the twenty-first amendment did not
ex proprio vigore allow a state to infringe on protected commercial speech,
and that a state's restrictions unconstitutionally burdened free speech
rights.8 3 Having determined that the issues presented by Queensgate were
presented by Oklahoma Telecasters, the court concluded that it was obligated
to uphold Oklahoma's regulation of liquor advertising.
84
Despite the effect of Queensgate, the court proceeded to undertake an
independent examination of the Oklahoma law. The basis for this decision
was the Supreme Court's admonition against excessive reliance on summary
dispositions, and the fact that the laws in Oklahoma Telecasters imposed more
severe restrictions than those upheld in Queensgate.8 5 The court therefore de-
cided to proceed independently, treating Queensgate as a warning against too
easily finding Oklahoma's laws unconstitutional.
86
The court began its independent examination by noting that the
Oklahoma law could be viewed either as a regulation incident to the sale of
liquor or as a means by which the state protects its people from the dangers
attending alcohol use.8 7 In either event the Oklahoma law was within the
authority granted to the states by the twenty-first amendment, and was
therefore entitled to an added presumption of validity.8 8 The court then
analyzed the Oklahoma restrictions with reference to the standards Central
Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Pubhc Service Commission89 established for deter-
mining the validity of regulations touching commercial speech.'
Central Hudson set forth a four-pronged approach to review of commer-
cial speech regulations: 1) whether the commercial speech concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading; 2) whether the governmental interest underly-
ing regulation is substantial; 3) whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest; and 4) whether the regulation is more extensive than
necessary.9 ' The court quickly disposed of the first two steps in the Central
Hudson analysis, finding that neither the sale nor use of alcohol was illegal,
that advertisements for alcoholic beverages were not inherently mislead-
ing,92 and that several substantial state interests were affected by alcohol
abuse: health and safety of citizens, highway safety, family stability, and the
699 F.2d at 496 (listing relevant Supreme Court cases). Even where a summary affirmance acts
as binding precedent a lower court is free to reject the reasoning used by the affirmed court.
Oklahoma Telecasters, 699 F.2d at 496. See Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176-77.
82. 699 F.2d at 497.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. See Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176-77.
86. 699 F.2d at 497.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 498.
89. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
90. See 699 F.2d at 498-502.
91. 447 U.S. at 566.
92. 699 F.2d at 500.
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productivity of the work force.9 3 To these already substantial interests the
court added the state's twenty-first amendment power to regulate alcoholic
beverages.9 4 Thus, the first two prongs of the test were satisfied. 95
Regarding the third part of the Central Hudson test, the court held that
Oklahoma was not required to use the best means to advance its interest, but
was only required to choose a means directly advancing the state interest. 96
Accordingly, even though no evidence tied reducing advertising to a reduc-
tion in alcohol consumption, the court held that the advertising prohibitions
were reasonably related to reducing the sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages.9 7 The court noted that the alcohol industry's advertising conduct
indicated that it was not unreasonable to recognize the consump-
tion/advertising connection;9 8 in conjunction with the deference to state ac-
tion arising by virtue of the twenty-first amendment, the advertising
restrictions plainly were a means to directly advance the state's interests.
99
Analysis of the fourth prong was more problematic. Appellees argued
that the Tenth Circuit should uphold the lower court's finding that a ban on
all rebroadcasting of alcohol-related commercials was excessive.' 00 Noting
that the point was not without difficulty, the Tenth Circuit nonetheless re-
versed the lower court. Analogizing Oklahoma's restrictions to the ban on
substantially all billboard advertising upheld in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego,'0 ' the court essentially held that no advertising business has the right
to control the use of its chosen medium.102 Given the extensive state author-
ity stemming from the twenty-first amendment, and the availability of other
mediums for acquiring alcohol-related information, Oklahoma's restrictions,
even if severe, were not excessive.' 0 3 Because Oklahoma's laws did not un-
constitutionally burden appellee's commercial speech rights, the lower court
was reversed and its injunction against enforcement of the laws dissolved. 10 4
III. MCKAY V. UNITED STATES: JUSTICIABILITY OF NUCLEAR TORTS
REVISITED
In McKay v. United Slates 105 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered the justiciability of tort claims seeking redress for property damages









101. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
102. 699 F.2d at 502.
103. Id.
104. Id. Judge McKay's brief concurring opinion added an interesting twist to the decision.
Judge McKay noted that the challenged laws were enacted by voter referendum, and replaced
a previous prohibition ordinance. Given the quid pro quo conceived by the voters (i.e. total
regulatory package for surrender of prohibition), he doubted the court's power to sever the
challenged provision from the entire regulatory regime. Id. (McKay, J., concurring).
105. 703 F.2d 464 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 103 S.Ct. 3085 (1983).
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Kay provided the Tenth Circuit with its first opportunity to apply its hold-
ing in the landmark Si/kwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 106 decision, although that
application seems questionable in light of the trial court's holding. 107
A. Background and Lower Court Opinion: Non-Justictabiit through Primary
Jursdiction
Owners of land surrounding the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant
brought suit against the United States government and the plant's operators
(federal defendants), and against several state defendants, alleging that the
plant's operation had tortiously injured plaintiffs' property. 10 8 The land-
owners' complaint asserted negligence, nuisance, liability without fault, and
an unconstitutional "taking."' 0 9 In addition to demanding attorney's fees
and twenty-six million dollars of compensatory damages plaintiffs' prayer
included a request for one-hundred-sixty million dollars in exemplary
damages. 1O
After years of pretrial activity, the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado granted the federal defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs' complaint did not present justi-
ciable issues."' The basis of the trial court's finding of non-justiciability was
the pervasive federal administrative agency role in determining permissible
radiation levels from nuclear facilities in the context of the political decision
to operate a nuclear facility at Rocky Flats.' 12 This combination of factors
led the district court to hold that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction oper-
ated to preclude judicial consideration of plaintiffs' claims against the fed-
eral defendants.' 13
Plaintiffs' claims were grounded in the allegation that Rocky Flats had
created a widespread health hazard, and that this general hazard had dam-
aged their property. Plaintiffs did not allege the existence of personal injury
106. 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'din part, 52 U.S.L.W. 4043 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1984) (No.
81-2159). For fuller discussion of Silkwood, see Note, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.: Preemption
of State Law for Nuclear Torts?, 12 ENVTL. L. 1059 (1982); Note, Federal Preemption." State Law
Principles of Strict Liability in a Nuclear Accident--a Preemption Problem in Light of the Price-Anderson
Act?, 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279 (1981). Comment, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.: Workers'
Compensation and Federal Preemption Rescue the Nuclear Tortfeasor, 60 DEN. L.J. 291 (1982).
107. See in/ta notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
108. McKay, 703 F.2d at 465.
109. Id. at 466. The takings claim was disposed of by noting that the Court of Claims had
exclusive jurisdiction over such claims when exceeding 510,000. Id. at 469-70. In upholding the
Court of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' contention that
these takings claims could be heard under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 470.
110. Id. at 466.
111. Good Fund Ltd.-1972 v. Church, 540 F. Supp. 519 (D. Colo. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3085 (1983). The claims
against the state defendants were not dismissed. See 703 F.2d at 548 (holding that only claims
against federal defendants are dismissed).
112. See 540 F. Supp. at 537-48.
113. Id. at 538-39. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires a court to defer to agency
factfinding where legislative intent and agency expertise dictate that an agency, not a court,
should serve as factfinder. Primary jurisdiction therefore operates to divest a court of any func-
tion except judicial review of the agency decision. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§§ 166-168 (1976).
19841
DENVER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:2
to any specific person. 114 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),"
15
however, had determined that the off-site radioactivity effects from Rocky
Flats had not created a general health and safety hazard.'' 6 Given EPA's
conclusion, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain tort claims
grounded in allegations relating to creation of a general health hazard.
1 17
Any finding contrary to that of the EPA would usurp the agency's factual
conclusion, based on its statutory jurisdiction, that Rocky Flats' operation
had not created a general health hazard.'i Deference to agency jurisdiction
therefore precluded any judicial action except consideration of the arbitrari-
ness of the EPA's findings concerning Rocky Flats' generalized health
effects. 119
Buttressing the reasons for finding primary jurisdiction were the na-
tional defense aspects of Rocky Flats. The trial court noted that the decision
to operate Rocky Flats was reviewed annually, 120 and that the judiciary has
traditionally recognized that questions concerning national defense (includ-
ing its nuclear component) are usually left to the other branches of govern-
ment.12 ' Given the political nature of the Rocky Flats operation, and the
existence of an agency having statutory jurisdiction over the health and
safety issues involved in the lawsuit, and a special competence in resolving
those issues, a proper respect for the judiciary's constitutional role required
recognition of, and deference to, EPA's primary jurisdiction.
122
B. The Appellate Opinion: Justcta.6hihy Through Non-Preemption
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not frame the issues in terms of pri-
mary jurisdiction, instead analyzing the trial court's opinion as a finding
that state tort remedies had been preempted through either pervasive regu-
lation or the presence of a political question.' 23 Seizing on the distinction
the lower court had drawn between claims of individualized personal injury
and the claims presented concerning property damage, 24 the Tenth Circuit
pointed out that if preemption existed for property injuries it would also
exist for personal injuries.' 25 The court, on the basis of its Silkwood decision,
114. 540 F. Supp. at 545.
115. Id.
116. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had jurisdiction to determine the health
and safety effects of Rocky, Flats' radioactive releases. Id. at 537.
117. Id. at 538. Plaintiffs argued that the EPA's findings were not final, were the result of a
collusive attempt by government agencies to insulate themselves from liability, were not final
agency action, and were improperly promulgated, with the result that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction did not mandate deference to the findings. Id. at 540-43. The trial court rejected
these contentions, finding them insufficient to justify assuming jurisdiction. Id. The Tenth Cir-
cuit, because it did not analyze the trial court's primary jurisdiction conclusions, see infra notes
123-132 and accompanying text, did not consider these arguments.
118. 540 F. Supp. at 538-39.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 545.
121. Id. at 547.
122. Id.
123. McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464, 466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3085
(1983).
124. 703 F.2d at 466-67.
125. Id.
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then simply rejected the viability of a preemption analysis with respect to
state tort claims requesting compensatory damages.
126
Having rejected preemption as a basis for denying plaintiffs their re-
quested relief the court of appeals turned to what it perceived to be the
alternate ground for the trial court's decision, which was the presence of a
political question. 2 7 The political question doctrine is rooted in separation
of powers principles,128 and seeks to avoid judicial usurpation of political
branch prerogatives by refraining from judicial decisionmaking on questions
constitutionally reserved for the political branches. 129 The Tenth Circuit,
while recognizing that certain aspects of the Rocky Flats operation had
political overtones (e.g. the decision to operate the plant), 30 rejected the
proposition that deciding to provide civil remedies to plaintiffs injured by




The circuit court's opinion, while probably correct in terms of existing
precedent, does not satisfactorily address the lower court's opinion. The dis-
trict court did not base its holding on a straight-forward preemption theory,
recognizing that Stikwood precluded such an approach.133 Instead, the court
examined whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction precluded considera-
tion of tort claims based on the generalized health and safety effects of
Rocky Flats, explicitly recognizing that with respect to issues not falling
within the EPA's jurisdiction (e.g. the effect of Rocky Flats on a single indi-
vidual), 134 primary jurisdiction was inapplicable. Further, the lower court
did not use the political question doctrine as an alternate basis for its rejec-
tion of plaintiffs' claims. The political nature of atomic weapons production
was merely an additional justification for finding that executive agencies had
primary jurisdiction to investigate the effects of governmental conduct in the
production of such weapons. 135 Had the the lower court opinion been ad-
126. Id. Silkwood held that compensatory tort actions were not preempted by federal regula-
tion. 667 F.2d at 922. This aspect of Silkwood was not affected by the Supreme Court's review
of the case.
127. 703 F.2d at 467-69.
128. Id. at 470.
129. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
130. 703 F.2d at 470.
131. Id. at 471-72. Applying the test enunciated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the
court noted the lack of a textual commitment of this issue to a political branch, the availability
of manageable judicial standards for resolving these claims, and the general propriety ofjudicial
action in the circumstances presented by this litigation. 703 F.2d at 471. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. at 217.
132. 703 F.2d at 472.
133. 540 F. Supp. at 532.
134. Id. at 545.
135. The lower court's "political question" analysis states:
The plaintiffs' contentions are that the manner in which these authorized operations
have been conducted has caused the deposition of transuranium elements on their
lands which then have become unusable because of claimed resultant health hazards.
It is my considered view that the determination of the existence of such hazards and
the acceptability of them are also political decisions for the Congress and the Presi-
dent. They have placed responszbifiy for the collection and evaluation of the relevant data in the
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dressed on its own terms, McKay might easily have reached a different result.
IV. CASE DIGESTS
A. Speech Restrtctions Created by Drug Paraphernah'a Laws
In three separate cases the court of appeals considered the constitution-
ality of drug paraphernalia laws. 136 Each statute or ordinance was attacked
as being vague and overbroad, and as permitting prosecution on the basis of
a third person's intent. 137 For the most part the court found its decision in
Hejira Corp. v. MacFarland'13 to be dispositive of these challenges, holding
that the intent element of the statute cured any vagueness problems.1 39 Ad-
ditional challenges, however, involving suppression of speech effects from the
regulations, raised new issues in the Tenth Circuit.
The speech challenges fell into two categories: non-commercial and
commercial. The non-commercial challenges centered around the statutory
criteria for discerning the presence of drug paraphernalia. These criteria
provided that the content of descriptive materials accompanying an object
could be used to define its paraphernalia status. 140 The court rejected this
challenge, holding that the first amendment impact, if any, was merely inci-
dental to regulation of nonspeech conduct (presumably sale of the accompa-
nying paraphernalia object) associated with the protected speech.' 4 '
Because the regulations were narrowly drawn to regulate nonspeech con-
duct, their incidental impact on protected speech was constitutionally
permissible. 142
The commercial speech objections arose from statutory provisions
criminalizing advertising of drug paraphernalia by a person with actual or
constructive knowledge that the advertised items constituted parapherna-
lia. 143 The trial courts ruled that the bans, which barred advertising over
wide geographical areas,' 44 were more extensive than required by the state
interest at hand and therefore unconstitutional.' 45 The Tenth Circuit re-
designated agencies and in the absence of a showing that there has been a violation of the agency
standards, this court has no power to intervene. Accordingly, all of the plaintiffs' claims
against the United States, Dow, and Rockwell must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Id. at 548 (emphasis supplied).
136. General Stores, Inc. v. Bingaman, 695 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1982) (challenging N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-31-2 (1978)); Kansas Retail Trade Cooperative v. Stephan, 695 F.2d 1343
(10th Cir. 1982) (pre-effective date challenge to H.B. 2020); Weiler v. Carpenter, 695 F.2d 1348
(10th Cir. 1982) (challenging Clovis, N.M. Ordinance No. 1150-80 (July 24, 1980)).
137. General Stores, Inc., 695 F.2d at 503; Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1345-46; Weller, 695 F.2d at
1349.
138. 660 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1981).
139. E.g., Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1343 ("a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vague-
ness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is
proscribed") (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 499 (1982)).
140. General Stores, Inc., 695 F.2d at 503; Weiler, 695 F.2d at 1350.
141. General Stores, Inc., 695 F.2d at 504-05; Weiler, 695 F.2d at 1350.
142. General Stores, Inc., 695 F.2d at 505; Weiler, 695 F.2d at 1350.
143. Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1345; Weiler, 695 F.2d at 1350.
144. Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1345 (statewide); Weler, 695 F.2d at 1350 (no geographic limit).
145. Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1347; Weler, 695 F.2d at 1350. Cf. Central Hudson Gas & Electric
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jected these rulings,146 apparently on the ground that the advertising pro-
posed an illegal transaction, and was thereforeF not protected by the first
amendment. 1
47
The only defect in any of the laws was in the Clovis, New Mexico city
ordinance, which provided for forfeiture of paraphernalia without a hear-
ing.' 48 The court said that a hearing in connection with the forfeiture was
required, but that a post-forfeiture hearing would suffice.
14 9
B. Constitutionalt'ty of Bankruptcy Court Filing Fees
In Otasco, Inc. v. United States (In re South)1 50 debtors of Otasco filed for
bankruptcy, naming Otasco as a creditor. Otasco filed pleadings objecting
to having the debts discharged, and was required to pay a filing fee in con-
nection with these pleadings.' 5 ' Instead of paying the fee, Otasco filed a
motion claiming that the filing fee was an unconstitutional burden on its
right to protect its property from governmental action.' 52 The bankruptcy
court agreed, and ruled that the fee requirement was unconstitutional as
violative of due process.' 53 The district court affirmed.'
54
Otasco argued that creditors of bankrupts are placed in a position
where they must defend their property rights and that the imposition of a
filing fee to defend those rights unconstitutionally burdens their access to the
courts. 155 Otasco relied primarily on its interpretation of Boddie v. Connecti-
Cut156 and read that decision to declare filing fees unconstitutional when
they operated to preclude access to the courts for the litigation of fundamen-
Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (restrictions on commercial speech
cannot be more extensive than necessary).
146. Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1347-48; Weier, 695 F.2d at 1350. The court's comments in Ste-
phan appear to be dicta, as neither party appealed the trial court's ruling on the advertising
ban. 695 F.2d at 1347-48.
147. The exact basis for the Tenth Circuit's rulings is unclear. The district court's decision
in Stephan had two bases, first that the ban was geographically overbroad, and second that the
ban reached non-paraphernalia advertisers. Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1347. The Tenth Circuit
properly rejected the second, or categorical, overbreadth rationale. See Hoffman Estates v. Flip-
side, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1982) (overbreadth doctrine inapplicable to
commercial speech). The geographical overbreadth argument, which is grounded in the re-
quirement that commercial speech regulation be no broader than necessary, was not addressed
in Stephan. See 695 F.2d at 1347-48.
In Weter, the court relied on its ruling in Stephan and the Supreme Court's Flipside ruling in
reversing the trial court. See 695 F.2d at 1350. Because neither Stephan nor Flpstde address the
problem of overextensive restrictions of commercial speech, Wetter is necessarily grounded in a
finding that the proposed speech is unconstitutional because proposing an illegal transaction.
Cf. Fhipside, 455 U.S. at 496 (government can ban speech proposing illegal transaction). Simi-
larly, Stephan appears grounded in Fzpstd-'s recognition that speech proposing illegal transac-
tions can be banned in its entirety.
148. Weiler, 695 F.2d at 1350.
149. Id. at 1351.
150. 689 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1522 (1983).
151. 689 F.2d at 164.
152. Id. at 164.
153. 6 Bankr. 645 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980), a'd, 10 Bankr. 889 (W.D. Okla. 1981), rev'd,
689 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct. 1522 (1983).
154. 10 Bankr. 889 (W.D. Okla. 1981),rev'd, 689 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1982),cert. dented, 103 S.
Ct. 1522 (1983).
155. 689 F.2d at 164.
156. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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tal rights. 157
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that Boddie did not hold
that access to the judicial system can never be burdened, but instead insti-
tuted a balancing test.158 When access to court is burdened, the interest the
individual is seeking to protect in court is balanced against the governmental
interest in imposing the restriction. 159 Otasco was seeking to protect its con-
tractual rights, none of which touched fundamental interests. 160 Against
Otasco's interests were balanced the governmental interest in recouping the
costs of the bankruptcy system and in discouraging creditors from harassing
debtors rather than genuinely contesting discharge. 16 ' In light of the
nonfundamental nature of Otasco's interest, the legitimate governmental in-
terests in exacting the fee, and Otasco's ability to pay, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the filing fee did not unconstitutionally burden access to the
courts. 162
C. Residency Requirements
Smith v. Paulk 163 considered the constitutionality of an Oklahoma stat-
ute which required applicants for employment agency licenses to have been
Oklahoma residents for one year. 164 After being denied a license solely be-
cause of his failure to meet the residency requirement,' 65 Smith filed suit
against the Oklahoma Commissioner of Labor alleging that the residency
requirement violated Smith's rights under the privileges and immunities,
equal protection, and due process clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion. 166 The district court held that the Oklahoma law violated the privi-
leges and immunities clauses of article IV and the fourteenth amendment by
restricting the right to travel. 167
The court of appeals noted that it was a corporate application which
had been denied, and that corporations do not have the benefit of the privi-
leges and immunities clause or the fourteenth amendment. 68 Despite these
facts, the court ruled that because Smith intended to relocate to manage the
corporation, personal rights to migrate were restricted by the statute, render-
ing Smith's claims justiciable. 1
69
The Tenth Circuit applied Supreme Court case law holding that legis-
lation which restricts the right of interstate migration must be justified by
157. 689 F.2d at 164.
158. Id. at 165.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 165-66.
162. Id. at 166.
163. 705 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1983).
164. OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 53(b) (1981).
165. 705 F.2d at 1281.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1283. To support the proposition that a corporation does not have the benefit of
the privileges and immunities clauses the court cited Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Stan-
dard Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656 (1981); Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207,
210-11 (1945), and Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548-50 (1928).
169. 705 F.2d at 1284.
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compelling state interests and must be narrowly tailored to achieve those
interests. 17° The court stated that a less lengthy residency requirement
would adequately serve the state interest of investigating applicants to en-
sure that employment agencies operated in the public interest. 1 7 ' Hence,
although the residency requirement was itself a proper legislative measure,
the existence of an alternative less restrictive than the one-year requirement
rendered the Oklahoma statute unconstitutional.
17 2
D. Associational Standing to Challenge Third Party Subpoena
In Grandbouche v. United States 173 the Tenth Circuit considered the issue
of standing to protect the first amendment right of association from govern-
mental invasion through subpoena. A grand jury subpoena served on the
First National Bank of Englewood, Colorado ordered production of all
records pertaining to the accounts of two groups advocating noncompliance
with the federal tax system. 174 The two groups and individual members of
one of the groups brought suit asking that the subpoena be quashed on the
grounds that enforcement of the subpoena would violate first amendment
rights of association. 175 The district court ruled that the petitioners lacked
standing to raise the first amendment claims because the subpoena was di-
rected to a third party.
176
The court of appeals reversed the district court and remanded the case
for a hearing to consider whether the petitioner's first amendment rights
would actually be violated by enforcing the subpoena. 17 7 First amendment
guarantees were distinguished from fourth and fifth amendment rights,
which cannot be infringed unless the governmental action is directed at the
holder of the right. 178 The court observed that the right to associate freely
will be chilled equally whether associational information is compelled from
an organization itself or from third parties. 179 Accordingly, an organization
and its members have standing to protect their first amendment rights of
association which are infringed by governmental information gathering ac-




171. Id. at 1285.
172. Id.
173. 701 F,2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983).
174. The groups were the National Commodity & Barter Association (NCBA) and the Na-
tional Unconstitutional Tax Strike Committee (NUTS). Id. at 116.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 118-19.
178. Id. at 117.




COMMENT, THE SUBSTANTIVE FALLACY OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST AMENDMENT: A CRITIQUE OF OKLAHOMA
TELECASTERS AssOCIATION V CRISP
I. INTRODUCTION
Oklahoma stringently restricts media advertising of alcoholic beverages,
both by statute' and by state constitution. 2 State authority to restrict alco-
hol-related advertisements is based on inherent police power and on the
twenty-first amendment, 3 which delegates to the states power to regulate the
importation and distribution of alcoholic beverages within their borders. 4 In
Oklahoma Telecasters Association v. Crisp , television broadcasters and cable tel-
evision operators challenged Oklahoma's advertising prohibitions, claiming
that the restrictions violated their free speech rights and were inconsistent
with equal protection principles. 6 The Tenth Circuit, reversing the district
court, ruled that Oklahoma could restrict television and cable television ad-
vertisements promoting alcoholic beverages even when Oklahoma's regula-
tions virtually banned television advertising of liquor in Oklahoma.
7
The Tenth Circuit determined that the crucial issue on the merits was
whether Oklahoma's advertising ban violated the plaintiffs' rights to engage
in commercial speech.8 Accordingly, the court decided the case on this issue
and held that Oklahoma's regulations were a permissible infringement of
plaintiffs' commercial speech rights.9 On appeal, the Supreme Court will
review the free speech issue, and will also consider whether Oklahoma's
prohibitions are preempted by federal regulation of cable broadcasting.iO
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 516 (1981) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to advertise any alcoholic
beverages or the sale of same within the State of Oklahoma, except one sign at the
retail outlet bearing the words "Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store," or any combination of
such words or any of them and no letter in any such sign shall be more than four (4)
inches in height or more than three (3) inches in width, and if more than one line is
used the lines shall not be more than one (1) inch apart.
2. OKLA. CONST. art. XXVII, § 5 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or
corporation to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverage within the State of Oklahoma, except one
sign at the retail outlet bearing the words, "Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store."
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
4. The pertinent section of the twenty-first amendment provides: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." Id. § 2.
See also infa notes 170-80 and accompanying text.
5. 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 66 (1983).
6. 699 F.2d at 493. The equal protection claim was based on Oklahoma's inconsistent
treatment of broadcast and print media. Newspapers and magazines published outside of
Oklahoma but circulated within the state were permitted to carry advertisements of alcoholic
beverages while this freedom was denied to telecasters. The trial court did not reach the equal
protection issue, and therefore it was not before the Tenth Circuit on appeal. Id. at 490 n. 1. A
similar equal protection challenge failed in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981).
7. 699 F.2d at 502.
8. Id. at 498.
9. Id. at 502.
10. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 66 (1983) granting cert. to Oklahoma
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II. OKLAHOMA TELECASTERS AssocIATION V CRISP
A. Background
Pursuant to the Oklahoma Constitution and state statute,"' television
broadcasters in Oklahoma were required to "block out" television advertis-
ing for wine. 12 Failure to comply with this requirement, or the solicitation or
acceptance of advertisements for alcohol, subjected broadcasters to possible
criminal prosecution.' 3  In 1980, the Attorney General of the State of
Oklahoma issued an opinion stating that cable operators were subject to the
prohibitions against alcoholic beverage advertising applicable to television
broadcasters.' 4 The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, the state agency
charged with primary responsibility for enforcing Oklahoma's alcohol con-
trol laws,' 5 then notified cable operators of its intention to enforce compli-
ance with the restrictions on liquor advertisements. '
6
Following the Board's notification, telecasters and cable operators filed
separate suits against Crisp, in his capacity as director of the Board, request-
ing declaratory judgments that Oklahoma's advertising restrictions violated
their constitutionally protected speech rights, and requesting injunctive re-
lief preventing Oklahoma from enforcing its restrictions. 17 In nearly identi-
cal memorandum opinions and orders, the district court granted the
plaintiffs' summary judgment motions and ruled that the power of the states
to regulate liquor pursuant to the twenty-first amendment did not override
the commercial speech rights of the telecasters and cable operators.' 8
B. The District Court Opinion
The district court applied the four-part commercial speech analysis set
forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Publc Service Commission '9 to
Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court granted certiorari
on three questions:
1) May a state adopt, consistently with protection of commercial speech under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, a sweeping ban on truthful, nonmisleading adver-
tising for a lawful product?
2) May a state prevent, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
cable television operators from carrying out-of-state news and entertainment programs
because those programs contain truthful, non-misleading advertising for wine?
3) Is a state's regulation of liquor advertising, as applied to out-of-state broadcast
signals, valid in light of existing federal regulation of cable broadcasting?
52 U.S.L.W. 3230, (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983)(No. 82-1795).
11. See supra notes 1-2.
12. 699 F.2d at 492. Beer advertisements were not prohibited. Under OKLA. STAT. tit. 37,
§ 506(3) (1981), beer containing less than 3.2% alcohol is not subject to the restrictions of
Oklahoma's alcoholic beverage control laws. Because television advertising of beer can refer to
beer containing either more or less than 3.2% alcohol, beer advertising is permitted. See 699
F.2d at 492.
13. 699 F.2d at 492.
14. Id.
15. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 514 (1981).
16. 699 F.2d at 492.
17. Id. at 492-93.
18. Id. at 493.
19. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The four-part analysis for determining the validity of commercial
speech regulation can be summarized as follows. First, the court inquires whether the commer-
cial speech concerns a lawful activity without misleading the public. Second, the court must
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determine the constitutional validity of Oklahoma's laws.20 The district
court concluded that the restrictions did not directly advance the state's as-
serted interest in reducing alcohol consumption, and were more extensive
than necessary to meet the stated interest. 21 Plaintiffs' motions for summary
judgment were therefore granted, and permanent injunctions were entered
prohibiting Crisp and the Board from enforcing the regulations against
either the cablecasters or the telecasters.
22
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Crisp focused on the trial court's appli-
cation of the Central Hudson analysis, and emphasized the significance of the
Supreme Court's recent summary dismissal of the appeal in Queensgate Invest-
ment Co. v. Liquor Control Commission23 for lack of a substantial federal ques-
tion.2 4  In Queensgate, the Ohio Supreme Court had upheld the
constitutionality of Ohio's restrictions on off-premises alcohol advertising in
the face of a free speech attack.25 Crisp argued that the summary dismissal
of Queensgate was dispositive of the issues presented in Oklahoma Telecasters.
2 6
While recognizing that preemption was a potential issue, 2 7 the Tenth
Circuit did not address the preemption question. Rather, it agreed with
Crisp that the precedential effect of Queensgate's summary disposition was the
critical issue on appeal.
28
1. Controlling Effect of the Summary Dismissal of Queensgate
Hicks v. Mranda29 is the leading case on the precedential effect of a sum-
mary dismissal for want of a substantial federal question. Hicks analyzed the
precedential distinctions created by the fundamental differences between the
Court's appellate jurisdiction and its certiorari jurisdiction.
30
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction exists when a state statute is chal-
lenged in state court on the grounds that the statute is incompatible with the
Constitution, and the statute's validity is upheld. 3 1 Unlike certiorari juris-
diction, appellate jurisdiction is mandatory. 32 The Supreme Court is not,
find that the government asserts a substantial state interest. If the answers to the first two
questions are positive, then the court proceeds to consider whether the speech regulation di-
rectly advances the asserted governmental interest, and whether the regulation is more extensive
than necessary to meet the government interest. See id. at 564.
20. 699 F.2d at 493.
21. Id.
22. ld.
23. 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N.E.2d 138, appeal dismzssed, 103 S. Ct. 31 (1982).
24. 699 F.2d at 494.
25. 69 Ohio St. 2d at 366-67, 433 N.E.2d at 142.
26. 699 F.2d at 494.
27. See id. at 492. For a discussion of the preemption issues presented by Oklahoma Telecast-
ers, see inyra notes 148-73 and accompanying text.
28. 699 F.2d at 494.
29. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
30. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976).
32. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344. The decision to assume jurisdiction via a writ of certiorari lies
within the Court's discretion. SUP. CT. R. 17.1.
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however, required to grant plenary review to an appealed case; the Court is
only required to address the merits of the appeal. 33 Consequently, summary
dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question is a decision
on the merits and leaves the appealed judgment undisturbed.
34
As precedent, summary dismissals are binding on lower courts con-
fronted with the constitutional issues presented in the dismissed appeal.
35
Once an issue has been declared unsubstantial and not deserving of review,
lower courts cannot disregard that pronouncement. 36 As a comment on the
merits, however, the summary dismissal's effect is limited to the precise issues
presented in the jurisdictional statement. 37 Lower courts are therefore pro-
hibited from reaching an opposite conclusion on the precise constitutional
conclusion affirmed by the Supreme Court, but are not bound by the af-
firmed court's reasoning.
38
In considering the effect of Queensgale's summary affirmance, the Tenth
Circuit utilized the methodology set forth in Justice Brennan's concurrence
to Mandel v. Bradley. 39 Justice Brennan outlined two considerations as rele-
vant when determining the controlling effect of a summary dismissal. First,
a court must examine the jurisdictional statement presented by the earlier
case, and ascertain whether the constitutional questions presented in both
cases are the same.40 If both cases present the same constitutional issue, the
court must determine that the prior judgment in fact rested upon decision of
the constitutional questions, and "not even arguably upon some alternative
nonconstitutional ground."
41
The Tenth Circuit found that Oklahoma Telecasters involved substan-
tially the same constitutional issues presented in Queensgale's jurisdictional
statement. 4 2  Under the court's analysis, both cases involved the state's
power, pursuant to the twenty-first amendment, to attempt to limit alcohol-
related problems by prohibiting "some, but not all, forms of liquor advertis-
33. 422 U.S. at 344.
34. Id. Accord Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam).
35. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176.
36. Id.
37. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344-45.
38. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176. In clarifying this area of law, the Court stated:
Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question
without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction
and do leave undisturbed the judgment appealed from. They do prevent lower courts
from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily
decided by those actions. . . . Summary actions, however, . . . should not be under-
stood as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions
to the particular facts involved.
Id.
39. 432 U.S. 173 (1977). See 699 F.2d at 496.
40. 432 U.S. at 180 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. 699 F.2d at 496. The jurisdictional statement in Queensgate presented the following
question for Supreme Court appellate review:
Whether Regulation 4301:1-1-44 of the Ohio Liquor Control Commission, which pro-
hibits a duly licensed retail liquor permit holder from advertising the retail price of
alcoholic beverages in any medium visible from outside the permit premises, violates
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States by
suppressing the public dissemination of truthful information about a lawful activity.
699 F.2d at 496-97.
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ing. ' ' 43 The court also determined that the judgment in Queensgate in fact
rested on the constitutional issues presented by the jurisdictional statement,
and was not based on some nonconstitutional ground.44 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that it was therefore bound to follow Queensgate and uphold the
constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising restrictions.
45
2. Interaction Between the Twenty-first Amendment and
Commercial Speech
The decision to follow Queensgate did not terminate the Tenth Circuit's
review. Responding to a Supreme Court admonition not to misunderstand
the effect and use of a summary dismissal, 46 the court of appeals examined
the merits of the broadcasters' challenges.
The crucial question on the merits was whether applying the advertis-
ing prohibitions to the broadcasters violated their constitutional rights of
free speech. 47 Resolution of this question required the court to balance the
plaintiffs' right to engage in commercial speech against Oklahoma's inherent
power, as enhanced by the twenty-first amendment, to regulate advertise-
ments dealing with alcoholic beverages.
48
As a threshold matter, the court held that regulating alcohol-related
commercials was an exercise of the authority granted by the twenty-first
amendment. 49 This conclusion stemmed from recognition that states have
the power, under the twenty-first amendment, to totally prohibit the sale of
alcohol within their borders50 and the power to regulate the circumstances
under which liquor is sold.5 1 Limiting advertisements directly related to the
sale of alcohol was seen as a reasonable way of limiting alcohol abuse and its
associated problems, and was therefore held to be a permissible subject of
state regulation pursuant to the twenty-first amendment.
52 Because the reg-
ulations were enacted pursuant to police power conferred by the twenty-first
amendment, they were entitled to an added presumption of validity.
53
After establishing the nature of Oklahoma's advertising restrictions, the
court considered the interaction between the authority delegated by the
twenty-first amendment and first amendment protections. Conceding that
the broadcasters were engaged in commercial speech entitled to some degree
43. 699 F.2d at 497.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Mandae, 432 U.S. at 177. in Mandel the Court cautioned lower courts not to be so
pre-occupied with a summary dismissal that they failed to recognize independent issues
presented by a case sub judice. Id.
47. 699 F.2d at 498.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 715 (1981) (per
curiam); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939)).
51. 699 F.2d at 498 (citing New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 715
(1981)).
52. 699 F.2d at 498. But see infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
53. Id. (quoting New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981)).
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of constitutional protection,54 the Tenth Circuit applied the four-part analy-
sis enunciated in Central Hudson.55 Guiding the court's application of the test
was Central Hudson's recognition that commercial speech, although constitu-
tionally protected, is afforded less protection than other forms of speech.
56
Disagreeing with the district court's determination that the advertising
prohibitions did not directly advance the state's interest and were more ex-
tensive than necessary, the Tenth Circuit upheld Oklahoma's restrictions.
5 7
Examining the "direct advancement" strand of the Central Hudson inquiry,
the court held that Oklahoma was not required to prove that its regulations
in fact advanced its asserted interests. 58 Rather, the inquiry was whether the
regulations could reasonably be said to advance the state's interest. 59 Be-
cause it was reasonable to believe that banning alcohol advertising could
effect the state's interest in reducing alcohol consumption, the regulations
directly advanced the state's interest.6°
Turning to the trial court's conclusion that the regulations were more
extensive than necessary to effect the state's goal, the Tenth Circuit noted
that the basis for this conclusion was the fact that the advertising ban pro-
hibited all rebroadcasting of alcohol-related advertisements. 6' Citing the
plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego ,62 the court held that
a total ban on the use of one medium of advertising did not, in and of itself,
render a commercial speech regulation overbroad. 63 Given the availability
of other mediums, for advertising (notably printed publications and on-
premises advertising), Oklahoma's law clearly did not eliminate dissemina-
tion of alcohol-related information. 64 In light of Oklahoma's enhanced po-
lice power under the twenty-first amendment, 6 5 and the forms of advertising
which were permitted, Oklahoma-s restrictions were not more unconstitu-
tionally overextensive. 66 Thus, the restrictions satisfied the constitutional re-
quirements of Central Hudson .67
III. ANALYSIS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDINGS IN OKLAHOMA
TELECASTERS
A. The Tenth Circuit's Reliance on Queensgate was Incorrect
In Oklahoma Telecasters the Tenth Circuit relied directly on the Supreme
54. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
55. 699 F.2d at 499-501. For an exposition of Central Hudson's four-part inquiry, see supra
note 19.
56. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 563. See 699 F.2d at 499, 502.
57. 699 F.2d at 502.




62. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
63. See 699 F.2d at 501.
64. Id. at 502.
65. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
66. 699 F.2d at 502.
67. Id.
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Court's summary dismissal of Queensgate. 6 8 Although the court ultimately
examined the merits of the broadcasters' challenge, its primary holding
found Oklahoma's advertising restrictions valid in light of the Queensgale dis-
missal. 69 As noted above, in order for a summary dismissal to be binding in
a subsequent case the constitutional issues presented by both cases must be
the same.7" In Mandel a. Bradley, 7 1 the Court determined that because the
facts of the case before the court were different than those in a case which
had been summarily dismissed, the summary action was not binding in the
subsequent case. 7 2 Similarly, major factual differences between Queensgate
and Oklahoma Telecasters render Queensgate invalid as controlling precedent
for Oklahoma Telecasters.
The Ohio regulation 73 at issue in Queensgate restricted the freedom of
specified licensees to advertise alcohol prices on their licensed business prem-
ises, 7 4 and also prohibited those licensees from advertising a price advantage
in relation to the alcohol they sold.7 5 Those licensees, along with manufac-
turers and distributors, were still permitted to advertise the retail price of
alcohol in any form of the media, 6 although permit holders were prohibited
from off-premise advertising of the retail price of beer.7 7 Clearly, the regula-
tion of commercial advertising challenged in Queensgate was limited, and, as
a whole, rather permissive. Conversely, the Oklahoma regulations operated
as a virtual ban on advertising concerning alcoholic beverages.7 Beer may
be advertised because of Oklahoma's statutory definition of alcohol, 79 and
magazines and periodicals containing alcohol-related advertisements are al-
68. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
69. See 699 F.2d at 497.
70. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
71. 432 U.S. 173 (1977).
72. Id. at 177. The Court stated: "The precedential significance of the summary action in
[Tucker v. Salera, 424 U.S. 959 (1976)], however, is to be assessed in the light of all the facts in
that case; and it is immediately apparent that those facts are very different from the facts of this
case." 432 U.S. at 177. The factual differences stemmed from the different provisions of the
laws challenged in each case, See id.
73. 5 OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 4301:1-1-44 (1978). This regulation provides in pertinent
part:
No alcoholic beverages shall be advertised in Ohio except in the manner set forth
in 4301:1-03 and as hereinafter provided.
(A) As to advertising on the premises, holders of Class C, D, and G permits shall
not advertise the price per bottle or drink of any alcoholic beverage, or in any manner
refer to price or price advantage except within their premises and in a manner not
visible from the outside of said premises.
(B) Manufacturers and distributors of alcoholic beverages are permitted to ad-
vertise their products in Ohio.
Holders of Class C, D, and G permits shall be authorized to advertise in newspa-
pers of general circulation, radio and television, on bill boards, calendars, in or on
public conveyances and in regularly published magazines. Advertising may include
the retail price of the original container or packages, but such advertising may not in





77. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.211 (Page 1982).
78. See supra notes 2, 12.
79. See supra note 12.
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lowed if the publications are imported into Oklahoma. 80 These are the only
types of liquor advertisements permitted by Oklahoma law.8t Oklahoma's
regulations are obviously very restrictive, almost totally prohibiting alcohol
advertisements, whereas Ohio's regulations prohibit only very limited types
of advertising. 82 Ohio's prohibitions are similar to reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech because they restrict where and how per-
mit holders are allowed to advertise rather than virtually banning this form
of expression.8 3 Thus, the scope of Oklahoma's advertising ban is one fac-
tual difference rendering Queensgate inapposite.
84
The second significant factual difference is that the plaintiffs in Queens-
gaze were liquor permit holders, 85 and as such were subject to rules and regu-
lations issued by the state agency granting their license.8 6 The licensees
therefore exercised their privileges subject to the provisions under which the
license was granted. In Oklahoma Telecasters, the plaintiffs were either televi-
sion broadcasters licensed by the Federal Communications Commission87 or
cable operators operating under local franchises8 8 and subject to federal reg-
ulation.89 Queensgate and Oklahoma Telecasters therefore involve factually dis-
tinguishable regulatory relationships.
A state agency's regulation of its licensees will raise different constitu-
tional issues than an agency's attempt to enforce subject matter restrictions
against independent cable operators and television broadcasters. In Queen-
sgale, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically found that the advertising regula-
tions at issue were properly enacted and within the scope of the Liquor
Control Commission's statutory authority to regulate its licensees.9° The
issue in Queensgale, then, was whether a state agency could regulate its licen-
sees by restricting their commercial speech rights in a limited manner. 9' In-
deed, this is precisely the issue set forth in the jurisdictional statement on
appeal to the Supreme Court.
92
Oklahoma Telecasters, unlike Queensgate, involves a state agency which has
issued regulations governing federal licensees or local franchisees whose oper-
ating privileges were not granted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.
Further, unlike the regulations challenged in Queensgate, the Oklahoma regu-
80. 699 F.2d at 493 n.1.
81. See id. at 492, 493 n.j.
82. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 516 (1981) wit/h 5 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4301:1-1-44
(1978).
83. Cf Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 650 (1981) (es-
tablishes four-part test for determining whether time, place, and manner restrictions on free
speech will be permitted); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction for use of public streets).
84. Cf Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 177 (1977) (differing statutory schemes were fac-
tual difference precluding existing summary affirmance from constituting controlling
precedent).
85. Queensgale, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 361, 433 N.E.2d at 139.
86. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.03 (Page 1982).
87. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
88. See OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
89. See generally United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
90. Queensgale, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 363-64, 433 N.E.2d at 140.
91. See id. at 366, 433 N.E.2d at 142.
92. See supra note 42.
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lations prohibit any advertising of alcohol by the plaintiffs within the state of
Oklahoma.9 3 Finally, the Oklahoma regulations may be in direct conflict
with federal law and regulations concerning cable television. 94 The two is-
sues presented by the facts of Oklahoma Telecasters are therefore whether
Oklahoma may issue regulations governing federal licensees in direct con-
trast to existing federal regulations, and whether Oklahoma may ban virtu-
ally all alcohol-related advertisements by a particular segment of the media.
The difference in the extensiveness of the Ohio and Oklahoma regulations
and the differing regulatory relationships between the agencies and plaintiffs
in the two cases render the issues presented by Queensgate and Oklahoma Tele-
casters substantially different. Hence, the Tenth Circuit's reliance upon the
summary dismissal of Queensgate was improper.
B. Commercial Speech and the Tweny-first Amendment
1. Oklahoma Telecasters Subordinates Commercial Speech to Twenty-
first Amendment Police Power
This analysis of the Tenth Circuit's application of the Central Hudson test
to Oklahoma's regulations focuses on the Tenth Circuit's conclusions that
the regulations directly advanced the asserted governmental interest and
were no more restrictive than necessary. 95 Oklahoma's asserted interest in
limiting advertising was to reduce the sale and consumption of alcohol and
thereby reduce the accompanying problems associated with alcohol abuse. 96
The Tenth Circuit found this interest to be substantial, and declared it to be
"exceptionally strong" in view of the additional police power delegated by
the twenty-first amendment.97 Because Oklahoma's prohibitions reasonably
related to reducing the sale and consumption of alcohol, 98 the court deter-
mined that, as a matter of law, Oklahoma's laws directly advanced its as-
serted interest.9 9 The court's final inquiry under the Central Hudson analysis
was whether the restrictions were more extensive than necessary to meet the
governmental interests. Even though the prohibitions banned virtually all
alcohol-related commercials by the plaintiffs, the court found that the regu-
lations were not more extensive than necessary. 100 Although the court relied
on the availability of other sources of advertising as one reason for upholding
the regulation,' 0 ' the primary theme of the court's decision was that com-
mercial speech related to alcohol is entitled to minimal constitutional protec-
tion. Central Hudson was characterized as being primarily "a balancing
test.' 1 2 When the power granted by the twenty-first amendment was con-
sidered in conjunction with Oklahoma's inherent police power, the balance
93. See supra note 2.
94. See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
95. See 699 F.2d at 501-02.
96. Id. at 500.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 501.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 502. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
102. 699 F.2d at 502.
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shifted in favor of the state, "permitting regulation of commercial speech
that might not otherwise be permissible."' 1 3 The court believed that this
balance was mandated by the Supreme Court's summary dismissal of Queen-
sgale.10 4 Both conclusions, however, are incorrect.
2. Commercial Speech and the Twenty-first Amendment
Truthful advertisements for the sale of lawful products are a protected
form of speech under the first amendment because freedom of speech neces-
sarily protects the right to receive information and ideas.1 0 5 Although com-
mercial speech comes within the purview of the first amendment, it is given
less protection than other forms of expression.106 In Central Hudson, the
Supreme Court developed an intermediate level of scrutiny for determining
whether regulation of commercial speech passes constitutional muster.
0 7
For a regulation of commercial speech to be valid, the Central Hudson test
requires that it directly advance a substantial governmental interest and not
be more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.108
At the heart of this portion of this comment is the question of whether
the twenty-first amendment's grant of authority to the states to regulate "the
transportation or importation"10 9 of alcohol includes the power to infringe
upon commercial speech rights to a greater degree than if the twenty-first
amendment was not involved. In Oklahoma Telecasters the Tenth Circuit
found that the twenty-first amendment did confer power to regulate com-
mercial speech to a degree which might otherwise be unconstitutional. 10
En banc, the Fifth Circuit has also concluded that restrictions enacted pur-
suant to a state's twenty-first amendment powers invoke a more relaxed stan-
dard of review than is normally applied in commercial speech cases. III
Essentially, both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held that a "rational
basis" standard should be used to review regulations regarding alcohol-re-
lated commercial speech, rather than the intermediate standard set forth in
Central Hudson. '
12
Several Supreme Court cases demonstrate, however, that the twenty-
first amendment does not necessarily enhance the constitutional significance
of a state's interest. Analysis of these cases shows that the twenty-first
amendment's effect must be evaluated by reference to the constitutionally
protected rights threatened by state regulation. In each of the cases, the
Court concluded that it should apply the standard of review customarily
associated with the particular constitutional right threatened by state alco-
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 764-70 (1976).
106. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 4.
110. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
111. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc),appealfiled, 52
U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Feb. 14, 1984) (No. 83-1221).
112. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 745; Oklahoma Telecasters, 699 F.2d at 501-02.
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hol restrictions. Further, an analysis of the Court's leading cases involving
alcohol-related restrictions of speech contradicts the Tenth Circuit's conclu-
sion that regulations promulgated pursuant to the twenty-first amendment
are entitled to special deference.
3. Oklahoma Telecasters' Subordination of Commercial Speech is Not
Justified by Supreme Court Precedent
In Craig v. Boren 113 the Court struck down an Oklahoma law which
mandated different drinking ages for men and women, declaring the law to
be a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 4 Oklahoma argued that pursuant to the twenty-first amendment it
had "enhanced" police power to regulate the drinking age within the state,
and that its statutory scheme was therefore not subject to normal equal pro-
tection strictures.' 15 The Court expressly rejected Oklahoma's argument
that the twenty-first amendment limited the operation of the fourteenth
amendment, and held that invidious discrimination was not saved by virtue
of the state's power to regulate liquor under the twenty-first amendment. 16
Examining the history of liquor regulation culminating in the twenty-first
amendment, the Court concluded that the amendment "primarily created
an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause."1 17
Once passing beyond consideration of the Commerce Clause, the
relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to other constitutional
provisions becomes increasingly doubtful. As one commentator
has remarked: "Neither the text nor the history of the Twenty-first
Amendment suggests that it qualifies individual rights protected by
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment where the sale
or use of liquor is concerned." . . . Any departures from this his-
torical view have been limited and sporadic." 8
The Court went on to apply the standard mandated by the equal pro-
tection clause." 9 Because the Oklahoma law made a gender-based distinc-
tion, strict scrutiny was not applied. Rather, the Court used an intermediate
level of review similar to the standard used in Central Hudson .120
Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau 121 the Supreme Court implicitly
rejected a claim that the power conferred by the twenty-first amendment
limited constitutional due process protections. Constantineau involved a state
statute authorizing public officials to publicly post a notice stating that alco-
hol sales to named persons were prohibited because the state had determined
that those persons were public burdens when they drank alcohol. 122 The
113. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
114. Id. at 210.
115. See id. at 204.
116. Id. at 205, 209.
117. Id. at 206.
118. Id. (quoting P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, CASES
AND MATERIALS 258 (1975)).
119. See 429 U.S. at 210.
120. See id. at 197.
121. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
122. Id. at 434.
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statute failed to provide notice and opportunity for hearing prior to the pub-
lic posting. 123 The fact that twenty-first amendment powers were involved
did not stop the Court from applying strict due process standards in examin-
ing the statute.'
24
More recently, the Court decided Larkih v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,' 25 which
involved the establishment clause' 26 and a state liquor zoning statute.
127
The statute authorized churches and schools to veto liquor license applica-
tions for places of business within 500 feet of the church or school.' 28 The
Court struck down the statute, declaring that the state may not exercise its
power under the twenty-first amendment in a way that impinges upon the
constitutional protections embodied in the establishment clause. 129 Applica-
tion of the normal standard of review for cases arising under the establish-
ment clause was therefore required.'
30
Finally, Caifornia v. LaRue' 3' and New York State Liquor Authority v. Bel-
lanca 132 do not support the conclusion that the twenty-first amendment lim-
its the constitutional speech rights of non-licensee advertisers. Thus, the
reliance on these cases by the Fifth 33 and Tenth 134 Circuits is misplaced.
In LaRue the Court upheld regulations, promulgated by California's
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, which prohibited nude dancing
and other sexually explicit conduct in establishments holding liquor
licenses.135 Emphasizing that the prohibition applied only to licensed estab-
lishments,' 36 the court found that the regulations were a permissible exercise
of state police power. ' 37 California's regulation was aimed not at an expres-
sion of speech per se, but on conduct associated with the dispensation of
alcohol.' 38 Thus, the regulation was only incidentally a burden on pro-
tected speech.' 39 Clearly, LaRue does not establish that twenty-first amend-
ment police power generally overrides speech rights when alcohol-related
legislation is challenged. At most, LaRue establishes that state power to regu-
late the actual sale of alcohol provides a state with power to regulate speech-
related conduct.
Similarly, in Bellanca the Court concentrated on the fact that the state
123. Id. at 435.
124. See id. at 436-37.
125. 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 provides in part that "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion .. "
127. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 16C (West 1974).
128. Id.
129. 103 S. Ct. at 510 n.5.
130. See id. at 510.
131. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
132. 452 U.S. 714 (1981).
133. See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 744-45 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
134. See Oklahoma Telecasters, 699 F.2d at 499.
135. 409 U.S. at 118.
136. The Court's analysis began by noting that the challenged regulations were presented
"not in the context of censoring a dramatic performance in a theater, but rather in a context of
hcensing bars and nightclubs to sell liquor by the drink." Id. at 114. (emphasis supplied).
137. Id. at 116, 118.
138. See id. at 117-18.
139. See id. at 117.
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regulations applied only to the premises of state liquor authority licensees. 140
The Court's analysis was couched in terms of the state's power to determine
where alcoholic beverages could be sold. 14 ' Given the state's unquestioned
power to regulate the conditions under which alcohol was sold, the state's
interest in public safety outweighed the speech values associated with topless
dancing. 142 Like LaRue, Bellanca only establishes a state's power to regulate
conduct on a licensee's premises.
Summing up the preceding discussion, it seems clear that the Supreme
Court's cases do not support the conclusion that regulation pursuant to the
twenty-first amendment enjoys any special exception from general constitu-
tional principles. Moreover, speech restrictions resulting from twenty-first
amendment regulation have been upheld primarily because the restrictions
applied directly to licensees, and involved only de minimis restrictions on
speech rights. 143 The Oklahoma prohibitions, conversely, are aimed directly
at speech content, and act as a complete ban on alcohol-related advertise-
ments by non-licensee broadcasters not engaged in selling alcohol. Further,
no alternative forums are available for the plaintiffs. 144 The Supreme Court
indicated in Central Hudson that such complete bans on otherwise protected
commercial speech may be presumptively unconstitutional.
We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress com-
mercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy. In
those circumstances, a ban on speech could screen from public view
the underlying governmental policy. . . . Indeed, in recent years
this Court has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech
unless the expression itself was flawed in some way, either because
it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity.'
4 5
In light of the preceding discussion, the conclusion of the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits that the twenty-first amendment permits a state to enact
otherwise unconstitutional regulations appears unsupportable. Further,
Queensgate does not mandate the conclusion that commercial speech values
are readily subordinated to twenty-first amendment regulation. As noted, a
summary affirmance should not be read to adopt any new ratio
decendendi. 146 LaRue and Bellanca, which are the most directly relevant
Supreme Court decisions, did not contain any general discussion of commer-
cial speech/twenty-first amendment interaction. Rather, those decisions ad-
dress a state's power to regulate its licensees.' 47 Queensgale is properly read as
140. 452 U.S. at 715-17.
141. The Court stated that "[t]he State's power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages en-
tirely includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing
occurs." Id. at 717.
142. Id. at 718.
143. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
144. Given Oklahoma's complete statutory ban on commercial advertising of alcohol, see
supra note 1, this argument takes on additional force if plaintiffs are making a facial challenge to
the statute, because a facial challenge would obviate the mitigating effects of beer and magazine
advertising. The reported opinion does not clearly delineate the posture of the plaintiffs'
challenge.
145. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
146. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
.47. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
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applying the limited holdings of LaRue and Bellanca, rather than as establish-
ing general propositions concerning the interaction of two constitutional
amendments. Hence, there is no basis for concluding that Oklahoma's
"otherwise unconstitutional" restrictions are validated by twenty-first
amendment police power.
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF OKLAHOMA'S ADVERTISING
RESTRICTIONS
The Tenth Circuit recognized that Oklahoma's laws might conflict with
federal regulations, but did not discuss the issue.148 Nonetheless, one of the
issues on appeal to the Supreme Court is whether Oklahoma's restrictions on
advertising by cable operators are preempted by federal law. 149 This section
will analyze the cable operators' preemption challenge.
A. Federal Preemption
The Constitution's supremacy clause 150 provides that the Constitution
and the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."' 5 ' When Congress exercises its granted powers, federal legislation
can supercede, or preempt, state law.' 52 Federal regulations, as well as fed-
eral statutes, have preemptive force.
153
Federal law can preempt state law in three ways. Most obviously, state
law may be expressly preempted, 15 4 or the plan or scheme of federal regula-
tion may evince a congressional intent to preempt a field entirely.' 55 Usu-
ally, however, congressional enactments in a particular area do not expressly
end all state authority. Where state and federal rules coexist, state law is
preempted only when it conflicts with federal law. 156 State law conflicts
with federal law when state regulation "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"'
15 7
or when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce.
'158
148. Oklahoma Telecasters, 699 F.2d at 492.
149. See supra note 10.
150. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This section provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state




152. See generaly Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983).
153. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
154. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
155. Paific Gas, 103 S. Ct. at 1722; Fidelity Federal, 458 U.S. at 153.
156. Pacifi Gas, 103 S. Ct. at 1722.
157. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
158. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
[Vol. 61:2
OKLAHOMA TELECASTERS ASSW v. CRISP
B. Conflil Between Federal Law and Oklahoma's Advertistg Restrictions
1. Potential Preemption Through Copyright Laws
The cable operators in Oklahoma Telecasters are governed by both federal
and state laws. Forseeable conflicts between those bodies of law indicate
that Oklahoma's advertising ban may be preempted insofar as it is applica-
ble to cable operators.
Cable television systems are subscription services that pick up broad-
casts originated by others (primary transmissions) and rebroadcast them
(secondary transmissions) to paying subscribers.1 59 Copyright laws protect
copyrights upon secondary transmission by prohibiting cable systems from
making any alteration in a program or a commercial. 160 Any change, dele-
tion, or addition is actionable as an infringement of a copyright. 16 1 These
statutory provisions reflect congressional awareness of the probability that
retransmission of distant non-network programming causes damage to the
copyright owner because the program is distributed in areas in which it has
not been licensed. 16 2 To protect the copyright holder, Congress decided that
secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system ought to be subject
to a compulsory license.' 63 Such a license ensures the copyright owner a fair
share of royalties from the rebroadcast of the copyrighted work, whether it
be a program or a commercial.164 The protection against infringement ac-
tions provided by the license is conditioned upon compliance with specified
procedures, including reporting requirements, 165 payment of the royalty
fee, 166 and compliance with the ban on the substitution or deletion of com-
mercial advertising.'
6 7
Oklahoma's "blocking out" requirement' 68 potentially conflicts with
the compulsory licensing 16 9 program of the federal copyright laws. A cable
159. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161 (1968).
160. 17 U.S.C. § II l(c)(3) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(c) Secondary Transmissions by Cable Systems.
The secondary transmission to the public by a cable system of a primary transmission
made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission or
by an appropriate governmental authority of Canada or Mexico and embodying a
performance or display of a work is actionable as an act of infringement . . . if the
content of the particular program in which the performance or display is embodied, or
any commercial advertising or station announcements transmitted by the primary trans-
mitter during, or immediately before or after, the transmission of such program, is in
any way wilo4ly altered by the cable system through changes, deletions, or additions, except for
the alteration, deletion, or substitution of commercial advertisements performed by
those engaged in television commercial advertising market research ...
(emphasis supplied).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 88-91 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5702-04.
163. Id. at 89, reprinted tn7 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5703-04.
164. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5703-04.
165. 17 U.S.C. § ll(d)(l)-(2) (1982).
166. 17 U.S.C. § IlI(d)(4) (1982).
167. 17 U.S.C. § Ill(c)(3) (1982).
168. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
169. Cable system operators are required to obtain the rebroadcast license, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 11 l(c)(1) (1982), and are therefore necessarily subject to the ban on deletion contained in 17
U.S.C. § l I I(c)(3) (1982).
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operator's freedom to choose its programming prevents the conclusion that
federal copyright law necessarily precludes application of Oklahoma's adver-
tising restriction to cable systems. Unfortunately for Oklahoma, in certain
circumstances federal regulations require cable systems to carry specified
programming. 170 The copyright laws will, in those circumstances, preempt
the operation of Oklahoma's advertising laws.
2. Potential Preemption Through Federal Regulation of Cable
Systems
Federal regulation of cable systems directly conflicts with Oklahoma's
ban on televised alcohol advertising. Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) regulations require that cable systems carrying required television
broadcast signals 1 7' must carry the signals without deletion or alteration of
any programming, including commercial segments.' 72 Because much of
Oklahoma may be subject to the mandatory signal requirements,
173
Oklahoma's advertising prohibition can directly conflict with federal
regulations.
As a practical matter, it is impossible for most cable operators in
Oklahoma to conform to both the federal and state regulations. Oklahoma's
laws require Oklahoma's cable operators to inspect all of the primary trans-
missions they receive, and "block out" alcohol commercials. Clearly,
Oklahoma's restrictions on alcohol-related advertisements are void to the ex-
tent that they will prohibit cable operators from adhering to federal law.
The applicable provisions of the Copyright Act and the FCC cable regula-
tions which forbid signal alteration by cable operators therefore may pre-
empt the Oklahoma laws prohibiting transmission of alcohol commercials.
V. COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRICTIONS ON OKLAHOMA'S ALCOHOL
ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS
If the cable operators or television broadcasters are engaged in inter-
state commerce they will be afforded the protection of the commerce
clause.' 74 The twenty-first amendment removes the subject of alcohol from
the reach of the commerce clause to the extent necessary to allow states to
control the transportation or importation of alcohol within their borders.'
75
Although this burden on interstate commerce is allowed, interstate busi-
nesses dealing with liquor are entitled to some commerce clause protections;
the twenty-first amendment "does not pro tanto repeal the commerce
170. See tifia note 171.
171. Cable systems can be required to carry signals of broadcasters within specified broad-
cast proximities. 47 C.F.R. § 76.57, -.59, -.61 (1983). Oklahoma's television market is easily
reached by out-of-state broadcasters, potentially making Oklahoma's cablecasters subject to the
FCC's mandatory signal requirements.
172. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(b) (1983).
173. See supra note 171.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This section provides that "The Congress shall have
Power. . .to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." Id.
175. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976). See generally Annot., 34 L. Ed. 2d 805
(1972).
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clause." 176 Commerce clause implications were not considered by the Tenth
Circuit in deciding Oklahoma Telecasters. The following brief analysis is pro-
vided as further evidence that commercial speech rights cannot be readily
subordinated to twenty-first amendment regulation.
In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. 177 the Supreme Court held
that New York could not regulate liquor destined for foreign ports and
under the control of the Federal Bureau of Customs. 178 Because there was no
showing that the liquor subject to regulation would be diverted into New
York, the state had no twenty-first amendment regulatory power. ' 79 Hostetter
did not read the twenty-first amendment literally; a state's power was lim-
ited to "transportation and importation" of liquor which would affect a
state's population. i80
Several years later the Court affirmed a decision declaring that liquor
involved in foreign commerce was protected by the commerce clause.' 8 '
The lower court had held that where liquor was not being imported for "de-
livery and use" within the state, state regulation could not be predicated on
the twenty-first amendment.'
8 2
In light of the restricted scope of twenty-first amendment police power
recognized by the Supreme Court, where the object of regulation does not
import or transport alcohol for delivery or use within a state, the state's
twenty-first amendment power to interfere with interstate commerce is sig-
nificantly attenuated. 183 Because Oklahoma's advertising ban affects parties
merely broadcasting information about alcohol, it constitutes regulation be-
yond the recognized scope of a state's exclusive power under the twenty-first
amendment.1 84 The regulation must therefore closely conform to commerce
clause principles generally applicable to state laws affecting interstate com-
merce.' 8 5 State regulations may interfere with interstate commerce to a cer-
tain extent, but state prohibitions cannot be oppressive.' 86 In this case,
176. 429 U.S. at 206.
177. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
178. Id. at 333-34.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 333.
181. See Lordi v. Epstein, 389 U.S. 29 (1967) (per curiam), affg, 261 F. Supp. 921 (D.N.J.
1966).
182. 261 F. Supp. at 982.
183. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (state power outside recognized scope of
twenty-first amendment extremely limited).
184. See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
185. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976): ("[T]he Twenty-first Amendment does
not pro lanlo repeal the Commerce Clause, but merely requires that each provision 'be consid-
ered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any
concrete case.' " (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332
(1964)). See also supra notes 113-47 and accompanying text.
186. E.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). In Bibb, the Court struck
down an Illinois statute requiring a certain type of rear fender mudguard on trucks and trailers
operating within the state. While recognizing that states have broad powers to regulate safety
on intrastate highways, the Court held that the Illinois statute placed too heavy a burden on
interstate commerce because Illinois' regulation would subject shippers to other states' contra-
dictory regulations, id. at 527, and would therefore cause significant interference with the free
flow of interstate commerce. Id. at 529-30.
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Oklahoma's restrictions create an unreasonable burden upon interstate cable
operators and television broadcasters.
Oklahoma's regulations affect not only cable operators and television
broadcasters in Oklahoma, but also affect out-of-state operators whose
broadcasts are transmitted into Oklahoma. A television network might
broadcast into several states, but because the broadcast would be transmit-
ted into Oklahoma the company would be required to delete all alcohol
commercials in order to comply with Oklahoma's laws. This would require
out-of-state television companies to preview and alter every broadcast, to
change their advertising policies, or to limit their marketing areas. Simi-
larly, cable operators might find themselves in the same position, although
they service much smaller areas than television broadcasters. A cable com-
pany located outside the state may have subscribers in Oklahoma. If so, the
cable operator, under Oklahoma law, would have to alter its particular
transmissions, change its advertising policies, or limit its available market.
Thus, Oklahoma's regulations are arguably an impermissible burden on in-
terstate commerce.
VI. SUMMARY
The Tenth Circuit's reliance on the summary dismissal of Queensgate was
incorrect. Queensgale involved a state agency narrowly limiting the commer-
cial speech rights of its licensees. 1 8 7 Oklahoma Telecasters involved a state
agency broadly limiting the commercial speech rights of independent ac-
tors.1 88 Because the Tenth Circuit failed to treat Queensgate with the preci-
sion required by Supreme Court decisions, 18 9 it wrongly held that Queensgate
was controlling.
Analysis of the commercial speech question involves a more compli-
cated issue. Oklahoma's interest, when viewed in conjunction with a consti-
tutional amendment directly supporting that interest, may well be
enhanced. Nonetheless, the conclusion that the twenty-first amendment jus-
tifies an otherwise unconstitutional regulation of commercial speech, by cre-
ating a lesser standard for judicial review, is a substantive fallacy. Case law
demonstrates that although the twenty-first amendment may enhance a
state's interest in regulating alcohol-related activities, a court's constitutional
methodology remains unchanged. 190 Thus, Oklahoma's advertising ban
must be evaluated under general commercial speech principles; evaluated
under those principles, the regulations must fall. 191
Further, in light of the federal regulations and laws applicable to cable
operators, Oklahoma's advertising prohibitions may be preempted with re-
spect to cable operators. When Oklahoma's statute directly conflicts with
federal law, 192 it must give way.
187. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 78, 87-88, 93 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 113-42 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 159-73 and accompanying text.
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Finally, commerce clause principles indicate that Oklahoma's laws are
of questionable validity. Oklahoma's prohibitions do not relate to the pro-
cess of bringing alcohol into Oklahoma, but rather seek to regulate speech
about alcohol legally brought into Oklahoma. Oklahoma's advertising pro-
hibition is therefore not entitled to the special deference granted laws within
the clear contemplation of the twenty-first amendment. Instead, the prohi-
bition should be subjected to ordinary commerce clause analysis. Under
such an analysis, Oklahoma's advertising ban must fall as an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. 193
Leshe C. Hansen





As shown by the title headings, a variety of criminal law issues reached
the court in the last year. Among the more significant decisions were con-
structions of statutes involving food stamp crimes and trial court probation-
ary powers, a constitutional challenge to enhanced sentencing, and the
"necessity" defense in the context of political protests.
I. BLOATING FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: TAKING MONEY BY
FALSE PRETENSES AND THE FEDERAL BANK CRIMES STATUTE
Chief Judge Seth's opinion in Unitled States v. Shoels' interpreted 18
U.S.C. § 2113(b), 2 the Federal Bank Crimes Statute, to include the crime of
taking money by false pretenses. 3 This interpretation was subsequently ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in Bell v. United States,4 which resolved a cir-
cuit court split over the reach of section 2113(b). The Bell decision and its
federalistic implications will be discussed following a review of the Shoels
decision and its circuit court antinomes.
A. United States v. Shoels
In Shoels, the Government alleged that the defendant presented a
$1,200 personal check for collection at a Denver savings and loan association
in July 1980. The check was made payable to Irving Butler, who testified
that although he had an account at the savings and loan association he had
never received the $1,200 check. 5 Evidence showed that the check had been
taken, possibly by Shoels, in a burglary of the home of a man who sold
Shoels an automobile earlier in the week. 6 The government contended that
Shoels' conduct violated section 2113(b); the jury agreed, finding Shoels
guilty.
7
1. 685 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3117 (1983).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1982) states in pertinent part:
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or
money or any other thing of value not exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care,
custody, control, management or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both ....
3. Taking money by false pretenses is defined as:
1) A false representation of material present or past fact;
2) Which causes the victim to take certain action;
3) The action taken involves transfer of title;
4) The transfer is to the wrongdoer;
5) The wrongdoer knows his representation is false; and
6) The wrongdoer intends to defraud the victim.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 655-72 (1972); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 296-319 (2d ed. 1969).
4. 103 S. Ct. 2398 (1983).




Shoels argued on appeal that his actions constituted obtaining money
by false pretenses, a state crime which was not punishable under the federal
law. 8 His reasoning was that the phrase "to steal or purloin" in section
2113(b) 9 indicated Congress' intent to limit the statute to common law lar-
ceny, which did not encompass stealing by false pretenses.' 0 The Tenth Cir-
cuit disagreed and embraced a broad construction of section 2113(b), relying
on United States v. Turley, I a Supreme Court decision construing the Na-
tional Motor Vehicle Theft Act.'
2
Turley rejected the notion that the word "stolen" in the Motor Vehicle
Theft statute was confined to the definition of common law larceny.1 3 Find-
ing the word "stolen" to lack an established common law meaning,' 4 the
Court examined the statute's legislative history and purpose. Three factors
were determinative in the decision to reject the proposed limitation on the
definition of "stolen." First, there was no indication in the legislative history
of an intent to distinguish common-law larceny from other felonious tak-
ings. 15 Second, the public and private interests at stake were damaged
equally regardless of the nature of the felonious taking. '6 Third, because
federal regulation was prompted by the interstate dimensions of the crime it
was unlikely that Congress had intended to leave "loopholes for wholesale
evasion" of the law. 1
7
As noted, the Tenth Circuit cited the Turley rationale with favor.' 8 This
rationale, in conjunction with the paucity of contrary legislative history, led
the court to conclude that the words "steal or purloin" in section 2113(b)
included behavior not constituting common law larceny. 19
Relying on essentially the same rationale as Shoels, the Second, Third,
Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had also adopted a broad reading of
section 2113(b). 20 Conversely, the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had
limited the application of section 2113(b) to common-law larceny. 2 1 Be-
cause an understanding of the reasons for adopting the narrower view is im-
portant for understanding the federalisic implications of the Supreme
8. Id
9. See supra note 2.
10. Id. at 381-82.
11. 352 U.S. 407 (1957).
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2313 (1982). The offense under this act involves interstate transpor-
tation of a motor vehicle "knowing the same to have been stolen." Id. § 2312.
13. The Supreme Court held that the term "stolen" in section 2312 included "all felonious
takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of owner-
ship, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny." 352 U.S. at 417.
14. 352 U.S. at 411.
15. Id at 414-15.
16. Id. at 416.
17. Id at 416-17.
18. 685 F.2d at 382-83. The court also stated that the term "steal" is usually given a broad
meaning under federal statutes. Id at 383.
19. Id at 383.
20. See United States v. Hinton, 703 F.2d 672 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3091 (1983);
United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1982), a~fd, 103 S. Ct. 2398 (1983); United States v. Guiffre, 576 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.),
cert. dented, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1978).
21. See United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1981); LeMasters v. United States,
378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961).
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Court's resolution of the circuit court conflict, the next section examines
LeMasters v. United States ,22 the most articulate exposition of the "narrower"
view.
B. LeMasters v. United States
LeMasters obtained a duplicate savings passbook for another person's
account by misrepresenting his identity, and then used this passbook to with-
draw $6,700 from the account.23 After trial, the defendant moved for ac-
quittal maintaining that while the indictment (based on section 2113(b))
charged larceny, the government had proved the crime of obtaining money
by false pretense, not larceny.24 The trial court denied the motion.25 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, placing emphasis on the legislative history and pur-
pose of section 2113(b).
26
The Ninth Circuit noted first that although an early form of the bill
which became section 2113(b) contained specific provisions for federal pun-
ishment of obtaining money by false pretenses, these provisions were deleted
by subsequent amendments. 27 Legislative history indicated that Congress
deleted the false pretenses provisions because it did not want the United
States to enter areas of state concern, such as forgery, fraud, and bad
checks.28 The Ninth Circuit invoked the statute's historical context to sup-
port this contention. Federal bank crimes legislation was needed (and in-
tended) to restrict interstate bands of "gangster bank robbers," not to protect
banks against all criminal defalcations.29 Congress intended to address a
specific problem, not to federalize crimes involving bad checks and forgeries,
crimes which did not significantly threaten interstate commerce and which
were already adequately regulated by local law enforcement authorities.
30
The Ninth Circuit court rejected the Turley analogy because the motiva-
tion underlying the Motor Vehicle Theft statute was "wholly different" from
the purpose animating section 2113(b). 3' The Motor Vehicle Theft statute
could be broadly construed because the interstate evils perceived by Con-
gress included all illegal motor vehicle sales.32 In enacting section 2113(b),
Congress was concerned only with evil of interstate bank robbers. 33 Turley's
22. 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967).
23. d at 263.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id at 263-68.
27. Id at 264-65.
28. Id at 264-66, 268.
29. Id. at 265 n.3 (citing S. REP. No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)). Although this
report accompanied a predecessor bill to section 2113(b), the court pointed to the lack of any
changed circumstances between the time the report issued and the time section 2113(b) was
enacted. At both times the salient problem was interstate bank robbery not involving stealth or
misrepresentations. 378 F.2d at 265-66.
30. Cf 378 F.2d at 268 (Congress rejected extending federal law to false pretenses because
such an extension would "serve no purpose except to confuse and dilute state responsibility for
local crimes which were being adequately dealt with by state law.").





definition of "stolen" was therefore inapposite. 34 Finally, the LeMasters
court found that the language of section 2113(b) was ambiguous, and that
ambiguities in federal criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the
accused, at least where broad construction would result in duplicating a
state offense.
35
C. Bell v. United States
The Supreme Court resolved the circuit court conflict in Bell v. United
Slates,36 by adopting a broad reading of the statute and holding that the
crime of taking by false pretenses was within the scope of section 2113(b). 37
The dissent in Bell, however, vigorously criticized the majority as ignoring
both the legislative history and LeMasters' compelling arguments for judicial
restraint in expanding federal criminal jurisdiction.38
In Bell, a check taken from the mail in Ohio was eventually deposited in
a federal savings and loan account in Miami. Bell was arrested and charged
with a violation of section 2113(b).39 Justice Powell, writing for the major-
ity, found that those who favored narrow construction of section 2113(b)
based on its text placed false reliance on the statute's "takes and carries
away" common law language. 40 Rules of statutory construction normally
require that in a federal criminal statute an undefined common law term
such as "takes and carries away" must impart its common law meaning.4'
Congress, however, did not incorporate all the elements of common-law lar-
ceny into the language of section 2113(b). Because the language used was
therefore not consistent with an intent to limit the statute solely to common
law larceny, 42 the defendant's proposed common law meaning was not in-
herently embodied in the statute.
43
Justice Powell then examined the legislative history of section 2113(b).
This section had been added as an amendment to a statute proscribing only
those bank thefts involving force or violence or the creation of fear.44 The
Court treated this history as evidencing congressional intent to protect banks
from all asset-depleting thefts, regardless of whether all the elements of com-
mon-law larceny were present. 45 Unlike the LeMasters court, the Court felt
that a change in legislative purpose had taken place during the interval be-
tween 1934, when a legislative provision directly addressing false pretenses
34. Id.
35. Id at 268 (citing Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943)).
36. 103 S. Ct. 2398 (1983).
37. Id. at 2402.
38. Id. at 2402-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 2399.
40. Id at 2399-2400.
41. Id. at 2401 (citing 7iTrley, 352 U.S. at 411).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2401. The Court extracted two textual indicia of an intent to go beyond
common-law larceny. First was the application of the statute to non-tangible property; com-
mon-law larceny was limited to personal property. Second, the statute-unlike the common
law-did not require a taking from the possession of the property's owner. Id
43. Id.




was rejected, 46 and 1937, when section 2113(b) was enacted. 47 That change
stemmed from experience with a statute which did not encompass nonvio-
lent bank crimes. 48 Reacting to that experience, Congress enacted a statute
encompassing all acts involving an illegal "taking and carrying away" of
bank assets, regardless of common-law distinctions.
49
The dissent took a contrary position, and argued forcefully for a narrow
reading that would limit the breadth of federal criminal jurisdiction. Justice
Stevens found "strong evidence of Congress' specific, limited intent" to con-
fine the statute to takings without a bank's consent. 50 Agreeing that the
purpose of the amendment including section 2113(b) was to correct omis-
sions in the original bank crimes statute, he disagreed on the scope of the
correction. The original statute did not proscribe taking without violence,
burglary, or larceny by stealth, all crimes involving taking without con-
sent.5 1 Congress' concern in amending the statute was limited to non-con-
sensual takings; there was no intent to reach all bank crimes.5 2 Justice
Stevens concluded that the legislative history of the statute precluded an
interpretation imposing federal punishment for the crime of obtaining
money by false pretenses.
53
D. Federahzstzc Implications of Shoels and Bell
Justice Stevens' dissent in Bell was motivated by a strong aversion to an
approach to federal criminal jurisdiction which would subject a person to
prosecution by both federal and state authorities for the same act. 54 In his
dissent to McElroy v. Unted StatesS5 Justice Stevens, after carefully analyzing
the legislative history of the statute in question, 56 concluded that the Court
should not unnecessarily expand federal criminal jurisdiction in order to pre-
vent the federal prosecutor from "encroach[ing] into an area of state respon-
46. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
47. See Pub. L. No. 75-349, 50 Stat. 749 (1937).
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2402.
49. Id. The Court did state that had Bell not "taken and carried away" the money he
would not have violated section 2113(b), because the statute requires an asportation. Id. at
240 1.
50. Id at 2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2403 & nn.3-4.
52. Id The dissent also noted that an unanimous Court had previously rejected an inter-
pretation of federal bank crime laws which would bring all "asset depleting" acts within federal
jurisdiction. Justice Stevens quoted the following passage from Jerome v. United States, 318
U.S. 101 (1943):
It is difficult to conclude in the face of this history that Congress, having rejected in
i934 an express provision making state felonies federal offenses, reversed itself in
1937. . . . It is likewise difficult to believe that Congress, through the same clause,
adopted by indirection in 1937 much of the fraud provision which it rejected in 1934.
318 U.S. at 105-06, quoted with approval tn Bell, 103 S. Ct. at 2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. 103 S. Ct. at 2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id at 2402.
55. 455 U.S. 642 (1982).
56. Mi-cElroy construed 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982), which prohibits the interstate transporta-
tion of forged securities. The Court held that the "interstate" element was satisfied if a security
was forged while in the "stream of commerce," regardless of whether the forgery took place
prior to the instrument's crossing state lines. 455 U.S. at 653-54. Justice Stevens, dissenting,
interpreted the legislative history to require forgery prior to crossing an interstate boundary. Id
at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sibility and . . .cross[ing] a line that Congress has drawn. '5 7
The central fault with Shoels and Bell is that the opinions misread the
statutory limits evinced by section 2113(b)'s legislative history. This mis-
reading recognizes the semantic distinction between larceny and obtaining
money by false pretenses, but ignores the substantive distinction drawn by
Congress. The danger in the jurisdictionally expansive approach underlying
Shoels and Bell is the bloating of federal criminal jurisdiction, and ultimately
the "unnecessary growth of a national police force."
58
II. DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE TO THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD IN THE
DANGEROUS SPECIAL OFFENDER STATUTE
In United States v. Sche/159 Mr. Schell made a five-prong attack on the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3575, 60 which permits a federal district court
to increase the sentence prescribed for a particular offense:6 1 To give this
increased sentence, the court must make additional factual findings, not re-
quired for conviction, that the convicted person is "dangerous" 62 and a "spe-
cial offender. '"63 Schell's challenge, although unsuccessful, raised some
57. 455 U.S. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. See 103 S. Ct. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Other courts and commentators have
expressed concern over expanding federal criminal jurisdiction, especially where "no special
federal interest or subject matter is involved." ABRAMS, Consultant's Report onjurisdcttan, in I
WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
34 (1976). See also United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
59. 692 F.2d 672 (10th Cir. 1982).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b)-(d) (1982) provide in relevant part:
(b) If it appears by a preponderance ofthe information, including information submitted
during the trial of such felony and the sentencing hearing and so much of the
presentence report as the court relies upon, that the defendant is a dangerous special
offender, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate
term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maxi-
mum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony. Otherwise it shall sentence
the defendant in accordance with the law prescribing penalties for such felony.
(c) This section shall not prevent the imposition and execution of a sentence of
death or of imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding twenty-five years upon any
person convicted of an offense so punishable.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the court shall not sen-
tence a dangerous special offender to less than any mandatory minimum penalty pre-
scribed by law for such felony. This section shall not be construed as creating any
mandatory minimum penalty.
(Emphasis supplied).
62. Schell was alleged to be "dangerous" according to the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f)
(1982), which provide: "A defendant is dangerous for purposes of this section if a period of
confinement longer than that provided for such felony is required for the protection of the
public from further criminal conduct by the defendant."
63. Schell was alleged to be a special offender under 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1) (1982), which
provides:
A defendant is a special offender for purposes of this section if-
(1) the defendant has previously been convicted in courts of the United States, a
State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory or
possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency,
or instrumentality thereof for two or more offenses committed on occasions different
from one another and from such felony and punishable in such courts by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, for one or more of such convictions the defendant
has been imprisoned prior to the commission of such felony, and less than five years
have elapsed between the commission of such felony and either the defendant's re-
lease, on parole or otherwise, from imprisonment for one such conviction or his com-
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compelling questions about the due process implications of the preponder-
ance evidentiary standard included in section 3575,64 the dangerous special
offender (DSO) sentencing statute.
A. The Facts
Of his own accord, James Schell took liberty from the federal correc-
tional facility at Fort Scott, Kansas.65 Unfortunately for Mr. Schell, the tal-
ons of law ensnared him and he was charged with a violation of the federal
prison escape statute.66 While awaiting trial, Schell once again took french
leave; this flight also ended in recapture, producing another escape charge.
67
The United States attorney filed the required pre-trial notice 68 stating
that the government reasonably believed that Schell was a dangerous special
offender within the terms of section 3575 and should be given an enhanced
sentence. 69 Schell pied guilty to the escape charges. 70 The judge then con-
ducted a DSO hearing to determine if the defendant's criminal behavior was
sufficiently aberrant to warrant an enhanced sentence.7 ' The trial court
found that Schell's pattern of violent criminal activity made him "danger-
ous" within the meaning of section 3575(0,72 and that Schell was a "special
offender" because the number and temporal proximity of his felony convic-
tions and jail terms satisfied the requirements of section 3575(e)(1). 73 The
trial court then used section 3575's enhanced sentencing power to sentence
Schell to two consecutive ten-year prison terms.74 The defendant appealed,
alleging that the DSO statute contained numerous constitutional deficiencies
and that his sentence was improper under the DSO standards.
B. Schell's Challenge
1. "Organized Crime" Requirement
Schell contended that Congress aimed the harsh provisions of section
3575 at organized crime figures, 75 and that because there was no proof at
mission of the last such previous offense or another offense punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under applicable laws of the United States, a State,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory or possession
of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency or instru-
mentality thereof.
64. See supra note 61.
65. 692 F.2d at 673.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1982). See 692 F.2d at 673.
67. 692 F.2d at 673.
68. &e 8 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1982).
69. 692 F.2d at 673.
70. Id
71. Id at 674.
72. Id. at 675. Schell's criminal record included convictions for bank robbery, aggravated
robbery, armed robbery, and murder. Id at 674.
73. Id at 674. The Tenth Circuit explicitly limited its holding to sentences imposed pursu-
ant to the special offender definition under section 3575(e)(1). The DSO statute also permits a
person to be characterized as a special offender when that person is a professional criminal or is
part of a criminal conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(2)-(3) (1982).
74. 692 F.2d at 674.
75. Id. See generally Note, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 4 MICH. J.L. REFORM 546
(1971) (discussing legislative history of section 3575).
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trial of his involvement with organized crime the enhanced sentence under
the statute violated his due process rights. 76 The Tenth Circuit quickly dis-
missed this contention, holding that neither the legislative history of section
3575 nor its language limited its application to organized crime figures.7 7
2. Challenge to Finding of "Dangerousness"
Schell argued that because he faced sixty years in prison for other fed-
eral and state convictions he was not a threat to the public, and therefore
could not be considered "dangerous. '78 The court rejected this argument
because the DSO statute was not intended to involve the federal judiciary in
the "complexities and uncertainties of the sentencing and parole procedures
of other jurisdictions."' 79 Trial judges were therefore not required to calcu-
late the imminence of a defendant's release in applying the DSO statute.8 0
3. Eighth Amendment Does Not Bar Enhanced Sentencing
Schell also argued that because he was subject to lengthy federal and
state prison terms the additional twenty years imposed under section 3575
constituted a violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.8 1 The court dismissed this argument summarily,
finding that the eighth amendment only barred sentences "grossly dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the crime."18 2 The fact that existing sentences re-
mained to be served was insignificant; absent legislative irrationality, the
state retained the power to punish lawbreakers for each transgression.
3
4. Vagueness
Next, Schell argued that the definition of "dangerous" in section 3575
was unconstitutionally vague. The Tenth Circuit joined several sister cir-
cuits in rejecting this argument.8 4 Even though Congress might have used
more precise language, congressional imprecision did not in itself render the
statute unconstitutionally vague. 85 The statute required trial judges to con-
sider the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal activity.8 6  Trial
76. 692 F.2d at 674.
77. Id See also United States v. Bailey, 537 F.2d 845, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1976),cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1051 (1977). But see United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd,
603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980) (enhanced sentence permissible
under section 3575 because defendant had long-standing connection with New York organized
crime "family").




82. Id The court cited Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) for support, and speculated
that Rummel might permit any non-capital penalty for egregious felony convictions. See 692
F.2d at 675.
83. 692 F.2d at 675.
84. See United States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1175-76 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184, 1194
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864 (1977); United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 331-32, 335-
37 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
85. 692 F.2d at 675 (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975)).
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(0 (1982).
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judges, presumably familiar with predictive processes through experience
with normal sentencing and bail proceedings, could therefore interpret the
definition of "dangerous" without having to "guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. '8 7 Because section 3575(o therefore met the minimum
standards for notice,8 8 it satisfied due process requirements. 89
5. Evidentiary Standard and Sentencing Proceedings
Finally, in the only challenge generating a dissent, 90 Schell attacked the
statute's evidentiary standards. The DSO statute permits a defendant to be
found "dangerous" and a "special offender" upon proof by a "preponder-
ance of the information." 9 1 In a split decision, Judge McKay dissenting, the
Tenth Circuit panel held that the preponderance standard satisfies a con-
victed defendant's due process rights, and rejected Schell's challenge. 92 The
majority's analysis of the Supreme Court's opinions addressing the due pro-
cess aspects of sentencing led it to conclude that the Court had not articu-
lated the evidentiary standard constitutionally required for enhanced
sentencing proceedings. 93 In Specht v. Patterson94 the Court recognized that
enhanced sentencing proceedings implicated significant due process con-
cerns, and held that a defendant subject to enhanced sentencing was entitled
to procedural protections not required when sentencing in the normal
range.95 Because Specht had not considered the evidentiary standard ques-
tion,96 however, the majority proceeded to analyze Schell's constitutional
challenge by applying the interest balancing methodology underlying mod-
87. 692 F.2d at 675. Other circuits have used similar reasoning in rejecting vagueness
attacks on section 3575(o. For instance, the Seventh Circuit has stated:
[W]e [do not] find that the term dangerous is overly broad or vague for the purposes of
sentencing. . . Factors routinely considered by a sentencing judge are the defend-
ant's past record, the probation officer's report, the nature of the present offense and
the defendant's attitude. . . . Likelihood of future criminality and the potential dan-
ger to society are determinations implicit in sentencing decisions. The concept of dan-
gerousness as defined in § 3575 is a verbalization of considerations underlying any
sentencing decision.
United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184, 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. dentd, 434 U.S. 864 (1977).
88. See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975); Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385 (1926).
89. 692 F.2d at 675.
90. See id at 679 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b)'(1982). See supra note 61.
92. 672 F.2d at 679.
93. Id. at 677. The Court has held that due process requires use of the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard in proceedings leading to criminal conviction. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970). Conversely, the Court has indicated that the preponderance standard is constitu-
tionally permissible when a court is sentencing within the range prescribed for a particular
crime. Cf Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (no significant due process concerns at
sentencing). The Tenth Circuit characterized an enhanced sentencing proceeding as a "half-
way house" between a criminal proceeding and a normal sentencing proceeding. 692 F.2d at
676. Because the enhanced sentencing power could not be invoked without making factual
findings not required for conviction, Wilhams was not controlling. Similarly, because the pro-
ceeding did not involve a separate criminal conviction, Winshzp was not controlling. Thus, the
Tenth Circuit was required to engage in an independent analysis. 692 F.2d at 676.
94. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
95. Id. at 609-10.
96. The precise issue in Specht was whether a defendant in an enhanced sentencing pro-
ceeding was entitled to an adversarial hearing at the enhanced sentencing phase of the prosecu-
tion. Id at 608.
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ern due process jurisprudence.
9 7
Interest balancing methodology requires three inquiries: 1) determin-
ing the nature of the affected private interest; 2) evaluating the risk of erro-
neous deprivation of that interest through existing procedures and the
probable value of alternate procedures in preventing such erroneous depri-
vation; and 3) assessing the nature of the governmental interest. 98 When the
calculus of these inquiries balances in favor of a private party, existing proce-
dures are constitutionally inadequate. 99
The majority recognized that defendants have a liberty interest which is
affected by an enhanced sentence, although they did not engage in a mean-
ingful analysis of the nature of this interest. moo The majority also recognized
that evidentiary standards were procedural devices for allocating the risk of
error in judicial proceedings.10 ' The "reasonable doubt" standard allocates
virtually all the risk of error to the government; the "clear and convincing"
standard allocates most of the risk to the government; the "preponderance"
standard essentially allocates the risk equally.' 0 2 The final elements injected
into the due process equation were the government's interests in protecting
society and in deterring citizens from the criminal path.'
0 3
Relying on three factors, the majority concluded that the requirements
of due process were satisfied by use of the preponderance standard. First, a
defendant in a DSO proceeding is statutorily entitled to the adversarial
hearing explicitly required by Specht.'°4 Second, given the subjective nature
of a finding of "dangerousness," the reasonable doubt standard would, as a
practical matter, lead to total subordination of the government's interests.' 0 5
Finally, Congress had openly considered the constitutional issue and decided
on the preponderance standard; that decision was entitled to great
weight. 10 6 In light of the above, the majority concluded that the parties'
interests were roughly equal, and that section 3575's preponderance stan-
dard-which divides the risk of erroneous deprivation equally between the
parties to a proceeding10 7-adequately satisfied the demands of due
process. 108
Judge McKay, in his dissent, agreed that Specht had not resolved the
97. 692 F.2d at 678 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)). See also Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Court's
interest-balancing approach has been criticized as giving lip service to individual due process
rights and turning a constitutional check on governmental authority into a mechanistic exercise,
Note, Specifiing the Procedures Required by Due Process.- Towards Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975), but nonetheless remains controlling when adjudicating due
process challenges.
98. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
99. See id.
100. 692 F.2d at 678.
101. Id. at 676.
102. Id. at 676 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
103. 692 F.2d at 678. See also Addington, 441 U.S. at 429.
104. Id. at 677. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1982).
105. 692 F.2d at 679.
106. Id (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980)).
107. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
108. 692 F.2d at 679.
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due process issue raised by Schell. 9 Balancing the interests involved, how-
ever, led the dissent to conclude that due process required, at a minimum,
the use of a clear and convincing standard in a DSO proceeding.110
Divergence from the majority's conclusion stemmed from Judge Mc-
Kay's careful characterization of the interests involved. Subjecting a defend-
ant to an enhanced sentencing proceeding creates the possibility that the
liberty interest not extinguished by the original proceeding can be lost.I"
This residual liberty interest, which is in freedom from confinement not pre-
scribed by a criminal conviction, is an interest of "high order."' 12 Conse-
quently, due process concerns are sharply implicated when the legislature
attempts to impose an enhanced sentence based on facts not adduced as part
of the criminal conviction; in that situation the legislature is trying to de-
prive a defendant of a portion of his liberty interest not extinguished by the
criminal conviction simpliciter.' 13 Further, the government's interests in the
DSO proceeding are not solely adversarial. The government's interests are
not limited to protecting society from the effects of dangerous criminals; the
government also has an interest in "protecting persons who are not danger-
ous from imprisonments."' 14 Both interests are of high order. 1,5
Turning to an analysis of the preponderance standard, the dissent
found two serious problems. First, although the standard would advance the
government's interest in protecting society, through causing overinclusive
application of section 3575, overinclusiveness would generate wrongful im-
prisonment, thereby "undermining the 'moral force' of the criminal law."" 16
Second, the preponderance standard's overinclusiveness would affect pri-
marily those defendants not actually falling within the statute's scope,
thereby magnifying the number of erroneous deprivations. 
117
Recognizing the proof problems of a reasonable doubt standard in the
context of a statute requiring a subjective determination,I", Judge McKay
would have required a clear and convincing standard. 1 9 This standard
would advance the government interests by eliminating overinclusiveness
109. Id. at 680 (McKay, J., dissenting).
110. Id at 684.
111. Id at 681. Judge McKay read the Supreme Court's sentencing decisions to draw a
distinction between that portion of a defendant's liberty interest extinguished by the original
conviction and the defendant's residual liberty interest. Id Cf Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493
(1980) (transfer of prisoner to mental hospital implicated due process concerns because such
transfer not within the range of confinement created by prison sentence).
112. 692 F.2d at 683 (McKay, J., dissenting). AccordIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1967).
113. 692 F.2d at 681-82 (McKay, J., dissenting). Judge McKay limits the original depriva-
tion to that range of confinement justified solely by the criminal conviction. Any additional
confinement constituted an encroachment on a defendant's residual liberty interest. Id Judge
McKay's analysis does not bar the legislature from creating increased sentencing ranges, as the
legislatively chosen range of sentencing for the criminal conviction simpliciter defines the
residual liberty interest. Id at 681.
114. Id. at 684.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id at 683.




while simultaneously providing the defendant with sufficient protection
against erroneous deprivation of a residual liberty interest of fundamental
importance. 1
2 0
C. Analysis of Schell
Judge McKay and the majority (Judges Doyle and Logan) have sepa-
rate understandings of the necessary procedural due process safeguards to be
accorded. This results from their different assessments of the liberty interests
at stake.' 2 ' Before that conflict can be analyzed, however, it is necessary to
consider the initial premise underlying both opinions, which is that Specht
does not control the resolution of Schell's challenge.
1. Specht and Due Process at Enhanced Sentencing Proceedings
In an early decision, Williams v. New York,' 22 the Supreme Court ap-
proved of relaxed procedural rigor in the context of ordinary sentencing pro-
ceedings. Willams involved an appeal from a death sentence which had
been given based on background information in a presentence report.
23
The defense had no opportunity at trial to cross-examine the probation au-
thorities or the parties relied on in developing the fatal document. 124 The
Court upheld this procedure, distinguishing the finding of guilt from the
imposition of punishment.' 25 Adversarial protections at sentencing were
deemed unnecessary because the convicted defendant did not need the pro-
tections against caprice adversarial procedures provided for the merely in-
dicted defendant.' 26 Moreover, the sentencing judge was entitled to all
information regarding the defendant in order to make the most intelligent
imposition of sentence.127 Due process therefore did not require any proce-
dural protections, at least beyond an opportunity to object to the sentence.
The next decision addressing due process requirements at sentencing
was Spechl. Specht involved an enhanced sentencing statute 2 8 similar to sec-
tion 3575, in that both statutes required a finding of fact ("dangerousness")
not required for conviction on the underlying criminal charge. 129 The
Supreme Court held that invoking the Colorado statute involved making a
new and separate criminal charge. 130 Thus, the defendant in such a pro-
ceeding was entitled to the "full panoply" of procedural protections due pro-
cess deemed essential for a fair trial.
13 1
120. Id.
121. Compare supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text (majority opinion) with supra notes
109-117 and accompanying text (dissenting opinion).
122. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
123. Id at 244.
124. Id at 244-45.
125. Id at 246.
126. See id at 247.
127. See id at 249-51.
128. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-19-1 to -10 (1963), repealed, Act of May 21, 1972, § 8, 1972,
Colo. Sess. Laws p. 268.
129. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 39-19-1 (1963), repealed, Act of May 21, 1972, § 8, 1972, Colo.
Sess. Laws p.2 68; 18 U.S.C. § 3575() (1982).
130. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967).
131. Id. at 609-10 (quoting Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966)).
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An expansive reading of Specht would entitle those accused under sec-
tion 3575 to what the Supreme Court recognizes as one of the most funda-
mental due process protections available for criminal defendants: the
reasonable doubt standard.132 Logically, if Spech incorporates the "full pan-
oply" of due process protections, the preponderance of the evidence standard
in the DSO statute is patently unconstitutional. Specht, however, for several
reasons, has not been read so broadly.
First, Specht predates the cases establishing the due process balancing
test, making it inappropriate to extend Specht without engaging in balancing
analysis. 133 Additionally, while Specht explicitly required some procedural
due process protections, the beyond the reasonable doubt standard was not
mentioned. 134 Further, the fact that additional factfinding is required in an
enhanced sentencing proceeding does not seem determinative, in light of the
fact that Williams (which was explicitly reaffirmed in Specht)' 35 permits a
judge to engage in additional factfinding.' 36 Finally, the Court has recog-
nized the due process fundamentality of the reasonable doubt standard in
the context of a defendant's conviction proceeding, not in the context of a
post-conviction proceeding. 137 Although the foregoing clearly does not settle
the question, until the Supreme Court actually decides the issue it appears
that both the majority and the dissent properly rejected Specht and WZlhiams
as controlling precedent.1
38
2. Weighing the Interests
It is apparent that the defendant in a DSO proceeding has a substantial
liberty interest: his residual freedom.' 39 In evaluating the degree of proof
required, it is important to remember Justice Brennan's statement that
"[t]he procedure by which the facts of the case are determined assume an
importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule to be applied.
And the more important the rights at stake the more important must be the
132. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1967).
133. Cf 692 F.2d at 680 (McKay, J., dissenting) (Supreme Court has developed "more disci-
plined method of due process analysis" since Specht).
134. Specht required a hearing, assistance of counsel, compulsory process, cross-examination
of adverse witnesses, written findings of fact, and appeal from an adverse decision. 386 U.S. at
610. These protections are all included in a DSO proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1982).
It should be noted, however, that the evidentiary standard question was not before the Court in
Specht. See supra note 96.
135. Specht, 386 U.S. at 608.
136. See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Stauaes P iemting k-cre.-sed &'.s for Habitual Or
Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARv. L. REV. 356 (1975).
137. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1967). Winship's concern with due process at the
original conviction stage of the criminal justice process is demonstrated by its citation to that
portion of/n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which held that due process rights are invoked in a
proceeding leading to confinement. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at
50-51). Winsh'p did not cite Specht, perhaps indicating that the Court perceives a distinction
between post-conviction and pre-conviction proceedings. Additionally, note that Wl jiams drew
the pre-/post-conviction distinction. 337 U.S. at 246.
138. Cf Note, supra note 136, at 373 (precise answers to due process requirements at en-
hanced sentencing proceedings not deducible from Court's decisions "as a matter of pure
logic").
139. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
1984]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
procedural safeguards surrounding those rights."' 140
The selection of a burden of proof depends on the societal interests
which are pitted in certain types of litigation. For instance, the preponder-
ance standard (more probable than not) is used in civil cases, where the law
considers plaintiffs and defendants equal, and considers the possibility of an
erroneous verdict without grave consequences. 14' When moral issues are in-
volved in a civil proceeding, such as libel, the Court requires a standard
which is stricter than the preponderance standard-clear and convincing
evidence. 142 In deportation, denaturalization, and expatriation cases, where
fundamental interests are at stake, the more exacting, clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence standard is also utilized. 143 Thus, the clear and con-
vincing standard generally applies in situations where "[t]he various interests
of society are pitted against restrictions on the liberty of the individual."'
144
Finally, in criminal proceedings, which involve immense interests, the be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard is required.
145
From this recitation, it is obvious that the defendant's residual freedoms
can be classified as significant, throwing doubt on the propriety of section
3575's preponderance standard. It would be virtually impossible to prove an
individual "dangerous" beyond a reasonable doubt, however. The most rea-
sonable solution to the dilemma was articulated by Judge Friendly in Holi's
v. Smith.1
4 6
Hol/s involved an enhanced sentencing proceeding not unlike that in
Specht. Following a cursory psychiatric examination the judge found Hollis
dangerous to society and sentenced him to an indeterminate'term. 14 7 The
appellate court recognized that a finding of "dangerousness" based on psy-
chiatric evidence is both onerous and uncertain; given Hollis' significant lib-
erty interest, the judge should have used a "clear, unequivocal and
convincing" standard. 148 The dissent in Schell cites Holis and, echoing Hol-
h's' concern for a defendant's liberty interest, found the clear and convincing
evidence standard necessary in DSO proceedings.' 49 Given the defendant's
fundamental interest, and the fact that the preponderance standard's overin-
clusiveness causes the risk of erroneous deprivation to fall most significantly
on the "non-dangerous" defendant, the dissent's position more properly rec-
ognizes the due process protections required by the DSO proceeding.
140. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958).
141. Set supra notes 10 1-03 and accompanying text.
142. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 333-32 (1974) (libel requires proof by clear and convincing standard); 9
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2498, p. 329 (3d. ed. 1940) (fraud and undue influence should be
proven by clear and convincing amount of evidence).
143. See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S.
665 (1944).
144. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
145. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
146. 571 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1978).
147. Id. at 688-89.
148. Id at 695-96.
149. 692 F.2d at 684-85 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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III. THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT FOR FOOD STAMP FRAUD
In United States v. O'Brien 150 the Tenth Circuit, in a case of first impres-
sion, 15 1 set forth the elements necessary for conviction under 7 U.S.C.
§ 2024(b), 15 2 the criminal fraud provision of the Food Stamp Act.' 53 Sec-
tion 2024(b) provides that "whoever knowingly . . . acquires [food stamp]
coupons" in any unauthorized manner has committed a felony. 5 4 The issue
on appeal was whether this section required proof that the defendant knew
that the manner of acquisition was not authorized by the Food Stamp
Act. 155 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the defendants' contention that to
support a conviction, the trial court must instruct the jury that the defend-
ant knew the manner in which the food stamps were acquired was not au-
thorized by the statute.
156
A. The Facts
Bonnie Sue O'Brien was contacted by a friend who asked Mrs. O'Brien
if she wanted to purchase some food stamps. 157 Unknown to Mrs. O'Brien,
her friend (Clark) was acting as an informant.' 5 8 Mrs. O'Brien eventually
gave Clark and her companion (an undercover agent) $220 in exchange for
$500 of food coupons. 159 This conduct resulted in the first charge against
Bonnie O'Brien.'6o
Several weeks later, Clark and the undercover agent contacted Paul
O'Brien (Bonnie's husband) and asked whether he would exchange twenty
tablets of phenmetrazine for $500 in food stamps. 16 1 O'Brien agreed; after
obtaining the drugs, the proposed transaction was made. 162 Although the
undercover agent stated that Bonnie O'Brien actually effectuated the ex-
change, charges were brought against both O'Briens.'
6 3
At the trial the jury could not reach a verdict on the first count, and the
judge declared a mistrial. ' 64 The same jury, however, returned with a guilty
verdict against Mr. and Mrs. O'Brien on the second count. 165 As noted
above, the O'Briens then appealed the adequacy of the jury instructions.
150. 686 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1982).
151. Id at 852.
152. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (1982). This section reads in relevant part: "[W]hoever knowingly
... acquires [food stamp] coupons . . . in any manner not authorized by this chapter or the
regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall, if such coupons . . . are of a value of $100 or
more, be guilty of a felony ... " Id § 2024(b)(1).
153. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029 (1982).
154. See supra note 152.
155. 686 F.2d at 852. The appeal arose from the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that
an element of the crime was knowledge of the unauthorized manner of acquisition. Id
156. Id.
157. Id at 851.
158. Id
159. Id









The Tenth Circuit examined the language of the statute and found that
it was ambiguous because the adverb "knowingly" could be read to modify
either the word "acquire" or the phrase "acquire in a manner not author-
ized."' 16 6 Judge McWilliams, who wrote the opinion, first examined the leg-
islative history of section 2024(b) and found it unhelpful because the issue of
knowledge of unauthorized acquisition was never discussed. 16 7 Similarly,
earlier versions of the Food Stamp Act did not prove to be of assistance in
clarifying the statute.168 Lacking helpful legislative history, the Tenth Cir-
cuit applied the maxim of statutory construction that criminal statutes
should be construed against the government and in favor of the accused. 1
69
Additionally, because the offense involved a felony, the court read the stat-
ute as requiring criminal intent. 1
70
Utilizing these rules, the panel held that reversible error was committed
when the trial court failed to instruct the jury that knowledge that the man-
ner of acquisition was in violation of statute or regulation constituted an
essential element of the crime.' 71 The significance of the O'Brien decision is
that it is the first reported decision to delineate the mens rea element of
section 2024(b).
IV. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE AND POLITICAL PROTEST: ROCKY FLATS
SIT-IN CASE
In United States v. Seward,' 72 the court considered the requisite showing
of justification necessary to sustain the defense of "necessity" or "choice of
evils" in the political protest context.
A. The Facts
Several thousand people were permitted to use an isolated ten-acre por-
tion of the Rocky Flats Nuclear Plant site in Jefferson County, Colorado on
April 28, 1979 for a peaceful and orderly demonstration during which no
arrests occurred. 173 On the next day, three groups of protestors returned; 283
members of these groups were arrested when they crossed a painted line at
the east access gate of the plant, which indicated the area of restricted access
to the government property. 174 The protesters were symbolically resisting
166. Id at 851-52 & n.3. See also W. LA FAVE & A. Sco-r, supra note 3, at § 27 (discussing,
in an analogous situation under "blue sky" laws, problem of determining which clauses were
modified by adverb "knowingly").
167. 686 F.2d at 852.
168. Id at 852-53.
169. Id at 853. This is a markedly different approach than that taken by the Tenth Circuit
in construing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1982), the Federal Bank Crimes statute. See supra notes 1-19
and accompanying text.
170. 686 F.2d at 853.
171. Id. at 853-54.
172. 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. deniedsub nom. Ahrendt v. United States, 103 S. Ct.
789 (1983).
173. Id. at 1271-72.
174. Id. at 1272. The defendants were charged with trespass on an installation of the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2278a (1976) and 10 C.F.R. §§ 860.1-
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the presence of the plant, which they considered a threat to community
health and well-being because of the nuclear research and development ac-
tivities performed there.175
Following arraignment on trespass charges, the prosecution filed a mo-
tion in limine seeking to prevent the defendants from presenting evidence at
trial supporting common-law "necessity" defenses including justification,
self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property.176 At the hearing on
this motion the trial court ordered the defense to submit written offers of
proof substantiating the common law defenses sought to be excluded by the
prosecution. 177 Numerous offers were presented, the defendants proffering
expert testimony on the effects of radiation, the risk of leaking radioactive
material, the existing levels of soil contamination around the Rocky Flats
Plant, and the lack of viable relief through the political system.'17
On June 7, 1979, all of the trial judges assigned to the cases 179 joined in
an order placing strict requirements on the use of the common-law necessity
defenses. The trial judges' order stated that to use the necessity defenses, the
defendant had to make an acceptable offer of proof at trial. '8 0 The offer had
to show: 1) a direct causal relationship between the defendant's actions and
the cessation of the harmful activity; 2) the defendants were preventing
criminal conduct by the government; 3) the government's criminal act was
occurring in the defendants presence; and 4) no alternative short of criminal
activity was available to halt the objectionable activity at Rocky Flats.'"'
Although made in accordance with this order, the offers of proof were uni-
formly denied.18 2 On appeal, the defendants challenged this action.'
8 3
B. The Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts' assault on
the necessity defenses, finding that several essential elements were not satis-
fied by the offers of proof.' 84 The court defined the elements of the defense
as 1) the absence of a legal alternative to criminal conduct; 2) imminence of
harm, and 3) proof of a causal relationship between the criminal conduct
.8 (1983). 687 F.2d at 1271. For a discussion of an administrative law challenge to the trespass
convictions, see Admnistratwe Law, Tenth Annual Tenth Czrcuit Survey, 61 DEN. L.J. 109, 110-17
(1984).
175. 687 F.2d at 1274, 1276.
176. Id at 1273. It is not clear whether all the defenses were properly termed "necessity";
the defenses of necessity are similar to duress defenses but conceptually distinct. See W. LAFAVE
& A. ScoT-r, supra note 3. at § 50. at 383.
177. 687 F.2d at 1273.
178. Id
179. The defendants were divided into several groups of 15 to 20 for trial; on appeal, the
appellants were similarly grouped. Id. at 1272.
180. Id. at 1273.
181. Id at 1273-74. The trial court supported its order by citing United States v. The Di-
ana, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 354 (1869); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971); and United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
182. 687 F.2d at 1274.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1275.
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and avoidance of the imminent harm.' 8 5 The appellate court saw the avail-
ability of another, legal course of action-political action-as the primary
impediment to the necessity defenses. 186 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
the necessity defense is based on a real emergency confronting an individual
who then has no choice but to perform a criminal act.1 8 7 In the Seward case
this "indispensable element" was absent. t 88 Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the defense.
C. The "Necessity" Defense and Poltical Protests
The application of the necessity defense involves an examination of the
utility of the two acts confronting the defendant: the criminal act is weighed
against the harm avoided.' 89 In the eyes of the Seward defendants, the nega-
tive effects of criminal trespass were weighed against the effect of radioactive
materials on the persons and environment near the plant. Given this bal-
ance, the Seward defendants felt impelled to break the law. The cases and
commentators, however, stress that the availability of a third course of action
will preclude the defense when that third course of action provides an effec-
tive means of preventing the criminal harm without the necessity of law-
breaking. The Seward court assumed that an effective course of action was
available in the political mechanism. Of course, this reflects a judgment on
the severity and immediacy of the harm to persons and the environment
which might result while the defendants pursue a political course of action.
It is probably more appropriate for the court to look to the element of causa-
tion as justification for precluding the defense: the defendants' trespass on a
small corner of the property did not significantly alter the course of plant
operation. This more objective criterion is preferable because courts deal
with causation on a daily basis. The effect of nuclear research on persons
and the environment is far more speculative.
V. ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE: ADMISSION OF CRIME CHARGED REMAINS
A PREREQUISITE
In United States v. Pride,190 the defendant Pride was convicted on all
three counts of the indictment: count one, unlawfully transporting a female
from New Mexico to Texas for the purpose of prostitution; 191 count two,
185. Id at 1275 (citing State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973)).
186. 687 F.2d at 1275. The offers of proof had attempted to show the futility of resort to the
political process; the Tenth Circuit found those offers insufficient. "The references to attempted
political action were inadequate and only referred to attempts by other persons." Id. (emphasis
supplied).
187. Id at 1276.
188. Id
189. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 3, at § 50.
190. No. 80-1909 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1982).
191. Id. at 2. Pride was charged with violating the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1982),
which provides in part:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of
Columbia or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, any woman or girl for
the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with
the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a
prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral
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unlawful possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute;' 92 and count
three, unlawful distribution of cocaine to Robin Phillips. 193 The evidence
showed that Pride had transported Robin Phillips, along with other prosti-
tutes, from New Mexico to Texas for the purpose of having the women en-
gage in prostitution. After returning to New Mexico, Phillips reported
Pride's activities to the Albuquerque Police Department and agreed to act as
an informant. 19 4  Subsequently, Phillips and Pride had a meeting where
they used cocaine. At the trial the testimonies of Phillips and Pride con-
flicted as to who provided the cocaine, each claiming the other had fur-
nished the controlled substance.195 Nonetheless, Pride took the fall.
On appeal, Pride contended that his convictions on the drug charges
should be reversed because the district court failed to give an instruction on
entrapment.' 96 Generally, entrapment is available as a defense only when
the defendant admits commission of the crime.' 97 Pride apparently at-
tempted to persuade the court that his admission that he had used or pos-
sessed cocaine provided by Ms. Phillips was sufficient to fulfill this
requirement. 198 He further asserted that it would be "wholly inconsistent
with his testimony and generally absurd" for the defendant to be required to
admit to the crimes as charged in light of his theory of defense. 199
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge McWilliams, first noted that although
several courts have departed from the general rule and permitted an accused
to rely upon a defense of entrapment while denying commission of the acts
constituting the charged offenses,2°° a "vast majority" of courts hold that the
accused may not assert entrapment without also admitting the offense as
charged.20 ' Citing Untted States v. Freeman,202 a Tenth Circuit case holding
practice... [s]hall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
192. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 2. This charge related to violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1982) which provides in part: "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally-(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or pos-
sess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance .... "
193. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 2. This count also charged a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1982).
194. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 3. Phillips was given a tape recorder for the purpose of ob-
taining evidence. Pride could not prove he was prejudiced by the quality of the tape recording
or the government's delay in delivering a copy of the tape to his attorney. The Tenth Circuit
therefore found no abuse of discretion in admitting the tape. Id at 5-7.
195. Id
196. "Entrapment occurs when the criminal design originates with agents of the govern-
ment who implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the offense."
United States v. Gusule, 522 F.2d 20, 23 (10th Cir. 1975),cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976). Pride
did not appeal his conviction under the Mann Act.
197. See, e.g., Padilla v. United States, 421 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1970).
198. See No. 80-1909, slip op. at 3.
199. Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, United States v. Pride, No. 80-1909 (10th Cir. Aug. 3,
1982).
200. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 4 n.3 (citing United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 182 (5th
Cir. 1977),cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978); United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir.
1975); Hansford v. United States, 262 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir. 1958) (per curiam)).
201. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 4 n.3 (citing United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1314 (5th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Arnese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1046 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Brooks,
611 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 964 (3d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Garcia, 562 F.2d 411,418 (7th Cir. 1977)). Among Tenth Circuit cases holding
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that the defense of entrapment was inconsistent with denial of transacting a
drug sale with government agents, the court refused to depart from the ma-
jority view. 20 3 Pride therefore reaffirms that in the Tenth Circuit the defense
of entrapment is not available to a defendant denying commission of the
crime charged. In reaffirming its previous rule, the court eschewed comment
upon the obfuscation and highly prejudicial effect a defendant's admission
to the crimes charged might have upon juror consideration of the defend-
ant's alternate theories of defense.
VI. DISTRICT COURT PROCEDURAL FLEXIBILITY IN PROBATION
PROCEEDINGS
Herzfeld v. United States District Court20 4 was an appeal arising from the
aftermath of the mail fraud conviction of Trenton H. Parker in connection
with numerous fraudulent tax shelter investment schemes. Mr. Parker pled
guilty to mail fraud under a plea agreement which required him to transfer
approximately six million dollars, previously in a Bahamian bank, to the
registry of the trial court. 205 This money was generated by Parker's "Gold
Tax Shelter Investment Program" (Gold Program), which was the fraudu-
lent investment program leading to Parker's mail fraud conviction. 20 6 The
district court ordered this money paid as restitution, and appointed a re-
ceiver to administer the fund.207 Two separate groups of plaintiffs maintain-
ing civil fraud actions against Parker based on the Gold Program then
brought suit seeking to have the receivership dissolved.208 The United
States District Court for the District of Colorado refused to invalidate the
receivership and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292,209 certified to the Tenth Cir-
cuit the question of whether a federal district court has the power, in a crimi-
nal proceeding, to create a receivership to effect restitution.
210
On appeal, the civil plaintiffs argued that in the absence of express au-
thority the district court had no jurisdiction to create the receivership. 2i No
specific statutory provisions prohibiting the creation of a receivership in a
matter of criminal restitution were tendered to the court. 2t 2
The Tenth Circuit held that implicit in both a district court's statutory
authority to order restitution as a condition of probation2i 3 and the latitude
the same are United States v. Smith, 629 F.2d 650, 652-53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994
(1980) and Munroe v. United States, 424 F.2d 243, 244 (10th Cir. 1970).
202. 412 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1969).
203. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 4-5.
204. 699 F.2d 503 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 70 (1983).
205. Id at 504.
206. Id.
207. Id
208. Id. The two groups included a group of Colorado plaintiffs with a judgment against
Parker and a group of New Jersey plaintiffs maintaining a class action against Parker. Id
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982). This section permits a district court to certify an interlocu-
tory appeal to an appellate court. Id. § 1292(b).
210. 699 F.2d at 505.
211. Id
212. See id.
213. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982), which provides in pertinent part: "While on probation
and among the conditions thereof, the defendant- . . may be required to make restitution or
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provided by Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b) 2 14 was the authority to take those actions
necessary 21 5 or appropriate 21 6 to effect restitution. In reaching this conclu-
sion the court relied upon two distinct analyses. The first was grounded in
the premise that any legislative grant of judicial power "carries with it the
right to use the means and instrumentalities necessary to the beneficial exer-
cise of that power."'2 17 Because a receivership might be necessary to effect
restitution to numerous unknown victims, the district court's action was not
inherently void.21 ' The Tenth Circuit's decision did not rest on that narrow
ground, however. The court noted that Congress had never detailed the
manner in which restitution could be effected, but had nonetheless granted
restitutionary power.2 19 Congress' legislative intent in permitting restitution
must necessarily have been to create sufficient flexibility and authority to
utilize practical means useful in accomplishing restitution. 220 Where large
sums of money are involved, the "practical needs" of the system justify crea-
tion of a receivership. 2 2 ' The Tenth Circuit carefully limited its holding,
however, by stating that because the receiver was under the control and di-
rection of the district court there could be no suggestion that the establish-
ment of the receivership constituted an unlawful delegation of authority to
private parties.
222
Finally, the court rejected the civil plaintiffs' contentions that they were
equitably entitled to the fund because of their diligence in bringing Parker
to justice and discovering the fund.22 3 The receivership and restitution were
an integral part of Parker's plea bargain arrangement. 224 The concern on
appeal was the validity of the manner chosen to effect that arrangement, not
equitable entitlement to the fund. 225 Accordingly, the lower court's power
to create the receivership was affirmed.
226
reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which con-
viction was had ... "
214. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) provides: "If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule,
the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any
applicable statute."
215. 699 F.2d at 505.
216. Id. at 506.
217. Id at 505 (citing Blue Cross Ass'n v. Harris, 622 F.2d 972, 978 (8th Cir. 1980)). See also
Daly v. Stratton, 326 F.2d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1964).
218. See 699 F.2d at 505.
219. Id
220. Id at 506.
221. Id. The court supported its conclusion by noting that unique probation orders entered
under 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) have been upheld by circuit courts. Id (citing United States v.
Lawson, 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.), cerl.
dentied, 435 U.S. 923 (1977); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975)).
222. 699 F.2d at 506.
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VII. LIMITING JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN CREATIVE SENTENCING AND
SYMBOLIC RESTITUTION
A. Limiting "Creative Sentencing" United States v. Prescon Corp.
In United States v. Prescon Corp. 227 the defendants Prescon Corporation
(Prescon) and VSL Corporation (VSL) pled nolo contendere to charges of
bid rigging to eliminate competition on commercial construction projects in
Colorado and nine neighboring states,228 and mail fraud in connection with
the submission of the rigged bids.2 29 The trial court sentenced Prescon and
VSL to unsupervised probation and fined the defendants $252,000 and
$302,000, respectively. 2 30 The sentence provided, however, that the execu-
tion of these fines would be suspended if the corporate defendants deposited,
respectively, the sums of $50,000 and $75,000 "into the registry of the Court,
to be disbursed to such community agencies as selected by the Chief Proba-
tion Officer with the approval of the Court. ' ' 231 The district court expressed
its hope that the funds would be used for community programs aimed at
decreasing crimes, but did not specifically require the funds be used for that
purpose.
2 32
The government, claiming the sentence to be illegal, appealed on the
grounds that the Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651,233 did not authorize a
sentence permitting a corporation, as an alternative to paying a fine, to
make contributions to persons or groups not aggrieved by the crime.2 34 In
the alternative, the government requested a writ of mandamus be issued to
the district court. 235 The defendants vigorously objected, contending that
the government had no right of appeal absent explicit statutory authority,
and that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy.2 36 The Tenth Circuit
held that the United States had the right to appeal an assertedly illegal sen-
tence under both the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3731,237 the Criminal Ap-
227. 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1982).
228. Defendants were charged with violating section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982). 695 F.2d at 1238.
229. Defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). 695 F.2d at 1238.
230. 695 F.2d at 1238.
231. Id
232. Id at 1238-39.
233. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction . . . any court having jurisdiction to try
offenses against the United States when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best
interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.
While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant-... May
be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages
or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had . ...
Id
234. 695 F.2d at 1240.
235. Id
236. Id
237. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982), which provides:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a
decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or informa-
tion as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
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peals Act, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,238 which permits an appeal of a final
decision.
239
After analyzing decisions from the Supreme Court and various circuit
courts, the Tenth Circuit concluded that, notwithstanding the limiting lan-
guage of section 3731,240 this statute removed all statutory barriers to crimi-
nal appeals. 24 ' As a result, only constitutional constraints, such as the
double jeopardy clause, 24 2 could preclude government appeals in criminal
cases. 243 Because the government's appeal was limited to the trial court's
proposed modification of the original sentences, double jeopardy concerns
did not bar this appeal. 244 Appellate jurisdiction was also sustained by hold-
ing that the trial court's sentences were final decisions within the meaning of
section 129 1.245 Because of its assumption of jurisdiction and decision on the
merits, the Tenth Circuit did not examine the propriety of mandamus in this
case.
246
In determining the legality of the terms of the sentence imposed by the
district court, the Tenth Circuit, per Judge Barrett, adhered to the narrow
interpretation of the Probation Act the Tenth Circuit first embraced in
United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Associalion.247 In Clovis, the
defendants entered pleas of nolo contendere to charges of violating the Sher-
man Antitrust Act 248 through conspiring to fix retail liquor prices. As a
condition of probation, the trial court had directed defendants to pay
$233,500 to a private group which coordinated alcoholism treatment pro-
grams. 249 The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's sentence because it
could not conclude that the recipient of the fund, or the persons it helped or
represented, were aggrieved parties within the meaning of section 3651.25°
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Prescon could not conclude that the alter-
native payment option imposed by the district court conformed to any of the
special conditions of probation permitted by section 3651.25 1 The court
noted that the enumeration of the four specific conditions of probation did
not "close the door" to other conditions, and reaffirmed its holding in Porth v.
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982), which provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . .except where a
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
239. 695 F.2d at 1240.
240. The plain language of section 3731 seems to limit its scope to court orders dismissing
criminal charges. See supra note 237.
241. 695 F.2d at 1241.
242. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
243. 695 F.2d at 1241.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id at 1240.
247. 540 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1976).
248. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
249. 540 F.2d at 1390.
250. Id See supra note 233.
251. The Tenth Circuit reads section 3651 to permit, in addition to a fine, four special
conditions of parole: "restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties, provision for support of a
person for whom a defendant is legally responsible, participation in a residential community
treatment center, and participation in a community program for drug addicts." 695 F.2d at
1242. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
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Templar 252 that the conditions of parole must have "a reasonable relation-
ship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public.
253
Nonetheless, the court held that the language of section 3651, which specifi-
cally permitted an order of restitution to aggrieved parties for actual injury
or damages, precluded a trial court from ordering a defendant to make pay-
ments to parties who were not victims of the defendant's criminal con-
duct. 2 5 4  Clearly the nexus between the "aggrieved parties" and the
alternative payments in Prescon was even less discernible than that in Clovis,
where the dealers in alcoholic beverages were ordered to make payments to
groups concerned with treating alcoholism. The Tenth Circuit therefore re-
versed the trial court's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.
255
B. "Creative Sentencing" A Survey
Although the Tenth Circuit Court, absent any dissent, has adhered to a
strictly limited and unequivocal interpretation of a court's power under sec-
tion 3651, it should not be surmised that this approach represents the only
reasonable reading of the statute. Several courts have explicitly rejected the
reasoning used by the Tenth Circuit and have allowed a more liberal or
"progressive" construction of section 3651, in promotion of the concepts of
creative sentencing and behavioral sanctions.2 56  These courts have not
found the enumerated conditions of probation to be exclusive, nor have they
been convinced that the maxim expressio unis exclusio alterius governs, 25 7 as
is the Tenth Circuit.
258
Perhaps most notable of the cases validating creative sentencing is the
Eighth Circuit decision United States v. Wilam Anderson Co. 259 Anderson, like
Prescon, was a construction bid rigging and mail fraud case. 26 0 The corpo-
rate defendants in Anderson were placed on probation with special conditions,
252. 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).
253. Id at 333. Accord United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982).
254. 695 F.2d at 1243.
255. Id at 1245.
256. "Creative sentencing" and "behavioral sanctions" are terms used to describe a sentenc-
ing approach which seeks to provide an alternative to fines or incarceration where those sanc-
tions appear inappropriate. This approach is often used with corporations whose monetary
resources eliminate the punitive effect of a fine, e.g. United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677
F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982), and with defendants otherwise entitled to probation but for whom
additional behavioral sanctions are needed. E.g., United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144 (5th Cir.
1979) (former state representative convicted for violating federal election laws required to re-
frain from political candidacy because of representative's demonstrated propensity to abuse
electoral process). See also United States v. William Anderson Co., 686 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982)
(fine suspended upon payment to charity); United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1979)
(probation required employment with charity); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F.
Supp. 213 (D. Md. 1983) (requiring payment to charity); United States v. Danilow Pastry Co.,
563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (requiring donation of bread to charity; distinguishing Pres-
con as involving monetary payment).
257. See 695 F.2d at 1245.
258. The Tenth Circuit stated in Prescon that a more specific provision (grant of restitution-
ary power towards victim) governed over a more general provision (grant of power to order
probation on terms court considers best). 695 F.2d at 1243.
259. 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982).
260. Id at 911.
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including installment payment of fines to charitable organizations.2 6 1 If the
corporate defendant elected to pay the fine to the charitable organization for
which its officers or employees were performing community service work in
fulfillment of their individual sentences, then the amount payable to the
Government was reduced pro tanto.2 62 Judge Urbom of the United States
District Court for the District of Nebraska, who imposed the sentences,
opined that "a sentence should be constructive, if possible. ' ' 26 3
The Eighth Circuit upheld Anderson on the principle that the purpose of
section 3651 is to give judges broad discretion in fashioning sentences, and
that unique probationary conditions are enumerated in section 3651264 to
place their propriety beyond doubt rather than to limit a court's discre-
tion.265 Several courts have reached similar conclusions, stating "[i]t would
be hard to use more general words than 'upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems best.' ",266 These courts have recognized that the broad dis-
cretion under section 3651 permits reversal only for abuse of that discre-
tion,267 and refuse to eliminate the discretion to impose sentences tailored to
meet the circumstances of a particular case.
2 6 8
Creative sentences, such as those imposed in Anderson, are intended to
effect general rehabilitation and specific deterrence against the offense com-
mitted.2 69 Such sentences alert corporate decisionmakers to the dangers of
violating criminal law, thereby deterring corporate criminality. 270 Courts
which impose and review these sentences view the restitution not as "actual
restitution" but as "symbolic restitution," designed primarily to deter future
misconduct on the part of defendants and reform the principles of their in-
dustry rather than provide compensation to victims.2 7' Under such a view,
"symbolic restitution" can be distinguished from the "restitution" language
of section 3651, and escape even the strict construction of the Act adhered to
by the Tenth Circuit. Accordingly, probationary conditions need not be




261. Id at 912.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See supra note 233.
265. 698 F.2d at 914. The Eighth Circuit explicitly noted that its decision was limited to
the scope of a court's probationary (as opposed to sentencing) powers. Id
266. E.g., Daniow Pastr Co., 563 F. Supp. at 1169 (quoting United States v. Pastore, 537
F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1976)).
267. E.g., Fiore v. United States, 696 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1982). See also United States v.
Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1976).
268. See supra note 256.
269. See Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction Agathst Corporations, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 970, 977.
270. Anderson, 698 F.2d at 913-14; Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. at 1167; See Note, Struc-
tural Crime and Instiutional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 Yale L.J. 353,
370-71 (1979).





The Tenth Circuit's criminal procedure decisions over the past survey
period were especially significant for both sides of the criminal bar. The
court confronted the affect the availability of a telephone warrant can have
in precluding a warrantless search, analyzed the affect the use of firearms has
in characterizing a police detention, adopted the "inevitable discovery ex-
ception" to the exclusionary rule, and once again addressed the problems
inherent in police use of a drug courier profile. The court also explored the
sixth amendment implications of judicially foreshortened trial preparation
time, and resolved several issues relating to exhaustion of claims prior to
filing a federal habeas corpus petition. Additional issues addressed by the
court are illuminated by the section headings.
I. UNITED STATES V. MASSEY: POST-ARREST SILENCE AND THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE
Massey and five others made a round trip from Oklahoma to Missouri
to harvest wild marijuana.' Massey was arrested while returning to
Oklahoma and was eventually convicted of possessing marijuana with intent
to distribute and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute.
2
At trial, Massey testified that he had been a deputy sheriff and that he
was acting in an undercover capacity when he made the trip to Missouri.
3
Massey told the jury that the undercover operation had been discussed in
the presence of third parties prior to the trip.4 This testimony was corrobo-
rated by two of those parties. 5 Massey was then cross-examined at length
about his post-arrest failure to inform law enforcement authorities that he
had been working in an undercover capacity.6 During closing argument, the
prosecutor encouraged the jury to conclude that Massey's exculpatory story
was untrue because it had not been mentioned to the appropriate authorities
following the arrest.
7
Massey argued on appeal that reversible error occurred when the prose-
cutor was permitted to elicit evidence of Massey's post-arrest silence and
comment upon that silence in an effort to impeach Massey's defense. The
Tenth Circuit reversed Massey's conviction and remanded for further pro-
ceedings.8 In an opinion by Judge Seymour, the court recognized that the
i. United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1351 (10th Cir. 1982).
2. Id. Massey's convictions were pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982) (possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) (conspiracy to possess mari-
juana with intent to distribute).





8. Id. at 1356.
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use of a defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach an exculpatory story vio-
lates due process if the silence follows the giving of Miranda warnings. 9 This
is because the Miranda warnings contain an implicit assurance that the de-
fendant will not be penalized for his silence.' 0 Impeachment use of a de-
fendant's silence before the giving of Miranda warnings, however, is
permissible because in that context the defendant has not relied upon im-
plicit police assurances that his silence will not be used against him.1 The
record in United States v. Massey 12 failed to indicate when, if at all, Massey
was given his Miranda warnings.13 The case was therefore remanded to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the timing of Massey's Miranda
warnings. 14
The Tenth Circuit's remand contained instructions for disposition of
Massey following the evidentiary hearing. If the trial court found that Mas-
sey's post-arrest silence followed his receipt of Miranda warnings, the defend-
ant would be entitled to a new trial because a review of the entire record
convinced the Tenth Circuit that the constitutional error in Masse; was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5 The court noted that Massey was
questioned not only about his silence at the time of his arrest, but also about
his silence at subsequent interrogations, at his initial appearance, at the mag-
istrate's office, at the bond hearing, and at the arraignment. 16 Given the
relentlessness of the prosecutor's attack on the "heart" of Massey's defense,
the court ruled that if the trial court should find Massey's silence followed
Miranda warnings, a new trial was mandated.1
7
II. UNITED STATES V CUARON: TELEPHONE WARRANTS AND EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES
United States v. Cuaron I required the Tenth Circuit to consider, for the
first time, whether the circumstances surrounding an arrest were sufficiently
9. Id at 1353. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) requires that persons subjected to
custodial interrogations be informed of their right to remain silent, the likelihood that incrimi-
nating statements will be used by the prosecution, and the right to counsel even if indigent. Id
at 467-68.
10. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Doyle is the dispositive Supreme Court decision on
the use of post-arrest silence. In Doyle, the Court held that because the Mranda warnings im-
plied that a defendant would not be penalized for remaining silent, due process was violated by
commenting on silence which had been encouraged by giving the warnings. Id at 618-19 (cit-
ing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1975)).
11. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982), cted 6n United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348,
1353 (10th Cir. 1982).
12. 687 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1982).
13. Id at 1353.
14. Id
15. Id. at 1354. The court stated that the following factors were significant in determining
the degree of constitutional error caused by prosecutorial use of post-arrest, post-Miranda warn-
ing silence: 1) the nature of the prosecution's use of the silence; 2) whether the prosecution or
defendant initiated the inquiry into the silence; 3) the quantum of other inculpatory evidence;
4) the degree of prosecutorial emphasis on the silence; and 5) the trial judge's opportunity to
grant a mistrial or issue a curative instruction. Id See also Williams v. Zadradnick, 632 F.2d
353 (4th Cir. 1980), quoted in Massey, 687 F.2d at 1353.
16. 687 F.2d at 1354.
17. Id.
18. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
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exigent to justify police failure to obtain even a telephone warrant. 19 The
Tenth Circuit, over a dissent by Judge Kelly, 20 upheld the trial court's rul-
ing that the exigent circumstances in Cuaron justified a warrantless entry into
a private home.
2 1
Cuaron arose after Jon and William Neet sold four ounces of cocaine to
undercover Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents in Boulder, Colo-
rado.2 2 The agents negotiated for the purchase of two additional pounds of
the drug, which the Neets agreed to procure from their supplier.2 3 Jon was
followed to the home of Frank Cuaron, which was immediately placed under
surveillance. 24 When John returned to the hotel and delivered additional
cocaine to the undercover agents, he and his brother were promptly arrested,
and the agents began efforts to obtain a state court warrant to search
Cuaron's home. 25 Less than an hour after the Neets were arrested, the
agents decided to "secure" Cuaron's home without a warrant. 26 Entering
the home, the agents saw one occupant apparently signal another person in
an upstairs room; an agent rushed up the stairs and caught Cuaron in the
act of flushing cocaine down the toilet. 27 Cocaine lying in plain view was
also seized.
28
Cuaron was later convicted on four related counts29 and appealed on
19. Id. at 586. Telephone warrants were authorized by Congress to encourage police of-
ficers to obtain warrants when circumstances existed which might induce an officer to conduct a
warrantless search. Id. at 588-89 (citing United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1146 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprintedtn 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 527, 534. The provision for telephone warrants is found in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2),
which provides in pertinent part:
Warrant upon Oral Testimony
(A) General Rule. If the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense with a
written affidavit, a Federal magistrate may issue a warrant based upon sworn oral
testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means.
(B) Application. The person who is requesting the warrant shall prepare a doc-
ument to be known as a duplicate original warrant and shall read such duplicate
original warrant, verbatim, to the Federal magistrate. The Federal magistrate shall
enter, verbatim, what is so read to such magistrate on a document to be known as the
original warrant. The Federal magistrate may direct that the warrant be modified.
(C) Issuance. If the Federal magistrate is satisfied that the circumstances are
such as to make it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit and that grounds for
the application exist so that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, the
Federal magistrate shall order the issuance of a warrant by directing the person re-
questing the warrant to sign the Federal magistrate's name on the duplicate original
warrant. The Federal magistrate shall immediately sign the original warrant and
enter on the face of the original warrant the exact time when the warrant was ordered
to be issued. The finding of probable cause for a warrant upon oral testimony may be
based on the same kind of evidence as is sufficient for a warrant upon affidavit.
20. Honorable Patrick F. Kelly, District Judge, United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Kansas. sitting by designation.
21. United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 591 (10th Cir. 1983).







29. Cuaron was convicted of two counts of distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (1982) and 21 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); one count of conspiring to distribute in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1982); and of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). 700 F.2d at 584.
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the ground, inter alia, that the trial court had wrongfully failed to suppress
evidence discovered through the warrantless search of his home.30 Cuaron
did not argue that exigent circumstances could never justify a warrantless
search; rather, he argued that the DEA agents had no objective basis to be-
lieve that criminal evidence was about to to be destroyed, thereby preclud-
ing a finding of exigent circumstances in his case. 3 1 Cuaron further argued
that in any event there was sufficient time to obtain a federal search warrant
by telephone pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c),32 and
that the agents' violation of the fourth amendment's3 3 prohibition against
warrantless searches therefore could not have been justified by exigent
circumstances.
34
The Tenth Circuit opinion, by Judge Seymour, noted that warrantless
seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable, 35 and that the prose-
cution has the burden of establishing exigent circumstances.3 6 The court
found that the agents' initial entry into Cuaron's home was prompted by
their reasonable belief that criminal evidence and contraband mreht be de-
stroyed or removed before a warrant could have arrived.3 7 The agents knew
that the Neets were to return to effect yet another purchase, but that the
Neets had been arrested and would not be returning to the home within the
time expected. 38 The agents also knew that cocaine is easily transported or
destroyed, 3 9 and that several people had arrived and left Cuaron's residence
following Jon Neet's arrest. 4° Further, the agents had information that
Cuaron was interested in selling his supply of cocaine as quickly as possi-
ble. 4 1 Finally, the agents were "aware" that the supplier was nervous about
operating from his home.42 In the court's view, under these circumstances
the agents could reasonably believe there was insufficient time to obtain
either a conventional warrant or a telephone warrant without losing impor-
30. 700 F.2d at 586.
31. Id The Supreme Court has never expressly sanctioned an independent "destruction of
evidence" exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, although dicta has sug-
gested approval for warrantless entries in such circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). In Santana, a warrantless entry into the defendant's home was
upheld on the basis that the police were in "hot pursuit" of the defendant. Id at 43. One of the
reasons supporting this holding was a "realistic expectation" that police delay would result in
the destruction of evidence. Id
The dissenting judge in Cuaron pointedly contrasts a "realistic expectation" test for recog-
nizing an exigency with the majority's test for assessing the existence of a purported exigency-
whether the officers have reason to believe that evidence may be lost or destroyed. See 700 F.2d
at 592-93 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The dissent concludes that the latter test is so slippery and
unreliable that its application threatens to swallow the warrant requirement altogether. Id
32. 700 F.2d at 589. See supra note 19.
33. U. S. CONST. amend IV.
34. 700 F.2d at 586.
35. Id at 586 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
36. 700 F.2d at 580 (citing United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969),cert. denied,
404 U.S. 979 (1971)).
37. 700 F.2d at 586-87.
38. Id at 586.
39. See id. at 587.
40. Id. at 586-87.
41. Id. at 586.
42. Id. at 587.
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tant evidence. 43 Thus, the warrantless search was constitutionally permissi-
ble, and the trial court properly admitted the evidence.
44
Judge Seymour rejected the argument that the finding of an exigency
should have been affected by the fact that the agents delayed their warrant-
less search for fifty-five minutes after Neet's arrest.4 5 As long as probable
cause and exigent circumstances existed under the specific facts of Cuaron,
delaying a search did not remove the exigent circumstance, even if the pe-
riod of delay would have allowed the officers to obtain a warrant.
46
After rejecting Cuaron's arguments, the court articulated a prophylactic
standard to be used in all future cases involving exigent circumstances. In
Cuaron, the trial court had failed to consider the availability of a telephone
warrant. 4 1 While the Tenth Circuit found that failure harmless in Cuaron,48
the court did state that trial courts must henceforth consider the availability
of a telephone warrant in determining whether exigent circumstances ex-
isted, unless the "critical nature of the circumstances clearly prevented the
effective use of any warrant procedure."'49 Absent such a clear and compel-
ling exigency, the prosecution must bear the burden of submitting evidence
regarding the availability of a telephone warrant and the time necessary to
obtain one before a warrantless "exigent search" will be upheld.
50
Judge Kelly filed a sharp dissent. In his view, the majority's opinion
will invite "excusable neglect" of established search and seizure procedures,
license future abuse, and unnecessarily plague the courts. 5i Judge Kelly was
bothered by the majority's reliance on one agent's speculative (and self-serv-
ing) testimony regarding the likelihood that evidence would be destroyed or
removed. 52 In his opinion, the court should make an objective comparison
between the likelihood that evidence will be lost or destroyed and the likeli-
hood that a warrant cannot be timely obtained. 53 Judge Kelly preferred
justifing a warrantless "destruction of evidence" exigency only when the con-
stable has something near a "realistic expectation" that evidence will be lost
if time is taken to obtain a warrant. 54 Additionally, Judge Kelly felt that the
majority failed to accurately assess the time required to obtain a telephone
warrant, because its calculation was based on reference to the time normally
required to obtain a warrant from a state judge, rather than by reference to
43. See id. at 587-90. The trial court did not assess the possibility of obtaining a timely
telephone warrant, and apparently the prosecution did not offer any evidence on the question.
Despite this evidentiary vacuum, Judge Seymour managed to conclude that such a warrant
could not possibly be obtained within 30 minutes. Id at 590.
44. Id at 591.
45. Id. at 590.
46. Id.
47. Id at 588.
48. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
49. 700 F.2d at 589 (emphasis in original).
50. Id at 589-90. The court emphasized that Cuaron was a unique situation, and that law
enforcement agencies should not treat the decision as creating a significant breach in the fourth
amendment warrant requirement. See id at 590 & n.6.
51. Id at 591 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
52. Id at 592.
53. Id at 593.
54. Id See also supra note 31.
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the particular time efficiencies created by the availability of a telephone war-
rant. 55 Finally, Judge Kelly opined that because the prosecution offered no
evidence on how long it would have taken to secure a telephone warrant, the
search must fall to the presumption that warrantless searches are unreasona-
ble.56 The telephone warrant was not "an option tendered solely for the
investigating officers' convenience." '57 Rather, even in circumstances like
those of Cuaron a timely attempt to obtain a telephone warrant should have
been mandatory, and conduct to the contrary by well-trained but overzeal-
ous federal agents should not have been excused.
58
III. RESTRICTING THE LIMITS OF A TERRY PATDOWN SEARCH
In United States v. Ward59 the defendant challenged the admission of evi-
dence obtained from a non-arrest patdown search made during a lawful
search of the defendant's home.60 Internal Revenue Service agents had ob-
tained a warrant to search Ward's residence for evidence of illicit bookmak-
ing activities.6 ' Although the agents' affidavits supporting issuance of the
search warrant established probable cause to search Ward's person,62 the
warrant authorized only a search of the residence. 63 The agent executing
the search conducted a cursory patdown search of Ward's person before
searching the house, and then asked Ward if he carried weapons. 64 Ward
was ordered to empty his pockets after revealing he carried a pocketknife;6 5
this action precipitated discovery of betting slips and checks which were ad-
mitted into evidence at trial over Ward's objection. 66 Ward argued that this
evidence should have been suppressed because the scope of the warrant did
not authorize a search of his person. 67 The government argued that the
patdown search constituted a reasonable frisk for weapons under the doc-
55. See 700 F.2d at 594 (Kelly, J., dissenting). Judge Kelly observed that the magistrate
could have been put "on hold," obviating many time constraint exigencies. Id.
56. Id. The Supreme Court has stated that "[it is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment
law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasona-
ble." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
57. 700 F.2d at 594 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 594-95. Neither the dissenting judge nor the majority discuss the agents' role in
creating the exigency. It is not clear from either opinion why the agents chose to arrest the Neets
when they did. Presumably, Jon Neet could have been allowed to return to Cuaron's while the
warrant was being obtained. There is no indication in the opinions that any cocaine or cash
would have been lost had the agents simply continued their surveillance without arresting the
Neets while they waited the "two or three hours" necessary to obtain a state warrant, or the
shorter time required to obtain a federal telephone warrant. In United States v. Rosselli, 506
F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974), the court held that under circumstances similar to those in Cuaron, an
exigency which followed the agents' conduct could not be utilized as an "easy by-pass of the
constitutional requirement that probable cause should generally be assessed by a neutral and
detached magistrate before the citizen's privacy is invaded." Id at 630.
59. 682 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1982).
60. Id. at 879.
61. Id. at 877.
62. Id at 878 n.2.
63. Id
64. Id at 878.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id at 879.
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trine of Terry v. Ohio"6 8 and was therefore constitutionally sound regardless of
the scope of the search warrant. 69 The trial court admitted the evidence,
and Ward was convicted of failure to purchase a wagering stamp.70
The Tenth Circuit, with Judge McWilliams dissenting, reversed. In an
opinion by Judge Barrett, the court held that a patdown search is permissi-
ble under Terry only if it is supported by a reasonable belief that the subject
of the search is armed and presently dangerous. 7 ' Because nothing in the
record indicated that the agents believed Ward was armed and presently
dangerous, 72 the evidence discovered during the patdown was illegally seized
and its admission into evidence gave rise to reversible error.73 The court
noted that this fourth amendment violation could have been easily avoided
had the search warrant been drafted to include a search of Ward's person.
74
In dissent, Judge McWilliams emphasized that Ward was the target of
a criminal investigation, and obviously realized this fact when the agents
arrived at his home for the purpose of executing the search warrant. 75 Judge
McWilliams suggested that when a search of a residence must be conducted
in the presence of a home owner who is aware that he is a "target" in a
criminal investigation, the searching officer may reasonably infer that the
homeowner is armed and dangerous and may therefore conduct a limited
patdown search for weapons for their protection. 76 Thus, the search of
Ward was permissible under Terry.
77
Apparently the government did not argue, nor did the court consider,
that the search of Ward's person was valid as an adjunct to the evidence-
gathering function of the search warrant. For instance, in Ybarra v. illinois 78
the defendant, a tavern patron, was illegally searched during the execution
of a search warrant which made no mention of criminal involvement by any
of the patrons. 79 The Court emphasized that none of the circumstances in
that case indicated to the police that Ybarra was connected with the crimi-
nal activity to which the search warrant was addressed, and therefore no
probable cause to search Ybarra existed.830 The circumstances in Ward are
quite different from those in Ybarra. As noted in the dissenting opinion,
Ward was the "target" of the investigation, 8t and, as noted in the majority
opinion, the agent's affidavit was adequate to establish probable cause for
68. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry held that a police officer questioning a citizen as part of a
police investigation may, when he reasonably suspects that person to be "armed and presently
dangerous," frisk that person in an attempt to discover potential weapons of assault. Id at 30.
69. See 682 F.2d at 879.
70. Id. Ward's failure to purchase a wagering stamp violated 18 U.S.C. § 7203 (1982).
71. 682 F.2d at 880. Accord Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85. 92-93 (1979).
72. 682 F.2d at 881.
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Id. at 882 (McWilliams, J., dissenting).
76. Id at 882-83.
77. Id at 882.
78. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
79. Id. at 90.
80. Id. at 90-91. The Court also held that, given Ybarra's behavior, the police could not
subject him to a Terry search. Id at 93-94.
81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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searching both the residence and Ward's person.8 2 Further, many of the
items mentioned in the search warrant could easily have been (and indeed
were) concealed on Ward's person. Under these circumstances, state court
cases since Ybarra almost invariably permit frisks of persons strongly identi-
fied with the premises searched.8 3 Also, it might be argued that Ward is
closer to Mzchigan v. Summers 84 than to Ybarra. Summers held that occupants of
a private premises may be seized and detained while a search warrant for
contraband is executed because of the potential danger attendant to execut-
ing the search warrant when persons connected with those premises are pres-
ent.8 5 Summers' holding was based on a recognition that, after a premises-
specific search warrant issues, detaining the occupants present during the
search constitutes a minimal intrusion on personal liberty while simultane-
ously providing significant personal protection to the searching officers. 86 In
view of Summers' holding and rationale, it would not be implausible to sug-
gest that the incremental liberty intrusion stemming from a frisk during a
Summers detention is similarly outweighed by the increased protection that
frisk provides for those executing the search. Thus, a slight extension of Sum-
mers could have validated the search made in Ward, even though the search
would not have been justified by Tery.
IV. UNITED STATES V MERRIT: SHOW OF FORCE
AND THE TERRY STOP
A. The Case
Denver police officers had received word that Thomas Gerry, a Texas
fugitive wanted for murder, was staying at a home on Sherman Street in
Denver.8 7 Several officers went to this location; Gerry was not there, but the
officers learned that he would be returning later that evening.88 Gerry was
believed to be heavily armed and dangerous, and the officers observed an
impressive array of weapons and ammunition at the Sherman Street
address.
8 9
The officers then set up a stakeout, in anticipation of Gerry's return.9°
Several hours later, while a police cruiser was parked in front of the Sherman
Street home, some officers observed a white pickup truck circle the block,
stop, and switch off its lights.9 1 Nobody exited the truck, and it appeared
that the truck's occupants had assumed a crouching position. 92 Three of-
82. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
83. E.g., People v. Broach, 111 Mich. App. 122, 314 N.W.2d 544 (1982); State v. Brooks, 51
N.C. App. 90, 275 S.E.2d 202 (1981); Lippert v. State, 653 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
84. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
85. Id at 705.
86. Id. at 702-04.
87. United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1898 (1983).
88. Id at 1266.
89. Id at 1265-66. The police observed shotguns, handguns, and what appeared to be an
automatic rifle. Id at 1266.





ficers then approached the truck with weapons, including shotguns, pointed
at the truck;93 the occupants were ordered out and told to "freeze." '94 One
or two shotguns were pointed at the suspects at this time, and one shotgun
remained aimed at the suspects throughout the incident. 95 After identifica-
tion revealed that Thomas Gerry was one of the truck's occupants, the truck
was checked for weapons, and a loaded revolver was recovered from under-
neath the driver's seat.96 Merritt, who was also one of the truck's occupants,
was then formally arrested.
97
The trial court suppressed the revolver and several inculpatory state-
ments made by Merritt subsequent to his arrest on the ground that the po-
lice did not, at the time they ordered Merritt and the others from the truck,
have the reasonable suspicion Terry v. Ohio 98 requires in order to justify a
police investigatory stop.99 In an alternative holding, the trial court ruled
that in Merritt's case the police had actually made an arrest without prob-
able cause, even though there may have been justification to make a
"stop.'"100
The government took an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's sup-
pression order. " In a well-reasoned opinion by Judge Anderson, the Tenth
Circuit reversed the suppression order. The court held that, based upon the
totality of the circumstances, the officers who effected the stop had a particu-
larized and objective basis for suspecting that the occupants of the truck
were or had been involved in a criminal activity, and could therefore make a
stop to determine the identities of those in the truck. 
102
B. Use of Hearsay in Suppression Hearings
Judge Anderson observed that the trial court erred at the suppression
hearing when it excluded testimony by two officers concerning critical infor-
mation a third officer had conveyed to them describing the appearance and
movements of the truck and its occupants near the Sherman Street ad-
dress.' 0 3 The Tenth Circuit found that this evidence, if admitted, would
have provided the necessary link to justify a Terry stop. '
0 4
Before reversing the district court's determination that no reasonable
suspicion existed, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that a trial court generally is





98. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The "reasonable suspicion" required for a Ty stop is "[a] particu-
larized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). The reasonableness of a suspicion is
determined by viewing the "totality of circumstances" confronting the officer. Id.
99. 695 F.2d at 1267.
100. Id It is axiomatic that probable cause is required to make a valid arrest. Probable
cause must be based on the likelihood of an individual's guilt, rather than on reasonable suspi-
cion of possible criminal activity. Seegenerally I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1 (1978).
101. 695 F.2d at 1267. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982).
102. 695 F.2d at 1269. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.




not bound by the rules of evidence during a suppression hearing, 1 0 5 and that
-consideration should have been given to the officers' vital testimony, despite
its hearsay character, because these statements were corroborated by other
testimony. 10 6 Moreover, given Gerry's known dangerous character, the of-
ficers who made the hearsay statements had every reason to report their ob-
servations of suspicious behavior as accurately as possible.' 0 7 Because police
officers may rely on hearsay statements "as the basis for reasonable suspicion
to make a stop, they should also be permitted to offer that same hearsay as
testimony to support their reasonable suspicion when a defendant moves to
suppress evidence on the ground that reasonable suspicion did not exist."' 10 8
In reaching its conclusion the Tenth Circuit relied on United States v. Mal-
lock,' 0 9 which approved the use of hearsay evidence in a suppression hearing
concerning third party consent to a premises search. I °
Furthermore, reasonable suspicion could rest upon the collective knowl-
edge of the police officers rather than solely upon the knowledge of the of-
ficer actually making the stop."' In light of the collective knowledge of the
officers involved in the stakeout and stop, the requisite reasonable suspicion
was manifest, and the initial stop was entirely proper.
C. Show of Force During Terry Stop
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the trial court's conclusion that Merritt
was in fact arrested, not merely stopped.' 12 The trial court reasoned that
the encounter immediately escalated into an arrest because the level of force
employed by the police officers during the encounter went beyond that ap-
parently authorized by Tery. 13 The Tenth Circuit observed that the trial
court's analysis somehow assumed that some level of police force during an
otherwise valid Tery stop turns the stop into an arrest requiring probable
cause, regardless of the justification that may exist for the degree of force
used."I4 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that this view of the distinction be-
tween a stop and arrest diverted a court's focus from the central concern in
all fourth amendment cases, which is the reasonableness of the police intru-
sion in light of all the surrounding circumstances.' 15 The relevant inquiry
was not whether the force used was of a quantum requiring characterization
of a stop as an arrest, but rather whether the police used reasonable force. 116
In this case the officers' show of force, including the continuous pointing of
105. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a), I 101(d)(l).
106. 695 F.2d at 1270.
107. Id
108. Id
109. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
110. Id at 175. The Court indicated that hearsay evidence should be admitted at suppres-
sion hearings when the circumstances surrounding the evidence, including corroborating state-
ments by other witnesses, indicate that the hearsay statement is reliable. d. at 175-76.
111. 695 F.2d at 1268 n.9. The "fellow-officer" rule adopted in Merritt had previously been
recognized in cases concerning the existence of probable cause for an arrest. Id
112. 695 F.2d at 1272.
113. Id
114. Id.




weapons, was reasonable given their reasonable suspicion that an armed,
dangerous murderer was present." ' Thus, "the incremental intrusion visited
upon a citizen's personal security by having a gun pointed at him instead of
merely drawn, as was true here, is outweighed by the increased protection
the officers afford themselves by making certain of their safety in face of the
danger presented."' 18
This approach to the investigatory stop arrest distinction is apparently
inconsistent with the approach recently taken by a Supreme Court plurality
in Florida v. Royer.i 19 In that case, the defendant fit a drug courier profile
and was subjected to a valid Terry stop. 120 Following an initial public stop,
however, the defendant was taken to a small room, where he was alone with
two police officers who accused him of carrying narcotics.121 The court held
that because of the intensity of the detention and its purpose (to search the
defendant's luggage) at some point the stop matured or escalated into a
functional, though not a formal, arrest unsupported by probable cause. 
1
22
To the extent the Tenth Circuit's reasoning diminishes the significance of an
intensive, facially coercive detention, it appears inconsistent with Royer.
Merrill is also inconsistent with those circuits which hold that the use of
a drawn, or at the very least pointed, gun converts a stop into an arrest. 123
The court, however, felt that if such clearly self-protective actions as those
taken in arresting Merritt turned every such confrontation into an arrest, an
important public interest in police safety would be sacrificed. 124 Weighed
against the incremental intrusion on a person's liberty stemming from rea-
sonable police use of weapons, the public interest in police safety required
recognizing that the use of drawn and pointed weapons does not in and of
itself transform a Terry stop into an arrest.
125
V. ADOPTION OF THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In United States v. Romero 126 the Tenth Circuit both recognized that the
scope of a weapons search incident to a Terry stop extends to the detainee's
vehicle1 27 and adopted the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusion-
ary rule. 128 Romero began when a tip made to a Drug Enforcement Agency
agent, supported by corroborative first-hand observations, led Albuquerque
police officers to reasonably suspect that Romero and Ortega were in posses-
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
120. See id at 1326.
121. Id at 1327.
122. Id at 1328-29.
123. See United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Strickler, 490
F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974).
124. 695 F.2d at 1274.
125. Id
126. 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982).
127. Id at 703.
128. Id. at 704.
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sion of a substantial amount of marijuana. 129 The van in which these two
were riding was stopped and they were ordered out of the vehicle. 130 Officer
Espinosa conducted a patdown search of Romero. 3 ' While Espinosa was
patting down Romero, Officer Ortiz was inspecting the driver's seat area of
the van for weapons and detected a strong odor of marijuana. 132 As he
walked around the van to check for weapons on the passenger side, Ortiz
stated that "It smells like a ton of dope in there."'
' 3 3
Either immediately before or after Officer Ortiz's announcement con-
cerning the marijuana smell1 34 Officer Espinosa felt a "stiff bulge" in Ro-
mero's pocket.' 35 Although not believing the bulge to be a weapon,' 3 6 the
officer reached into the pocket and pulled out a small amount of mari-
juana. 137 Romero and Ortega were arrested; a subsequent search of the van
pursuant to a search warrant resulted in the discovery of several pounds of
marijuana, and Romero was eventually convicted of possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute.'
38
The defendants appealed on the grounds, inter alia, that the officers
twice exceeded their authority under Tery, first by searching the van's inte-
rior for weapons, and second by seizing the marijuana from Romero's pocket
despite Officer Espinosa's belief that the "stiff bulge" was not a weapon.' 3 9
A. Search of Vehicle Permissible Under Terry
In an opinion by Judge Logan, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion.' 40 The court first held that just as an officer may search a car for weap-
ons during a lawful arrest, 14 ' an officer who has lawfully stopped a suspect
whom he reasonably suspects is armed and dangerous may conduct a limited
weapons search of the suspect's car. 142 The court reasoned that such a sus-
pect may have concealed a weapon in a part of a car readily accessible to
him, and might "break away from the police and grab the weapon or, if
allowed to return to the car,. . . may shoot or harm an officer."' 143 In light
of the potential danger in a traffic stop involving a suspect reasonably be-





134. The trial court's findings did not set forth the exact sequence of events. Id at 704.
135. Id at 701.
136. Id
137. Id
138. Id. at 701-02. Romero was found guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
139. 692 F.2d at 702.
140. Id at 705.
141. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
142. 692 F.2d at 703.
143. Id. The expansion of Ter7 y recognized in Romero was recently validated by Michigan v.
Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983). Long held that Teny did not limit protective searches to the
suspect's person, and that a weapons search of the passenger compartment of a suspect's vehicle
is permissible under Terr ' when an officer has a reasonable belief in articulable facts suggesting
that the suspect may be dangerous and may have immediate access to weapons in the passenger
compartment. Id. at 3480.
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lieved to be armed, 144 the fact that Romero and Ortega were out of the van
and under the control of other officers before the van was searched did not
render the search an unreasonable intrusion upon a citizen's liberty.
B. Adoption of the "'Inevttable Discoveiy " Exception
The seizure of marijuana from Romero's pants pocket was more trou-
blesome for the court. The court reasoned that if Officer Ortiz's announce-
ment concerning the marijuana odor preceded the seizure of marijuana, the
seizure might be justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest because the
marijuana odor, combined with the anonymous tip and the corroborating
observations which initially justified the stop, gave the officers probable
cause to arrest.' 4 5 Any search thereafter would be proper as a search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest. If Officer Ortiz's announcement followed the seizure,
however, the evidence was illegally seized because Officer Espinosa believed
that the bulge in Romero's pocket was not a weapon, precluding seizure
under Terry. 1
46
Rather than remanding the case to the trial court for a finding as to the
timing of Officer Ortiz's announcement, the Tenth Circuit adopted the "in-
evitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule.' 4 7 Under this excep-
tion, illegally seized evidence is admissible if there is "no doubt" that the
police would have lawfully discovered the evidence at a later time.'14 Ap-
plying this exception to the facts of Romero, the court observed that the van
search was underway as Romero was being patted down, and that Officer
Ortiz's announcement could have occurred no more than a few seconds after
the seizure of marijuana from Romero's pocket. 149 The discovery of the
marijuana odor in the van provided probable cause to arrest, and upon ar-
rest the officers would unquestionably have searched Romero and inevitably
would have discovered the marijuana in the pants pocket. 150
C. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
The Supreme Court has recognized several discrete situations where the
victim of illegal police conduct cannot use the exclusionary rule to suppress
evidence. One such situation is where the police are able to obtain illegally
seized evidence from an "independent source"; that is, a source whose
knowledge and possession of the evidence were not the result of the illegal
police conduct.' 5 ' Another exception is where the connection between the
illegal police conduct and evidence subsequently acquired is so "attenuated"
144. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3479 & n.13 (1983).
145. 692 F.2d at 703.
146. Id
147. Id. at 704.
148. Id. The Tenth Circuit noted that although the Supreme Court has not formally
adopted this exception to the exclusionary rule, id. (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406
n.12 (1977)), most circuit courts recognize the inevitable discovery rule. 692 F.2d at 704.
149. 692 F.2d at 704.
150. Id
151. This rule was announced in Silverhorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920). The Court reaffirmed Sitoerthorne in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)
and in Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
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as to warrant the conclusion that the evidence was not obtained by exploit-
ing the illegal conduct.
152
The Fifth Circuit has announced a "good faith" exception to the exclu-
sionary rule. In United State v. Mi/liams, 5 3 the court refused to suppress evi-
dence "[dliscovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good
faith and in the reasonable though mistaken belief that they are author-
ized."' 154 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the "good faith" exception is con-
sistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which exists to deter willful
or flagrant actions by law enforcement officers, not to deter reasonable, good
faith actions.' 55 Although the Supreme Court has not, to date, adopted such
a broad good faith exception, it appears to be on the verge of doing so in its
next term. 1
5 6
Still another exception to the exclusionary rule, the inevitable discovery
doctrine, has been explicitly recognized by lower federal and state courts,
but has never been expressly sanctioned by the Supreme Court. 15 7 This
exception permits the prosecution to use unlawfully obtained evidence if it
can demonstrate that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered by
lawful means. The prosecution must initially demonstrate that the police
did not use illegal conduct as a means of discovering the evidence.' 58 The
prosecution must then prove that the evidence would have been found with-
out use of illegal conduct and must prove how it would have been found.15
9
All the courts adopting this exception agree that the prosecution has the
burden of proving these elements, but have split as to whether the burden is
a preponderance standard or a clear and convincing standard.
160
Although the Tenth Circuit did not expressly adopt the inevitable dis-
152. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) is the source of this rule. More recent
cases applying this principle are United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) and Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
153. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). See generally
Note, United States v. Williams: The Good Faith Excepton to the Exclusionary Rule, 32 MERCER L.
REV. 1329 (1981).
154. 622 F.2d at 840. Several states have enacted legislation codifying the good faith excep-
tions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (Supp. 1983-84); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-3-
308 (Supp. 1983).
155. See 622 F.2d at 842.
156. Justice White's concurring opinion in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) approves
of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 2344 (White, J., concurring). The
Court declined to consider the good faith exception on jurisdictional grounds, 1d. at 2321-25,
but has granted certiorari to review two cases which raise the good faith exception issue. See
United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Com-
monwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. grantedsub nom. Massachu-
setts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
157. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 n.12 (1977). The first clear application of
this doctrine was in Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943).
158. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 261 (Iowa 1979),cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921 (1980)
(prosecution must show that bad faith actions were not taken in order to hasten discovery of the
evidence). See also United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1048 (5th Cir. 1980) (prosecution
must show that, at time of illegality, police were pursuing the evidence or leads which would
have reasonably led to evidence).
159. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Iowa 1979).
160. Compare United States v. Schipani, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
922 (1970) (preponderance) with Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 927
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975) (clear and convincing).
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covery exception until Romero, it applied its rationale in United States v. Leo-
nard,16 1 a case decided two years earlier. In Leonard, police officers located a
gun in the glove compartment of Leonard's car during an inventory search
executed after his arrest.' 6 2 Prior to that discovery, however, the arresting
officer had discovered the gun's location through an illegal interrogation of
Leonard.' 6 3 The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to suppress
the gun, because it was actually recovered during a valid inventory search
and because its discovery was inevitable regardless of Leonard's state-
ment. 164 The Tenth Circuit, however, based its decision on the independent
source exception to the exclusionary rule' 65 rather than the inevitable dis-
covery exception. 1
66
D. Problems with Romero
The court's decision in Romero, while it unambiguously adopts the inevi-
table discovery exception, offers little or no explanation as to when and how
the exception should be applied by trial courts. The court did not intimate
what the burden of proof should be, nor was any attention paid to the good
faith vel non of the officer who improperly recovers the challenged evidence.
Future cases are necessary to show how the Tenth Circuit will shape the
criteria for use of the exception in district courts, and to demonstrate to what
extent this exception will affect defendants seeking suppression of evidence.
VI. McCRANIE V. UNITED STATES: REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THE
DRUG COURIER PROFILE
In McCranie o. United States ' 67 the Tenth Circuit, in affirming a convic-
tion for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, held that the correla-
tion of a person's behavior with a "drug courier profile," in conjunction with
evidence obtained through investigation based on that correlation, was suffi-
cient to justify seizing that person for investigation of criminal activity. 168
The drug courier profile is a loosely formulated, unwritten checklist of char-
acteristics or traits which narcotics agents believe are common to persons
who traffic in illegal drugs. 169 Among the recurring elements are travel from
drug "source cities" or travel to major drug "use" cities; unusual nervous-
ness; intense scanning of the terminal area; travel with very little luggage;
use of one-way tickets purchased with small bills; travel under an alias; and
placing a telephone call immediately upon arrival.
170
161. 630 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1980).
162. Id at 790.
163. Id The interrogation was illegal because the officer had failed to provide Leonard his
Miranda warnings. Id.
164. Id. at 791.
165. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
166. 630 F.2d at 791.
167. 703 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir.), cer. dented, 104 S. Ct. 484 (1983).
168. 703 F.2d at 1218.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
170. See United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
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A. Supreme Court Drug Courier Profile Cases
The Court's first decision involving the use of the drug courier profile
was United States v. Mendenhall. 17' Although there was no majority opinion in
Mendenhall, Justice Powell, writing for three members of the Court, stated
that in light of the training of the DEA agents and the matching of Ms.
Mendenhall's conduct with that of the drug courier profile, the DEA agents
had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to
justify a Terry stop. 1 72 Justice Powell emphasized that it was the agents'
experience which validated use of the drug courier profile to single Menden-
hall out for questioning; reliance on the profile alone would probably have
been an insufficient basis to initiate a Terry stop. 173 In a later case, Reid v.
Georgia ,'174 the Court again rejected the sufficiency of the drug courier profile
ex proprio vigore as a basis for establishing the articulable, reasonable suspi-
cion necessary for a Terry stop. Reid involved two travelers who fit the drug
courier profile, but who did not otherwise act in a furtive or unusual man-
ner.' 75 The Court held that the agent could not, as a matter of law, have
reasonably suspected the defendant of criminal activity on the basis of the
observed circumstances' 76 because the circumstances at best supported a
"hunch" that the defendant was transporting narcotics. 177 Then, in Florida
v. Royer,1 78 a plurality of the Court, moving away from Mendenhall and Reid,
apparently disagreed with a state appellate court's conclusion that mere sim-
ilarity with the contents of a drug courier profile cannot establish the articul-
able basis for the reasonable suspicion required to justify a Terry stop. t7 9
B. Previous Tenth Ctrcuil Drug Courier Profile Cases
The Tenth Circuit had decided one drug courier profile case prior to
McCranie. In United States v. MacDonald,'8 0 the court determined that the
articulable suspicion required to justify a Terry investigatory detention was
established when the defendant displayed the following "profile" character-
istics: 1) checking of luggage at an airport which was not the defendant's
final destination; 2) cash payment for a one-way standby ticket; 3) flight
emanating from a drug source city; and 4) the defendant appeared nervous
and did not approach the luggage claim area but directly left the termi-
U.S. 910 (1980). Accord United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n. 1 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
171. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
172. Id at 565 (Powell, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 565 n.6.
174. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
175. Id at 441.
176. The only behavior which deviated from that of ordinary travelers was that one peti-
tioner occasionally looked backward at the other. Id.
177. Id
178. 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
179. Compare 103 S. Ct. at 1326 (plurality opinion) (evidence that defendant fit drug courier
profile sufficient to justify detention) with Royer v. State, 389 So.2d 1007, 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (rehearing en banc) (drug courier profile insufficient basis for detention), afd sub
nor. Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
180. 670 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1981).
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nal.181 Although the court did not evaluate the sufficiency of the profile ex
proprio vigore in establishing reasonable suspicion, its approach-which em-
phasized that reasonable suspicion was established by adding the agent's ex-
perience to the traveler's correlation with the drug courier profile' 82 -
closely paralleled that of Justice Powell in United States v. Mendenhall.' 3
C. McCranie v. United States
When DEA agents observed McCranie disembarking from a plane at
the Atlanta airport, he seemed to fit the drug courier profile in a number of
respects.' 8 4 Based on this observation, the agent investigated further and,
after learning that McCranie was flying on a one-way ticket from a "drug
source" city in Florida, accosted McCranie and requested an interview.' 8 5
During the interview, the agent accused McCranie of carrying drugs and
requested permission to search McCranie's luggage.18 6 McCranie became
nervous and refused the requested permission, whereupon the agent termi-
nated the interview and informed McCranie that other agents would meet
him at his destination.'
87
The agent then notified a fellow DEA agent in Tulsa (McCranie's desti-
nation) of his suspicions about McCranie, also informing the other agent
that investigation following the interview had revealed that McCranie had a
prior criminal record which included marijuana convictions.188 Upon arri-
val and after retrieving his luggage, McCranie consented to an interview
with a DEA agent who was accompanied by a Tulsa policeman. 8 9 McCra-
nie was then given his Miranda advisements. 190 After he refused to permit a
search of his luggage, a sniffing dog (and three more policemen) were sum-
moned.' 9 ' The dog was not trained in narcotics sniffing, but nonetheless
selected McCranie's suitcase. 192 McCranie was then permitted to leave, but
was later arrested and convicted when a search pursuant to warrant revealed
that his suitcase contained cocaine.'
9 3
On appeal, McCranie argued that he was "seized" for fourth amend-
ment purposes in the Tulsa Airport, and that the seizure was not supported
by a reasonable, articulable suspicion, but only by the DEA agents'
hunches. 194 He conceded that the dog's signals provided reasonable suspi-
181. Id at 913.
182. See id
183. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
184. The "suspicious" characteristics exhibited by McCranie included: 1) flying on a one-
way ticket: 2) a flight emanating from a major drug source city, Ft. Myers, Florida; and
3) McCranie's apparent nervousness. United States v. McCranie, 703 F.2d i213, 1215 (10th









193. Id at 1216. McCranie was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
194. 703 F.2d at 1216.
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cion or probable cause, but argued that because these signals came after he
and his suitcase had been illegally seized, the evidence obtained as a result of
that seizure should have been suppressed.'
95
In an opinion by Judge Doyle, the Tenth Circuit, with Judge McKay
dissenting, held that McCranie presented no fourth amendment violation
because he was not seized in either Atlanta or Tulsa. 1 96 Because the police
did not make an overt display of force, did not seize McCranie's wallet,
move him from a public area, or detain him for a lengthy period, the court
characterized the encounters as mere police-citizen contacts to which the
fourth amendment does not apply. 197 The majority held that the circum-
stances of the detentions would not have indicated to a reasonable person
that he or she was in custody and under official compulsion to answer ques-
tions.198 Thus, any evidence which was discovered was not discovered pur-
suant to an illegal search.
The court held alternatively that even if the Tulsa encounter was a
seizure, the participating agent had the reasonable suspicion necessary to
make a Terry stop. 199 The reasonable suspicion was provided by the match
between McCranie's conduct and some of the drug courier profile character-
istics, in conjunction with the discovery of McCranie's criminal record.
20 0
The court stated that McCranie's behavior would not, by itself, have sup-
ported seizure, but that the drug courier profile characteristics combined
with his criminal record did give rise to reasonable suspicion.
20
Judge McKay filed a blistering dissent. For Judge McKay, the offen-
sive note in the seizure and search was the use of the drug courier profile. He
characterized the use of the profile as a "prime example of organized en-
forcement efforts that are rapidly eroding our protection against unwar-
ranted, arbitrary intrusions of public officials."'202 Judge McKay stressed
that the courts know little or nothing about the characteristics making up
the profile, the standards that guide its application, or the probability that
the profile incorporates a racial bias not amenable to judicial review.
20 3
According to the dissent, McCranie's alleged drug courier characteris-
tics could not have provided reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause,
because these characteristics are indistinguishable from the traits exhibited
by many perfectly innocent travelers. 20 4 Judge McKay also noted that even
federal judges might become nervous when accosted by DEA agents. 20 5 Fur-
ther, the defendant's criminal record should not have been permitted to add
to the quality of the agent's suspicions "unless people who have previously
195. Id
196. Id at 1218.
197. Id. at 1217-18.
198. Id
199. Id. at 1218.
200. Id
201. Id.
202. Id at 1218-19 (McKay, J., dissenting).
203. Id at 1218-19 (citing United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1353 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Oakes, J., dissenting)).




been arrested are excepted from Fourth Amendment protection. '" 20 6 Judge
McKay found that McCranie had been "seized" as he was about to leave the
Tulsa Airport, because a reasonable person in his position would have be-
lieved that he was not free to leave.20 7 Thus, because the seizure was not
supported by reasonable suspicion, the evidence discovered by the sniffing
dog was tainted and therefore subject to suppression.
208
D. lmphcations of McCranie
In McCran'e, the court seemed to follow the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Reid v. Georgta2 0 9 by rejecting a person's similarity to the drug courier
profile as an independently sufficient basis for a Terry stop.2 10 This appears
to be a retreat from MacDonald, where the court found that similarity to the
drug courier profile, in light of the agent's experience in observing drug ped-
dlers, was sufficient to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry
stop.2 11 It should be noted, however, that even if McCranie is a retreat from
MacDonald the "something more" than the drug profile now required for a
reasonable suspicion is not very much at all; in McCranie, the defendant's
criminal record was sufficient.
VII. LINAM v. GRIFFIN: THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AND
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATIONS
Pursuant to New Mexico's original habitual criminal statute,21 2 when a
defendant with prior felony convictions was again convicted of a felony, the
district attorney could file a supplemental information seeking an enhanced
sentence based on the number of felony convictions.2 1 3 The court was then
required to hold a jury hearing on the issue of whether the defendant had in
fact been convicted of the alleged prior felonies. 2 14 If the jury found that the
defendant did in fact commit the prior felonies as alleged, the judge was
required to impose an enhanced sentence for the underlying felony
conviction.
21 5
Linam, a thrice convicted felon, was convicted of two counts of forgery
and, after an habitual offender hearing, was given a life sentence pursuant to
the enhanced punishment provisions of New Mexico's habitual criminal stat-
ute. 2 16 On appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court, Linam argued that
206. Id.
207. Id at 1220. Judge McKay noted that a person who has received Mranda warnings and
who is the object of concern of four armed policemen would not reasonably feel free to leave.
Id
208. Id
209. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
210. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
212. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-5 (1978) (repealed 1977). A similar statute, which became
effective in 1979, is codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Supp. 1981).
213. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-7 (1978) (repealed 1977). A similar statute, which became
effective in 1979, is codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-20 (Supp. 1981).
214. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-7 (1978) (repealed 1977).
215. Id.
216. Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369, 370-71 (10th Cir. 1982).
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the habitual offender statute should be construed to require proof that each
prior felony was committed after conviction for the immediately preceding
felony. 2 17 The prosecution had not presented evidence on the dates of
Linam's prior felony convictions because earlier constructions and the plain
language of the statute did not so require. 2 8 The New Mexico Supreme
Court adopted Linam's argument and construed the enhanced sentencing
statute to require proof of the sequence of prior felonies.2 19 Linam's case was
remanded to the trial court for a second hearing during which the prosecu-
tion would have an opportunity to supply the newly-required evidence of the
dates of the prior felonies. 220 On remand, Linam was given a life
sentence.
22 1
Following exhaustion of state post-conviction relief procedures, Linam
filed a habeas petition with the federal district court, arguing that the re-
hearing violated his fourteenth amendment right not to be subjected to
double jeopardy. 222 Linam argued that because the New Mexico Supreme
Court had stated that there was "no substantial evidence" to support the
original enhanced sentence,2 23 the double jeopardy clause barred his re-
trial. 224 Linam relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Burks
v. United States,225 which held that where a conviction is reversed by an ap-
pellate court on the ground of insufficient evidence, the defendant may not
be retried. 226 The district court rejected Linam's habeas petition, and he
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit, in Linam v. Grffin ,227 rejected the proffered analogy
to Burks and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Linam's habeas peti-
tion. 228 The court emphasized that prior to Linam's state court challenge to
the evidentiary requirements of New Mexico's enhanced sentencing statute,
New Mexico courts had not required proof of the date of conviction for prior
felonies.2 29 Linam's conviction was not reversed because the prosecution put
on all the evidence it had and came up short, or because there was negligent
failure to carry the burden of proof 2 30 In Judge Doyle's view, the reversal of
Linam's conviction was caused by something more akin to trial error than a
true inadequacy of evidence.2 3' Because reversal for trial error does not
subject a person to the risk of twice being at the mercy of the state's presenta-
217. State v. Linam, 93 N.M. 307, 307, 600 P.2d 253, 253, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979).
218. Id at 310, 600 P.2d at 256.
219. Id at 309, 600 P.2d at 255.
220. Id. at 310, 600 P.2d at 256.
221. Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1982).
222. Id at 371. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (recognizing that fifth amend-
ment is applicable to states via due process clause of fourteenth amendment).
223. State v. Linam, 93 N.M. 307, 310, 600 P.2d 253, 256, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979).
224. 685 F.2d at 373.
225. 437 U.S. I (1978).
226. Id at 18. The defendant may not be retried because reversal for insufficient evidence is
an implicit aquittal on the charge. See id. at 16-18.
227. 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1982).
228. Id at 372.
229. Id at 373.
230. Id at 373-74.
231. Id. at 373.
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tion of its full case, double jeopardy did not bar Linam's retrial.
2 32
The Tenth Circuit also held, as an alternative basis for its decision, that
double jeopardy protections were inapplicable during Linam's rehearing be-
cause New Mexico's enhanced sentencing proceeding was merely part of the
sentencing phase of trial, and not an adjudication of guilt or innocence to
which double jeopardy protections traditionally apply.2 33 Judge Ander-
son 2 3 4 refrained from joining this portion of the opinion.
235
In reaching its alternative holding, the Tenth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in DiFrancesco v. United Sates,236 which the Tenth
Circuit read as holding that a criminal sentence, once pronounced, is not to
be accorded finality and conclusiveness similar to that which attaches to a
jury's verdict of acquittal. 237 The court emphasized that New Mexico's en-
hanced sentencing proceeding did not involve conviction for a distinct crime
and should not be equated with a judgment on the issue of guilt or inno-
cence; rather, the proceeding was little more than a procedural formality
required to establish that the defendant had committed prior felonies as
shown by the public records. 238 Given its purely formal, almost perfunctory
quality, New Mexico's habitual criminal proceeding was not, in the court's




Judge Anderson, writing separately, concurred in the majority's denial
of habeas on the basis of the trial error analysis, but sharply disagreed with
the majority's application of DiFrancesco. In Judge Anderson's view, Bulling-
Ion v. Mssour, 240 decided by the Supreme Court almost a half year after
DiFrancesco, compelled the conclusion that the double jeopardy clause was
implicated by New Mexico's habitual criminal proceeding.
241
Bullington was convicted of capital murder. 24 2 Under Missouri's then
existing statutory scheme, following a decision on guilt or innocence in a
capital case a jury was required to make the sentencing determination and
select between the death penalty and life imprisonment. 24 3 In this separate
sentencing proceeding, which involved a virtual full scale trial on the exist-
ence of aggravating factors justifying capital punishment, 244 the jury failed
to find the statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Bullington to
life imprisonment. 245 Subsequently, Bullington was granted a new trial due
232. Id at 374 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978)).
233. 685 F.2d at 376.
234. Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Utah, sitting by designation.
235. 685 F.2d at 376 (Anderson, J., concurring).
236. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
237. 685 F.2d at 374.
238. See id. at 373, 376.
239. Id at 376.
240. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
241. 685 F.2d at 376 (Anderson, J., concurring).
242. 451 U.S. at 435.
243. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006 (1978) (repealed 1983).
244. 451 U.S. at 438.
245 Id at 436
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to certain sixth amendment violations.2 46 The Supreme Court held that the
double jeopardy clause prohibited the prosecution from seeking the death
penalty upon retrial. 247 Essentially, the original jury's decision to sentence
Bullington to life imprisonment after an effective trial on whether Bulling-
ton's behavior required imposition of the death penalty constituted a finding
that Bullington was innocent of engaging in conduct punishable by
death.
248
Judge Anderson opined that New Mexico's enhanced sentencing pro-
ceeding was sufficiently similar to the sentencing procedure analyzed in Bull-
ington to implicate the double jeopardy clause. 249  Judge Anderson
emphasized that the sentencing proceeding was conducted like a trial, with
the defendant entitled to be present at the proceedings, to have counsel, and
to have the issues tried to a jury.250 Further, the prosecution was required to
prove essential issues of fact, and was most probably required to meet a bur-
den of proof.2 5 1 The trial nature of the proceeding triggered Linam's double
jeopardy protections;2 52 the majority's failure to recognize this crucial thrust
of Bulhngton necessitated Judge Anderson's separate opinion.
VIII. OTHER TENTH CIRCUIT DOUBLE JEOPARDY DEVELOPMENTS
In Abney v. United States,253 the Supreme Court held that a trial court's
pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy
was a "final decision" and thus immediately appealable. 254 Typically, filing
an Abne appeal will result in a stay of trial court proceedings.2 55 In United
States v. Hines,256 the Tenth Circuit recognized that where a "district court
has considered a double jeopardy claim after a hearing and, for substantial
reasons given, finds the claim to be frivolous, the district court should not be
divested of jurisdiction by an Abney appeal." 2 57 In that circumstance, both
the district court and court of appeals will have jurisdiction to proceed.
2 5
1
In United States v. Puckett, 259 the Tenth Circuit declared that, although
the "same evidence" test is still the test used by the court in determining
whether two statutes proscribe the same offense for double jeopardy pur-
poses, the "totality of the circumstances" test might be adopted in the appro-
246. Id
247. Id at 446.
248. The Court stated: "Because the sentencing proceeding at petitioner's ... trial was like
the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause to one aquitted by a jury is also available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at
his retrial." Id (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted).
249. 685 F.2d at 377 (Anderson, J., concurring).
250. Id
251. Id. at 378-79.
252. Id at 379. Accord Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1982).
253. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
254. Id at 662.
255. See United States v. Hines, 689 F.2d 934, 936 (10th Cir. 1982).
256. 689 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1982).
257. Id. at 937.
258. See id. at 938.
259. 692 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1982). cert. denied. 103 S. Ct. 579 (1983).
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priate case. 2 6 0 Under the "same evidence" or "Blockburger" 26 ' test, two
offenses are identical for double jeopardy purposes only if the facts alleged in
one would sustain a conviction if offered in support of the other.
2 62 The
court noted that the same evidence test has been sharply criticized in recent
years as an inadequate measurement of double jeopardy when applied to
multiple prosecution for conspiracy charges.2 6 3 The Sixth and Eighth Cir-
cuits have rejected the same evidence test in favor of a totality of the circum-
stances approach in multiple conspiracy prosecution.
2 64  Under this
approach, double jeopardy protections are implicated unless the prosecution
can demonstrate that the criminal agreements in separate conspiracy prose-
cutions are "indeed separate and distinct."
265
IX. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals heard three significant cases involving the sixth amendment 266 right
to effective assistance of counsel. The three, United States v. Golub (Golub
I1),267 Griffin v. Winans ,268 and United States v. Verdin ,269 apply and expand
the principles set forth in United States v. Golub 2 7 0 (Golub I), an earlier Tenth
Circuit consideration of a defendant's sixth amendment claims.
A. United States v. Golub (Golub II)
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals heard Golub I in 1980. In Golub I,
Robert Golub appealed his mail fraud convictions, 27 1 claiming he was de-
nied adequate assistance of counsel at trial because his trial attorney, Shel-
don Emeson, was not skilled in criminal law, and further had not had
adequate time to prepare. 2 72 Golub had originally retained another attor-
ney; two weeks before trial, however, the attorney was permitted to with-
draw because Golub was uncooperative, had not paid his fees, and, most
importantly, because Golub had misled the attorney.27 3 Golub then re-
tained Emeson, his uncle by marriage. 27 4 Emeson attempted to obtain a
260. Id. at 668.
261. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 229 (1932).
262. 692 F.2d at 667.
263. Id at 668.
264. See United States v. Jabarra, 644 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Tercero,
580 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1978).
265. United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 317 (5th Cir. 1978).
266. U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
267. 694 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1982).
268. 684 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1982).
269. No. 81-2346, slip op. (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 1983).
270. 638 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 694 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1982). Other recent Tenth
Circuit opinions concerned with the effective assistance of counsel are United States v. King,
664 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1981) and United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982),cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1182 (1983).
271. Golub was found guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 2314 (1982). 638 F.2d at 186.
272. Golub 1, 638 F.2d at 188.
273. d. Golub did not oppose the motion to withdraw. United States v. Golub, 694 F.2d
207, 208 (10th Cir. 1982) (Golub I).
274. Golub 1. 638 F.2d at 188.
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continuance by telephone, which the trial judge denied27 5 in accordance
with statements made at the time Golub's first lawyer was permitted to with-
draw.276 The case then proceeded to trial as scheduled and, as noted, Golub
was convicted.
Golub I originally reversed Golub's convictions and ordered a new
trial. 27 7 The Tenth Circuit found that Emeson performed adequately at
trial, but had not been given adequate time to prepare for trial in light of the
case's complexity, the geographical dispersion of witnesses, and his unfamili-
arity with criminal law.278 The government then filed a motion for rehear-
ing, tendering an affidavit from the trial court which stated that Golub had
received above average assistance of counsel.2 79 The Tenth Circuit granted
the motion, and on rehearing en banc stayed Golub I's order for a new trial,
instead ordering the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether
Emeson's forensic performance was inadequate and whether Emeson's trial
preparation time was inadequate. 280 The evidentiary hearing was held over
a period of nine months to ensure that Golub would have an ample opportu-
nity to present evidence of inadequate assistance.28' After hearing Golub's
evidence, including expert witnesses, the trial judge found that Emeson's fo-
rensic performance was extremely capable, 28 2 and that no prejudice resulted
from the short trial preparation time.2 8 3 The review of the evidentiary hear-
ing and the trial court's findings formed the basis for the second UnltedStates
v. Golub284 (Golub IF).
Applying the standards enunciated in the earlier Tenth Circuit decision
Dyer v. Crisp ,285 -olub II, over Judge Doyle's dissent, found Emeson's forensic
performance constitutionally adequate. Under Dyer, the court does not look
for a flawless defense, but rather one which reflects the skill of a reasonably
competent defense attorney.286 Because the record at the evidentiary hear-
ing indicated that Emeson's performance satisfied that standard, no constitu-
tional right was violated by the manner in which Golub's counsel conducted
the defense.
28 7
The Tenth Circuit then had to consider whether the trial court had
violated Golub's sixth amendment rights by denying Emeson adequate time
to prepare for trial. The factors used by the Tenth Circuit to determine
275. Id. at 186.
276. At the withdrawal hearing, the trial judge told Golub that the trial would proceed as
scheduled, with or without counsel. Id
277. Id at 190.
278. Id at 189.
279. Golub II, 694 F.2d at 209.
280. Id at 210.
281. Id. at 210-11.
282. Id. at 211.
283. Id. at 212.
284. 694 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1982).
285. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
286. 613 F.2d at 278.
287. Golub II, 694 F.2d at 214. The court noted that the adequacy of trial counsel's repre-
sentation had to be determined, at least in part, by reference to the defendant's behavior.




whether given preparation time was constitutionally sufficient were: 1) the
time allowed to investigate and prepare; 2) counsel's experience; 3) the sever-
ity of the offenses charged; 4) the complexity of the defense; and 5) counsel's
accessibility to witnesses.288 The majority found that these factors com-
ported with a Supreme Court admonition that sixth amendment protections
are not violated unless an asserted interference with the right to counsel
either prejudices, or threatens to prejudice, the effectiveness of counsel's rep-
resentation.289 Thus, unless the facts of the particular case demonstrate that
the defendant was actually prejudiced by the time allowed for preparation,
or that there was a substantial threat of prejudice, the trial court has not
deprived the defendant's sixth amendment rights.29° Because Golub was
unable to show, through the evidentiary hearing or otherwise, how he had
been prejudiced by the short trial preparation period, the Tenth Circuit,
over Judge Doyle's dissent, reversed and vacated Golub 1.291
Judge Doyle dissented because he found that the trial court's actions
had denied Golub effective assistance of counsel. The dissent emphasized
that sophisticated mail fraud cases are inherently complex and difficult for
both prosecution and defense. 29 2 This complexity, which by itself might
have mandated a longer preparation period, was exacerbated by Emeson's
unfamiliarity with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.29 3 Further, the
trial court had failed to advise Golub of his right to appointed counsel,
294
thus virtually forcing him to retain counsel inexperienced in a federal court
defense of a serious and difficult federal charge.295 Finally, Judge Doyle
stressed that the majority's reliance on the absence of prejudice wrongly fo-
cused the constitutional inquiry. In United States V. Morrtson ,296 which the
majority relied on in articulating its absence of prejudice standard,29 7 the
Court addressed whether police interference with the relationship between a
defendant and her counsel justified dismissal of an indictment. 298  The
Court did not decide whether proof of prejudice from prosecutorial interfer-
288. 694 F.2d at 214. These factors were originally announced in Golub I See 638 F.2d at
189 (citing Wolfs v. Britton, 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975)).
289. 694 F.2d at 214, (quoting United States v. King, 664 F.2d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 1981))
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981)). Accord United States v. Cronic,
675 F.2d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1182 (1983).
290. Golub (I, 694 F.2d at 215.
291. Id at 216.
292. Id at 220-21 (Doyle, J., dissenting)-
293. See id at 218 (Emeson's failure to file written motion for continuance indicative of lack
of familiarity with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and therefore indicative of Emeson's
lack of preparation).
294. Id. at 219. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) provides: "Every defendant who is unable to obtain
counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceed-
ings from his initial appearance before the federal magistrate or the court through appeal, un-
less he waives such appointment." See also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982).
295. See 694 F.2d at 218-20 (Doyle, J., dissenting). Judge Doyle observed that Emeson was
unable to obtain any of his colleagues to represent Golub, given the complex case and the short
preparation period, id at 218 and that Emerson's request for a continuance reflected his own
belief that the preparation period was inadequate. See id
296. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
297. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
298. 449 U.S. at 363-64.
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ence was necessary to estabhsh a sixth amendment violation.299 Judge Doyle
flatly rejected the majority's position:
[T]he presence or absence of prejudice should not be and cannot be
the test of the violation of the Constitution. In an inadequacy of
counsel case to require proof that a different result would have oc-
curred had able counsel been present is not a true test of the uncon-
stitutionality of the action.
3 ° °
Accordingly, the dissent would have remanded the case for a new trial so
that Golub could obtain effective counsel. 30 1
B. Griffin v. Winans
The question presented to the Tenth Circuit in Griffin v. Win'ans3° 2 was
whether the defendant's representation by a relatively inexperienced alco-
holic attorney violated the sixth amendment right to effective counsel,
thereby justifying the federal district court's grant of habeas relief.
30 3
Habeas relief was necessary because New Mexico's trial and appellate courts
had rejected Griffin's sixth amendment claims because his attorney's con-
duct did not cause the trial to become a "sham and mockery" of justice.
30 4
In affirming the grant of habeas relief, the Tenth Circuit observed that
the trial court had properly conducted an evidentiary hearing, and had
properly rejected New Mexico's application of the sham and mockery stan-
dard. The court recognized that although federal courts are bound by state
court findings of fact absent a statutory exception, 30 5 in this case the state
courts had made no findings of fact.306 Thus, the federal district court's
evidentiary hearing was proper. Similarly, the federal district court had
properly rejected use of the sham and mockery standard, recognizing that
the Tenth Circuit has adopted the more stringent "reasonably competent
counsel" standard for assessing an asserted violation of a defendant's sixth
amendment right.
30 7
The district court found that Griffin's representation was constitution-
ally inadequate because his lawyer was unprepared, was forensically ineffec-
tive, and was chronically intoxicated. 30 8  Reviewing the district court's
299. Id. at 364.
300. 694 F.2d at 221 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
301. Id
302. 684 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1982).
303. Id at 687.
304. Id at 688 & n.2 (quoting unpublished New Mexico trial, appellate court opinions).
305. Id at 688 (citing Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982)). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(1982).
306. See 684 F.2d at 688.
307. Id at 689. The "reasonably competent counsel" standard was adopted in Dyer v.
Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. demed, 445 U.S. 945 (1980). New Mexico had
alleged that its courts had in fact applied the reasonable counsel standard, and that the "sham
and mockery" language actually used was "unfortunate semantics." 648 F.2d at 689. The
Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court had properly rejected this argument, pointing to the
testimony of the trial judge concerning the standard he had applied and the explicit language of
the state appellate opinion. See id. New Mexico has since adopted the reasonably competent
counsel standard. State v. Orona, 97 N.M. 232, 638 P.2d 1077 (1982).
308. 684 F.2d at 689 n.4.
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factual conclusions under the clearly erroneous standard,3 0 9 the Tenth Cir-
cuit found the district court's findings supported by substantial evidence and
therefore acceptable.3 10 In light of those findings, the Tenth Circuit agreed
that the district court had properly found that the defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights were violated, and had properly granted the requested habeas
relief.
3 t1
C. United States v. Verdin
Winans demonstrates that having inadequate, inexperienced, and ill-
prepared counsel violates a defendant's sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. In UniedStates o. Verdin, 312 the Tenth Circuit articu-
lated a distinction between ineffective counsel and counsel using unsuccess-
ful trial strategy. In Verdin, counsel decided not to impeach an identifying
witness and not to call alibi witnesses because, according to counsel, this
testimony would have been cumulative and inconclusive. 31 3 The Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the decision to refrain from calling these witnesses was a
mere strategic decision, which could not support a claim of constitutionally
ineffective counsel.
314
X. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES AS PREREQUISITE TO FEDERAL
HABEAS RELIEF
Under the recent United States Supreme Court ruling Rose v. Lundy,
3t 5
habeas corpus petitioners must exhaust all of their claims at the state level
before a federal district court can hear a petition for habeas corpus relief.
31 6
Prior to Lundy, the Tenth Circuit had held that where a petition presented
both exhausted and unexhausted (or mixed) claims, the exhausted claims
could be considered, but the unexhausted claims had to be dismissed.
31 7
This rule was changed inJones v. Hess
3
18 to conform to Lundy's standards.
3 9
Jones was convicted by an Oklahoma jury in August, 1971 on two
counts of murder and one count of shooting with intent to kill. 320 The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions in May,
1973.321 Jones then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Pittsburg
County District Court in March, 1976.322 The district court denied the ap-
309. Id. at 690.
310. Id.
311. Id
312. No. 81-2346 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 1983).
313. Id at 3.
314. Id
315. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
316. Id. at 510.
317. E.g., Smith v. Gaffney, 462 F.2d 663, 665 (10th Cir. 1972); Whiteley v. Meacham, 416
F.2d 36, 39 (10th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(197 I); Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. dented, 385 U.S. 876 (1966).
318. 681 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1982).
319. See id. at 695.
320. Id at 685.
321. Jones v. State, 509 P.2d 924, 925-27 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
322. 681 F.2d at 689.
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plication in September, 1977 after an evidentiary hearing. 323 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals finally affirmed the district court's denial of post-
conviction relief on April 10, 1979.324 In May, 1979, Jones filed a habeas
corpus petition with the federal district court, which denied the petition in
1980 with respect to all claims except one relating to judicial bias and mis-
conduct. 325 This claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust state court reme-
dies. 326 Jones then appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
32 7
Judge Holloway, writing for a unanimous court, observed that petitioner's
claim of prejudicial ex parte communication between the trial judge and
prosecution "if accepted, would present a very serious and disturbing chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of Jones's convictions, grounded on the consti-
tutional right to a fair trial and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 32 8 The district court, however, had not reached the merits of
the claim, holding that because the claim was not exhausted in the state
courts it could not be considered. 32 9 The initial consideration on appeal was
the propriety of that ruling.
330
Jones asserted two bases for error in the district court's ruling. First, he
argued that a general claim of bias had been presented to the state courts,
and the additional evidence presented to the district court was merely addi-
tional evidence of bias. 331 Remanding his claim, Jones argued, would re-
quire him to file repetitious applications, in violation of Wiwording v.
Swenson.
33 2 Alternately, Jones argued, because he had been incarcerated
since 1971, the amount of time already spent in litigation and the seriousness
of the constitutional violation made his case sufficiently exceptional to per-
mit a relaxation of the exhaustion requirement.
3 33
Judge Holloway quickly disposed of Jones' second argument by refer-
ence to the Supreme Court case of Duckworth v. Serrano .334 Duckworth rejected
the argument that hardship to a petitioner caused by delay, in conjunction
with a strong showing of constitutional deprivation, could justify an excep-
tion to the exhaustion requirement. 335 The Court held that the only excep-
tion to exhaustion occurred when there was no opportunity to obtain redress
in state court, or when the deficiencies in available state court procedures
rendered resort to state court futile. 336  The Tenth Circuit found
Oklahoma's post-conviction proceedings adequate, 337 so that Jones' case did
323. Id
324. Id at 690.
325. Id at 690-91.
326. Id at 691, 693.
327. Id at 691.
328. Id at 692.
329. Id. at 693.
330. Id
331. Id.
332. 404 U.S. 249 (1971). See 681 F.2d at 693.
333. 681 F.2d at 693.
334. 454 U.S. 1 (1981).
335. I at 4.
336. Id. at 3.
337. Ste 681 F.2d at 694 n 7
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not fall within the exceptions to exhaustion permitted by Duckworih.338
The Tenth Circuit also rejected Jones' argument that he had in fact
exhausted his judicial bias claim. The court observed that when newly dis-
covered evidence, such as that presented by Jones, placed a claim in a "sig-
nificantly different posture," the claim must be heard by the state courts
prior to a federal habeas petition.339 Because Jones' evidence of judicial im-
propriety was new, and significant, 340 the bias claim was placed in a new,
and therefore unexhausted, posture.
3 4 1
After determining that Jones' petition contained mixed claims, the
court analyzed Lundy 's applicability to Jones' petition. The court noted that
in the absence of manifest injustice, it was required to apply the law in effect
at the time of decision. 342  Despite Jones' lengthy incarceration, and the
further delay resulting from remand, the court felt compelled to apply
Lundy's total exhaustion rule.34 3 Hence, following remand, Jones would
have a choice of exhausting his bias claim, or amending his petition to ex-
clude, and possibly forfeit, the claim.
344
XI. EFFECT OF STATE WAIVER OF HABEAS EXHAUSTION
REQUIREMENTS
Naranjo v. Ricketts 34 5 represents the Tenth Circuit's entry into the circuit
court debate over whether a federal court should assume jurisdiction over a
habeas claim when the state attempts to waive the exhaustion require-
ment. 34 6 Naranjo held that the general rule in the Tenth Circuit will be to
require exhaustion regardless of the state's attempted waiver.
34 7
The appellants in Naranjo had been convicted in Colorado of first degree
kidnapping and first degree sexual assault. 3 48 These convictions were modi-
fied by the Colorado Supreme Court. 3 4 9 The Naranjos then brought a
habeas claim to the district court, arguing that the Colorado Supreme
Court's modification of their convictions was unconstitutional. 350 After the
338. Id at 694.
339. Id.
340. Id Copies of the ex parte communications are reproduced id at 696-99.
341. Id
342. Id at 695 n.9.
343. Id at 695.
344. Id. at 695 (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-21 (1982)). A case which followed
soon afterjones is Reed v. Brown, No. 82-1354 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1982). The petitioner, Reed,
filed a mixed petition for habeas corpus relief presenting exhausted and unexhausted claims.
Citing Lundy, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case giving Reed the same option as Jones in the
earlier case: either amend the petition by deleting the unexhausted claims, thereby risking no
further consideration of the unexhausted claims, or first exhaust the remaining unexhausted
claims. Id at 2-3 (citingjones, 681 F.2d at 693).
345. 696 F.2d 83 (10th Cir. 1982).
346. Compare Batten v. Scurr, 649 F.2d 564, 568-69 (8th Cir. 1981); Jenkins v. Fitzberger,
440 F.2d 1188, 1189 (4th Cir. 1971) (deciding in favor of assuming jurisdiction) w1*h Sweet v.
Culp, 640 F.2d 233, 237 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981); Gayle v. LeFerre, 613 F.2d 21, 22 n.I (2d Cir. 1980)
(requiring strict compliance with exhaustion doctrine).
347. 696 F.2d at 87.
348. Id. at 84.
349. Id
350. Id at 85.
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petitions were dismissed with prejudice by the district court for failure to
exhaust state remedies, the Tenth Circuit, on appeal, remanded the cases to
determine whether the Naranjos' claims had been properly exhausted.
3 5 1
The state attorney general then applied for a rehearing, claiming that
because the state had waived the exhaustion requirement, the circuit court
could dismiss the case on the merits. 35 2 The Tenth Circuit declined to do so,
stating that although exhaustion was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to fed-
eral jurisdiction over a habeas petition 35 3 protection of the state court's role
in the enforcement of federal law required strict enforcement of the exhaus-
tion requirement. 354 In reaching its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit weighed
expediency and the efficient use ofjudicial resources against the need to pro-
tect and promote the state's role in preserving constitutional protections,
finding the latter to be the more important consideration. 355
XII. JUDICIAL REFERENCE TO CO-CONSPIRATORS AT VOIR DIRE
The Tenth Circuit found reversible error in United States v. Baez 35 6 when
the trial judge's voir dire included comments about previous guilty pleas of
alleged co-conspirators and the possibility that one of those co-conspirators
might offer testimony exculpating the defendant. 35 7 The exculpatory testi-
mony, which was to have come from the defendant's son, never material-
ized.358 The other alleged co-conspirator testified and his guilty plea was
elicited; 359 the trial court, however, failed to give the required instruction
limiting the use of such testimony. 360 The Tenth Circuit found these actions
constituted plain error sufficiently prejudicial to overturn the defendant's
conviction.
36'
Judge Seymour found the logic of two Fifth Circuit cases directly on
point to be controlling. 362 In reversing a conviction where the trial judge
had told prospective jurors that the defendant's co-indictees had pled guilty,
the Fifth Circuit stated:
There is no need to advise the jury or its prospective members that
someone not in court, not on trial, and not to be tried, has pleaded
guilty. The prejudice to the remaining parties who are charged
with complicity in the acts of the self-confessed guilty participant is
351. Id
352. Id
353. Id at 86.
354. Id at 86 (listing cases).
355. Id. at 87.
356. 703 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1983).
357. See id. at 454-55.
358. The defendant's son did not testify. Id at 455.
359. Id
360. Id A co-defendant's guilty plea does not constitute substantive evidence, 1. (citing
United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1981)), and must be accompanied by a
limiting instruction so stating. 703 F.2d at 455 (citing United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000,
1006-07 (9th Cir. 1981)).
361. 703 F.2d at 455-56. The defendant had been convicted of distributing, and conspiring
to distribute phencyclidine (PCP) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1982). 703 F.2d
at 454.
362. 703 F.2d at 455 (citing United States v. Vaughn, 546 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1977); United





Judge Seymour found the error in Baez to be even greater than that in
the Fifth Circuit cases, because once the defendant's son failed to testify the
jury might have readily concluded that the failure to testify was because the
son felt he could not "honestly testify in his father's favor."' 364 Given the
prejudice resulting from the trial judge's conduct, reversal was required. 365
David Dansky
Davidj apha
363. United States v. Hansen, 544 F.2d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 1977), quoted in Baez, 703 F.2d at
455.




FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
During the past year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided nu-
merous federal practice and procedure cases, the majority of which involved
common issues in this area of the law. This brief review of selected cases is
intended to assist the practicing attorney in ascertaining the present status of
certain federal practice and procedure questions and to provide guidance for
further research.
The first part of this article will analyze two decisions which considered
jurisdiction issues. One decision concerns the final judgment rule and the
other decision concerns a unique twist in the diversity requirement for fed-
eral jurisdiction. The second part of the article is comprised of a survey of
selected Tenth Circuit decisions in the areas of removal jurisdiction, finality
of interlocutory orders, and review of a master's recommendations.
I. PRECLUSION OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION BY OPTION JUDGMENTS
By statute, the federal circuit courts are vested with appellate jurisdic-
tion over the final decisions of federal district courts.' The statute does not
define what is "final" for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction. Conse-
quently, the question of finality is often the threshold issue in a case on ap-
peal. Unless a district court judgment is deemed final, an appeal must be
dismissed without considering its merits. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, on its own motion, addressed the issue of finality in McKnney
v. Gannett Co. 2
A. The Final Judgment Rule
Although the wording is original, the final judgment rule in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291' has existed in the American judicial system since the Judiciary Act
of 1789.4 Today, section 1291 allows appeals only from "final decisions."5
In 1789, when the final judgment rule was enacted under the Judiciary Act,
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). The statute reads in relevant part: "The courts of appeals
. .. shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States . .. except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Id.
2. 694 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1982). The issue of appellate jurisdiction may be raised at
any time during the proceedings and, if the parties fail to raise the question, the court has a
duty to determine the issue sua sponte. United States v. Siviglia, 686 F.2d 832, 834-35 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1902 (1983) (citing Basso v. Utah Power and Light Co.. 495
F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974)), quoted in McKinney, 694 F.2d at 1245-46. The lack of a final
judgment in McKtnney was not raised by the parties on appeal. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
4. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 21, 1 Stat. 73, 83-84.
5. See supra note 1. When originally enacted, section 1291 allowed appeals only from
"final judgments or decrees." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 21, 1 Stat. 73, 83-84. The actual
origin of the final judgment rule is hidden in the obscure history of appellate procedure in
English common law. Crick, The Finaljudgrnent as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 544
(1932).
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its underlying purpose was to avoid piecemeal reviews.6 This remains the
primary purpose behind section 1291, although two other policy concerns
now affect the resolution of finality questions. The first, prevention of exces-
sive appeals, evolved after the final judgment rule had been enacted.7 The
second, maintaining the appropriate relationship between the trial and ap-
pellate courts,8 is also of relatively modern origin.
A literal reading of section 1291 suggests strict construction even though
Congress did not define the term "final." 9 Because of the strict construction
suggested by the language of section 1291 and the problems surrounding a
determination of what is "final," the Supreme Court and Congress have cre-
ated exceptions to the rule. One common exception is the provision for ap-
peals from interlocutory orders, found in 18 U.S.C. § 1292.10 Another
exception is the collateral order doctrine set out in Cohen v. Beneftzial Industrial
Loan Corp. 11 Additionally, to avoid the harshness section 1291 may effect
appellate courts will use the extraordinary writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, or habeas corpus.12 These exceptions reflect the general recogni-
tion among circuit courts that flexibility is appropriate under section 1291.
McKinne , however, creates a limitation upon appellate flexibility by con-
cludiig that certain relief awarded by a triai court prevents a judgment from
becoming a final decision.
6. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). See also
United States v. Feeney, 641 F.2d 821, 824 (10th Cir. 1981) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 690).
7. See Crick, supra note 5, at 550-5 1.
8. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) (quoting Parkinson v. April
Industries, Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975)). The phrase "appropriate relationship" refers
to the judicial process of allowing the trial court to fully hear and consider a case without the
appellate court running interference for the litigants by considering every order issued by the
trial court. The trial court's actions are entitled to respect; only upon completion of the entire
trial should the appellate court consider the wisdom of the trial court's actions. See generally
Note, Appealabil'ty in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 351-52 (1961).
9. A strict construction is suggested because use of the word "final" indicates a congres-
sional intent to maintain an "appropriate relationship" between trial and appellate courts.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982). Section 1292 appeals usually concern trial court injunctions,
id § 1292(a)(1), or unsettled questions of law which should be determined to facilitate proper
adjudication on the merits. Id § 1292(b).
11. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Cohen held that appellate jurisdiction existed for interlocutory
appeals "which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights as-
serted in the action, [and which are] too important to be denied review and too independent of
the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudi-
cated." Id at 546. For discussion of a recent Tenth Circuit case, Chavez v. Singer, 698 F.2d 420
(10th Cir. 1983), which addressed the collateral order exception, see in/ra notes 227-237 and
accompanying text.
12. See generally Crick, supra note 5, at 553-54 (general discussion of the purpose and appli-
cation of each extraordinary writ). An example of the harsh effects of the finality rule is a lower
court order that a litigant's trade secrets are discoverable. The appellate court may grant a writ
of mandamus to consider the propriety of such an order. Set, e.g., Hartley Pen Co. v. United
States District Court, 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961).
The majority in McKinney did not address the harsh effect its dismissal would have on the
litigants. The dissent, however, did consider the issue. 694 F.2d at 1251-52 (Logan, J., dissent-
ing).
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), allowing appeals from orders not dispositive of the entire case, is a
variation of the final judgment rule and not an exception. See nifra notes 234-36 and accompa-
nying text.
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B. McKinney v. Gannett Co.
1. The Facts
McKnney v. Gannett Co. 3 arose from a breach of contract action. Mc-
Kinney and Gannett had entered into an agreement whereby McKinney
agreed to sell his two New Mexico newspaper corporations to Gannett in a
stock-for-stock exchange.14 The agreement included a ten-year employment
contract with McKinney which required McKinney to contribute his serv-
ices to one of the newspaper corporations on the proviso McKinney would
retain editorial control and that Gannett would compensate McKinney for
his services.' 5 After three years, the contractual relationship between the
parties deteriorated and McKinney instigated suit. The grounds for the ac-
tion were limited by the district court, through pretrial motions and rulings
during trial, to McKinney's claims of breach of contract and fraud, and
Gannett's affirmative defenses of waiver and legal excuse for the alleged
breach of contract. 16
The New Mexico district court eventually considered the case in two
phases. The first phase concerned liability. The liability issues were heard
by a jury which returned special verdicts finding in favor of McKinney on
the breach of contract claims and for the defendants on the fraud claim.'
7
The second phase concerned an accounting required for effecting an equita-
ble rescission. This accounting was ordered following a post-trial hearing at
which McKinney argued that rescission was the only adequate remedy. The
district court agreed, stating that any other relief would be "mere patch-
work."" 8 The court added, however, that to ensure Gannett properly man-
aged the papers during the accounting phase, McKinney did not have to
elect rescission until the trial on the accounting was completed.19
Upon completion of the accounting phase of the trial, the district court
entered judgment providing McKinney sixty days from the expiration of the
time to appeal, or sixty days from a Tenth Circuit decision affirming the
judgment, in which to exercise an option to rescind the contract. 20 If Mc-
13. 694 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1982).
14. Id. at 1241. "Gannett" refers collectively to Gannett Co. and the two newspapers un-
less otherwise noted.
15. Id. at 1241-42.
16. Id at 1242. McKinney originally alleged eleven causes of action and sought rescission,
an accounting, and damages. Gannett Co. asserted eight affirmative defenses; in a separate
answer the New Mexican newspapers asserted twenty-six affirmative defenses. Id
17. Id. at 1243.
18. Id.
19. Id. Because the New Mexico newspapers were not fully assimilated into Gannett, an
accounting was proper and, additionally, was necessary to separate the newspapers' books and
profits from Gannett operations.
As noted, the purpose of the option judgment was to ensure that Gannett Co. continued
responsible operation of the newspapers. Id. at 1244. At this point in the proceedings, the
defense attorney questioned whether the option to rescind would be a final judgment from
which an appeal could be taken. Id. at 1245. The district court believed that an option judg-
ment would be final. Id.
20. The option portion of the judgment was worded as follows:
McKinney may exercise the rescission election only during either of the following
periods:
(1) The 60-day period commencing the day following expiration of the time to
1984]
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Kinney failed to exercise this option, the contract would remain in full force
and effect. 2 1 The parties then appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
2. The Decision
As noted, the Tenth Circuit considered the finality issue on its own mo-
tion.22 The majority held that the district court judgment was not final, and
dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 23 Judge Logan dis-
sented from this disposition.
24
McKinney argued that the judgment was final by virtue of the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning in Irwin v. West End Development Co. 25 In Irwin, a con-
structive trust was imposed over stock to allow the plaintiffs thirty days to
exercise their rights, as shareholders, to purchase a pro-rata share of the
stock. 26 The defendant agrued that the plaintiffs' purchase rights had ex-
pired because they failed to exercise those rights within thirty days after the
trial court's entry of judgment. 2 7 The Tenth Circuit held that the appeal
suspended the thirty-day period until the judgment became effective, and
that plaintiffs therefore retained their purchase rights. 28 The issue of final
judgment was not considered.
McKinney argued that there was no meaningful difference between the
stock purchase arrangement in Irwti and the rescission option created in his
case. Both arrangements merely created the right to elect a fixed remedy
following appellate consideration of the trial court's rulings.
29
The McKinney judgment obviously contains an option. The Tenth Cir-
cuit, through Judge Barrett, viewed the judgment as terminating only the
liability question, leaving the award of damages unresolved. 30 This form of
judgment, leaving damages unresolved, is not final under section 1291. 3 ' To
appeal, . . . provided that none of the parties to the action has filed a timely notice of
appeal; or
(2) The 60-day period commencing on the date of issuance of a mandate of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirming McKinney's right to
the rescission election.
Id. at 1245 (quoting district court judgment).
21. Id
22. See supra note 2.
23. 694 F.2d at 1249.
24. Id (Logan, J., dissenting).
25. 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. demid, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974).
26. 481 F.2d at 37, 40.
27. Id at 3 9.
28. Id. at 40. The Tenth Circuit held that the option fell within the general rule that an
appeal suspends the time required for performance of an obligation. Id at 39-40.
29. 694 F.2d at 1247. The Irwin judgment provided "[such] tender shall be made within
thirty days from the date this judgment becomes final, and, if such tender is not made, the trust
hereby impressed shall be released." Id. at 1250 (Logan, J., dissenting).
30. 694 F.2d at 1246.
31. Id The Supreme Court has held:
The order, viewed apart from its discussion of Rule 54(b), constitutes a grant of partial
summary judgment limited to the issue of petitioner's liability. Such judgments are by
their terms interlocutory, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c), and where assessment of dam-
ages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved have never been considered to
be "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976), quoted in McKinney, 694 F.2d at
1246.
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have the appellate court consider the case before a decision on damages dis-
turbs the appropriate relationship by placing the appellate court in the trial
process.
Besides relying on the form of the judgment in reaching its conclusion
on lack of finality, the Tenth Circuit also drew upon the final judgment
definition articulated in Cathn o. United States.32  In Cat/in, the Supreme
Court held that a final judgment is one that "end[s] the litigation on the
merits and leave[s] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.
'33
The option judgment in McKinney required more than the mere execution of
judgment, because execution of the district court judgment was dependent
on McKinney's decision to rescind. Therefore, under Cal/in, the trial court's
order was not a final decision. 34
A further factor militating against finding a final decision was the possi-
bility of rendering an advisory opinion. Even though the parties' rights and
liabilities had been adjudicated, to have the Tenth Circuit consider the mer-
its would place the court in the position of rendering an advisory opinion.
35
The advisory opinion was possible because the majority interpreted the trial
court's judgment as a "second . . . option to rescind,following our opinion on
the merits."'36 Essentially, McKinney's decision would be based on the ap-
pellate treatment of alleged errors in the accounting, rather than the trial
court's findings in the accounting proceeding.
37
The majority opinion dismissed McKinney's analogy to Irwin v. West
End Development Co. 38 by distinguishing Irwin. According to the majority, the
Irwin judgment required plaintiffs to tender money for stock.39 Therefore, it
contained no option similar to that present in McKinney.40
Judge Breitenstein concurred in Judge Barrett's majority opinion, but
distinguished Irwin on different grounds. Irwin involved equitable relief es-
sentially forcing performance of a contractually created stock purchase op-
tion.41 McKinney involved a judicially created option which would allow the
plaintiff to choose one of two forms of relief after an appellate decision had
settled certain issues affecting the relative worth of each option. 42 Essen-
tially, the McKinney option allowed the plaintiff to obtain judicial advice on
the effect of a particular election, thereby allowing an improper exercise of
32. 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
33. Id at 233, quotedzn McKinney, 694 F.2d at 1247.
34. 694 F.2d at 1248. Cf Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Frontier Airlines,
Inc., No. 82-1404 (10th Cir., Dec. 8, 1982) (district court approval of settlement agreement not
final inasmuch as a defendant could opt out of the agreement).
35. It is axiomatic that federal courts cannot render advisory opinions. E.g., Norvell v.
Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co., 519 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1975).
36. 694 F.2d at 1249 (emphasis in original).
37. Id. The merits of the appeal involved tax questions and challenges to the accuracy of
accounting; deciding those issues would have helped McKinney choose the most advantageous
option. Id
38. 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974).
39. Id. The majority's characterization of the Irwin judgment order appears inaccurate. See
supra note 29.
40. 694 F.2d at 1247.
41. Id at 1249 (Breitenstein, J., concurring). See Irwin, 481 F.2d at 37-41.






Pointing first to the equitable motivation for the option,4 4 and second
to the fact that McKinney had no remedial option-he could either accept
rescission or forego all relief whatsoever 4 5-the dissent found the relief
granted was an appropriate exercise of the trial court's equitable power.
4 6
The dissent also found support for its position in Irwzn's failure to consider
the finality of the shareholders' option, which, for Judge Logan, was essen-
tially identical to McKinney's option. 47 This failure indicated the routine
nature of judgments granting optional relief.
48
Judge Logan also rejected the majority's reliance on Cat/hn. The only
action required of the trial court was entry of McKinney's election, and
modifications in the accounting ordered by the court of appeals. Thus, the
judgment was final under Catln.
Next, the dissent pointed to the general rule that a judgment should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction when considering
finality.4 9 The Tenth Circuit could have entertained the appeal to advance
final judgment policies: trial proceedings would not be interfered with be-
cause the trial was over for all practical purposes; costs and piecemeal ap-
peals would be avoided because remanding would allow interlocutory
appeals pursuant to the certification provision in section 1292; and judicial
efficiency would be promoted. 50 Also, because the legal issues had been de-
cided by the lower court and the option was designed to encourage responsi-
ble action by Gannett, a remand would impose undue and unjustified
hardship on the parties.5 1 Judge Logan concluded by stating that he could
not "accept the view that because litigants may abandon rights reduced to
judgment the judgment is advisory"; accordingly, he would have addressed
the appeal on the merits.
52
C. Judic'al Discretion and Final Dectstons
The only Supreme Court construction of the meaning of "final deci-
sion" was in Catl'n, where the Court held that the primary indicium of final-
43. Id.
44. Id at 1250 (Logan, J., dissenting).
45. Id See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
46. 694 F.2d at 1250 (Logan, J., dissenting).
47. Judge Logan observed that the hwin judgment did not requirte any action by the plain-
tiffs, notwithstanding the majority's interpretation of the terms of the judgment. Id (quoting
Irwin judgment).
48. Id
49. E.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964); Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). The dissent claimed the majority's opinion
was merely a technical decision because, practically, the case was ripe for appeal. All the legal
issues had been developed and decided. The contingency judgment was merely an equitable
device that should not defeat the appeal. 694 F.2d at 1251 (Logan, J., dissenting).
50. 694 F.2d at 1251 (Logan,J., dissenting). See generally Andre, The Final judgment Rule and
Party Appeals of Civil Contempt Orders. Time_/or a Change, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1041, 1061 (1980).
51. 694 F.2d at 1252 (Logan, J., dissenting).
52. Id
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ity was termination of a trial court's adjudicative function. 53 The Supreme
Court has since acknowledged that this definition has not provided a
formula through which a final judgment can be pinpointed. 54 Thus, as pre-
dicted in an early critique of the final judgment rule,55 a large volume of
litigation has evolved around the question of what constitutes a final
decision.
In light of the inadequate Cat/hn definition, courts often invoke a bal-
ancing test. Although the ultimate purpose of the final decision rule is to
have one review over all stages of the proceeding, 56 courts must balance
avoidance of piecemeal review against delay which will cause a denial of
justice.57 Thus, fairness to litigants is not sacrificed merely because the pres-
ence of a final judgment is arguable. This balancing approach, however,
still fails to create a clear formula for determining what constitutes a final
judgment.
In Gillespie v. United Slates Steel Corp. ,58 Justice Black recognized that a
decision on whether a judgment is final can often be supported equally
either way.5 9 The decision in McKinney illustrates Justice Black's assertion,
and also demonstrates the significant discretionary power of an appellate
court to determine finality.
The majority in McKinney strictly followed the Catlin definition. The
trial court could not simply execute judgment because it was required to
wait for McKinney's decision on the option. Because that decision would
occur after the appeal, the majority refused to treat the trial court's order as
a final decision; to do so would involve the appellate court in the trial pro-
cess. Further, McKinney would have benefitted from an appellate decision
on the merits of the appeal. 60 Thus, on balance, the competing policy fac-
tors weighed against assuming jurisdiction.61  The dissent focused on the
negative effects of refusing jurisdiction to a decision which had eliminated all
the trial court's adjudicatory functions. 62 By remanding the case, the parties
would incur considerable hardship, and interlocutory appeal possibilities
would contribute to judicial inefficiency. 63 Therefore, the competing policy
concerns weighed in favor of accepting jurisdiction. In essence, the judges,
53. Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233 ("A 'final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.")
54. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
55. Crick, supra note 5, at 558.
56. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
57. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950). See generally
Andre, supra note 50, at 1042. Judge Logan considered this balancing approach in MlfcKznm,.
See 694 F.2d at 1251 (Logan, J., dissenting).
58. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
59. Justice Black stated: "[w]hether a ruling is 'final' within the meaning of § 1291 is
frequently so close a question that decision of that issue either way can be supported with
equally forceful arguments. Id. at 152.
60. 694 F.2d at 1249.
61. Although the majority's analysis does not explicitly weigh competing policy concerns,
this conclusion is implicit in its rejection of a decision which was final for all practical purposes.
See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
63. 694 F.2d at 1250 (Logan, J., dissenting).
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in keeping with the practice of other circuit courts, 64 were using their discre-
tion in determining whether the trial court's order was a final decision.
Fifty years ago one commentator concluded that without a definite
formula for identifying a final judgment, section 1291 was useless. 65 A satis-
factory definition must establish a definite point in a trial court proceeding
which can be labeled as final; only when that point is reached could an
appeal be taken.66 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the Cat/in defini-
tion is not dispositive. Instead of perfecting the definition, appellate courts
continue to emphasize various purposes and policies in determining what is
a final judgment. 67 Unfortunately, all the Tenth Circuit determined in Mc-
Knney was that a certain form of judgment is not a final decision under
section 1291. The holding does nothing to clear the fog emanating from the
Cat/n definition.
Section 1291 is important because it avoids disruption and delay of le-
gitimate court functions and minimizes the strain on the parties and the
judicial system forseeable in a system sending all trial court orders through
the appeal process. 68 As McKznney illustrates, however, in many cases courts
are using their discretion in determining what constitutes a final decision
under section 1291. Although the purposes behind section 1291 are impor-
tant and must be effected, as it stands section 1291 generates as much labor
as it saves. 69 Instead of requiring courts to rationalize their decisions, section
1291 should be repealed. 70 Appellate courts would then be left in their pres-
ent position of applying discretion based on court-made policies, but would
be able to develop a more disciplined set of criteria for determining finality.
The proposed repeal of section 1291 should not be equated with ignor-
ing the judicial policy of avoiding piecemeal reviews, however. That policy,
along with the policies of preventing excessive appeals, maintaining an ap-
propriate relationship with the trial court, and avoiding undue hardship,
must continue to serve as the guidelines for determining the scope of appel-
late jurisdiction.
64. See, e.g., In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1980); In re Berkley & Co.,
629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); Dilly v. S.S. Kresge Co., 606 F.2d 62 (4th Cir. 1979); Ryan v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978); David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412
(9th Cir. 1977); West v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 558 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1977); Kap-
pelmann v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061
(1977).
65. Crick, supra note 5, at 563-65.
66. See id at 558.
67. Cf Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 575 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) ("The Court's decision in these appeals throws the law of finality into a state of great
uncertainty and will, I am afraid, tend to increase further efforts at piecemeal review.").
68. See Andre, supra note 50, at 1061.
69. See Crick, supra note 5, at 562.
70. Cf Crick, supra note 5, at 564-65 (proposing repeal of statutory limits on appellate
jurisdiction in favor of appellate discretion in order to effect a more meaningful appellate
review).
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II. HARRIS V. ILLINOIS-CALIFORNIA EXPRESS, INC.: APPLYING THE
REQUIREMENT OF COMPLETE DIVERSITY
A. Overview of Dversi' Jurisdiction
It is fundamental that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
7 1
Federal jurisdiction is limited both by the provisions of article 11172 and by
the acts of Congress. 73 One such limitation is the diversity requirement,
which permits actions normally within state court jurisdiction to be brought
in federal court when the adverse parties are citizens of different states.
74
Supreme Court interpretations of the current diversity jurisdiction statute
have held that if any adverse parties are citizens of the same state, diversity
jurisdiction does not exist. 75 Historically, an exception to this statutory re-
quirement of complete diversity has been recognized where complete diver-
sity is lost through events taking place after a federal court properly had
jurisdiction. In that circumstance, the Court has recognized the continued
presence of diversity jurisdiction.
7 6 Harris v. I/linois-Caformia Express, Inc. 77
required the Tenth Circuit to consider whether diversity jurisdiction existed
following a series of procedural events, detailed below, which resulted in a
loss of complete diversity.
B. Harris v. Illinois-California Express, Inc.
1. The Facts
Harris was a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident
which took place in New Mexico. Kimberly Harris, a passenger in the car of
Sherry and William Harden, commenced an action against the drivers, own-
ers, and insurers of the other vehicles involved in the accident. 78 The action
was filed in the federal district court for New Mexico, with jurisdiction based
on complete diversity between Harris and the defendants. 79 The defendants
71. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Accord Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).
72. U.S. CONST., art. III.
73. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441
(1850).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982) provides: "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(l) citizens of different states." See also U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 7. The primary purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to protect out-of-
state citizens from the prejudice of local courts, or at least to alleviate the fear of such prejudice.
See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). Other justifications for
diversity range from the supposed procedural advantages existing in federal court to the invigo-
rating effect an available federal forum has on inter-regional capital flows. See generally C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 134-36 (1983).
75. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967). Accord Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 & n,13 (1978); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
76. See Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922); see generally
D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 303 (1982).
77. 687 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 1364. Harris sued individually and as a personal representative of her husband's




subsequently filed a third-party complaint against William Harden. 80 Fol-
lowing this complaint, Sherry Harden filed a motion requesting permission
to intervene as a co-party plaintiff against the defendants named in Harris'
original complaint, which motion was granted. 8 1 Sherry's intervention did
not affect jurisdiction; complete diversity remained between all plaintiffs and
defendants in Harris' original suit.8 2 Next, however, Harris amended her
complaint to include William Harden as a defendant.8 3 Sherry Harden did
not assert any claims against William.8 4 Nonetheless, because both Hardens
had identical state citizenship, William's addition as a defendant destroyed
complete diversity; citizens of the same state were then on opposite sides of
the same action. 8 5 After trial on the merits the defendants appealed, raising
the question of diversity jurisdiction.86
2. The Decision
The Tenth Circuit began by observing that complete diversity existed
at the time of Harris' original complaint, remained after Sherry Harden in-
tervened as a plaintiff, and was only lost when William Harden was joined
as a defendant by Harris' amended complaint. 87 The Tenth Circuit held,
however, that Harris's addition of William did not violate the complete di-
versity rule.88 This holding stemmed from the court's statement that once
diversity jurisdiction has properly attached, jurisdiction is not destroyed by
the permissive intervention of a non-indispensable party, especially where
that party has independent grounds for jurisdiction.8 9 The court rejected
defendants' argument that Sherry Harden was an indispensable party. Al-
though the claims of Harris and Sherry Harden had questions of law and
fact in common, the actions were independent of each other and could be
treated separately. 9° Because Sherry was not an essential party, her inter-
vention could not defeat diversity jurisdiction.9'
The Tenth Circuit then considered William Harden's position in the
80. Id. William Harden filed cross-claims against the defendants as third-party plaintiffs.
Id
81. Id at 1364-65.
82. Id at 1365.
83. Id Harris and William Harden had different state citizenships.
84. Ila.
85. Id At the district court level the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of diversity
jurisdiction, but withdrew the motion. Id
86. d Plaintiffs prevailed at trial. Id at 1364.
87. Id at 1366.
88. Id at 1369.
89. Id at 1367. This principle is grounded in the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, which
permits a court to exercise judicial power over a group of related claims once jurisdiction exists
over the original claim. See D. CURRIE, supra note 76, at 303. Limits on ancillary jurisdiction
exist, see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), although those limits
have yet to be defined. See D. CURRIE, supra note 76, at 304. See also infra notes 99-143 and
accompanying text.
90. 687 F.2d at 1368. The court also noted that Sherry's intervention did not, in itself,
destroy diversity jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit analogized this situation to a consolidation of
actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 42. If the two actions had been commenced independently, they
would have been consolidated for judicial economy. Therefore, jurisdiction should be main-
tained. See 687 F.2d at 1368-69.
91. Id. (quoting Wihta R.R. &Light Co. v. Pub/ic UJtZ Comm'n, 260 U.S. 51, 53-54 (1922)).
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action. Although Harris' amended complaint joining William Harden as a
defendant destroyed complete diversity, like Sherry, William was not an es-
sential party. 92 Therefore, William's addition, like Sherry's, could not divest
the court of jurisdiction.
93
The conclusion to recognize jurisdiction was buttressed by citation to
the Supreme Court's decision in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.94
Owen rejected the argument that diversity jurisdiction remained after all di-
verse defendants had been dismissed from plaintiffs case, even though diver-
sity jurisdiction had originally been present. 95 Crucial to the decision,
however, was the fact that the plaintiff in Owen could not have sued the
remaining defendant under the diversity provisions. 9 6 The Supreme Court
recognized that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, although flexible,
could not be used to create jurisdiction over a suit so obviously in contraven-
tion of the statutory diversity requirement.97 The Tenth Circuit, emphasiz-
ing Owen's recognition of the benefits of flexibility in construing a court's
ancillary jurisdiction powers, 98 upheld jurisdiction in Harris notwithstanding
the lack of complete diversity.
C. The Tenth Circui Loses Itself in Court-Made Rules
Diversity jurisdiction is determined at the time an action is commenced
and at every stage of the proceeding. 99 This jurisdiction cannot be enlarged
or limited by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 0 0 Pursuant to Rule
14(a),' 0 1 the defendants named in Harris' original complaint impleaded
William Harden as a third-party defendant.' 0 2 By so doing, the district
court acquired jurisdiction over Mr. Harden. Because impleader is a defen-
sive weapon, which ensures that a defendant's interests are adequately pro-
92. 687 F.2d at 1368-69.
93. See id at 1368-69.
94. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
95. Id. at 377.
96. See id.
97. d
98. 687 F.2d at 1369.
99. See, e.g., Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). In certain circumstances,
once diversity jurisdiction is held to exist subsequent changes in the status of the original parties
will not divest a court's jurisdiction. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283
(1938) (diversity jurisdiction not ousted by plaintiff's subsequent lowering of claimed damages);
Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41 (1895) (subsequent change in a
party's citizenship will not destroy diversity jurisdiction). Cf also Hill v. Rolleri, 615 F.2d 886
(9th Cir, 1980) (court maintained jurisdiction over non-diverse third-party claim after dismissal
of diverse plaintiff because diversity was present at time action commenced, and subsequent
events would not defeat jurisdiction).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in part that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts."
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). This rule provides in part:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party as a third-party
plaintiff may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him . . . . The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defend-
ant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plain-
tiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff . ...
Id.
102. 687 F.2d at 1364.
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tected, no independent jurisdictional grounds need to be asserted by the
impleading defendant.' 3 Jurisdiction over an impleaded defendant exists
by virtue of a federal court's power to hear claims ancillary to the primary
action. 104
Rule 14(a) also permits the original plaintiff to assert claims directly
against a third-party defendant.105 Because Rule 14(a) is not jurisdic-
tional,1 0 6 confusion has arisen as to when independent grounds for jurisdic-
tion are necessary for a plaintiff asserting claims directly against a third-
party defendant. This section will attempt to sort out some of that
confusion.
In 1978, the Supreme Court concluded that independent jurisdictional
grounds must be present for a diversity plaintiff to assert a claim directly
against a third-party defendant. 10 7 The Supreme Court's decision, Owen
Equipment & Erectton Co. v. Kroger,'0 8 involved diversity action in which the
plaintiff amended her complaint to assert a claim against a non-diverse
third-party defendant. 10 9 The primary diverse defendant was dismissed
from the action," 0 and the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was lost
over the remaining claim in the absence of an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction. '" Although Kroger reemphasizes strict construction of the di-
versity requirement,'1 2 its actual holding is limited to the factual situation in
which the plaintiff and the third-party defendant are non-diverse."13
The lower courts in Kroger would have retained the action under the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.' 14 Discussing the scope of ancillary juris-
diction' t 5 in light of the federal diversity requirements, the Court observed
103. Northern Contracting Co. v. C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 621, 624
(ED. Pa. 1977); see also James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.
1971); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
104. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 n.18 (1978).
105. See supra note 101.
106. See supra note 100.
107. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
108. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
109. See id. at 368-69.
110. Id at 368.
111. Id. at 370, 377.
112. See id at 377. The rule of complete diversity reaffirmed in Kroger requires every plain-
tiff in a diversity action to have a state citizenship different from every defendant. Hlarts, 687
F.2d at 1366 (quoting Kroger, 437 U.S. at 377). See also Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806); Oppenheim v. Sterling, 368 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1011
(1966).
113. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit has held that Kroger
holds that "an independent basis of jurisdiction is necessary for a plaintiff in a diversity action
to assert a non-federal claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant." Birmingham Fire
Ins. Co. v. Winegardner & Hammons, Inc., 714 F.2d 548, 553-54 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Fauvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 1977)).
114. 437 U.S. at 367. The court of appeals held that the district court had discretion over
whether it should adjudicate the non-diverse claim because, under United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1976), the plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant derived from
the same "core of operative facts" as the main action. 437 U.S. at 369.
115. The distinctions in applying pendant and ancillary jurisdictions are fading into one
indistinguishable doctrine. See general'y Comment, Pendant and Anci11a, Jurtsdction.- Towards a
Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1263, 1273 (1975). In Kroger, the Supreme Court,
without attempting to distinguish between ancillary and pendant jurisdiction, 437 U.S. at 370
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that if the plaintiff was allowed to assert her claim against the non-diverse
third party, the diversity requirement would be circumvented.' 16 To pre-
vent such an occurrence, the Supreme Court set forth three criteria for ancil-
lary jurisdiction. Besides the requirement of a "common nucleus of
operative fact" enunciated in UnitedMne Workers v. Gibbs,' 1 7 the Court ad-
ded that consideration should be given to the context in which the non-
federal claim is propounded, and that consideration should be given to
maintaining the integrity of the statute bestowing jurisdiction over the origi-
nal claim.18 Noting that ancillary jurisdiction normally is a defensive
weapon used by defendants, 19 and applying the three criteria to the facts in
Kroger, the Supreme Court prohibited the offensive use of ancillary jurisdic-
tion by the plaintiff in a diversity action.
The Tenth Circuit did not discuss the initial propriety of Harris'
amended complaint including William Harden as a defendant. Instead, the
court was concerned solely with whether Mr. Harden was an indispensable
party.' 20  Although Judge Barrett failed to discuss Harris's amendment
under the three criteria set out in Kroger, the complaint satisfies those criteria
and, therefore, is not in conflict with Kroger's prohibition against the offen-
sive use of ancillary jurisdiction. First, Harris' direct claim against William
Harden as third-party defendant obviously arose from the same core of oper-
ative fact, 12 1 and is a claim which Harris would expect to try with her other
claims in one judicial proceeding. ' 22 Second, the posture in which Harris'
amended complaint comes about is important on two points. To begin with,
unlike the defendant in Aldinger v. Howard12 3 Mr. Harden was already a
party to the action and within the court's jurisdiction. Harris' amended
complaint therefore does not raise the problems associated with a plaintiff's
n.8, recognized that ancillary jurisdiction is clearly proper with respect to impleader, cross-
claims, and counter-claims. Id. at 375 & n.18.
116. "[A] plaintiff could defeat the statutory requirement of complete diversity by the sim-
ple expedient of suing only those defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for
them to implead nondiverse defendants." 437 U.S. at 374.
117. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
118. Id. at 373 (citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)). The three factors articu-
lated in Kroger have been applied in subsequent ancillary jurisdiction cases. E.g., Travelers Ins.
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 675 F.2d 633, 638-40 (5th Cir. 1982) (held no ancillary jurisdiction over
cross-claims of non-diverse parties in an interpleader action); Acton Co. v. Bachman Foods, Inc.,
668 F.2d 76, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1982) (held no ancillary jurisdiction over joinder of non-diverse
plaintiff); Gunnell v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 67, 69 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (held no ancillary
jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant). See also Runyan
v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 566 F. Supp. 600 (D. Colo. 1983) (applied Kroger's requirements
to prohibit pendant jurisdiction over a state claim).
119. 437 U.S. at 376. Ancillary jurisdiction is "defensive" because it is a way for defendants,
brought into court against their will, to protect their interests by asserting claims against the
plaintiff or other responsible parties. Id ; see also Acton Co. v. Bachman Foods, Inc., 668 F.2d
76, 79 (1st Cir. 1982); Comment, supra note 115, at 1273. Justice White dissented from Kroger's
defensive classification of ancillary jurisdiction. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 381 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White would have followed Gibbs, and held that a common nucleus of operative fact is
sufficient for jurisdiction over all claims arising in a diversity case. Id. at 384.
120. 687 F.2d at 1368-69. The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that Mr. Harden was not a
necessary party to Kimberly Harris' action.
121. See id. at 1364-65.
122. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
123. 472 U.S. 1 (1976). The Supreme Court in Aldinger held that a federal court does not
have pendant party jurisdiction over a defendant sued solely on a state claim.
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attempt to add a new party to the action.' 24 Next, unlike Kroger, Harris and
William Harden were diverse parties, so that Harris could have maintained
an independent action against Mr. Harden in federal court. 12 5 Finally, the
independent jurisdictional basis upon which Harris could amend her com-
plaint to include a claim against William Harden ensures the integrity of the
diversity jurisdiction statute. Harris' use of Rule 14(a) did not expand the
Tenth Circuit's limited jurisdiction; hence, her action against Harden is per-
missible under Kroger.
Sherry Harden's effect on diversity, as a result of Sherry's intervention,
is not necessarily determinative for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. When
a party seeks to intervene in a lawsuit, several considerations are implicated.
First, it must be determined whether the party seeking intervention is an
indispensable party under Rule 19.126 The Tenth Circuit correctly held that
Sherry was not an indispensable party.' 2 7 After determining that an inter-
venor such as Sherry is not an indispensable party, the propriety of permis-
sive intervention must be considered. Two requirements must be met for
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b).' 22 First, the intervenor must have
a question of law or fact in common with the pending action.' 29 Second, the
intervening party must have independent grounds for federal jurisdiction. 13
0
Sherry Harden met both requirements. 13' When a party is not indispensa-
ble and meets the criteria for permissive intervention, diversity jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a) 132 is not destroyed.' 33 Therefore, Sherry's pres-
ence as a permissive intervenor did not have to be considered when Harris'
complaint was amended to include William Harden as a defendant.
124. See id at 14-15. Aldnger distinguished between the situation where a plaintiff seeks to
assert a claim against one already present under federal jurisdiction and a plaintiff's attempt to
join an entirely new defendant without an independent basis ofjurisdiction. In the latter situa-
tion, the federal court would lack jurisdiction. Id. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 381-82 (White, J.,
dissenting) (noting this significant distinction involving context). Moreover, the Aldnger hold-
ing was limited to the plaintiff's specific claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982) and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). The Court recognized that different party alignments and dif-
ferent jurisdictional statutes could permit a different result. 427 U.S. at 18.
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (providing a federal jurisdiction for diversity actions). This
aspect of the case negates the Supreme Court's fear in Kroger that a plaintiff could sue only
diverse citizenship defendants and wait for the defendants to implead non-diverse defendants.
See supra note 116.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. This rule sets out the requirements for classification as an indispen-
sable party.
127. See 689 F.2d at 1367.
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
129. "[A]nyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ... (2) when an applicant's
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." Id.
130. 687 F.2d at 1367; Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc. v. G.W. Murphy Indus., Inc., 472
F.2d 893, 528, 530 (10th Cir. 1973) (permissive intervention denied because no independent
grounds for jurisdiction). When the intervening party does not have independent jurisdictional
grounds, the intervenor must meet Rule 24's requirements for intervention by right.
131. Sherry had questions of law and fact in common with Harris, and diversity jurisdiction
was present between Sherry and the original defendants. 687 F.2d at 1367.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982).
133. Miller v. Miller, 406 F.2d 590, 593 (10th Cir. 1969) ("Executors are not indispensable
parties in actions such as this and therefore the intervention of such a party cannot destroy
diversity jurisdiction."); Drillers Engine & Supply, Inc. v. Burckhalter, 327 F. Supp. 648, 649-50
(W.D. Okla. 1971) (non-indispensable parties do not defeat the court's diversity jurisdiction
over the main action).
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The above reasoning appears to have been followed by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, 134 but parts of Judge Barrett's analysis fail to articulate the interaction
between Rule 19(a), Rule 24(b), and section 1332(a). At the outset, the
Tenth Circuit's emphasis on the fact that Sherry intervened prior to Harris'
amended complaint 135 is misplaced. Regardless of when permissive inter-
vention is sought, it is within the court's discretion to allow intervention if
the party is not indispensable and the criteria behind Rule 24(b) are met.136
Because diversity jurisdiction over the main action is not affected by such a
party, it does not matter when the party seeks to intervene.
137
Another aspect of Hams indicating the court's failure to focus on the
relevant rules is its quote from Wzchila Railroad & Light Co. v. Pubic Uihties
Commission.' 31  Wichit'a Railroad involved the permissive intervention of a
non-diverse party as a defendant. 139 In that case, the Supreme Court held
jurisdiction was not divested.1 40 The Tenth Circuit unfortunately did not
distinguish Wichita Railroad, which did not involve Rule 24(b) and which
does not support the Tenth Circuit's statement that Sherry Harden could
not have intervened if Harris had amended her complaint first. 14' Finally,
the discussion of consolation 142 seems to be a weak effort to bolster the Tenth
Circuit's holding, and suggests that the court may have been uneasy with its
own reasoning and with reliance on Rule 24(b).
Although the court's conclusion in Harris is correct under the criteria set
out in Kroger, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning relies on undisciplined argu-
ments and fails to note factual distinctions in relevant precedents. Kroger did
134. See 687 F.2d at 1367-68.
135. See id. at 1368.
136. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text; cf Drillers Engine & Supply, Inc. v.
Burckhalter, 327 F. Supp. 648, 649 (W.D. Okla. 1971) (pointing out that non-diverse parties did
not assert claims against each other but were asserting their own claims independently).
137. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit implicitly recognized
this point when it discussed whether William Harden was an indispensable party. See 687 F.2d
at 1369.
138. 260 U.S. 48 (1922). Harris quoted the following passage from Wichita Railroad:
The intervention of the Kansas Company, a citizen of the same State as the
Wichita Company, its opponent, did not take away the ground of diverse citizenship.
That ground existed when the suit was begun and the plaintiff set it forth in the bill as
a matter entitling it to go into the District Court. Jurisdiction once acquired on that
ground is not divested by a subsequent change in the citizenship of the parties ....
Much less is such jurisdiction defeated by the intervention, by leave of the court, of a
party whose presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the origi-
nal parties . . . . The Kansas Company, while it had an interest and was a proper
party, was not an indispensable party.
687 F.2d at 1368 (quoting Witchila Railroad, 260 U.S. at 53-54).
139. 260 U.S. at 52-53. This case illustrates the defensive use of ancillary Jurisdiction. rather
than the offensive use prohibited by the Supreme Court in Kroger. Such a factual difference
surrounding the non-diversity claim is perhaps the material reason why Kroger did not overrule
Wichita Railroad. In Wichita Railroad a defendant benefited, whereas in Kroger it would have
been the plaintiff who benefited.
140. Id. at 54.
141. See 687 F.2d at 1368. Specificially, there were no independent jurisdictional grounds in
Wichita Railroad. 260 U.S. at 52. In fact, the Wichita Railroad quote supports the conclusion that
Sherry Harden could have intervened after William Harden had been joined as a direct defend-
ant by Harris.
142. See 687 F.2d at 1368-69 (distinguishing Kroger from consolidation actions under FED.
R. Civ. P. 42).
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not eliminate the possibility of avoiding complete diversity. It is a significant
decision in the diversity area and should not be tossed aside unnoticed, as the
Tenth Circuit seemed to do in Harris. Reaching the proper result through




Removal refers to the right to transfer an action from a state court,
where it was originally filed, to a federal court. Removal is permitted when
the federal court would have had original jurisidiction over the action. 144
This right has existed as a valid statutory procedure since the Judiciary Act
of 1789.145 The purposes behind the removal statute are to escape local
prejudice towards nonresident litigants and to provide an appropriate forum
for actions involving federal law which have been brought in state court. 1
46
The construction and effect of the removal statute was the subject of several
Tenth Circuit decisions this past term.
A. Defect in Stale Jurisdiction Not Cured by Removal
Jurisdiction upon removal is derivative, meaning that when a state
court has no jurisdiction over a claim, a federal court acquires none on re-
moval and must dismiss the case. 14 7 This is true even if jurisdiction would
have been proper had the suit originally been filed in a federal court. 148 The
Tenth Circuit, in Goodrich v. Burlngton Northern Railroad, 14 9 reinforced the rule
that where a state court does not have jurisdiction over a particular claim,
proper removal to a federal court will not cure the defect regardless of con-
siderations of judicial economy.
Goodrich was a negligence action originally brought in a Colorado state
court. The defendant, Burlington Northern Railroad (Burlington), im-
pleaded the United States Postal Service (United States), asserting claims for
143. Harris is another example of the judicial energy wasted on the diversity requirement,
and lends support for abolishing diversity jurisdiction. See generally Rowe, Abolishing Dzversiy
Juridiction." Positive Side Efecs and Poienial for Further Reforns, 92 HARv. L. REV. 963 (1979).
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). This section states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such ac-
tion is pending.
Id.
145. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12; 1 Stat. 73, 79. For a brief history of the removal
statutes, see Note, Remand Order Review After Thermtron Products, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 1086, 1088-
91.
146. Myers, Federal Appellate Revtew of Remand Orders.- Expanstn or Eradcaion? 48 Miss. L.J.
741, 741 (1977).
147. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 & n.17 (1981). The dismissal is based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Venner v. Michigan Central R.R., 271 U.S. 127, 131 (1926);
accord Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654 (9th Cir.
1972); Martinez v. Seaton, 285 F.2d 587 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 946 (1961). See also
Montgomery v. Utah, No. 82-2194 (10th Cir., Feb. 28, 1983) (removal jurisdiction dependent
upon a viable state action).
148. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 n.17 (1981).
149. 701 F.2d 129 (10th Cir. 1983).
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contribution and indemnity under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 150 The
United States successfully removed the case to federal court., 5 ' Once in fed-
eral court, the United States pointed out that exclusive jurisdiction over
claims asserted under the Federal Tort Claims Act rests with the federal
district courts. 152 The state court therefore had no jurisdiction over the
third party claim, with the result that the federal district court had no deriv-
ative jurisdiction. 3 The district court agreed, and dismissed the third-
party claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 154 The propriety of the
dismissal was appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
On appeal, Burlington asserted that the federal district court erred in
granting the dismissal because such a ruling, based on the derivative juris-
diction principle, frustrated judicial economy. 155 Judge Seymour, writing
for the Tenth Circuit, considered the impleader rule 156 and its purpose of
judicial economy, and stated that the derivative jurisdictional principle
nonetheless applied to third-party claims. 157 Judge Seymour followed Kenrose
Manufacturing Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co. ,'15 a Fourth Circuit decision which
held that mere permission in the federal rules to bring a claim does not con-
fer jurisdiction over a claim.
15 9
The application of Kenrose Manufacturing in Goodrich was entirely appro-
priate. The state court did not have jurisdiction over the third-party claim,
and removal could not create jurisdiction over that claim. The Tenth Cir-
cuit properly ruled that a judicial economy argument supporting a third-
party claim cannot cure a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, the
derivative jurisdiction principle applies to third-party claims as well as to
main actions.
B. Limiting the Permz'ssble Grounds for Remand to State Court
After removal, a district court must remand a case back to state court at
any time prior to final judgment if the case appears to have been "removed
improvidently and without jurisdiction."' 6 0 Until 1976, the general rule was
no appellate review of district court remand orders. 161 The nonreviewability
150. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982). See 701 F.2d at 130.
151. 701 F.2d at 130.
152. Id See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
153. 701 F.2d at 130.
154. Id Because the federal district court did not have jurisdiction over the primary claim
of negligence, and did not acquire jurisdiction over the federal claim, the question of pendent
jurisdiction over the primary claim was not considered.
155. Id Dismissal of the third-party claims means Burlington must now bring its indemnity
and contribution claim against the United States as a separate cause of action in federal court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Rule 14(a) allows a defendant to implead a third party who is
or may be liable to the defendant for all or part of the original plaintiffs claim. Id
157. 701 F.2d at 130.
158. 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972).
159. Id at 893. "Permission" means that although Rule 14(a), for example, does not re-
quire third party impleader, a court in its discretion may allow the impleader. There is nothing
in Rule 14 (a) conferring jurisdiction, and therefore it should not be construed as a source of
jurisdiction. See FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
161. See Myers, supra note 146, at 743. This rule originates from 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982)
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rule was intended to prevent delays and interruptions of the proceedings in a
case. 16 2 Then, in Thermtron Products, Inc., v. Hermansdorfer,163 the Supreme
Court relaxed the harshness of this rule by holding that a remand order for a
properly removed case may be reviewed when the remand is based on
grounds not authorized by statute. ' 64 The Tenth Circuit applied this rule of
law when it granted a writ of mandamus in Sheet Metal Workers International
Assoctaton v. Seal.165
Sheet Metal Workers was commenced in Oklahoma state court, and in-
volved an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement.' 66 The case
was properly removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma because federal district courts have original jurisdic-
tion over actions involving collective bargaining agreements. 16 7 The federal
district court then granted the employer's motion to remand the case to state
court.168 The case was not remanded upon statutory grounds, however.1
69
Applying Thermtron, the Tenth Circuit granted the requested writ of manda-
mus and ordered the district court to vacate the remand order and hear the
case. 170
The Tenth Circuit's decision rejected the three arguments raised by the
employer (Acme). First, Acme argued that the mandamus proceeding was
barred because of the statutory prohibition against appellate review of re-
mand orders.'t7  Citing Thermtron, the Tenth Circuit responded that a re-
mand decision is reviewable when it is based on grounds not specified by
statute. 17 2 Because the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144 7 (c), 173 permits remand only
when removal is "improvident and without jurisdiction," and those were not
the grounds proffered by the district court, appellate review was not
barred. 1
74
Second, Acme attempted to distinguish Thermtron by pointing out that
the word "improvidently" is not defined. Therefore, respondent Acme con-
which reads in relevant part: "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." The statute provides an exception for re-
mand orders in civil rights cases. Id
162. Myers, supra note 146, at 742 (citing Chandler v. O'Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045, 1057 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972)).
163. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
164. Id. at 351. The statutory basis for remand is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
165. 693 F.2d 1000 (10th Cir. 1982), modifitd, 696 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1983). The court
modified its original decision to allow the district court to determine whether it would entertain
pendent state claims. 696 F.2d at 783.
166. 693 F.2d at 1001.
167. See Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982). Removal of original jurisdiction actions is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982).
168. 693 F.2d at 1001.
169. Concurrent jurisdiction existed between the state and federal court. The injunctive
relief requested by the employer could not be granted by the federal court, see Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-114 (1982), but was a possible remedy in state court. 693 F.2d at
1001. The district court remanded because it felt the state court's power to grant complete relief
made that court a better forum. Id at 1002 n.2.
170. 693 F.2d at 1006.
171. Id at 1002. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982).
172. 693 F.2d at 1002.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
174. 693 F.2d at 1001-02.
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tended, the definition of "improvidently" removed should include situations
in which removal would limit the available remedies. 175 The Tenth Circuit
disagreed, stating that the presence of restricted remedies in federal court
does not compel a remand. Disparity in remedies is just one of the hardships
incurred when federal jurisdiction is properly invoked.1
76
Third, Acme contended that the case had been "improvidently re-
moved." For this argument to stand, however, Acme was required to show a
procedural defect. 1 77 Because the case had been timely removed and con-
tained no other procedural defects, it had not been "improvidently re-
moved" and appellate review was proper.' 78 Restricted remedies did not
violate a procedural requirement, and consequently could not affect the cir-
cuit court's jurisdiction. '
79
After rejecting Acme's arguments the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
restricted availability of remedies is not a statutory ground for remand back
to a state court.' 80 Consequently, the court was required to grant the re-
quested mandamus.' The fact that the court felt compelled to grant the
mandamus indicates that district courts are no longer free to remand for
reasons not specified by statutes.
C. Limil'ng "Federal Quest'on" Removal
Another general rule in removal jurisdiction is that removal statutes are
to be strictly construed.' 8 2 The Tenth Circuit applied this rule in Fajen v.
Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. ,183 where it considered whether the federal
district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b),18 4 which per-
mits removal of cases involving federal questions. 185
A brief recital of the complex procedural history behind Fajen is neces-
sary for an understanding of the court's decision. Five years after the plain-
175. Id at 1003. Acme was seeking injunctive relief which a federal court could not grant
but a state court could. See supra note 169.
176. See 693 F.2d at 1004 (quoting Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Assoc. of Ma-
chinists, 390 U.S. 557, 561 (1968)). The Tenth Circuit noted that the solution to the problem of
restricted remedies lies with Congress. 693 F.2d at 1004.
177. 693 F.2d at 1005. See generally Note, supra note 145, at 1093 (concludes improvidently
means legally defective). But cf Young v. Board of Educ., 416 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (D. Colo.
1976) (without mentioning section 144 7 (c), the district court remanded a properly removed case
because either state or federal court could hear civil rights actions and the plaintiff's choice of
forum should be protected).
178. See 693 F.2d at 1005 (failing to find procedural defect).
179. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 561 (1968).
180. 693 F.2d at 1005-06.
181. Id. at 1006.
182. See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941); Chicago, R.I. &
P.R. Co. v. Stude. 204 F.2d 116 (8th Cir. 1953), aJ'd, 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
183. 683 F.2d 331 (10th Cir. 1982).
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). This section reads:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on
a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any
other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the state in which such action is
brought.
Id.
185. 683 F.2d at 333.
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tiff had obtained a default judgment in a Nevada state court, the plaintiff
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
to recover the unsatisfied judgment. 186 The district court refused to enforce
the judgment; instead, it granted summary judgment for the defendant be-
cause the record in the earlier action indicated that the plaintiff had failed to
comply with Nevada's requirements for substituted service of process.187
Consequently, the Nevada court had not had personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in the earlier action, and the default judgment was unenforce-
able.188 The plaintiff then returned to Nevada and obtained an amended
default judgment nunc pro tunc, which corrected the personal jurisdiction
problem.' 8 9 Plaintiff then instituted an action in a New Mexico state court
seeking to enforce the amended Nevada judgment.190 Defendant requested
removal to federal district court, which the United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico granted to protect its prior summary judgment
decision.' 9' Instead of treating plaintiff's suit on the nunc pro tunc judg-
ment separately, however, the district court consolidated it with the prior
grant of summary judgment for the defendant and characterized the consoli-
dated action as a Rule 60(b)192 motion to vacate the grant of summary judg-
ment. 193  The hybrid motion was then denied, and the action was
dismissed. 194
On appeal the issue was whether jurisdiction existed to permit re-
moval. 195 The majority held that removal was improper, and ordered the
case remanded to state court.1 96 The starting point for the majority's analy-
sis was the rule that removal jurisdiction statutes must be strictly con-
strued. 19 7 In Fajen, the majority found that the district court was more
concerned with protecting its prior summary judgment than with applying
the Tenth Circuit's standard for removal based on a federal question.' 98
Two reasons were given for reversing the trial court's assumption of
jurisdiction.
First, plaintiff's action on the judgment nunc pro tunc was not a collat-
eral attack on the federal court's grant of summary judgment because the
issues involved in the two actions were markedly different. 199 The issue in
the summary judgment proceeding was limited to determining whether the
186. Id at 332.
187. Id.




192. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) permits motions to vacate a prior judgment.
193. 683 F.2d at 333.
194. Id
195. Id
196. Id at 334. Chief Judge Seth dissented from this decision. Id (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
197. Id at 333 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941)).
198. 683 F.2d at 333. The standard to be met is that "the required federal right or immu-
nity must be an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action, and . . . that federal contro-
versy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the
petition for removal." Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. 635 F.2d 797. 800 (10th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981), quoted in Fajen, 683 F.2d at 333.
199. 683 F.2d at 334.
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Nevada state court had jurisdiction to enter the original default judg-
ment.200 The issue in the disputed proceeding on the judgment nunc pro
tunc, however, was whether Nevada could cure the jurisdictional defect after
the fact. 2 0 1 Consequently, the prior judgment was not at issue in the second
suit, and the court had no jurisdiction to grant a removal petition to protect
its previous judgment.
20 2
Second, to the extent that the federal summary judgment order was
implicated in the second proceeding, it was implicated only by way of de-
fense.2 0 3 The majority stated that the basis for federal question removal
must appear on the face of a complaint.2 4 Where the complaint was predi-
cated on state grounds, the fact that the suit might ultimately involve con-
struction of a prior federal judgment did not convert the suit into an action
involving a federal question.20 5 Hence, removal under section 1441(b) was
improper.
20 6
Chief Judge Seth, in dissent, presented the two issues on appeal as first,
whether plaintiff's motion to remand the action to state court was properly
denied, and second whether the Rule 60(b) motion was properly denied .
2
07
Chief Judge Seth declared strongly that the action on the nunc pro tunc
judgment directly attacked the district court's grant of summary judgment
because the nunc pro tunc proceeding was in essence an attempt to obtain
relief from a federal judgment.20 8 Thus, the remand was properly denied,
because protecting a prior decision presented a federal question under the
Fifth Circuit's Villarreal v. Brown Express, Inc. 209 decision. The plaintiff
should not be allowed to circumvent the prior federal court dismissal by
correcting the defect supporting the dismissal; rather, the earlier federal
judgment was entitled to protection in subsequent actions.
210
The dissent also abjured the majority's use of a well-pleaded complaint
rule. The duty of the court was to go beyond the facts of the complaint and
look for a controlling question of federal law.2 1 , If the majority had done so,
they would have found a federal question, 21 2 and therefore would have sus-





204. Id See supra note 198.
205. Id Cf Louisville & Nashville kR. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (no federal question
jurisdiction based on a "lurking" federal defense).
206. 683 F.2d at 334.
207. Id at 335 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 336.
209. 529 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1976). In Vzllarreal, the plaintiff had settled a personal injury
claim for $300,000 in federal district court, and the action was dismissed with prejudice. Plain-
tiff later brought a state court action against the defendant, claiming that the federal award was
inadequate because the defendant had converted key evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that
federal question removal was proper to protect the existing federal judgment. Id at 1220-21.
210. 683 F.2d at 336 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
211. Id at 335.
212. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
213. 683 F.2d at 335-36 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
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have affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion.
2 14
Despite the strong dissent, the decision in Fajen limits the rule articu-
lated in Villarreal. Unless a prior federal judgment is a material part of a
subsequent action, protecting that prior judgment is an insufficient basis for
federal question removal in the Tenth Circuit.
D. RetazrtngJury Trial Rights After Removal
The question of when a state right to a jury trial is retained upon re-
moval pursuant to section 1442(a)(1) 2 15 was addressed in City of Aurora v.
Erwin.2 16 City of Aurora involved a petty offense action2 1 7 in which Erwin, a
United States postman, argued that he had an absolute right to a jury trial
under state law 2 ' 8 and that this right was retained upon removal. 2 ' 9 Apply-
ing a two-part analysis, a Tenth Circuit panel majority determined that Er-
win's right to a jury trial was retained following removal. 220 First, the Tenth
Circuit noted that removal cannot supplant substantive state law, but that
federal procedural rules preempt conflicting state rules. 2 2' Next, the court
concluded that the Colorado statute providing for a jury trial was non-
procedural in character,2 2 2 and that this right was therefore retained upon
removal.
In reaching the court's conclusion, Judge McKay, writing for the major-
ity, considered the limited purpose behind section 1442(a)(1). Citing Arizona
v. Manypenny, 223 Judge McKay stated that section 1442(a)(1) was intended
to permit a federal officer to assert immunity defenses in a forum free from
local interests and prejudices.22 4  Removal jurisdiction could "neither en-
large nor contract the rights of the parties." 225 Therefore, state law applies
unless it is preempted by a federal procedural rule.
2 2 6
Next, Judge McKay considered whether the Colorado statute providing
jury trials in criminal petty offense actions was enacted for procedural or
nonprocedural reasons. Although this determination was a federal question,
the court observed that a state's purpose in granting the jury trial right is a
significant factor in arriving at a final conclusion. 227 Probing into the his-
tory of the state statutory provision for ajury trial, the court concluded that
214. Id at 336.
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1982). This section permits removal to a federal court when
the action is brought against a United States officer, or an agent of such officer, concerning an
act within the scope of his or her office. Id
216. 706 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1983).
217. The postman was charged with a petty offense after spraying a dog's owner with dog
repellant. The offense took place on the "doggiest route in Aurora." Id at 295 n.j.
218. Id at 295. The defendant was entitled to a jury trial under Colorado law. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-10-109(2) (1978).
219. 706 F.2d at 296.
220. Id at 299.
221. Id at 296-97.
222. Id at 298-99.
223. 451 U.S. 232 (1981).
224. 706 F.2d at 296.
225. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981), quoted n) City of Aurora, 706 F.2d at
296-97.
226. 706 F.2d at 297. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
227. 706 F.2d at 297.
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the right was created as a direct response to the Colorado Supreme Court
decision in Austin v. City of Denver.228 In Austzn, the state supreme court ruled
that the right to a jury trial did not extend to petty criminal offenses.
Shortly thereafter, the legislature enacted a statute granting such jury trial
rights.229 Since its enactment, the Colorado Supreme Court has character-
ized the statute as creating a substantive right,230 albeit without articulation
of a nonprocedural rationale to support that characterization. Judge Mc-
Kay concluded that the jury trial right had been enacted, at least in part, for
nonprocedural reasons, and therefore the right was retained as state substan-
tive law upon removal to the federal court under section 1442(a)(1).
2 3t
In the dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Seth criticized the majority's
conclusion that Erwin was entitled to a jury trial in federal court. Chief
Judge Seth's primary argument was that "state laws cannot alter the essen-
tial character or functions of a federal court. '232 He reasoned that because a
federal magistrate court does not hold jury trials for petty criminal offenses,
the majority's decision alters this fundamental characteristic of the magis-
trate court. 233 The dissent concluded that, although the policy behind the
Colorado law was relevant in assessing the rule's importance, it should not
dictate the determination of what constituted a substantive right in a federal
court.
2 3 4 Because the majority's decision altered the federal distribution of
functions between judge and jury in the absence of convincing evidence of
the substantive nature of the state jury trial right, Chief Judge Seth
dissented.
IV. MULTIPLE CLAIMS AND FINALITY UNDER RULE 54(b)
A basic policy in federal courts is that an appeal will lie only from a
final decision. 235 A slight variation of that policy is provided in Rule
54(b) .236 Rule 54(b) allows particular orders which are not dispositive of an
entire action to be treated as final and, therefore, reviewable. 237 The usual
228. 170 Colo. 448, 462 P.2d 600, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 910 (1970). See 706 F.2d at 298.
229. 706 F.2d at 298. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-109(2) (1978).
230. Garcia v. People, 200 Colo. 413, 615 P.2d 698 (1980); Hardamon v. Municipal Court,
178 Colo. 271, 497 P.2d 1000 (1972).
231. 706 F.2d at 299.
232. Id. at 300 (Seth, C.J., dissenting). As supporting authority, the chief judge cited two
diversity jurisdiction cases, Byrd v Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) and Herron v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931). 706 F.2d at 299. The majority distinguished these cases
because they were diversity cases, not section 1442(a)(1) actions, and therefore invoked different
policy considerations, Id. at 299 n.10. In addition, the majority offered three other rebuttal
arguments: Byrd concerned a seventh amendment, not a sixth amendment, jury right; like Bryd,
City fAurora furthered the federal policy of promoting jury trials; and, finally, Byrd has been
subject to controversy. Id
233. 706 F.2d at 300 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
236. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) reads in pertinent part:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . .or when multi-
ple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination





problem with Rule 54(b) is determining which trial court decisions are final.
In this past term, the Tenth Circuit considered this question in light of the
requirements and purposes of Rule 54(b).
A. Partial Damage Awards Are Not Final Under 54(b)
In the per curiam decision Wheeler Machineiy Co. v. Mountain States Mineral
Enterprises, Inc. ,238 the Tenth Circuit held that a partial summary judgment,
awarding only a portion of the damages claimed, is not a final judgment for
purposes of Rule 54(b). 239 The district court in Wheeler granted partial sum-
mary judgment for the minimum undisputed amount Mountain States owed
Wheeler under a contract, and declared that judgment final under Rule
54(b). 24 0 The Tenth Circuit dismissed Mountain States' appeal, concluding
that the partial summary judgment was not final within the meaning of
Rule 54(b).
2 4 1
In determining whether the damages judgment was final, the Tenth
Circuit relied on the definition of a Rule 54(b) final judgment set forth in the
Supreme Court decisions Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey 2 4 2 and Curtiss- Wright
Corp. o. General Electric Co. 243 Sears defined final judgment under Rule 54(b)
as the ultimate disposition of one claim among several claims. 24 4 An "ulti-
mate disposition" must meet the finality requirements of section 1291 even
though it encompasses fewer than all the claims in an action.24 5 The district
court cannot, by certifying a decision as final, change the inherent nature of
that decision. 246 Once finality is found, a Rule 54(b) appeal is permitted if
the district court determines that there is no just reason for delay.
24 7
In Wheeler, the partial summary judgment for damages left other dam-
age claims arising from the same breach-interest, attorney fees, disputed
principal-undetermined. The Tenth Circuit applied the rule, followed by
other circuit courts,2 4 8 that where a principal amount is awarded but an
interest claim has yet to be determined, the award is not final for purposes of
appellate review.
24 9
238. 696 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
239. Id. at 789.
240. Id
241. Id
242. 351 U S. 427 (1956). The Supreme Court held that Rule 54(b) is important for permit-
ting timely appeals of adjudicated issues before all the issues in an action are determined. Id. at
437.
243. 446 U.S. 1 (1980).
244. 351 U.S. at 436, quoted t Curtiss- Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 7.
245. 351 U.S. at 438.
246. Id. at 437.
247. 446 U.S. at 8. The district court acts as a dispatcher, determining when Rule 54(b)
certification is appropriate.
248. See Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley, 614 F.2d 131, 131-32 (6th Cir. 1980); Acha v.
Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1978); Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66, 69 (2d
Cir. 1973).
249. 696 F.2d at 789. The court also noted that a dispute over a portion of the principal
precludes finality. Id
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B. Rule 54(b) Fnaht and Class Action Damage Awards
In Strey v. Hunt International Resources Corp. ,250 the Tenth Circuit also con-
cluded that a damage award was not final and therefore not reviewable
under Rule 54(b).25 1 Strey was a class action in which the district court ren-
dered a damage award without providing a method for dividing the fund
among class members, for disposing of unclaimed shares, and for assessing
attorney fees against the common fund. 252 The Tenth Circuit cited Boeing
Co. v. Van Gemert 25 3 as supporting the rule that the absence of a formula for
dividing the damage award created a lack of final judgment, and dismissed
the appeal.
2 54
C. Rule 54(b) Certifxation Merges with Previous Orders to Create Final
Judgment
A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of an order or judg-
ment in a civil action. 255 The timely filing of the notice of appeal is a condi-
tion precedent to appellate jurisdiction over the appeal. 256 The Tenth
Circuit adheres strictly to this rule.2 57 A prerequisite to appeal is a final
order.2 5 8 If the appeal is under Rule 54(b), the district court must expressly
determine that the partial judgment is final, and must direct entry of judg-
ment. 259  Without such certification, even a timely appeal is not
reviewable.
26 °
In A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Sims Consolidated, Ltd. 261 the Tenth Circuit held
that a Rule 54(b) certification merges with a prior order disposing of a claim,
and constitutes the final judgment for purposes of the thirty-day period for
filing a notice of appeal. 26 2 Garden City Production Credit Association v. Interna-
250. 696 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1982). In another class action case, the Tenth Circuit held that
an order which did not address the merits of the claim was not appealable under Rule 54(b).
See Baker v. Bray, 701 F.2d 119 (10th Cir. 1983).
251. 696 F.2d at 88.
252. Id
253. 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
254. 696 F.2d at 88. See 444 U.S. at 481 n.7.
255. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(l). The thirty-day rule is subject to exceptions, such as interlocu-
tory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982) and certain bankruptcy appeals.
256. Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974)
(timeliness is mandatory and jurisdictional).
257. The Tenth Circuit's strict adherence to the filing rule is represented by several opin-
ions, not selected for routine publication, issuing this past term and dismissing cases for un-
timely appeals. See, e.g., Boyd v. Shawnee Mission Pub. Schools, No. 82-1699 (10th Cir., Mar. 3,
1983); Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union, No. 82-1680 (10th Cir., Feb. 28, 1983); Myers v.
Utah State Adult Probation & Parole Dept., No. 82-2171 (10th Cir., Dec. 13, 1982); United
States v. Daniels, No. 82-2071 (10th Cir., Dec. 8, 1982); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Scott
Fertilizer Co., No. 82-1510, No. 82-1561 (10th Cir., Oct. 27, 1982); United States v. Clayton, No.
82-1482 (10th Cir., Oct. 22, 1982); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Resource Technology Corp.,
No. 82-1492 (10th Cir., Aug. 27, 1982); Herron v. Pendleton, Sabian & Craft. No. 82-1200 (10th
Cir., Aug. 3, 1982); United States v. Afflerbach, No. 82-1667 (10th Cir., July 29, 1982).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
259. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Accord Golden Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Indus., Inc., 549 F.2d
1363, 1364 (10th Cir. 1977). Seealso United States v. Taylor, 632 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1980) (if no
certificate of finality is issued, then appeal under Rule 54(b) should be dismissed).
260. Golden Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Indus., Inc., 549 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1977).
261. 647 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1981).
262. Id at 121.
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tional Cattle Systems 26 3 allowed the Tenth Circuit to reaffirm its holding in
A. O. Smith.
The issue in Garden City was whether the court had jurisdiction over an
appeal and cross-appeal filed prior to a Rule 54(b) certification. The district
court had granted a partial summary judgment against only one defendant,
International Cattle Systems (ICS), on November 20, 1981.264 On January
7, 1982, that judgment was adjusted for interest due.2 65 On February 24,
1982, the district court denied ICS's motion for reconsideration of the judg-
ment.2 66 A notice of appeal was filed by ICS on March 25, 1982, and an-
other defendant cross-appealed on April 7, 1982.267 Because the summary
judgment was only partial, ICS then requested certification of its appeal
under Rule 54(b); the district court issued the Rule 54(b) certificate on April
13, 1982.268
As the facts illustrate, ICS's notice of appeal was filed more than thirty
days after the November 20 order and the January 7 order but prior to the
Rule 54(b) certification. In determining its jurisdiction over the appeals, the
Tenth Circuit answered two questions. First, the Tenth Circuit held the
orders on summary judgment and interest were not final because not all of
the parties' rights and liabilities were adjudicated. 269 Thus, jurisdiction over
the original appeals was defective. Next, the Tenth Circuit considered
whether the Rule 54(b) certification cured the jurisdictional defects in the
notices of appeal. Relying on A. 0. Staih, the court held that the Rule 54(b)
certification did not cure the defects; rather, the certification merged with
the prior orders to create a final judgment.2 70 The notices of appeals pursu-
ant to the original summary judgment orders were ruled premature, and the
court would therefore have been required to dismiss the appeals except that
a second set of appeal notices had been timely filed following the certifica-
tion order.2 71 Garden City reaffirms the holding ofA. 0. Smith and further
emphasizes the importance of filing a timely notice of appeal.
IV. COLLATERAL ORDER EXCEPTION TO FINALITY
Collateral orders are orders incidental to the primary action, and are
exceptions to the final decision rule for appellate jurisdiction. Regardless of
the status of the primary action, such orders are immediately appealable as
final decisions provided certain factors are present. 272 The Tenth Circuit
263. No. 82-1387 (10th Cir., July 30, 1982).
264. Id. at 2.
265. Id





271. Id. at 4-5. The court considered this second notice of appeal to be properly filed. Id. at
4-5.
272. The collateral order exception concerns orders "which finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied re-
view and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated." Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
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considered these factors, and their application in the context of a claim of
absolute governmental immunity, in Chavez v. Sziger.
273
In Chavez, a federal government firefighter brought a tort action in fed-
eral district court against his supervisor, claiming that he had been injured
as a result of his supervisor's negligent instructions.2 74 The district court
granted partial summary judgment denying the supervisor's asserted defense
of absolute immunity.2 75 The supervisor appealed this decision, claiming ap-
pellate jurisdiction existed under the collateral order exception.
2 76
The four elements to be met before a collateral order exception will lie
are: 1) the appeal must be from an order conclusively resolving a disputed
question; 2) the question resolved must be collateral to and separate from the
merits of the action; 3) the question must be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment; and 4) the appeal must present a serious and
unsettled question.2 77 The Tenth Circuit found the collateral order doctrine
applicable by analogizing the absolute immunity issue to the double jeop-
ardy issue presented to the Supreme Court in Abney v. United Slates.2 73 The
Tenth Circuit recognized that, like the double jeopardy issue, the absolute
immunity issue should be addressed before trial because it determines
whether the supervisor could be "haled into court" and would therefore not
be subject to meaningful review.2 79 Similarly, the question of immunity was
distinct from the merits and was a serious and unsettled question. 280 Fi-
nally, the district court's ruling on the issue was conclusive.2 1 The court
therefore concluded that the immunity question was collateral to the main
action; finding the appeal proper under the collateral order exception, the
Tenth Circuit discussed the merits and affirmed the district court's ruling.
28 2
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SPECIAL MASTER'S RECOMMENDATION
Judges must be alert to the possibility that a jury may have reached a
compromise verdict. 2 3 A judge cannot question a jury's deliberative pro-
cess, but the judge's suspicion should be aroused when there is a close ques-
tion on liability and the damage award is extremely inadequate.2 8 4 If it is
determined a compromise verdict was reached, then the judge should recom-
273. 698 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1983).
274. Id at 421.
275. Id
276. Id
277. Id The first three elements were set forth by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). The final element was recognized in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731, 742-43 (1982) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949)).
278. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
279. 698 F.2d at 421. Set also 431 U.S. at 659.
280. 698 F.2d at 421.
281. d.
282. Id at 421-22.
283. A compromise verdict is reached when some jurors surrender their view on a material
issue in return for similar action by other jurors on another issue, resulting in a verdict which is
not shared by the jury. A common source for compromise verdicts is a disagreement on liabil-
ity. Liability will be found, but only a small award of damages is given. See, e.g., Lucas v.
American Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1980); Young v. International Paper Co., 322
F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1963).
284. See supra note 283.
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mend a new trial. This was the problem presented in National Railroad Passen-
ger Corp. v. Koch Industries, Inc. 285
The jury in National Railroad returned a verdict finding the defendant
ninety-nine per cent negligent and the plaintiff one per cent negligent, yet
awarded damages only equaling what the plaintiff had paid third parties
and ignoring the actual losses the plaintiff suffered. 28 6 Noting that liability
was a hotly contested issue and that the defendant did not contest plaintiffs
damages, the special master concluded that the jury had reached a compro-
mise verdict and recommended a new trial. 28 7 Without reviewing the tran-
script, the district court judge rejected the special master's recommendation
and ordered a new trial limited to the issue of damages. 288 The issues
presented to the Tenth Circuit were the degree of deference the district court
judge should give the special master's recommendation, and the degree of
deference the Tenth Circuit should give to the district court judge's decision.
Addressing the first issue, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the abuse-
of-discretion test should apply to its review of the district court's decision to
reject the master's findings.2 9 The Tenth Circuit recognized that if the trial
judge alone had determined that a compromise verdict was reached and had
ordered a new trial, or if the trial judge alone had ordered a new trial on
damages, a circuit court would uphold the decision unless the record indi-
cated an abuse of discretion. 29° The decision to grant a new trial based on
the master's findings was entitled to similar deferential review. 29 '
The Tenth Circuit then noted that a district court could abuse its dis-
cretion by failing to apply the proper standard of review to a master's recom-
mendation. 2 92 When reviewing a masters's recommendation, a de novo
determination was required, which meant that the district court could place
whatever reliance it chose to on the special master's recommendations.
293
The district court, however, could not summarily ignore a recommendation
based primarily upon credibility; rejecting such a recommendation without
reviewing the record was an abuse of discretion. 294 The Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that a finding of a compromise verdict was similar to a finding based
on credibility, because the master's subjective impression of the trial was in-
timately tied to the conclusion that there had been a "hotly contested" issue
285. 701 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1983). A magistrate conducted the proceedings in the district
court as a special master pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1982). 701 F.2d at 109. Section
636(b)(2) allows special master proceedings "upon consent of the parties, without regard to the
provisions of rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Therefore, the limitations of
Rule 53(b) (requiring the reference to a master to be the exception rather than the rule) need
not be considered.
286. 701 F.2d at 110.
287. The special master discovered "no rational connection between the verdict rendered
and the facts and evidence presented at the trial." Id.
288. Id at 112.
289. Id at 110-11.
290. Id
291. Id at 1ll.
292. Id
293. Id See also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1980) (holding that con-
gressional intent behind requiring de novo review of magistrate's findings required "sound exer-
cise of judicial discretion," not a new hearing).
294. 701 F.2d at Ill.
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of liability. 29 5 The trial court was therefore required to review the transcript
before rejecting the master's recommendation. 296  Because the trial court
had failed to do so in National Railroad, it had abused its discretion; accord-









The Tenth Circuit's survey period labor law decisions produced few sur-
prises, although spawning two dissents by Judge Barrett. Three significant
cases are reviewed below. These decisions gain their interest either from
their clarification of existing law or their refusal to move from precedent
despite convincing challenges. While the Tenth Circuit was not in the fore-
front of labor law reform during this edition of the survey, in two areas-
threats which constitute strike misconduct and the use of presumptions in
unfair labor practice hearings-the court addressed issues of national
relevance.
I. THREATS AS STRIKE MISCONDUCT
A. Existing Standards for Strike Misconduct
In Midwest Solvents, Inc. v. NLRB,' a Tenth Circuit panel majority re-
fused to join two sister circuits in rejecting the National Labor Relations
Board's (NLRB or Board) standard for determining when threats are mis-
conduct sufficient to justify an employer's refusal to reinstate a striking em-
ployee. 2 The First3 and Third4 Circuits have adopted an "objective" test,
under which threats themselves will be deemed strike misconduct if, under
the circumstances in which they were uttered, the threats could reasonably
1. 696 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1982).
2. 696 F.2d at 767. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982),
protects concerted employee activity, including strikes. See id. §§ 157-163. This protection,
however, is not absolute.
An employer must rehire employees involved in an economic strike if positions are open
following the strike. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967). Failure to
reinstate striking employees to available positions constitutes an unfair labor practice, because
without the reinstatement requirement an employer could chill the right to strike by penalizing
those who exercise this right. Id. The employer, however, can refuse to reinstate striking em-
ployees if the refusal is not motivated by an anti-union purpose, but is instead based upon a
legitimate and substantial business reason. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Co., 388 U.S. 26, 34
(1967). Individual strike misconduct, such as a coercive or threatening act directed at non-
striking workers, furnishes a legitimate basis for refusing to reinstate a striking employee because
such misconduct does not involve the exercise of a protected right and because such misconduct
can render an employee "unfit for further service." NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811,
815-16 (7th Cir. 1946). See also Associated Grocers of New England v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333
(1st Cir. 1977); NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Wichita
Television Corp.. 277 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Cambria Clay Prod. Co., 215 F.2d 48
(6th Cir. 1954). Cf NLRB v. Fansteel Melhallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939) (employer
not compelled to reinstate employees committing torts against the employer's property; to re-
quire reinstatement of such employees would hinder labor law's purpose of seeking peaceful
solution to labor disputes). Not all misconduct is sufficiently serious to justify refusal to rein-
state. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1967). The
issue in strike misconduct cases is therefore determining which kinds of misconduct are suffi-
ciently serious to justify refusal to reinstate. See, e.g., Midwest Solvents, 696 F.2d at 766.
3. Associated Grocers of New England v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333 (1st Cir. 1977).
4. NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977).
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"coerce or intimidate" non-striking employees. 5 The NLRB, however, ap-
plies an "animal exuberance" test, under which threats alone cannot justify
refusal to reinstate. 6 In order to constitute strike misconduct under the
NLRB standard a striker's threats must be "accompanied by . . . physical
acts or gestures that would provide added emphasis or meaning to [the]
words." 7 Interestingly, in Midwest Solvents the Tenth Circuit both refused to
adopt the objective test and denied that it was applying the animal exuber-
ance test.8
B. Midwest Solvents
The Midwest Solvents case arose out of a twenty-nine day economic
strike. 9 Following the strike the employer, Midwest, refused to reinstate two
strikers, Donald and Roy Lassen, accusing them of strike misconduct.' 0 The
Lassen's brought unfair labor practice charges against Midwest resulting in
an administrative law judge's order of reinstatement." Midwest appealed
this order and the NLRB affirmed the administrative judge,' 2 as did the
Tenth Circuit. '
3
Donald Lassen was charged with two instances of misconduct. 14 The
first involved a visit, accompanied by another striker, to the apartment of
Bob Call, a non-striking worker.' 5 Call refused to open the door, and there-
fore could not identify which of the two strikers told him he better "watch"
himself because "some of the boys might get rowdy."' 6 Midwest also
charged Donald Lassen with threatening three college students temporarily
working at its plant.17 Only Lassen and a companion testified about what
5. Associated Grocers, 562 F.2d at 1336 (quoting McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 528); McQuaide, 552
F.2d at 528. The McQuaide court adopted the standard set out in Local 542, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. dented, 379 U.S. 826 (1964), wherein the
court stated: "The test of coercion and intimidation is not whether the misconduct proves effec-
tive. The test is whether the misconduct is such that, under the existing circumstances, it may
reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights protected under the
Act." 328 F.2d at 852-53 (quoted in McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 527-28). Local 542 articulated the
"objective" test for coercion in the context of an unfair labor charge brought against a union,
not an employer. 328 F.2d at 852.
6. E.g., McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 527. The phrase "animal exuberance" is taken from Milk
Wagon Drivers Union, Local 752 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
Meadowmoor held that picketing could not be suppressed merely because the pickets engaged in
"a trivial rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance." Id. at 293.
7. McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 527.
8. 696 F.2d at 767.
9. An economic strike is a strike to secure union demands, rather than a protest against an
employer's unfair labor practices. See NLRB v. Juniata Packing Co., 464 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir.
1972).
10. 696 F.2d at 765. Midwest originally refused to reinstate six striking workers. After
further investigation Midwest allowed one of the six to return to work. Two others did not
challenge Midwest's action. The remaining three, Donald, Roy and Harold Lassen, filed unfair
labor practice charges against Midwest based on the failure to reinstate. Id
11. Id
12. Midwest Solvents, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1282, 1282 (1980), enforced, 696 F.2d 763 (10th
Cir. 1982).
13. See 696 F.2d at 767.






was said to the three; they denied threatening the students although Lassen
admitted asking them not to be "scabs." 1
At the preliminary hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) deter-
mined that Donald Lassen had threatened both Call and the three college
students.' 9 The ALJ found, however, that both threats were isolated inci-
dents insufficient to warrant denial of reinstatement. 20 The NLRB affirmed
this decision, noting that there was no evidence that the threats were any-
thing more than "the type of impulsive, trivial misdeed which we have
found, in the past, to be insufficient to warrant a denial of reinstatement to a
protected striker."
''
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Board's order, holding that "[absent]
other threatening statements or . . . some coercive action, [Lassen's state-
ments were] too ambiguous to be considered a threat."'22 In support of this
conclusion the court cited NLRB v. W.C McQuaide, Inc. ,23 yet refused to
adopt McQuaide's objective test. 2 4 Apparently, therefore, the presence of two
strikers outside the apartment door of a non-striker is not a coercive action
sufficient to raise a threat to the level of strike misconduct.
Roy Lassen was denied reinstatement because, while picketing, he
threatened Donald Caudle, a farmer making deliveries across the picket line
to Midwest's plant.2 5 Roy said that he would blow up or burn up Caudle's
combine if Caudle continued making deliveries. 26  Caudle subsequently
crossed the picket line several times without further interference from the
strikers. 27
The NLRB characterized Roy's threat as minor misconduct and or-
dered reinstatement. 28 The court of appeals enforced the Board's order for
several reasons: 1) there was a question as to whether Roy Lassen made the
threat;29 2) Caudle apparently was not frightened by the threat;30 and
3) Caudle was free from subsequent interference. 3 1 The court characterized
Roy Lassen's statement as "animal exuberance, the result of high emotions
18. Id at 767.
19. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1291.
20. Id. at 1292.
21. Id at 1282.
22. 696 F.2d at 766 (citing McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 766).
23. 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977).
24. 696 F.2d at 767. The court's supporting citation to McQuaide is problematic because
McQuaide adopted the "objective test" which the Tenth Circuit conspicuously avoided. Id. Ap-
parently the court was only attempting to show that Donald Lassen's conduct did not constitute
strike misconduct by any standard. The citation may also have been an indication that the
court is willing to find misconduct through threats alone in the proper case. Cf id. at 766 (no
strike misconduct "in absence of other threatening statements or of some coercive action") (em-
phasis supplied),




29. Id. at 767 n.4. The opinion had previously noted that an employer's determination not
to reinstate for strike misconduct must be based on evidence that the striker personally engaged
in the alleged misconduct. Id at 765 (citing NLRB v. Wichita Television Corp., 277 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1960)).




and frustration on the picket line," and therefore protected conduct. 32
The majority appears to have been content to defer to the expertise of
the Board in determining the misconduct issue. The court found the Board's
decisions supported by substantial evidence and declined to rule on Mid-
west's contention that the Board had applied an improper test. Instead, the
court held that "[t]he refusal to reinstate would not be proper under any of
the standards suggested by Midwest. Accordingly, we need not decide the
merits of the objective test."
'33
Judge Barrett, the sole dissenter, disagreed with the majority and would
have adopted the objective test.34 By this test, Judge Barrett reasoned, the
actions of Roy and Donald Lassen would "clearly constitute such miscon-
duct which amounts to coercion and intimidation" warranting denial of
reinstatement.
35
Curiously, Judge Barrett injected a strong element of subjectivity into
the objective test when he observed that the ALJ found that the Lassens'
conduct placed others in fear, and that it was his view that the Lassens'
actions were calculated threats.36 While Judge Barrett's observations may
have been offered solely as evidentiary support of the objective unreasona-
bleness of the Lassens' conduct, his comments do reflect the subjective basis
upon which several circuits have decided strike threat cases. Although the
standard is often not articulated, threats have been characterized on the ba-
sis of their effect on the non-striker, 37 or on the striker's subjective intent.38
C. Evaluation of Standards for Characteriztng Threats as Strike Misconduct
1. Subjective Approach
Subjective tests have the obvious disadvantage of being difficult to ap-
ply. Intent and effect do not always admit of easy discovery. Although the
effect of a threat may be manifest in the reaction of a non-striker, the lack of
response may indicate no more than the non-striker's bold constitution or his
desperate need of a job. Similarly, if the intent of the striker is the test, the
court is placed in the dubious position of having to determine just how seri-
ous the striker is about carrying out the threat. Further, the striker is pun-




34. Id at 768 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
36. Id
37. See NLRB v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., 327 F.2d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 1964) (threats were
misconduct when they resulted in non-striker leaving work for five weeks); NLRB v. Efco Mfg.,
Inc., 227 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956) (threats were misconduct
when they placed employer in fear of imminent beating).
38. Se NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Co., 496 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir. 1974) (line drawn at "conduct
that is intended to threaten or intimidate non-strikers"). See also NLRB v. Hartmann Luggage




2. The "Animal Exuberance" Standard
The NLRB suggests use of the animal exuberance test, under which
threats alone can never justify a refusal to reinstate. 39 The test ensures that
strikers are not to suffer the harsh penalty of losing their jobs because of
impulsive words spoken in the heat of the moment during the course of a
protected activity. The test overlooks, however, an employee's right not to
join in a concerted activity, guaranteed by section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act. 4° Section 8(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
41
makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of section 7 rights. Although the strike misconduct of an indi-
vidual is not an unfair labor practice, clearly a significant part of Congress'
intent in enacting section 7 was to protect the employee's right of choice. To
assert that words alone cannot intimidate is to shut one's eyes to the coercive
power of language, and to subvert a worker's right of choice. The animal
exuberance test therefore protects the striking worker's rights at the expense
of the non-striking worker.
The First and Third Circuits criticize the "animal exuberance" test in
other terms. In Associated Grocers of .ew England v. NLRB, 42 the First Circuit
found the "animal exuberance" test "too inelastic to provide a reliable
means for distinguishing serious misconduct or threats from protected activ-
ity."'4 3 A similar rationale pervaded the Third Circuit's McQuaide opinion;
the McQuaide court framed the question as "whether a threat is sufficiently
egregious not whether there is added emphasis."
44
3. The "Objective" Test
Realizing that the problem presented by strike misconduct is to distin-
guish actions sufficiently egregious to justify refusal to reinstate while simul-
taneously preserving the vitality of collective action,45 the objective test
proposes a solution in the ubiquitous "reasonable person." The test is
whether a threat reasonably tends to coerce or intimidate, ensuring that
neither employer nor worker is penalized for engaging in arguably proper
activity. The test does not require a physical gesture,46 thereby recognizing
the coercive potential of words and protecting an employee's right of choice.
The equitable nature of the objective test is further demonstrated by its
39. Associated Grocers, 562 F.2d at 1336; .4fcQuaide, 552 F.2d at 528. The Eleventh Circuit
has found that the animal exuberance test gives better protection to an employee's right to
engage in concerted activity than does the objective test. Georgia Kraft Co. v. NLRB, 696 F.2d
931, 939 (1 lth Cir. 1983).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). This section provides, in relevant part, that "[e]mployees shall
have the right . . . to engage in . . . concerted activities . . . and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities. Id
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1982).
42. 562 F.2d 1333 (1st Cir. 1977).
43. Id at 1336.
44. 552 F.2d at 527. The court observed that focusing on the presence of physical activity
fails to concentrate the inquiry upon the actual nature of an employee's conduct. See id.
45. Set supra note 2.
46. E.g., McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 527.
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application. The objective test does not find strike misconduct in words
alone without the added weight of surrounding circumstances. 47 Miscon-
duct through threats has been found in strikes marked by incidents of van-
dalism and harassment, 48 where non-strikers have been followed to delivery
points, 49 or to their homes, 50 or when their egress has been blocked. 5 1 A
threat in such circumstances has added coercive force, as it does when the
threat is made with forty to fifty picketers nearby.
52
The objective test, as applied, has also had a subjective element. For
example, Judge Barrett's dissent relied on evidence that the Lassens' threats
had placed other employees in fear.53 Similarly, the Associated Grocers court
noted that a threatened applicant left the premises of the plant without sub-
mitting an application;54 evidently the court found the applicant's motive
significant, even though motive is intrinsically subjective. While considera-
tion of subjective reaction may be important in characterizing the reasona-
bleness of strike-related conduct, it is important to strictly limit the weight
given such evidence. To effectively separate reasonable and unreasonable




The refusal by the Tenth Circuit to apply the objective test may signify
nothing more than that Midwest Solvents was the wrong case in which to dis-
rupt precedent. Strike misconduct is an area in which the conscience of the
court might be easily aroused. If, in another case, the animal exuberance
test would require reinstatement, but the threats, given the surrounding cir-
cumstances, were clearly coercive, the Tenth Circuit might adopt the objec-
tive test. In doing so, the court would be reaching a result more consistent
with the National Labor Relation Act's goal of facilitating industrial peace56
47. "The test is whether the misconduct is such that, under the circumstances existing, it may
reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate .. " Id at 528 (quoting Local 524, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850, 852-53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964))
(emphasis supplied).
48. McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 528. See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d
511, 512 (5th Cir. 1971), in which the Fifth Circuit articulated no standard, but found strike
misconduct in a vulgar invective and hand sign; it may have been significant that the striker
involved had been engaged in other, more violent activity during the strike. See id at 512-13.
49. McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 526-27.
50. Associated Grocers, 562 F.2d at 1337.
51. Id
52. Id at 1336.
53. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
54. Associated Grocers, 562 F.2d at 1336.
55. Associated Grocers demonstrates the proper approach to the use of evidence of subjective
reaction. The Associated Grocers court remanded to the Board, with instructions to apply the
objective test, the case of a striker ordered reinstated because his threats had not deterred a non-
striker from applying for a position. The court rejected the notion that filing the job application
proved the applicant had not been coerced, noting that while the applicant's subjective reaction
was important, that reaction could not in itself satisfy an inquiry into the objective reasonable-
ness of the striker's conduct. Id at 1337.
56. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-43 (1937).
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and protecting an employee's freedom of choice. 5 7
II. NLRB USE OF PRESUMPTIONS WHEN CERTIFYING HEALTH CARE
BARGAINING UNITS
Beth Israel Hospital and Geriatric Center v. NLRB 58 (Beth Israel II) was an en
banc rehearing of an employer challenge claiming that due process protec-
tions precluded use of a presumption of unit appropriateness at an unfair
labor practice hearing seeking to force an employer to negotiate with a certi-
fied employee bargaining unit.59 The Tenth Circuit rejected the challenge,
holding that reliance on the presumption of unit appropriateness was per-
missible, even though the presumption relieved the Board's General Coun-
sel 60 of the burden of persuasion on an element of an unfair practice
charge. 6 1 Chief Judge Seth and Judge Barrett dissented from this holding.
62
A. Background
The NLRB's General Counsel, as the moving party in an unfair labor
practice hearing, has the burden of persuasion on the unfair practice
charge. 6 3 The Board, however, had permitted the General Counsel to rely
on a presumption which required the employer to prove the inappropriate-
ness of a previously certified unit. 6 4 Employers appealed this action, con-
tending that because the issue of appropriateness was central to the unfair
practice charge, due process required that the General Counsel bear the bur-
57. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
58. 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), cert. dsmi sedper stipulation, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
59. The NLRB has the responsibility for determining which employee units are appropri-
ate for collective bargaining purposes. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). Certification of a bargaining
unit as appropriate is made following a nonadversarial representation hearing. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.21 (1983). Accord Inland Empire District Council, Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union v.
Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 706 (1945). The certification decision can be made either directly by the
Board or by one of its regional directors. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(b), 159(b) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 101.
21 (1983). This function is generally referred to as "determining unit appropriateness."
Once a bargaining unit has been certified, an employer is required to negotiate with that
certified unit, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982); failure to do so constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice. Id There is no right to have a certification decision reviewed directly. A.F. of L. v.
NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). Accord Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 139
(1971). To obtain judicial review of the determination the employer must refuse to bargain
with the certified unit, be charged with an unfair labor practice, and raise the inappropriateness
of the bargaining unit as a defense in the unfair labor practice proceeding. A.F. of L. v. NLRB,
308 U.S. 401 (1940). The circuit courts then have power to review the determination of unit
appropriateness through the grant of jurisdiction to review the Board's unfair labor practice
decisions. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e)-(f) (1982). Because the unit certification reflects on exercise
of the Board's discretion, however, the finding of unit appropriateness cannot be overturned
unless the Board has abused its discretion. Beth Israelil, 688 F.2d at 699-700; see Packard Motor
Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947).
60. The NLRB's General Counsel represents the agency in unfair practice proceeding. See
29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982).
61. Beth Israel II, 688 F.2d at 701.
62. See id. at 701 (Barrett, J., dissenting); id. at 704 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
63. Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 456 (10th Cir. 1981),
overruled in part, Beth Israel Hosp. and Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), cert.
dsmissedper stipulatzon, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
64. See Beth Israel Hosp. and Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir.
1981) (Beth Israel i), reo'd in part, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en banc rehearing), cert. dsmissedper
stipulation, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
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den of persuasion on this issue. 65 This argument was supported by citation
to Federal Rule of Evidence 301,66 which Congress had expressly made ap-
plicable to unfair labor practice hearings "so far as practicable. '6 7 Because
Rule 301 bars presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion, the Board's
approval of a burden-shifting presumption allegedly vitiated the due process
protection provided by allocating the burden of proof to the General Coun-
sel,68 thereby violating the employers' rights.
The challenge outlined above was first considered by a Tenth Circuit
panel in Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB. 69 Presbyterian/St. Luke's
held that the Board could not permit the use of a presumption which re-
quired the employer to bear the burden of persuasion on its contention that
a certified bargaining unit was inappropriate. 70 Proof that a certified bar-
gaining unit is appropriate is necessary to establish that the asserted unfair
practice (refusal to bargain) 7 I has occurred. 72 Because the Federal Rules of
Evidence, including Rule 301, were applicable to the unfair practice hear-
ing, 73 it was impermissible to use a presumption which shifted the burden of
proof on any element of the unfair practice charge.7 4 Two panel decisions
following this holding were the subject of the en banc rehearing in Beth Israel
11.75
B. The Majorty Opi'on
The majority in Beth Israel II overruled the Presbyterian/St. Luke's restric-
tion on the use of presumptions of unit appropriateness at unfair labor prac-
65. See generaly Beth Israel II, 688 F.2d at 702-704 (Barrett, J., dissenting). The majority
opinion does not address the employers' challenge in due process terms, which may be a central
flaw in the opinion. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
66. FED. R. EVID. 301 provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or
by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with the evidence, to rebut or meet the presumption, but
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersua-
sion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast.
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
68. Cf Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (recognizing that burden of proof acts as
due process procedural mechanism).
69. 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981),ovemledinpart, Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v.
NLRB, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dsmissedper stipulatibn, 103 C. St. 433 (1982).
70. 653 F.2d at 456. Presbytertan/St. Luke's also held that the Board could not rely on its
traditional "community of interests" test when certifying health care bargaining units, but must
apply a "disparity of interests" test. Id at 457. Further, the Board was required to include a
specific statement explaining why the certified unit did not result in an undue proliferation of
bargaining units in the health care industry. Id This holding, although not before the Tenth
Circuit in Beth Israel I, see 688 F.2d at 698, was expressly approved by the circuit en banc. Id
at 700.
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
72. See 653 F.2d at 456. For a fuller explanation of the refusal-to-bargain unfair labor
practice, see supra note 59.
73. 653 F.2d at 456.
74. Id
75. Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1981) (Beth
Israel 1), rev'd in part, 682 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dsmissedper stipulation, 103 S. Ct.
433 (1982); St. Anthony Hosp. System v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part,
688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. disnmssedper stipulation, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
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tice hearings.7 6 The first step in reaching this decision was an examination
of the nature of the decision to certify a bargaining unit as appropriate. Cer-
tification of unit appropriateness is initially made at a representation hear-
ing.77 Congress intended that the determination of unit appropriateness be
made primarily through the Board's exercise of its expertise and experience
with the labor relations problems existing in a particular economic sphere.78
Thus, the process of unit determination at the representation hearing was
not subject to strict rules of evidence; the Board was entitled to make its
initial determination of appropriateness through the use of any procedural
devices-including presumptions creating a burden of persuasion-which
were justified by experience and which were not arbitrary.
79
The majority's second step was to examine Supreme Court precedent
concerning the Board's obligation to make an independent review of a unit
certification when that certification is challenged through an unfair practice
proceeding. Citing Magnesium Casling Co. v. NLRB,8 ° the majority stated that
the Supreme Court had established that the Board was not required to re-
consider the issue of unit appropriateness during the unfair practice proceed-
ing.8 1 Rather, the Board had discretion to require rehearing on the issue,
adopt the conclusion entered following the representation hearing, or make
an independent decision.
8 2
In light of the two principles of law discussed above, the majority con-
cluded that the question of unit appropriateness was not a factual question
to be resolved during the unfair practice hearing.8 3 Accordingly, the General
Counsel had no burden of persuasion on the issue of unit appropriateness,
and the Federal Rules of Evidence did not provide a procedural framework
for determining whether the bargaining unit had been properly certified.
8 4
Essentially, because the determination of unit appropriateness was commit-
ted to Board discretion, Rule 301 could not control the Board's use of pre-
sumptions.8 5 Hence, the Board's use of a presumption "violating" Rule 301
did not, in the context of a determination of unit appropriateness, constitute
a denial of due process.8 6 Additionally, because judicial review existed to
ensure that the Board's discretion was not exercised arbitrarily, excluding
the issue of unit appropriateness from the unfair practice hearing's adver-
76. See Beth Israel I, 688 F.2d at 698, 700-01.
77. See supra note 59.
78. See 688 F.2d at 699.
79. Id
80. 401 U.S. 137 (1971).
81. 688 F.2d at 700-01 (citing Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 141
(1971)). Accord Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 161 (1941).
82. 688 F.2d at 700-01.
83. Id at 701.
84. Id at 700-01.
85. Id
86. The majority does not address the question on rehearing in terms of the denial vel non
of due process. The question presented to the court, however, was whether due process protec-
tion permitted use of a presumption relieving the General Counsel of the burden of persuasion
on any element of the unfair practice charge. Id at 702 (Barrett, J., dissenting). Thus, the




sarial environment did not deny an employer's due process rights.8 7
C. The Dissents
1. Judge Barrett
Judge Barrett's dissent was premised on his perception that due process
required that an employer be accorded a full adversarial hearing on every
element of the unfair practice charge.88 There was no indication in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act that the issue of unit appropriateness was entitled
to unique treatment; rather, the Act stated that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence were applicable to all unfair practice proceedings. 8 9 Further, the
Rules were made applicable to unfair practice proceedings in order to pro-
vide protection against arbitrary action by the Board. 90 The majority's
holding was therefore directly and indirectly9 contrary to the statutorily
mandated restrictions of Rule 301. Additionally, the majority's holding sub-
verted the judiciary's power to provide a meaningful guarantee against arbi-
trary Board decisions. Judge Barrett would have upheld Presbyterian/St.
Luke's and held that due process bars the use, in an unfair practice proceed-
ing,92 of a presumption which relieves the General Counsel of the burden of
persuasion on any element of an unfair practice charge.
9 3
2. Chief Judge Seth's Dissent
Chief Judge Seth's dissent was grounded in his concern that the major-
ity's holding would render judicial review of this class of unfair practice
charges virtually useless. By permitting the Board to use a presumption
which relieved it of the burden of producing any evidence, the court would
not have a meaningful basis for determining whether the Board had acted
arbitrarily.94 Excusing the Board from producing evidence by characteriz-
ing unit appropriateness as a nonfactual, discretionary determination would
eliminate the check on arbitary action provided by a record setting forth all
facts constituting a basis for agency action. 95 Because application of Rule
87. See id. at 701.
88. Judge Barrett succinctly captured the essence of his dissent in summing up his opinion:
In any unfair labor practice proceeding, there must be a full and complete adversarial
hearing. The hospitals were not accorded such a proceeding. The Board was obli-
gated to present evidence in the unfair labor practice proceedings (through its General
Counsel) which effectively met the burden of persuasion. This and this only could
meet the measure of a "full and adequate" hearing ....
Id at 704 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
89. Id at 703 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982)).
90. See 688 F.2d at 703-04 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
91. in addition to finding a direct contravention of Rule 301 in the majority holding,
Judge Barrett characterized the majority's approach as permitting the Board to treat a pre-
sumption as evidence, and stated that this was an impermissible use of presumption under Rule
301. Id. at 702 (citing J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 301-4 to 301-7
(1982)).
92. Judge Barrett limited his analysis to the use of presumptions at unfair practice pro-
ceedings. 688 F.2d at 701 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
93. Id at 704.
94. Id at 705 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 706.
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301 to the unfair practice proceeding would ensure the necessary record
while the majority's approach would not, Chief Judge Seth dissented.
D. Analysts
There are two significant shortcomings in the majority opinion. The
first is its failure to examine the legislative intent behind the statutory re-
quirement to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence to unfair practice pro-
ceedings. The statute only requires that the Rules be used so far as
practicable.96 The majority's recognition of an exception to this mandate
would have been more convincing if the opinion had demonstrated that the
statutory requirement was not intended to affect the characterization of a
particular issue as factual, or if the opinion had demonstrated that it was not
"practicable" to apply the Rules to the issue of unit certification.
The second, more serious flaw is the failure to demonstrate that the rule
of Magnesum Casting97 was applicable when the Board reviewed certification
decisions based primarily upon a Board-created presumption. Magnesium
Casting and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 98 its progenitor, both involved
review of unfair labor practice proceedings following certification hearings
which had resulted in fully developed records. It was in that context that
the Court held that the two procedurally distinct proceedings were essen-
tially two parts of a unitary proceeding, and that it was therefore unneces-
sary, at the unfair practice proceeding, for the Board to reconsider its
decision entered following the representation hearing.99 The majority opin-
ion in Beth Israel II would clearly have been a more valuable precedent had
it explicitly considered the extent to which due process concerns are satisfied
by a unitary proceeding in which the government relies throughout on a
presumption. Similarly, the opinion would have gained persuasiveness had
it engaged in the interest balancing methodology the Supreme Court has
adopted for due process challenges to the adequacy of a particular agency
proceeding. 100
Although the majority opinion might have been strengthened by in-
cluding either or both of the above analyses, it does appear to adequately
respond to the due process concerns raised by the dissenters. Determination
of an appropriate bargaining unit is a function which is primarily commit-
ted to the NLRB and which requires a significant degree of expertise. The
majority's approach would prevent arbitrary action by retaining judicial re-
view of the rationality of a particular presumption. 10 ' Additionally, the em-
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
97. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
98. 313 U.S. 146 (1941).
99. Id. at 158-62.
100. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). A Tenth Circuit panel recently recog-
nized that it should not dispose of due process challenges on the basis of Supreme Court prece-
dent which did not address the exact challenge before the court and which was decided before
the era of interest-balancing jurisprudence. See United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672 (10th Cir.
1982). Although Schell was a criminal case, no compelling reason exists not to apply its cautious
approach to due process challenges when considering civil cases.
101. Cf 688 F.2d at 699 (courts should defer to NLRB discretion and expertise, including
presumptions drawn from past experience, subject to showing of reasonableness).
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ployer always has the chance to meet the burden of persuasion imposed by
the presumption of appropriateness.
0 2
One final point deserves mention. NLRB regulations state that the pur-
pose of a representation hearing is to develop "as full a statement of the
pertinent facts as may be necessary for determination of the case."'
10 3
Neither the majority or dissenting opinions examine whether use of a pre-
sumption eliminating the obligation of any party to introduce evidence of
appropriateness is consistent with existing regulations.
III. "BENCHING" As INTERNAL UNION DISCIPLINE
The dispute in Hackenburg v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers 104 had
its roots in a wildcat strike by the ten plaintiffs. 10 5 The Union imposed, as a
penalty for the strike, a ninety day "benching," that is, deprivation of assign-
ment to jobs through the Union-controlled hiring hall. 10 6 The sanction was
imposed pursuant to a provision in the collective bargaining agreement with
the employer which required the Union to "bench" members fired for
misconduct. 107
Suit was brought in federal district court by the plaintiffs, alleging that
the benching violated Colorado labor law, that the Union breached its duty
to fairly represent its members (through entering into a collective bargaining
provision calling for benching of fired employees), and that the summary
benching violated section 101(a)(5) of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959I08 (Landrum-Griffin Act), which provides proce-
dural protections for Union members upon whom a union is imposing sanc-
tions. On cross motions for summary judgment the district court found that
federal law preempted Colorado labor law, that there was no breach of the
duty to fairly represent in negotiating the collective bargaining agreement,
and that application of the sanction to seven voluntary strikers did not vio-
late the Landrum-Griffin Act. 10 9 The trial court held, however, that appli-
cation of the sanctions to three claimed involuntary strikers violated the
protection of section 101(a)(5), and rejected the Union's motion for sum-
mary judgment as to these three plaintiffs.1 10
The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's determination on all issues
except the holding in favor of the involuntary strikers.III The court recog-
nized that the union's duty to fairly represent created no obligation to re-
frain from accepting a collective bargaining agreement not entirely
102. Note, however, that one reason Rule 301 rejected the "presumption-as-evidence" ap-
proach was the difficulty in determining the proper evidentiary weight to give a presumption.
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 91, at 301-4 to 301-7.
103. 29 C.F.R. § 101.20(c) (1983).
104. 694 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1982).
105. Id at 1238.
106. Id at 1237-38.
107. Id at 1238.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1982).
109. 694 F.2d at 1238.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 1239-40.
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beneficial to its members.'" 2 Similarly, the court found there was no breach
in the Union's operation of a hiring hall which, on balance, benefited Union
members." 13 The preemption ruling was upheld without discussion." 14
As noted, however, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the three plaintiffs who claimed they had
not willingly joined the strike."1 5 The Tenth Circuit held that the benching
had not affected the three plaintiffs' rights as union members, and that
therefore the trial court incorrectly held that these plaintiffs had been
wrongly denied the due process protections of the Landrum-Griffin Act." 16
Section 101(a)(5) of the Landrum-Griffin Act provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fired, sus-
pended, expelled or otherwise discipl'ned except for nonpayment of
dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such
member has been (A) served with written specific charges;
(B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a
full and fair hearing.117
The plaintiffs had been afforded none of these procedural protec-
tions.1 8 The trial court determined that benching fell within the "otherwise
disciplined" language, and that therefore the plaintiffs' rights had been vio-
lated." 9 The Union argued on appeal that section 101(a)(5) was intended
to protect workers only against union related disciplinary action, and that
because the discipline imposed on the plaintiffs was not internal Union disci-
pline, the Landrum-Griffin Act's procedural protections were inapplica-
ble. 120 The court of appeals agreed' 2 1 on the basis of the recent United
States Supreme Court decision Finnegan v. Leu.
t 2 2
In Finnegan the petitioners were Union members who were also em-
ployed as business agents by the Union.' 23 Petitioners were fired by Leu, the
Union's president, after he had won an election defeating Brown, the union's
former president. 124 Leu felt that petitioners' open support of Brown during
the election cast doubt on their ability to implement the policies and pro-
112. d at 1240.
113. Id.
114. Set id. at 1238.
115. Id at 1239.
116. Id. at 1239. The district court decision is unreported, but apparently the court ruled
that protection of the Landrum-Griffin Act extended to unwilling participants in a wildcat
strike, perhaps because of the opportunity the Act provides for a hearing before the imposition
of a penalty. If the collective bargaining agreement contained a grievance procedure, the three
unwilling participants in the strike could have filed a grievance against the employer for unfair
discharge and had a hearing in that context. See Emporium Capweli Co. v. Western Addition
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1976) (emphasis supplied).
118. 694 F.2d at 1238.
119. Id
120. Id.
121. Id at 1239.
122. 456 U.S. 431 (1982).
123. Id at 434. As business agents, petitioners performed confidential, policymaking tasks
for their local. Id
124. Id. at 433-34.
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grams of the new administration. 125 Leu's right to discharge business agents
was granted by the Union's by-laws.'
2 6
Petitioners in Finnegan claimed protection from dismissal in section 609
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959127 (Lan-
drum-Griffin Act), which makes it unlawful for a union official "to fire, sus-
pend, expel or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act."' 28 Among the
Landrum-Griffin Act's guarantees is the right "to express any views, argu-
ments, or opinions." 129 The Supreme Court held that "the term 'discipline,'
as used in section 609, refers only to retaliatory actions that affect a union
member's rights or status as a member of the union" not as its employee.' 30
In construing section 609 the Supreme Court cited the "otherwise disci-
plined" language from section 101 (a) (5)"3 ' and its accompanying conference
report to lend force to the distinction it found between union action affecting
a union member's rights as a member and action affecting his rights as an
employee.1 32 The intent of Congress in enacting these sections of the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act was to protect union members against discipline arbitrarily
denying members the rights incident to union membership. 133 Actions
which did not affect those rights-such as loss of an employment position
with the Union-were therefore not discipline within the meaning of section
609,134 and, by implication, section 101(a)(5).
The Tenth Circuit found the analysis in Leu controlling in Hack-
enburg. 135 The court held that because the benching imposed by the Union
did not affect the disciplined members' rights qua members, the employees
were not disciplined within the meaning of section 101(a)(5). Hence, the
procedural protections of that section were inapplicable, and the trial court




125. Id. at 434.
126. Id
127. 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1982).
128. Id
129. 29 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1982).
130. 456 U.S. at 437 (emphasis in original).
131. See supra text accompanying note 116.
132. 456 U.S. at 436.
133. Id at 438.
134. Id at 439. Finnegan also analyzed whether the firing violated the petitioners' speech
rights within the meaning of section 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982), which provides an
independent action for deprivations of rights secured by the Act. Id This analysis does not
affect the holding with respect to the scope of the "otherwise disciplined" language, as the two
sections were intended to address different problems. See 456 U.S. at 439 & n. 10.
135. 694 F.2d at 1239.
136. Id
. Sections I & Ill. Section II was prepared by the Denver Law Journal Editors in con-
junction with Ms. Lindsay.
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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a surprisingly small
number of controversies involving lands and natural resources during the
time period covered by the Tenth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey. The subject
matter of the few land and resource decisions was also limited. Whereas in
recent years the court has considered a wide variety of resource and land
issues,' the past year is distinguished by its lack of variety. Of the eight land
and resource decisions published by the court,
2 six concerned public lands, 3
one involved Indian lands,4 and one resolved an environmental law ques-
tion. 5 This survey will highlight the issues resolved in each of these cases.
I. PUBLIC LANDS
A. Bounday Disputes
In a routine application of established principles, the court resolved a
boundary-line dispute concerning privately held lands bordering a national
forest. 6 The interesting aspect of the case, however, is the court's announce-
ment of an additional requirement for establishing estoppel against the gov-
ernment in boundary disputes involving federal land patents.
Sweeten v. United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service 7 was an ac-
tion to quiet title to a parcel of land bordering a national forest. Although
Sweeten believed the land to be hers, a Forest Service survey, which was
based on a previous resurvey that reestablished a lost corner of the section
encompassing Sweeten's land,8 indicated Sweeten's fence encroached on na-
tional forest property. 9 After receiving notice of her alleged encroachment,
Sweeten attempted to quiet title' 0 by attempting to prove that the resurvey
1. See Lands and Natural Resources, Ninth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 60 DEN. L.J. 333 (1983);
Lands and Natural Resources, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 59 DEN. L.J. 335 (1982); Lands and
Natural Resources, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 58 DEN. L.J. 415 (1981).
2. This discussion of the number of land and resource decisions of the court does not
include non-published opinions or cases based on diversity jurisdiction.
3. Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1983); Stewart Capital Corp. v.
Andrus, 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1983); Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d
734 (10th Cir. 1982); City and County of Denver v. Bergland, 695 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1982);
Ahrens v. Andrus, 690 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982); Sweeten v. United States Dep't of Agriculture
Forest Service, 684 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1982).
4. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1982).
5. Johnston v. Davis, 698 F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 1983).
6. Sweeten v. United States Dep't of Agriculture Forest Service, 684 F.2d 679 (10th Cir.
1982).
7. Id
8. Public lands have been divided on a rectangular grid system since 1785. P. GATES,
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 64-65 (1968). A section is a square land area
containing 640 acres. 43 U.S.C. § 751 para. 3 (1976).
9. 684 F.2d at 680.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1982) permits the United States to be joined as a defendant in quiet
title actions involving lands in which the United States claims an interest.
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impermissibly reduced the rights granted by her original patent," and by
arguing that the government was estopped to deny that her fence was the
true property boundary.'
2
1. Validity of the Resurvey
The location of a disputed boundary is a question of fact.' 3 The circuit
court's review was therefore limited to a determination of whether the trial
court's findings were clearly erroneous.' 4 Because the trial court's determi-
nation that the resurvey established the true boundary was based on ade-
quate evidence, this finding was upheld by the Tenth Circuit.' 5
Sweeten then argued that the resurvey was invalid as a matter of law
because it impaired her ownership rights. 16 The patent to her land con-
veyed a specific amount of acreage described in metes and bounds.' 7
Sweeten contended that the stated acreage reflected the true extent of her
ownership rights, and that the resurveys were invalid because they reduced
her total acreage.'" The Tenth Circuit dismissed this argument, observing
that a metes and bounds description was generally more persuasive evidence
of the scope of a conveyance.' 9 Because Sweeten's ownership rights were
limited by the metes and bounds description, the Forest Service's accurate
resurveys could not impair her ownership rights.
20
2. Estoppel
The Tenth Circuit also denied Sweeten's claim that the government
was estopped to deny that her fence was the boundary line.2 1 In so doing
the Tenth Circuit recognized that in addition to the four traditional ele-
ments of estoppel,22 a fifth requirement must be established to estop the gov-
ernment in boundary disputes involving federal land patents. 23 The fifth
11. See 43 U.S.C. § 772 (1976). This statute provides in relevant part that "no . . . resur-
vey [of public lands] . . . shall be so executed as to impair the bona fide rights or claims of any
claimant, entryman, or owner of lands affected by such resurvey. ... Id
12. 684 F.2d at 681.
13. Id Accord United States v. State Inv. Co., 264 U.S. 206, 211 (1924); United States v.
Doyle, 468 F.2d 633, 636 (10th Cir. 1972).
14. 684 F.2d at 681.
15. Id
16. Id See supra note 11.
17. 684 F.2d at 681 n.3.
18. Id at 681-82.
19. Id at 682 & n.4.
20. Id
21. Id at 682. Sweeten also argued that the fence was the basis for a finding of ownership
through adverse possession or boundary by acquiescence. Id The court summarily rejected
these claims, noting that title to public lands cannot be acquired through doctrines designed to
resolve private disputes. Id (citing United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39-40 (1947)).
22. The four traditional elements of estoppel are:
1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; 2) He must intend that his conduct
shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to
believe it is so intended; 3) The latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and 4) He
must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.
684 F.2d at 682 n.5 (quoting United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
dntied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979)).
23. 684 F.2d at 682.
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element requires the party asserting estoppel to prove affirmative miscon-
duct on the part of the government. 24 Because no affirmative misconduct
was evident, Sweeten's estoppel claim was denied.
2 5
Judge Barrett disagreed only with the majority's holding that a fifth
element, affirmative misconduct, must be proved in order to estop the gov-
ernment in federal land patent boundary cases. 26 Judge Barrett stated the
traditional elements of estoppel were sufficient in these cases and indicated
that the flexibility of the traditional estoppel doctrine would better effect just
and fair decisions.
2 7
In summary, it is clear that the Tenth Circuit will hereafter require a
showing of affirmative misconduct on behalf of the government in order to
estop the government in boundary disputes involving federal land patents.
The requirement of proving affirmative misconduct means the government
will be estopped in only the most flagrant cases.
B. Construction of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
1. Mineral Leasing in Wilderness Study Areas
In Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. Watt 28 (RMOGA) the Tenth
Circuit construed the "grandfather clause" of section 603(c) of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 197629 (FLPMA) in order to deter-
mine whether the Department of Interior (Interior) interpretation of the sec-
tion was reasonable.
RMOGA had its inception in a 1978 interpretation of section 603(c) is-
24. Id The additional requirement was first applied in United States v. Ruby Co., 588
F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
25. 684 F.2d at 682.
26. Id at 682 (Barrett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. Id at 682-83. Judge Barrett also stated that in some circumstances compelling reasons
of public policy might prevent recognition of estoppel against the government. Id at 683. This
emphasis echoes Judge McKay's dissent in Home Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Nimmo, 695 F.2d 1251
(10th Cir. 1982) (McKay, J., dissenting), where Judge McKay views separation of powers con-
cerns as a policy limitation on estopping the government. Id. at 1260-61.
28. 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982).
29. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976). Section 603(c) contains the congressionally mandated
standards under which the Secretary of Interior (Secretary) is required to manage Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) lands under review for designation as wilderness areas. The section
states:
During the period of review of such areas and until Congress has determined
otherwise, the Secretary shall continue to manage such lands . . . in a manner so as
not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness, subject, how-
ever, to the continuation of existing mining and grazing uses and mineral leasing in
the manner and degree in which the same was being conducted on October 21, 1976:
Provided, That, in managing the public lands the Secretary shall by regulation or
otherwise take any action required to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of
the lands and their resources or to afford environmental protection. Unless previously
withdrawn from appropriation under the mining laws, such lands shall continue to be
subject to such appropriation during the period of review unless withdrawn by the
Secretary under the procedures of section 1714 of this title for reasons other than pres-
ervation of their wilderness character.
Id.
The "grandfather clause" is that portion of section 603(c) which states that the non-impair-
ment management standard is "subject . . . to the continuation of existing mining and grazing
uses and mineral leasing in the manner and degree in which the same was being conducted on
October 21, 1976. ... Id See 696 F.2d at 746-47.
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sued by the Solicitor of the Department of Interior (Solicitor).30 The Solici-
tor's opinion stated that all activities that were not protected by the section
603(c) grandfather clause 3 1 were to be regulated pursuant to the general
nonimpairment standard provided in the section. 32 The opinion then inter-
preted the grandfather clause as applying only to actual, on-the-ground uses
as they existed on the date of FLPMA's enactment. 33 Thus, any new uses or
modifications in existing uses would only be permitted if the requested use
would not impair an area's suitability for preservation as wilderness.
34
The Solicitor's opinion, along with stringent Interior Department leas-
ing guidelines promulgated following the opinion, resulted in an almost total
cessation of mineral development in Wilderness Study Areas (WSA's). 35
The Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association challenged the Solicitor's in-
terpretation of section 603(c) as being arbitrary and capricious and contrary
to law, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief from Interior's appli-
cation of the nonimpairment standard to mineral leasing within WSA's.
3 6
The district court granted the requested relief, holding that because section
603(c) unambiguously required active development of mineral leasing, 37 In-
terior's restrictive regulations were an invalid exercise of administrative
authority.
38
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the
regulations that were based on the Solicitor's opinion. 39 After a preliminary
discussion of the overall policy and purpose of FLPMA,4° the Tenth Circuit
examined the district court's interpretation of section 603(c). The Tenth
Circuit disagreed with the district court's characterization of section 603(c)
as unambiguous and therefore delved into the section's legislative history to
determine which mineral lease activities the grandfather clause exempted
30. 86 Interior Dec. 91 (1978) (formal opinion).
31. See supra note 29.
32. 86 Interior Dec. at 99-109. See supra note 29.
33. Id. at II1-15.
34. Id at 111-12 (interpreting section 603(c)'s grandfather exception for "existing mining
and grazing uses" to apply only to activities actually taking place on FLPMA's effective date);
id at 114-15 (interpreting section 603(c)'s grandfather exception for "existing mineral leasing"
to apply only to lease development activities actually taking place on FLPMA's effective date).
35. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (D. Wyo. 1980),
rev'dsub nom. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982). Wilder-
ness Study Areas (WSA's) are lands which have been identified as roadless areas of 5,000 acres
or more, or roadless islands. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1976). Once designated as a WSA an area
is evaluated to determine whether it should be designated as a wilderness area under the Wil-
derness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982). See 43 U.S.C. § 1781(a) (1976). Section
603(c), codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976), is designed to protect the WSA's while they are
evaluated for designation as a wilderness area.
36. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (D. Wyo. 1980),
rev'dsub nom. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982).
37. 500 F. Supp. at 1344-45.
38. Id at 1344.
39. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 750 (10th Cir. 1982).
40. Id at 738-39. The court ruled on two jurisdictional issues prior to discussing the merits
of the case. First, the court held that the case was ripe for decision because the solicitor's opin-
ion was final agency action resulting in significant, ongoing financial harm to RMOGA's mem-
bers. Id at 741-42. Second, the court held that RMOGA was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies because the merits of the case involved a question of statutory interpre-
tation previously ruled on by the agency. Id at 743-44.
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from application of the nonimpairment standard. Based on its interpreta-
tion of congressional intent, the court ruled that section 603(c)'s grandfather
clause exempted mineral lease development in WSA's only "in the manner
and degree actually occurring on October 21, 1976."4 1 Interior's policy of
subjecting new or changed mineral lease activity to the nonimpairment stan-
dard was therefore upheld.
4 2
As a result of RMOGA, additional mineral leasing development will
not-as a practical matter-take place in WSA's. The opinion in effect in-
terprets section 603(c) as permitting stricter land management standards for
WSA's than those provided for lands designated as Wilderness Areas, where
mineral development was allowed through 1984. 4 3 RMOGA therefore inter-
prets FLPMA to require less mineral development in potential Wilderness
Areas than was allowed in existing Wilderness Areas.
2. Cost Reimbursement for Right-of-Way Applications
A Department of Interior (Interior) cost reimbursement regulation
promulgated under the authority of FLPMA was the subject of a challenge
in the consolidated case of Nevada Power Co. v. Wall .44 The regulation at
issue required an applicant for a right-of-way over federal lands to reimburse
the government for administrative and other costs incurred in processing the
application. 45 The regulation, on its face, is not contrary to the FLPMA
provisions that authorize the Secretary to require reimbursement of reason-
able costs associated with the application process. 46 By Secretarial Order,
41. Id at 750.
42. Id Activity exempt from the nonimpairment standard remains subject to reasonable
environmental protection regulations. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976).
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982).
44. 711 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1983).
45. The challenged regulation provided:
An applicant for a right-of-way grant or a temporary use permit shall reimburse the
United States for administrative and other costs incurred by the United States in
processing the application, including the preparation of reports and statements pursu-
ant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347),
before the right-of-way grant or temporary use permit shall be issued under the regula-
tions of this title.
43 C.F.R. § 2803.1-1(a) (1983).
46. Two FLPMA provisions authorize the Secretary to collect the reasonable costs associ-
ated with processing applications from right-of-way applicants. Section 504(g) provides:
The Secretary. . .may, by regulation or prior to promulgation of such regulations, as
a condition of a right-of-way, require an applicant for or holder of a right-of-way to
reimburse the United States for all reasonable administrative and other costs incurred
in processing an application for such right-of-way and in inspection and monitoring of
construction, operation, and termination of the facility pursuant to such right-of-
way....
43 U.S.C. § 1764(g) (1976).
Section 304 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary may establish reason-
able filing and service fees and reasonable charges, and commissions with respect to
applications and other documents relating to the public lands and may change and
abolish such fees, charges, and commissions.
(b) The Secretary is authorized to require a deposit of any payments intended to
reimburse the United States for reasonable costs with respect to applications and other
documents relating to such lands. . . . As used in this section 'reasonable costs' in-
clude, but are not limited to, the costs of special studies; environmental impact state-
ments; monitoring construction, operation, maintenance, and termination of any
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however, the "reasonable costs" language of FLPMA and the "administra-
tive and other costs" language of the regulation were defined to mean "ac-
tual CoStS". 4 7 As a result of this interpretation, right-of-way applicants were
being charged the full, actual costs of processing their applications. 48 Nevada
Power involved several power company challenges to the practice of requir-
ing reimbursement of actual costs incurred in processing electric transmis-
sion line right-of-way applications.
49
In Nevada Power each utility alleged that FLPMA required the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) to consider specifically the factors listed in
section 304(b) of FLPMA50 when establishing its reasonable reimbursement
costs, and that BLM had breached this statutory duty.5 The utilities also
argued that BLM could not, as a matter of law, require reimbursement for
the entire cost of any environmental impact statement (EIS) required by a
right-of-way application. 52 BLM, conversely, insisted that application of the
reasonableness factors was purely discretionary, and that its regulations were
therefore valid even absent consideration of the statutory factors.
53 Simi-
larly, they insisted that the full cost of an EIS could be included in the reim-
bursement charges.
54
In resolving this conflict, the Tenth Circuit carefully examined the legis-
lative history of section 304(b). 55 That examination indicated that Congress
had included the specific factors in section 304(b) to prevent Interior from
routinely assessing the full cost of an application." Essentially, Congress
included the reasonableness factors in the statute to guide the Secretary in
his determination of reasonable costs; the Secretary, therefore, was required
to consider the factors in determining how much of the actual cost would be
charged to the applicant. 57 Because the reimbursement regulation had not
been promulgated after consideration of the statutorily mandated reasona-
authorized facility; or other special activities. In determining whether costs are rea-
sonable under this section, the Secretary may take into consideration actual costs (ex-
clusive of management overhead), the monetary value of the rights or privileges
sought by the applicant, the efficiency to the government processing involved, that
portion of the cost incurred for the benefit of the general public interest rather than for
the exclusive benefit of the applicant, the public service provided, and other factors
relevant to determining the reasonableness of the costs.
43 U.S.C. § 1734 (1976).
47. The Secretarial Order stated in pertinent part:
It is my fmdng that "reasonable costs" under Sectbns /sic/ 304 of FLPMA for processing
applications for rights-of-way over public lands and for monitoring right-of-way
holder activity, are the actual costs incurred by the United States in performing statutory
responsibilities necessitated by such applications or rights-of-way. The term "reason-
able costs" means the same as the term "administrative and other costs" as used in the
regulations . . .and includes costs incurred in preparation of environmental impact
statements.
Secretarial Order No. 3011, 42 Fed. Reg. 55,280 (1977) (emphasis added).
48. Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913, 916 (10th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 918-19.
50. 43 U.S.C. § 1734(b) (1976). See supra note 46.
51. 711 F.2d at 919.
52. Id at 929.
53. Id at 919.
54. Se id. at 918, 929.
55. Id at 921-25.
56. Id at 924.
57. Id at 925.
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bleness factors, the court held that the regulation was invalid.58
The Tenth Circuit also held that Interior could not charge the full cost
of an EIS to right-of-way applicants.5 9 The benefit of a required EIS inured
partially to the applicant and partially to the general public.60 Thus, be-
cause the statutory requirement to assess only reasonable costs required con-
sideration of the public benefits accruing from bestowing a private benefit, 6 1
the full cost of an EIS could not be charged to the applicant.
62
In summary, the Nevada Power decision mandates that Interior consider
the statutorily enumerated reasonableness factors when calculating the costs
that will be passed on to a right-of-way applicant. Consideration of these
factors will usually result in payment of less than full reimbursement costs by
the applicant. 63 In any case, the right-of-way applicant benefits because In-
terior cannot assess that portion of the cost of an EIS which results in general
public benefit.
64
C. Oil and Gas Leasing Regulattons
The court decided two narrow questions concerning a BLM interpreta-
tion of regulations controlling simultaneous filings for noncompetitive oil
and gas leases. These regulations set forth the specific procedural and sub-
stantive requirements for filing a valid simultaneous lease application. 65 In
Ahrens v. Andrus,66 the Tenth Circuit rejected a BLM ruling requiring that
the date of execution be shown for each separate signature on a lease appli-
cation (also known as a lease drawing entry card or DEC).
6 7
Because the Ahrens DEC's did not have dated signatures, the BLM re-
jected the applications and issued the leases to the next qualified parties. 68 In
overturning the BLM decision, the court reasoned that a signature date re-
quirement served no important purpose because the only significant date for
BLM purposes was the filing date of the DEC.69 The court therefore fol-
lowed a prior Tenth Circuit opinion 70 which held that denying an applica-
58. Id at 926-27. The court noted, however, that in some instances, consideration of the
statutory factors might result in a determination that actual cost reimbursement was reason-
able. Id at 925 n.6.
59. Id. at 928-29.
60. Id at 928 (citing Alumet v. Andrus, 607 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1979)).
61. 711 F.2d at 930. See supra note 46.
62. The court rejected the utilities' argument that assessing the full cost of the benefit
would be an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power. Id at 929-30. Because the EIS cost
was a necessary part of granting a special benefit to the utilities, the agency could constitution-
ally require full reimbursement. Id. at 930 (citing Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 601 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 1102
(1980)).
63. See supra note 58.
64. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
65. See 43 C.F.R. § 3112 (1983). The applications are referred to as "simultaneous filings"
because each application is for lease of both oil and gas rights. See 1. § 3112.2-1.
66. 690 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982).
67. Id at 808.
68. Id at 806.
69. Id at 808.
70. Winkler v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1979).
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tion based on inconsequential defects in the application was inappropriate,"'
and ruled that the Ahrens applications should not have been denied.
7 2
The second case concerning the simultaneous oil and gas leasing regula-
tions also concerned the adequacy of a DEC. In Stewart Capital Corp. v. An-
drus,73 the DEC's submitted by Stewart on behalf of its clients did not
contain a statement of agency required by existing regulations. 74 For this
reason the leases were denied in spite of the fact that Stewart had submitted,
and BLM had accepted, applications without the agency statement for over
six years. 75 The BLM's reversal of its policy was based on the retroactive
application of the administrative case D.E Pack, 76 which ruled that DEC's
filed without the required agency statement were invalid.
77
In affirming the trial court's refusal to permit retroactive application of
Pack to the leases submitted by Stewart, 78 the Tenth Circuit applied the
well-recognized balancing test set forth in Retail, Wholesale, and Department
Store Union v. NLRB. 79 After weighing the balancing standards8 ° in light of
Stewart's good-faith reliance on prior BLM practices, and in addition con-
sidering prior case law denying retroactive application of Pack,8 ' the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the Interior Department had abused its discretion in
retroactively applying Pack to the Stewart DEC's.
8 2
D. Construction of Right-of- Way
City and County of Denver v. Bergland8 3 adds one more chapter to the never-
ending saga that details Denver's attempts to construct the Williams Fork
71. Id at 778.
72. 690 F.2d at 808.
73. 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1983).
74. Id at 846. Stewart had failed to comply with 43 C.F.R. § 3102.6-1(a)(2) (1981)
(amended 45 Fed. Reg. 8545 (1982) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3102.4 (1983)). 43 C.F.R. § 3102.6-
1 (a)(2) stated:
If the offer is signed by an attorney-in-fact or agent, it shall be accompanied by sepa-
rate statements over the signature of the attorney-in-fact or agent and the offeror stat-
ing whether or not there is any agreement or understanding between them or with any
other person, either oral or written, by which the attorney in fact or agent or such
other person has received or is to receive any interest in the lease when issued.
Id.
75. 701 F.2d at 848.
76. 84 Interior Dec. 192 (1977), afdon reconsideration, 85 Interior Dec. 408 (1978).
77. 84 Interior Dec. at 196.
78. 701 F.2d at 850.
79. 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See 701 F.2d at 848.
80. The standards set forth in Retail, Wholesale, and Dep't Store Union are:
1. [Wihether the particular case is one of first impression;
2. [Wihether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well established prac-
tice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law;
3. [T]he extent to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the
former rule;
4. [T]he degree of the burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party; and
5. [T]he statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on
the old standard.
466 F.2d at 390.
81. E.g., McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1981); Runnells v. Andrus, 484 F.
Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1980).
82. 701 F.2d at 850.
83. 695 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1982).
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Diversion Project. 84 The case involved a right-of-way across United States
Forest Service (USFS) lands granted for water diversion canals that are a
part of the Williams Fork Project. Although the court detailed the complete
history of the right-of-way, 85 the basic question addressed was whether the
USFS was authorized to order Denver to discontinue construction on the
right-of-way in light of Denver's deviation from the right-of-way originally
granted.
8 6
In order to determine USFS authority over Denver's right-of-way, the
court began by defining the nature and scope of the Denver right-of-way.
The Denver right-of-way was granted in 1924 pursuant to section 4 of the
Act of February 1, 1905.87 Under this Act the Secretary of Interior (Secre-
tary) was charged with administering the Denver right-of-way. 88 Although
FLPMA both transferred authority to the USFS to administer rights-of-way
across national forest land8 9 and eliminated the Secretary's authority to
"grant, issue, or renew" rights-of-way over national forest lands,90 the court
held that FLPMA did not affect the Secretary's exclusive jurisdiction over
existing rights-of-way issued under the Act of February 1, 1905.91 Thus,
FLPMA did not grant USFS authority over Denver's right-of-way.
92
The USFS also attempted to rely on the Act of June 4, 189793 as au-
thority for the stop order issued to Denver. The USFS argued that the Act
authorized them to prevent unauthorized construction in order to preserve
national forests from destruction, and that Denver's deviation from the
right-of-way constituted unauthorized construction. 94 The Tenth Circuit
84. The Tenth Circuit's detailed history of the Williams Fork project reveals that the pro-
ject has been under construction since the late 1930's. See id at 469.
85. Id at 467-71.
86. See id at 474, 476-77.
87. 16 U.S.C. § 524 (1982), partzally repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976)).
See 695 F.2d at 468. Section 4 of the Act of February 1, 1905 provides:
Rights-of-way for the construction and maintenance of dams, reservoirs, water plants,
ditches, flumes, pipes, tunnels, and canals, within and across the national forests of the
United States, are granted to citizens and corporations of the United States for munic-
ipal or mining purposes, and for the purposes of the milling and reduction of ores,
during the period of their beneficial use, under such rules and regulations as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and subject to the laws of the State or
Territory in which said forests are respectively situated.
16 U.S.C. § 524 (1982).
88. 695 F.2d at 468, 475.
89. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1976).
90. See 43 U.S.C. § 17 7 0(a) (1976).
91. 695 F.2d at 475-76. The court reasoned that because FLPMA expressly stated that it
should not be deemed to work repeals by implication, Pub. L. No. 94-579 § 701(0; 90 Stat.
2743, 2786 (1976), revocation of the Secretary's authority to "grant, issue, or renew" rights-of-
way did not divest the Secretary of authority to administer existing rights-of-way. 695 F.2d at
475-76.
92. 695 F.2d at 476.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:
The Secretary of Agriculture shall make provisions for the protection against de-
struction by fire and depredations upon the public forests and national forests . . .
and he may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure
the objects of such reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to
preserve the forests thereon from destruction . . ..
Id
94. 695 F.2d at 476. The USFS also argued that Denver's use of steel culverts constituted
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recognized that, in the absence of the Secretary's authority under the Act of
February 1, 1905, the USFS had the power to issue an order halting con-
struction deviating from a right-of-way. 95 The court found, however, that
Denver's deviation implicated the Secretary's exclusive authority to adminis-
ter Denver's right-of-way. 96 Therefore, USFS had no power to issue its stop
order.9 7 The court then held that Denver could not continue construction of
the project along a path deviating from its original right-of-way without ob-
taining permission from BLM.98
The result of the Cy and County of Denver v. Bergland decision is that the
BLM, and not the USFS, has sole authority over administration of the Den-
ver right-of-way. The case did not, however, resolve all the issues raised by
Denver. Considering that the court left to BLM the determination of the
extent to which the National Environmental Protection Act of 196999 ap-
plies to the Williams Fork Diversion Project, this long-running saga may
again appear in federal court.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Interpretation and Adequacy of an Environmental Impact Statement
The National Environmental Policy Act of 196910 ° (NEPA) requires
the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) to accompany
"every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other ma-
jor federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."' 0 ' In effect, NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the
environmental consequences of their actions prior to undertaking certain
projects. Determining when NEPA applies 10 2 and the adequacy of federal
compliance with the EIS requirements, 0 3 has led to widespread litigation. '
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit, in Johnston v. Davis,10 5 further
refined the judicial interpretation of what constitutes an adequate EIS.
Johnston considered the adequacy of the final EIS10 6 the Soil Conserva-
tion Service (SCS) prepared in conjunction with the Toltec Reservoir Pro-
ject. 10 7 Plaintiffs alleged that the Toltec Reservoir Project EIS failed to
unauthorized construction because the original right-of-way permit was limited to construction
of canals. Id at 478. The Tenth Circuit agreed that USFS could halt this practice if it was
indeed unauthorized, but found that USFS administrative practice justified treating the use of
steel culverts as authorized by the right-of-way grant. Id at 478-79.
95. Id at 480.
96. Id
97. Id at 480-81.
98. Id at 481. BLM exercises the Secretary's authority over rights-of-way.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
102. For a discussion of when NEPA is applicable to federal agency action, see F. ANDER-
SON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 56-141 (1973).
103. For a discussion of the required contents of an EIS, see id. at 179-245.
104. For a partial list of cases interpreting NEPA, see id. at 298-307.
105. 698 F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 1983).
106. USDA-SCS-EIS-WS-(ADM)-79--F-WY (January 1980).
107. The Toltec Reservoir Project was authorized pursuant to the Watershed Protection
and Flood Prevention Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1008 (1982). 698 F.2d at 1090 n.l.
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consider certain environmental costs' 08 and applied an unrealistic discount
rate in preparing the required economic evaluation of the project. 10 9 The
Tenth Circuit quickly dismissed Johnston's claim that the EIS inadequately
discussed the issues mandated by NEPA.10 The court held, however, that
the EIS was inadequate not because an artificially low discount rate had
been used, but because SCS had used that rate to improperly represent an
unrealistic economic value for the project. I''
The SCS used a 3.2% discount rate to calculate the present value of the
Toltec Reservoir Project, pursuant to a congressional mandate that required
an artificial discount rate to be used to evaluate all water resource projects
authorized prior to 1970.112 Congress mandated this artificial standard in
order to permit construction of certain projects despite their economic ineffi-
ciency.t" 3 The Tenth Circuit recognized that the SCS was obligated to use
an artificially low discount rate when comparing alternatives to the Toltec
Reservoir Project.1 4 The court concluded, however, that the mandated use
of an artificial discount rate did not authorize the SCS to represent in the
EIS that the Toltec Reservoir Project would yield positive economic bene-
fits.'' 5 Failure to mention the use of the artificial rate rendered the EIS
misleading because the document would not reflect a reasonable comparison
of alternatives to the proposed project. 1 16 The court therefore required SCS
tr/include a discussion of the artificial discount rate in the Toltec Reservoir
Project EIS." 7 The court also held that the EIS must include an economic
evaluation of the project using a realistic discount rate.' 18
III. INDIAN LANDS
A. O and Gas Leases
The Tenth Circuit opinion infcaril/a Apache Trbe v. Andrus '9 discussed
the remedies available to an Indian tribe when the Bureau of Indian Affairs
108. 698 F.2d at 1091-92.
109. Id. at 1092. NEPA requires an assessment of a project's projected economic benefits in
order to contrast the project's value with the value of alternative actions. Id. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1976).
110. 698 F.2d at 1091-92. NEPA requires that an EIS address the following issues:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
111. 698 F.2d at 1094-95.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
113. 698 F.2d at 1092.
114. Id. at 1094.




119. 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1982).
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(BIA) failed to comply with the regulation 120 governing notice of oil and gas
lease sales on Indian reservations. 121 Although the Jicarilla Apache Tribe
(Tribe) requested cancellation of the leases based on BIA's noncompliance
with the regulation,' 22 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's determi-
nation that the equitable remedy of cancellation was unavailable.123 Can-
cellation was denied because the extensive exploration and development
activities on the leases made it impossible to return all the parties to the pre-
lease status quo.124 Given the impossibility of granting the requested equita-
ble relief, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's award of compensa-
tory damages. 1
25
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the propriety of the district court or-
der tolling both the primary lease term and the lessee's payment obligations
during the pendency of the litigation.' 26 Although the circuit court agreed
that application of the tolling remedy was appropriate, 27 the circuit court
reversed the district court's ruling that the lessee was excused from paying
rentals during the pendency of the litigation. 128 One party to a lease will
ultimately suffer the loss resulting from the delay in enjoying lease rights
caused by litigation; the Tenth Circuit determined that the equities required
payment of rent by the lessees.'
2 9
Jolene Crane
120. The regulation in question provided that:
(a) At such times and in such manner as he may deem appropriate, after being au-
thorized by the tribal council or other authorized representative of the tribe, the super-
intendent shall publish notices at least thirty days prir to the sale, unless a shorter period is
authorized by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that oil and gas leases on specific
tracts, each of which shall be in a reasonably compact body, will be offered to the
highest responsible bidder for a bonus consideration, in addition to stipulated rentals
and royalties ...
(b) All notices or advertisements of sales of oil and gas leases shall reserve to the
Secretary of the Interior the right to reject all bids when in his judgment the interests
of the Indians will be best served by so doing, and that if no satisfactory bid is re-
ceived, or if the accepted bidder fails to complete the lease, or if the Secretary of the
Interior shall determine that it is unwise in the interests of the Indians to accept the
highest bid, the Secretary may readvertise such lease for sale, or if deemed advisable,
with the consent of the tribal council or other governing tribal authorities, a lease may
be made by private negotiations. The successful bidder or bidders will be required to
pay his or their share of the advertising costs ...
25 C.F.R. § 171.3 (1981) (redesignated as 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (1983)) (emphasis supplied).
121. Both the district court and the court of appeals concluded that Interior's failure to
publish a notice describing the specific tracts, stating the stipulated rentals and royalties, and
reserving the right to reject all bids constituted a failure to comply with the regulations. 687
F.2d at 1331-32.
122. The Tribe also asserted that the leases should be cancelled because BIA failed to pre-
pare an EIS pursuant to NEPA. Id at 1337. The court rejected this claim, however, based on
the Tribe's unreasonable delay in bringing the claim and the Tribe's lack of good faith motiva-
tion in asserting the claim. Id at 1338-40.
123. Id at 1333.
124. Id at 1333-34.
125. Id. at 1334.
126. See id at 1340-42.
127. Id at 1342.
128. Id at 1343.
129. Id at 1342-43.
SECURITIES
OVERVIEW
During the recent survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided three cases' involving either the Securities Act of 19332 (1933 Act)
or the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 19343 (1934 Act). A
fourth case, Chandler v. KEW, Inc. ,4 was ordered published during the survey
period and is discussed in this section.
Chandler's publication reinforced the Tenth Circuit's leading position in
the ongoing debate over whether the sale of 100% of the stock in a corpora-
tion is a securities transaction within the purview of federal securities laws.5
In a similar case, Hackford v. First Security Bank,6 the court refused to treat an
instrument's denomination as "stock" as the controlling factor in deciding
whether the securities laws applied to a transaction. 7 Zobrist V. Coal-A, Inc. "
examined the scope of an investor's duty of diligence when purchasing a
security.9 The fourth case, Baum v. Great Western Cities, Inc. ,10 merely upheld
a jury's finding that plaintiffs had failed to prove the scienter required to
establish a violation of rule lOb-5.1" Baum, because of its limited preceden-
tial importance, will not be discussed in this survey.
1. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983); Baum v. Great Western Cities,
Inc., 
703 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1983); Hackford v. First Sec. Bank, No. 81-1863 (10th Cir. Jan.
31, 1983).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
4. 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977) (ordered published Oct. 18, 1982).
5. Compare, e.g. , Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Fredericksen
v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981) (holding that the sale of
100% of the stock in a corporation is not a securities transaction) with Seagrave Corp. v. Vista
Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982); Golden v. Garafolo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that such transactions fall within the purview of the securities laws). See also Dillport,
Restortng Balance to the Defition of Security, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1982); Seldin, When Stock Is Not a
Security.- The "Sale of Business Doctrine" under the Federal Security Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 (1981);
Thompson, The Shrinking Definition ofa Security: Why Purchasing All ofa Company's Stock Is Not a
Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 225 (1982); Note, Securities Law, 65 MARQ. L.
REV. 487 (1982).
6. No. 81-1863 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 1983).
7. See infra notes 40-67 and accompanying text.
8 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983).
9. See infra notes 67-102 and accompanying text.
10. 703 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1983).
11. Id. at 1206, 1210-11. Rule IOb-5, an anti-fraud rule promulgated under section 10b of
the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1982), is codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). The Supreme Court has held that proof of some degree of scienter is
necessary to establish a violation of rule lOb-5 when plaintiffs seek money damages under the
rule, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), but has not ruled on whether proof of
reckless behavior satisfies the scienter requirement. Id at 194 n.12. Accord Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980). The Tenth Circuit holds the scienter element established upon proof
of reckless behavior. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982). Ilackbart is discussed
in last year's Tenth Circuit Survey. See Securities, Ninth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 60 DEN. L.J.
373, 373-80 (1982).
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I. CHANDLER V. KEW, INC. THE SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE
A. The Case
Chandler charged defendant KEW, Inc. with securities fraud in the sale
of a liquor business.12 Chandler contended that because the sales contract
for the liquor store included 100% of defendant's outstanding corporate
stock, and because "stock" was defined as a security by the 1933 and 1934
Acts, 13 the transaction was subject to federal securities laws.' 4 The trial
court rejected plaintiffs argument, and dismissed Chandler's claim for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. '5 In a tersely worded opinion, the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court and held that the sale of 100% of the stock in a
liquor store as part of the sale of the business was not a securities transaction
within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
16
Relying on Unted Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,17 the court rejected
plaintiff's argument that KEW's sale of stock in the liquor business should be
considered a security transaction simply because the statutory definition of
security included the word "stock."' 8 The court viewed Forman as limiting
the application of the federal securities laws to those transactions in which
the "economic reality" involved an investment in the investment scheme of
another. 19 The economic reality of Chandler's transaction was the sale of
ownership of a business via transfer of stock, rather than the sale of stock qua
security.20 Hence, the transaction was not subject to federal securities laws.
12. Chandler v. KEW, Inc., 691 F.2d 442, 443 (10th Cir. 1983).
13. The 1933 Act defines "security" in 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982). This section provides:
[U]nless the context otherwise requires-(l) the term "security" means any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certifi-
cate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certif-
icate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based
on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participa-
tion in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of. or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id (emphasis supplied).
The 1934 Act's definition of security is found in 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982). This defini-
tion is almost identical to that found in the 1933 Act; the primary difference between the two
definitions is the 1934 Act's exclusion of short-term notes. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982)
with 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 c(a)(10)(1 98 2). The minor differences between the two Acts have been
found to lack controlling significance. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967);
Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556 n.7 (1979).
14. 691 F.2d at 443.
15. Id Both the 1933 and 1934 Acts contain provisions for federal jurisdiction over suits
asserting violations of those Acts. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)(1982)(1933 Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa(1982)(1934 Act). Lack of diverse citizenship between the parties precluded subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction once the federal securities claims were dismissed. 691 F.2d at 334.
16. 691 F.2d at 444.
17. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
18. 691 F.2d at 443, See supra note 13.
19. See 691 F.2d at 443-44.
20. Id at 444.
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B. The Sale of Business Doctrine
Chandler, although published belatedly, was the first post-Forman appel-
late recognition of the sale of business doctrine. 2 1 This doctrine restricts the
application of federal securities laws to those stock transfers which have the
indicia of an investment in a security. Stock transfers which are in effect
merely evidence of a commercial sale of property are, under this doctrine,
beyond the scope of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
22
The source of this restriction on the protection of federal law is found in
the Supreme Court opinions setting out the identifying characteristics of
those investments constituting federal securities. 23  Lower courts applying
the sale of business doctrine read the Court's classificatory opinions as man-
dating an inquiry into the economic reality of an alleged securities transac-
tion regardless of the formal denomination of the instruments involved.
2 4
Only when that inquiry reveals the type of investment contemplated by the
1933 and 1934 Acts (33/34 Act investment) 25 will federal securities laws be
applicable to a transaction.
26
Forman is the Court's most recent delineation of the general characteris-
tics of a 33/34 Act investment. Under Forman, application of the federal
securities laws is justified whenever there is an investment of valuable consid-
eration in an enterprise with the expectation that the enterprise will generate
profits through the management of a promoter or other third party.2 7 Thus,
even though an instrument may be denominated "stock," it is not a 33/34
Act investment unless the transaction involving the instrument manifests the
basic economic realities described immediately above.
28
The sale of business doctrine is a specific example of how courts apply
21. Seldin, supra note 5, at 642.
22. Frederiksen v. Poloway, 643 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017
(1981). Accord Thompson, supra note 5, at 252. See also Dillport, supra note 5, at 114. Cf SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943) (fact that reality of transaction was not
commercial sale of leasehold interest supported finding that transaction involved a security).
23. E.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1977); SEC v. WJ. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
24. E.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11 th Cir. 1982); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 643 F.2d
1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. KEW, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th
Cir. 1977).
25. The phrase "33/34 Act investment" is used in lieu of the statutory phrase "security" in
order to emphasize the judicial focus on the economic reality of a transaction rather than the
transaction's formal characteristics.
26. See, e.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 643
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
27. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1977). Forman left open
an important question which has occupied the circuit courts since SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293 (1943), the decision Forman relys on in articulating the factors distinguishing commer-
cial transactions from securities transactions. See 421 U.S. at 852 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1943)). Howey required an expectation of profits solely from the efforts of
others. 388 U.S. at 301. Forman noted that the Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973), had held that a security
was present even though profits were partially dependent on the investors' efforts. 421 U.S. at
852 n. 16 (citing Turner, 474 F.2d at 482). The Court, however, refrained from commenting on
the Turner holding. 421 U.S. at 852 n. 16. But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551, 560 n. 12 (1979) (stating that the required investment may be in form of services, citing
Forman's recognition of Turner).
28. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848, 850-51.
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Forman's economic realities concept to evaluate a class of investment transac-
tions. Typically, courts applying the doctrine find that the transfer of 100%
of a business' stock divests the seller of management prerogative, thereby
precluding application of the federal securities laws.29 Thus, although the
purchase of a business may be an investment in the conventional sense, it is
not an investment entitled to the protection of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Not all circuits accept the sale of business doctrine, however. Those
courts which reject the doctrine do not read Forman to establish the economic
reality inquiry as the sole determinant of a statutory security. 30 According
to these courts, the federal securities laws are applicable when a transaction
involves either instruments having the characteristics normally associated
with that type of instrument 3' or when the transaction has the economic
reality of a 33/34 Act investment. 32 These courts read Forman as containing
two holdings: first, the instruments involved lacked the normal attributes of
stock and therefore were not securities, and second, the instruments involved
were not securities as a matter of economic reality. 3 3 Both types of purchas-
ers are entitled to federal protection, the latter because Congress intended to
protect the unwary and the former because purchasers of instruments com-
monly understood to be securities are entitled to rely on the protection of
federal securities laws.
3 4
Regardless of the merits of reading Forman to establish two standards for
identifying securities within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,35 Chan-
dler and Christy v. Cambron,36 another recent Tenth Circuit decision, 37 clearly
establish that the economic reality test is the sole relevant inquiry in the
Tenth Circuit. Thus, unless the purchaser of a business can establish that
29. Eg. King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11 th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654
F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981).
30. See, e.g., Golden v. Garafolo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982); Mifflin Energy Re-
sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing, Inc., v. Hastings, 456
F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
31. For example, an instrument will be considered stock within the meaning of the 1933
and 1934 Acts when it entitles the owner to dividends, can be hypothecated, and bears other
indicia traditionally associated with instruments denominated "stock." See Golden, 678 F.2d at
1144; Mifin Energy Resources, 501 F. Supp. at 336; Titsch Printing, Inc., 456 F. Supp. at 449;
Bronstei, 407 F. Supp. at 929-30.
32. See Golden, 678 F.2d at 1144; Titsch Printing, Inc., 456 F. Supp. at 449.
33. E.g., Golden, 678 F.2d at 1144; Titsch Printing, Inc., 456 F. Supp. at 449. Accord Dillport,
supra note 5, at 115. But see Thompson, supra note 5, at 246-50 (Forman requires analysis of
nature of underlying transaction to determine applicability of federal securities laws regardless
of the formal characteristics of a transferred instrument).
34. Mifkn Energy Sources, Inc., 501 F. Supp. at 336; Titsch Prthng Co., 501 F. Supp. at 449.
Golden also rejects limiting federal protection to instruments satisfying the economic reality test,
but on a different basis than MufFin and Titsch. Golden reasoned that the careful statutory list of
covered instruments, see supra note 13, would have been superfluous had Congress intended to
adopt only the economic reality test. 698 F.2d at 1144-45. Further, to adopt the economic
reality test as exclusive would create uncertainty in the application of the Act, thereby under-
mining its prophylactic effect. See id at 1146.
35. Compare Thompson, supra note 5, at 246-50 (rejecting dual standards) with Dillport,
supra note 5, at 114-16 (supporting dual standards).
36. 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983).




the seller has retained control over management of the business,38 in all
probability the buyer will be required to resort to state law remedies for
fraud and misrepresentation.
3 9
II. GRAZING RIGHTS AS A FEDERAL SECURITY
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also relied
on the economic reality inquiry to arrive at a decision concerning the nature
of the instruments involved in Hackfordv. First Securzt' Bank .4o The dispute in
Hackford grew out of the distribution of Ute Indian reservation lands follow-
ing execution of the Ute Indian Supervision Termination Act 4t (Termina-
tion Act). The Termination Act divided members of the Ute Tribe into two
classifications: "full blood" (those who are at least one-half Ute Indian and
more than one-half Indian ancestry); 4 2 and "mixed blood" (those who are
part Ute Indian but who do not qualify as full bloods) .4 3 In accordance with
the Termination Act, 490 mixed bloods received 172,000 acres of range land
as part of their share of the partition of Ute tribal assets. 4 4 To facilitate the
distribution, the mixed bloods formed two nonprofit corporations to main-
tain the rangelands. 45 Each mixed blood then surrendered his interest in the
land for a share in each corporation. 46 Each share permitted a member to
graze a specified number of cattle and sheep for a specified number of days
each year.
47
First Security Bank was designated as the transfer agent for the shares,
and in addition was named by the Secretary of the Interior to act as trustee
for assets owned by mixed blood incompetents and minors. 48 The full
bloods, with permission of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, offered the mixed
bloods, and the bank acting as trustee, $1100 per share for the range corpo-
ration stock.49 The bank, in accordance with Department of Interior regula-
38. See Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 672 &n.1 (purchasers of less than 100% of shares
not entitled to bring action under federal securities laws because their participation in venture
precluded finding profits were derived from efforts of others). But see Crowley v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1975) (security present where essential managerial
efforts those of seller of investment) (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters. Inc., 474 F.2d 476
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973)).
39. Forman stated that the name given an instrument might lead a purchaser to rely on the
protection of the federal securities laws, especially when the instrument "embodies some of the
significant characteritics typically associated with the named instrument." 421 U.S. at 850-51.
Theoretically, therefore, an investor might be entitled to federal protection even absent
purchase of an "economically real" security. It should be noted, however, that the Seventh
Circuit, which has adopted the sale of business doctrine, recently held that the purchaser of a
business could not justifiably rely on federal security law protection because of the commercial
nature of the purchase transaction. Canfield v. Rapp & Son, 654 F.2d 459, 466 n.7 (7th Cir.
1981).
40. No. 81-1863 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 1983).
41. 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-677aa (1982).
42. Id § 677a(b).
43. Id § 677a(c).
44. Hackbart v. First Sec. Bank, No. 81-1863, slip op. at 2-3 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 1983).
45. Id at 3.
46. Id
47. Id




tions, offered the shares to the mixed bloods, the full bloods, and to the Ute
Tribe as a whole for at least $1100 per share.50 This offer was accepted by
the full bloods. 5 '
The plaintiffs in Hackford represented a class of mixed blood trust bene-
ficiaries whose stock was sold to the full bloods. 52 Among other allega-
tions, 53 the plaintiffs contended that the bank violated the antifraud
provisions of rule lOb-5 54 and section l0b of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Act of 1934. 5  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
the economic reality analysis articulated in SECv. W.j. Howe, Co. ,56 rejected
the plaintiffs' charge, ruling that the shares in the range corporations were
not securities within the meaning of the 1934 Act.
5 7
Howey defined a security transaction as an investment in a common en-
terprise with the expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of
others. 58 In Hackford, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the range corporation
stock failed the expectation of profits branch of the Howe, test for several
reasons. First, the range corporation was organized as a nonprofit corpora-
tion under Utah law, precluding any reasonable expectation of distribu-
tions.59 Second, the court found that any intent to capture any appreciation
in stock value caused by corporate activities was incidental to the real pur-
pose of the group, which was to facilitate grazing for its members. 60 Because
the primary motivation in acquiring the shares was use of the tribal prop-
erty, the mixed bloods lacked the necessary profit motivation. 6 1 Alternately,
the lack of evidence that the corporation had been promoted as a source of
profits precluded any finding of profit motivation by those mixed bloods not
50. Id
51. Id.
52. Id at 5.
53. The plaintiffs also alleged the bank breached its fiduciary trust obligations by not max-
imizing the sale price of the range land. The trial court ruled that the bank had set an appro-
priate price; this finding was upheld by the Tenth Circuit. Id at 11-12.
54. 29 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1983). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the sale of any
security.
Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
56. 328 U.S. 293 (1943). The Howey analysis served as the basis of the Forman holding. See
supra note 27.
57. No. 81-1863, slip op. at 9.
58. 328 U.S. at 301.
59. No. 81-1863, slip op. at 8. Se, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-6-21 (1953) (incorporation under
nonprofit corporation act limited to corporations not organized for pecuniary purposes).
60. No. 81-1863, slip op. at 8. Cf Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036
(10th Cir. 1980) (recognizing expectation of capital appreciation satisfies Hlowe expectation of
profits inquiry).




wishing to graze cattle. 62
The court also ruled that the stock failed the third part of the Howey
test-that profits be derived from the efforts of a promoter or other third
party.63 The court did not provide an explicit basis for this conclusion. Pre-
sumably, the fact that the corporations were required to obtain 85% of their
income from shareholder assessments 64 and the overall nonprofit nature of
the operation 65 precluded an expectation of profits from the efforts of
others.
66
III. DELINEATION OF THE CONTOURS OF JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE IN A
RULE lOb-5 ACTION
The question of the degree of diligence necessary to find justifiable reli-
ance in a private rule lOb-5 action was addressed by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Zobrzst v. Coal-A, Inc. 67 Holdsworth v. Strong,68 the first Tenth
Circuit opinion to address this issue, held that an investor was required to
prove that he justifiably relied on defendant's material misrepresentations in
order to recover under rule 10b-5.69 Under Holdsworth, justifiable reliance
could be proved in either of two ways, depending on the nature of the al-
leged misrepresentation. If the misrepresentation consisted of an omission to
state facts necessary to prevent a statement from being misleading, justifiable
reliance was shown upon proof that the omissions were material. 70  If the
misrepresentations consisted of affirmative misstatements, the factfinder was
required to evaluate the facts and circumstances surrounding the misrepre-
sentation and determine whether plaintiff was entitled to base his investment
decision on the defendant's statements. 7i Zobrzst considered two issues. The
first was the extent to which a plaintiff was entitled to rely on oral statements
contradicting written warnings in a Private Placement Memorandum. 72 The
second was whether the inference of reliance arising from a material omis-
sion could be rebutted by defendants.
73
62. No. 81-1863, slip op. at 9.
63. Id. at 7, 9.
64. Id. at 7.
65. See id. at 8.
66. Cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979) (fundamental
importance of employer contributions to success of pension plan indicative of lack of reliance on
managerial efforts of others to generate profits).
67. 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983).
68. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
69. 545 F.2d at 696. The Tenth Circuit established the justifiable reliance requirement in
order to ensure that a defendant -as not penalized for misrepresentations which did not cause a
plaintiffs loss. By requiring a showing of reliance, the plaintiff established a prima facie case of
causality; by showing the reliance was justified in light of the circumstances of a case, the plain-
tiff established that the defendant was responsible for plaintiff's actions. See id. at 693-95.
70. Id at 695 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-
54 (1972)). An omission is material when "a reasonable investor would have considered the
facts important." 545 F.2d at 695.
71. See 545 F.2d at 695-97. Itoldsworth did not provide an explicit set of criteria for evaluat-
ing reliance on affirmative misstatements, indicating only that the plaintiff's fault in relying on
the misstatements must be less than the defendant's fault in making them. Id at 693.
72. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1983).




Zobrist arose when the investments of plaintiffs Herman Zobrist, Neil
Rasmussen, and Phil Rasmussen in Coal-X, Ltd./'76 74 appeared to have
misfired. Plaintiffs filed suit against Coal-X, Inc., the general partner of
Coal-X, Ltd./'76, and two of its officers who were alleged to have made false
and misleading oral statements regarding the probability of success of the
investment. 75 A federal district court jury found that the defendant officers
of Coal-X, Inc. had "knowingly violated rule lOb-5 by misrepresenting ma-
terial facts to Phil Rasmussen, that he justifiably relied on these misrepresen-
tations, and that . . . he suffered $50,000 in damages."'76  The jury also
found that the defendants had withheld material facts from Neil Rasmussen
and Herman Zobrist, but that these plaintiffs had not relied on those omis-
sions and were therefore not entitled to damages. 77 Coal-X, Inc. appealed
the decision in favor of Phil Rasmussen; Neil Rasmussen and Zobrist cross-
appealed the verdict in favor of Coal-X, Inc. 78
B. Effect of Failing to Read a Private Placement Memorandum
At the crux of the Tenth Circuit's disposition of the cross-appeal against
Phil Rasmussen was his failure to read the Private Placement Memorandum
the defendants had provided to all three plaintiffs. 79 This Memorandum
expressly recited the generally high risk of investing in a speculative business
venture, and the specific risks and difficulties involved in operating a coal
company. 80 Additionally, the Memorandum stated that no person had been
authorized to make representations not contained in the document, and that
potential investors should not rely on such representations.81 Although Phil
Rasmussen signed documents indicating he had read the Memorandum, it
was undisputed that neither Phil nor the other plaintiffs read the
document.
8 2
Based primarily on Phil Rasmussen's failure to read the Private Place-
ment Memorandum, the Tenth Circuit overturned the jury's finding of justi-
fiable reliance, and reversed the jury award of $50,000.83 The court reached
its decision by charging Phil Rasmussen with constructive knowledge of the
74. Coal-X, Ltd./'76 was a Utah limited partnership organized to finance a West Virginia
coal mining venture. Id at 1513.




79. The Coal-X Ltd./'76 stock was sold as a private offering pursuant to rule 146, 17
C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981). Compliance with rule 146 exempted issuers from the registration re-
quirements of the Securities Act of 1933. See Rule 146-Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not
to Involve Any Public Offering, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5487 (April 23, 1974). Rule
146 required issuers to furnish an offering memorandum with information essentially equivalent
to that provided by a prospectus. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1) (1981). Rule 146 has since been
withdrawn, 47 Fed. Reg. 11261 (1982), and has been replaced by Regulation D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.501-.506 (1983). See 47 Fed. Reg. 11252 (1982).
80. 708 F.2d at 1517.
81. Id at 1517-18.
82. Id at 1514.
83. Id at 1518-19.
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risks stated in the Private Placement Memorandum,8 4 and then examining
his conduct in light of that knowledge. The court found that Phil had acted
recklessly by relying on defendants' oral statements without investigating the
discrepancy between those statements and the risk factors contained in the
Memorandum.8 5 The court held that in light of his reckless behavior, Phil
Rasmussen's reliance on the defendants' fraudulent claims was
unjustifiable.
86
C. Presumption of Rehance on Aaterial Omission is Rebuttable
Neil Rasmussen and Zobrist argued that the trial court had improperly
instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving reliance on
the defendants' omission of material facts.8 7 The district court's instruction
stated that once plaintiffs proved an intentional omission of material fact,
the defendants were required to prove that plaintiffs would have acted no
differently even if the omitted information had been disclosed. 88 The Tenth
Circuit held that this instruction was proper, because the trial court had
correctly instructed the jury that the presumption of reliance arising from
proof of an intentional material omission was a rebuttable presumption.8 9
Because plaintiffs had not read the Memorandum, substantial evidence sup-
ported the jury's verdict that the nondisclosures had not, in fact, caused
plaintiffs' actions, and that the plaintiff had therefore not relied on the
omissions.
9 °
D. Judge Holloway's Dissent
In a forceful dissent, Judge Holloway disagreed with the majority's
holding with respect to Phil Rasmussen. The dissent cited the portion of
Holdsworth v. Strong9 1 which held that a plaintiffs conduct in a securities
transaction could only bar recovery under rule lOb-5 when the plaintiff's
actions could be characterized as misconduct comparable to that of the de-
fendant. 92 Noting that the special verdict forms established that the defend-
ants had engaged in deliberate misconduct, 9 3 the dissent contended that
liability for intentional misconduct should not be immunized by a plaintiffs
negligence or recklessness.94 Judge Holloway perceived the federal concern
with deterring intentional misconduct to outweigh that of deterring negli-
84. Id at 1518. The Tenth Circuit noted that failure to charge an investor with knowledge
of the information contained in a Private Placement Memorandum would place that investor in
a better position, with respect to justifiable reliance, than the investor who had read the docu-
ment. Thus, to encourage investor prudence and to prevent unfairness to prudent investors,
knowledge of information supplied by legal mandate was imputed to an investor. Id
85. Id at 1518-19.
86. Id at 1518.
87. Id at 1519.
88. See id.
89. Id
90. Id at 1520.
91. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
92. 708 F.2d at 1520 (Holloway, J., dissenting). See Holdsworth, 545 F.2d at 693.
93. See 708 F.2d at 1520 & n.l (Holloway, J., dissenting).
94. Id at 1523. Judge Holloway also observed that the special verdicts had absolved Paul
Rasmussen of intentionally ignoring the possibility of misrepresentation. Id at 1522.
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gent or reckless conduct. 95 The majority's decision, which exonerated de-
fendants engaged in intentional misconduct through imputing knowledge of
"defendants' exculpatory boilerplate" 96 to the plaintiff, frustrated that pol-
icy. Accordingly, Judge Holloway dissented.
E. Critique
It is difficult to square the majority's decision in Zobrzsi with its holding
in Hloldsworth that a plaintiffs conduct bars recovery only when it is of com-
parable culpability to that of the defendant.97 Although Phil Rasmussen's
failure to read the Private Placement Memorandum clearly was negligent,
the court elevated this conduct to recklessness by the questionable artifice of
imputing constructive knowledge of the Memorandum's contents. 98 Even
accepting the court's finding of recklessness, it seems improper to equate the
plaintiffs recklessness with the defendants' deliberate fraud and misrepresen-
tation and bar all recovery for the plaintiff.99 The central purpose of the
1933 and 1934 Acts was to prevent fraud in the financial marketplace, not to
institutionalize caveat emptor1 0° Although the majority carefully noted
that constructive knowledge of the warnings contained in the Memorandum
could not, in and of itself, exonerate the defendants,' 0 ' the result reached by
the majority appears to unnecessarily protect, and perhaps encourage,10 2 se-
curities fraud.
Douglas D. Koktavy
95. Id. at 1522.
96. Id at 1523.
97. 545 F.2d at 693. See supra note 71.
98. But see Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232 (1904). The Court, in rejecting a common
law fraud claim, held that "when the means of knowledge are open and at hand or furnished to
the purchaser or his agent and no effort is made to prevent the party from using them . . .he
will not be heard to say that he has been deceived to his injury by the misrepresentations of his
vendor." Id at 241-42.
99. Cf Note, A Comparative Fault Approach to the Due Dligence Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 49
FORDI-IAM L. REV. 561, 575-88 (1981) (author proposes adapting contributory fault principles
for use in securities fraud cases in order to avoid injustice of foreclosing all relief for negligent or
reckless plaintiffs deliberately defrauded in securities transactions).
100. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1977). See also Zobrist, 708
F.2d at 1523 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (the majority's holding acts to favor those found guilty of
knowing misconduct and to frustrate the antifraud policy of the securities laws and rule lOb-5).
101. 708 F.2d at 1517.
102. Judge Holloway cited evidence in the record indicating that the defendants had con-





The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals selected for publication approxi-
mately half of the federal taxation cases it decided in the period covered by
this survey. For the most part, the court addressed routine issues and fol-
lowed established precedents. Some of the issues considered, however, in-
cluding third-party recordkeeper summonses and the availability of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the tax context, are cur-
rently of major interest throughout the country. The primary consideration
in preparing this article was to elucidate the Tenth Circuit's interpretation
of the law in order to aid attorneys in preparing presentations to the court.
I. CRITERIA FOR IMPOSING THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX
In Guarantee Abstract Tile Co. v. United States ,I the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of what constituted sufficient evidence of a com-
pany's plan for using its accumulated earnings to avoid imposition of the
accumulated earnings tax. 2 In contesting imposition of the accumulated
earnings tax, the taxpayer must present objective evidence of a specific and
definite plan for using accumulated earnings. 3 The plan need not be writ-
ten.4 The "reasonableness" of the need for the questioned accumulation is
determined case by case on a fact and circumstances basis in light of the
specific plan of the company in question.
5
In Guarantee Abstract the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judg-
ment, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Guaran-
tee had a definite plan for its accumulated earnings, and that the
accumulations were reasonable in light of that plan.6 The court observed
that although a formal plan would normally be contained in corporate min-
utes, a closely held corporation like Guarantee might be run informally and
a definite plan might not be found in the minutes.
7
The court of appeals found objective evidence of a definite plan in the
testimony of the stockholders and their accountants. This testimony showed
1. 696 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1983).
2. I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (1982). The accumulated earnings tax is a penalty tax imposed
upon corporations which accumulate earnings beyond the reasonable needs of their business.
See id §§ 531-533. Its purpose is to prevent avoidance of the income tax imposed on distribu-
tions to shareholders. See id. § 532. See generally United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 303
(i969).
3. 696 F.2d at 795 (citing Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 429,
433-34 (10th Cir. 1974); Henry Van Hummell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 746, 750 (10th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 US. 956 (1967)).
4. 696 F.2d at 795 (citing Hogg's Oyster Co. v. United States, 676 F.2d 1015, 1018 (4th
Cir. 1982)).
5. Cf Treas. Reg. 1.533-1(2) (1959) (tax avoidance purpose in accumulating earnings to
be determined on case by case basis).
6. 696 F.2d at 795-96.
7. Id at 795.
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that Guarantee, an abstract and title company, intended to become a title
insurance company and required increased accumulations to insure against
the higher risks associated with the title insurance business.8 There was also
evidence that the earnings were accumulated to cover anticipated increased
operating expenses as well as potential policy and litigation losses.9 The
court viewed Guarantee's practice of keeping its accumulated earnings in
short term notes on deposit with mortgage lenders as corroborative of its
asserted plan, because that practice ensured liquidity to meet title losses and
was a reasonable method of generating title business.1 ° In light of Guaran-
tee's proof of an established plan, the accumulated earnings tax was held to
have been improperly assessed against Guarantee, entitling Guarantee to a
refund of the accumulated earnings tax it had paid. "1
II. MINIMUM TAX: AN INCOME TAX THAT CAN CONSTITUTIONALLY BE
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
In Ward v. United Slates, 12 the court considered several issues regarding
the minimum tax. The minimum tax is a tax, in addition to the regular
income tax, which is imposed on individuals and corporations having tax
preference income in excess of a specified amount. 13 Congress' purpose in
imposing the minimum tax was to increase the income tax liability of tax-
payers who are able to reduce their taxable income drastically by claiming
preferential tax treatment with respect to special income items or allowed
deductions. 14
The Wards were independent oil and gas producers who, in 1964,
elected to exercise their one-time option to deduct all intangible drilling
costs (IDC's) associated with their drilling programs as current expenses,
rather than to capitalize and amortize those costs. 15
In 1976, Congress added intangible drilling costs to the list of tax prefer-
ence items, and imposed a minimum tax on the amount by which the one-
time deduction for these costs exceeded the amount which would have been
deductible if such costs had been capitalized using the straight line method
of amortization.16 This tax was imposed on the Ward's income for 1976,
8. Id
9. Id Evidence of Guarantee's past losses was significant in establishing the reasonable-
ness of its reserves. See id. Accumulation for theoretical contingencies is insufficient to avoid the
accumulated earnings penalty. See Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 429,
433 (10th Cir. 1974).
10. 696 F.2d at 796.
11. Id
12. 695 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1982).
13. See I.R.C. §§ 55, 56 (1982) (amended 1983). Tax preference income includes both di-
rect cash income and direct economic benefits such as accelerated depreciation. E.g., Graff v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743, 766 (1980).
14. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprntedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1645, 1725 and 1969-3 C.B. 200, 249; S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., lst Sess. 113,
reprntedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 1645, 2144 and 1969-3 C.B. 423, 426.
15. 695 F.2d at 1352. The Wards exercised the option provided by I.R.C. § 263(c) (1982)
(amended 1983). This is an irrevocable option which a taxpayer may elect only in the first
taxable year in which intangible drilling costs are incurred. See Treas. Reg. 1.612-4(d)(1965).
16. See I.R.C. § 57(a)(I1), (d)(1982).
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thereby increasing their tax liability.
17
After paying the increased minimum tax and being denied a refund, the
Wards sued to recover the tax paid. 8 The Wards claimed that imposing the
tax retroactively to the beginning of the taxable year was unconstitutional
and that, even if the retroactive application was constitutional, the tax was
not an income tax but an excise tax and therefore deductible as an ordinary
business expense.' 9 The district court rejected these contentions, and granted
summary judgment in favor of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
2 0
A. Retroactive Application of the Minimum Tax is Constitutional
The Tenth Circuit held that due process is not necessarily violated by
retroactive application of an income tax statute to the entire calendar year of
its enactment. 2' Rather, it is necessary to consider the nature of the tax and
the circumstances surrounding its enactment in order to determine whether
it can be retroactively applied.2 2 The court noted a distinction between im-
posing a tax on an activity never before taxed and changing the rate for an
activity already taxed.2 3 In the latter case, the taxpayer has no vested right
in any particular tax rate, because it is readily foreseeable that Congress can-
and will change existing tax rates24 The Wards argued, however, that they
could not have forseen that IDC's would be added to the list of minimum
tax preference items, and that retroactive imposition of this tax change was
therefore unconstitutional as to them. This argument was rejected by the
court because evidence showed that the Wards had lobbied extensively
against the inclusion of IDC's as a tax preference item, and therefore should
have been able to forsee the extension of the minimum tax. 25 Hence, retro-
active imposition of the tax on the Wards was not unconstitutional.
26
The court supported its holding by pointing to two policy considera-
tions indicating that courts should defer to Congress' retroactive application
of a tax. First, because the income tax is not a penalty but a means of appor-
tioning the cost of government, retroactivity allows "better allocation" of the
tax burden to those Congress decides should bear it. 27 Second, the court
observed that the Supreme Court has regularly upheld the constitutionality
of Congress' practice of giving general revenue statutes retroactive applica-
17. 695 F.2d at 1352.
18. Id
19. Id at 1352-53.
20. Id at 1352.
21. Id at 1353 (quoting United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1981)). Danis-
mont upheld retroactive application of increases in existing minimum tax provisions. 449 U.S.
at 300-01.
22. 695 F.2d at 1353 (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1938)).
23. 695 F.2d at 1354 (quoting Appendrodt v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 490, 492 (W.D.
Pa. 1980) (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir.
1930))).
24. 695 F.2d at 1354.
25. Id The district court found that Mr. Ward had made several trips to Washington
during 1975-76 to lobby against the tax, and that he should therefore have considered the possi-
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tion to the entire calendar year of enactment.
28
B. The Minimum Tax is an Income Tax
The Tenth Circuit also disagreed with the Wards' contention that the
minimum tax was an excise tax and hence deductible as an ordinary busi-
ness expense.29 The language of the statute states that the minimum tax is
imposed "[i]n addition to the other taxes imposed by this chapter." 30 The
court observed that the IRS has "consistently treated the tax as an income
tax," 3' and pointed out that all other courts which have considered the issue
have found the minimum tax to be an income tax. 32 Further, the legislative
history of the minimum tax indicated that Congress intended the minimum
tax to be an income tax.33 The court then rejected the Wards' claimed re-
fund because the minimum tax, as an income tax, is "specifically barred as a
deduction."
34
III. SOLE SHAREHOLDER HAS NO RIGHT TO DEDUCT INTEREST PAID ON
CORPORATE DEBT
In Crouch v. United States35 the Tenth Circuit considered two claims
made by the sole shareholder of a corporation: 1) that he was entitled to
deduct the corporation's net operating loss from his personal return because
the corporation was a subchapter S corporation, 36 and 2) that he was enti-
tled to a personal deduction for interest paid on a loan made to his corpora-
tion.3 7 The court affirmed the district court's denial of both claims.
38
A. Personal Deduction for Interest Paid on Corporate Indebtedness
With respect to the interest deduction, the facts revealed that Crouch,
as sole shareholder, had formed Seventeen Ventures, Inc. to build a luxury
apartment complex in Florida. 39 Crouch had used the corporate form to
avoid state usury law limitations on the interest which could be charged on
loans to individuals. 4° Crouch personally guaranteed payment of the corpo-
ration's note, agreeing that the lender need not pursue any remedies against
the corporation before collecting under the guarantee. 4 ' Crouch's subse-
quent payments on the corporate indebtedness included an interest compo-
nent, which he deducted on his personal tax return.
42
28. Id. at 1353.
29. Id at 1355. See I.R.C. § 56(a)(1982).
30. I.R.C. § 56(a)(1982).
31. 695 F.2d at 1355 (citing Rev. Rul. 77-396, 1977-2 C.B. 86).
32. 695 F.2d at 1355.
33. Id
34. Id I.R.C. § 275(a)(1)(1982) specifically disallows deductions for federal income taxes.
35. 692 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1982).
36. Id at 98.
37. Id
38. Id. at 100-01.





In affirming the district court's order upholding the IRS's denial of the
interest deduction, the Tenth Circuit observed that interest payments are
deductible only if made with respect to a taxpayer's own debts.4 3 Crouch
had contended that the debt was personal to him because of the uncondi-
tional guarantee, and because the lender knew the corporation could not
make the payments and expected Crouch to pay.44 The court held, how-
ever, that the corporate form of a transaction cannot be ignored when that
form has served a legitimate purpose.4 5 The corporate form had served
Crouch's purpose to avoid the usury laws, and he was bound to accept the
tax consequences of his choice. Because the corporation was a legal entity
separate from its shareholder the corporation, and not its sole shareholder
Crouch, was entitled to the deduction for interest payments on corporate
debt .46
Crouch argued alternatively that he was entitled to deduct the interest
payment on the corporate debt because he was the equitable owner of the
corporate assets.4 7 The court held that the concept of equitable ownership
applied in only two situations,4 8 neither of which was present. 49 Thus, this
exception did not entitle Crouch to a personal deduction for the interest paid
on his corporation's indebtedness.
50
B. Loss of Subchapter S Status for Seventeen Ventures, Inc.
The Tenth Circuit also considered Crouch's claim that he was entitled
to a personal deduction for the 1970 net operating loss suffered by Seventeen
Ventures, Inc., which had become a subchapter S corporation in 1969.51
The court affirmed the district court's determination that because Seventeen
Ventures had lost its subchapter S status, Crouch was not entitled to a de-
duction based on passthrough of the net operating loss.
52
Crouch presented two arguments in opposition to this result. The gov-
ernment had asserted that more than twenty percent of the corporation's
gross receipts were rent, which was passive investment income, and that the
corporation's subchapter S status was therefore automatically terminated
43. Id at 99.
44. Id
45. Id
46. Id. at 100.
47. Id Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(b) (1957) permits a taxpayer to deduct interest payments he
makes pursuant to real estate mortgage when the taxpayer is the legal or equitable owner of the
nortgaged property even though the taxpayer is not directly liable on the note incident to the
mortgage.
48. The Tenth Circuit held that the concept of equitable ownership under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.163-1(b)(1957) is only applicable either 1) when a trust beneficiary has equitable title to
property held by a trustee, or 2) under the doctrine of equitable conversion when real estate has
been sold under a contract for a deed with legal title remaining in the seller until the total
purchase price has been paid. 692 F.2d at 100. The Tenth Circuit did not rule on the IRS
argument that the regulation could not, as a matter of law, apply in the close corporation
context. Id.
49. 692 F.2d at 100.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 98.
52. Id at 101.
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under the existing subchapter S statute. 53 In opposition, Crouch first argued
that the rent received was not passive investment income, but rather was
income derived from the active business operation of the corporation, which
was renting apartments. 54 The Tenth Circuit pointed out that the then-
existing subchapter S explicitly listed rent as passive investment income,
55
and declined to accept Crouch's argument that the rent derived from the
business of renting apartments was not passive investment income.
56
Crouch then argued that Seventeen Ventures provided "significant
services" in connection with renting its apartments, so that, under a sub-
chapter S regulation,5 7 the payments received were not "rents" within the
meaning of subchapter S.58 The court found that the services provided by
Seventeen Ventures were those commonly provided in luxury apartment
complexes, 59 and held that the exemption Crouch relied on was provided for
operations similar to hotels and motels, not for apartment complexes provid-
ing deluxe services. 6° Hence, the rents received were passive investment in-
come, and because those rents constituted more than twenty percent of the
corporation's gross receipts, the corporation's subchapter S status was lost.
6 1
Given the loss of subchapter S status, there could be no passthrough of the
corporation's net operating loss to Crouch.
6 2
IV. FIFrH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN
CIVIL TAX PROCEEDINGS
Only those subject to actual or potential criminal prosecution can claim
the fifth amendment 63 privilege against self-incrimination. 64 In the federal
tax context, a taxpayer can be subject to both civil and criminal penalties for
an act or subject only to civil penalties, depending on the penalty provision
53. Id at 100. At the time Crouch was decided, I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5) (1982) provided that if
a subchapter S corporation received more than 20% of its gross receipts from passive investment
income, its subchapter S status was automatically terminated. Congress amended subchapter
S's passive income automatic termination provisions in the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1674 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3) (1982).
54. 692 F.2d at 100.
55. I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(C)(1976)(amended by Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1674 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D)(1982))).
56. 692 F.2d at 101. The court relied on its decision in Marshall v. Commissioner, 510
F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1975), which held that a taxpayer in the business of making loans was not
entitled to subchapter S status because subchapter S listed interest as passive investment in-
come. Id at 264.
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(iv)(b)(vi)(1959) provides that rents do not include pay-
ment for use of rooms where "significant services" are rendered to the occupant. "Significant
services" are rendered to an occupant if the services are primarily for his convenience and are
other than those customarily rendered in connection with rental for occupancy only. Examples
of "significant services" are maid services and parking of autos; heat, light, and trash collection
are not such services. Id.
58. 692 F.2d at 101.





63. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3 provides: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself....
64. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
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of the statute in question. The determination of whether or not a taxpayer
may claim the benefit of the fifth amendment privilege depends upon
whether he is subject, or has a reasonable belief that he may be subject, to
criminal prosecution. 65 Among the cases the Tenth Circuit considered in-
volving a taxpayer's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege were two in
which the court reached apparently opposite conclusions. 66 A comparison of
these two cases, however, illuminates the precise analysis necessary for suc-
cess in this area of law rather than inconsistent holdings.
A. Mertsching v. United States
The facts in Mertsching v. United Slates67 revealed that Mertsching, a tax
preparer, was assessed penalties for "negligently or intentionally disregard-
ing revenue rules and regulations in preparing tax returns."'68 Specifically,
the IRS contended that Mertsching prepared returns which sought to assign
income by means which well established case law held impermissible.
69
Mertsching paid fifteen percent of the penalties, thereby precluding immedi-
ate IRS action to collect the entire penalty, 70 and filed a suit for determina-
tion of his liability. The United States sought to depose Mertsching in that
suit and Mertsching filed an objection to the deposition request, asserting
that the deposition would violate his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.7 1 The district court granted the United States' motion to
compel discovery, advising Mertsching that his case would be dismissed if he
did not submit to deposition. 72 Mertsching refused to comply with the dis-
trict court's order, and the court granted the United States' motion to dis-
miss Mertsching's suit with prejudice.7 3 Mertsching appealed the dismissal
to the Tenth Circuit, claiming that the proceeding was criminal in nature,
and that he was therefore entitled to assert the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to insulate himself from being deposed.
74
In affirming the order of the district court the Tenth Circuit noted that
the Supreme Court has held that the right against self-incrimination only
applies in suits where a responsive answer to a question, or an explanation of
why it cannot be answered, exposes the claimant to prosecution for a
crime.75 The Tenth Circuit further noted that the penalties assessed against
Mertsching were civil, not criminal. 76 The court therefore held that Mert-
sching had inappropriately claimed fifth amendment protection, and that
65. See genera//y United States v. Jones, 703 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1983).
66. Mertsching v. United States, 704 F.2d 505 (10th Cir.),cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 105 (1983);
United States v. Jones, 703 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1983).
67. 704 F.2d 505 (10th Cir.), cer. demed, 104 S. Ct. !05 (1983).
68. 704 F.2d at 506. The penalties were assessed pursuant to I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1982).
69. See 704 F.2d at 506 & n.2.
70. See I.R.C. § 6694(c)(1982).




75. Id. (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487 (1951)).
76. 704 F.2d at 506. The court's decision was reached by comparing 1.R.C. § 6694(a)
(1982), the source of liability for negligence by tax preparers, with I.R.C. § 6653 (1982), which
provides penalties for individuals negligently preparing their own tax returns. Section 6653 had
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the district court had not abused its discretion in dismissing Mertsching's
action based on his failure to obey a court order to provide discovery.
77
B. United States v. Jones
In United Stales v. Jones, 78 the facts revealed that Mr. and Mrs. Jones had
been the subjects of an IRS investigation of their financial affairs over a ten
year period. The IRS had initiated a tax deficiency suit against the Joneses'
and had pursued a civil action against them to judgment. Because the
United States had collected only a small amount pursuant to that judgment,
however, Mr. Jones was asked to appear at a hearing in aid of execution of
judgment. 79 Jones appeared, and was questioned about the amount and
sources of his income and the nature and location of his assets. 80 Jones re-
fused to answer the questions, asserting his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, and was held in contempt of court.8t At a later hearing
Mrs. Jones was also cited for contempt for refusing, on fifth amendment
grounds, to answer similar questions. 2 Both appealed the contempt
citations.
Jones' fifth amendment claim was based on the assertion that answering
the questions could provide incriminating evidence of two crimes: 1) making
a false statement to a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 100183 and
2) attempted tax evasion under section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code. 4
1. False Statements to IRS Agent
Prior to the hearing in aid of execution an IRS agent had interviewed
Jones.8 5 The agent filed an uncontested affidavit with the district court stat-
ing that Jones had not provided any information at that interview.8 6 The
Tenth Circuit observed that because Jones had made no statement, nothing
that he could have said at the judgment execution hearing could contradict
statements made to a federal officer. 8 7 Because there was therefore no basis
for criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, Jones had no reasonable
fear of criminal prosecution on which to base his fifth amendment claim. 88
The Tenth Circuit therefore rejected Jones' first ground for invoking the
fifth amendment privilege. 89
been consistently interpreted as creating civil liabilities; ergo, section 6694(a) created only civil
penalties. 704 F.2d at 507.
77. 704 F.2d at 507.
78. 703 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 474.
80. Id
81. Id at 475.
82. Id
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
84. I.R.C. § 7201 (1982).







2. Attempted Tax Evasion
The Tenth Circuit, however, vacated the district court's contempt order
against both Mr. and Mrs. Jones because of the potential of prosecution for
attempted tax evasion. 90 In an illuminating discussion of this area of law,
the Tenth Circuit detailed the factors which underlie a taxpayer's successful
assertion of the fifth amendment privilege.
The privilege against self-incrimination extends to civil actions, whether
the claimant is a party or a witness.9 1 The privilege is implicated when a
question requires either "answers that would in themselves support a convic-
tion" or answers that would "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute the claimant for a crime."9 2 The witness may assert the privi-
lege when his fear of incrimination is "reasonable in light of the witness'
specific circumstances, the context of the questions, and the setting in which
the questions are asked." 93 The privilege exists only when a real danger of
prosecution exists; mere speculation that the answer will create a danger of
prosecution is insufficient.
94
In Jones' case, he had been the target of both civil and criminal investi-
gation by the IRS for more than ten years.95 In the early 1970's Jones had
been the target of a criminal investigation for tax fraud,96 but had been
given immunity in exchange for testimony which resulted in his law part-
ner's conviction for conspiracy to commit tax fraud. 97 Although the pro-
ceeding involving Jones' fifth amendment claim related to collecting a
judgment concerning tax years 1963-69, at the time of that proceeding the
IRS was suing Jones in a civil action for taxes allegedly owing for tax years
1973-79.98 The court found the civil tax deficiency litigation against Jones
indicative of both the IRS's institutional focus on Jones' tax behavior during
1973-79 and the IRS's belief that Jones had not accurately reported his in-
come during that period. 99 If it were true that Jones willfully failed to re-
port income for that period, he was subject to criminal prosecution. 10 0
Questions concerning the nature and location of his assets were therefore
potentially incriminating, even though asked in the context of an unrelated
civil proceeding.i 1i Given Jones' prior involvement with the IRS and the
ongoing civil deficiency proceedings, it was reasonable for him to fear that
his answers might provide "links in a chain of evidence on criminal charges
90. Id. at 478-79.
91. Id. at 475 (citing Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 464 (1975); Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972)).
92. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479. 486 (1951).
93. 703 F.2d at 476 (citing Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406
U.S. 472, 480 (1972); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1964); Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
94. 703 F.2d at 476. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S.
472 (1972).





100. A willful attempt to avoid tax liability is a felony. I.R.C. § 7201 (1982).
101. 703 F.2d at 476.
1984]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
of attempt to evade payment of taxes.'
1 0 2
3. IRS Use of Affidavits Asserting no Current Prosecution
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the propriety of the district court's
apparent reliance on an IRS affidavit in reaching its conclusion that Jones
was not entitled to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. 103 The af-
fidavit, prepared by an IRS agent, stated that no criminal charges had been
referred to the Justice Department and that no criminal investigation of
Jones was pending. 10 4 The court of appeals stated that the fact that no
criminal prosecution was pending was not a guarantee that there would be
no future prosecution, 10 5 and pointed out that the government might dis-
cover something from answers to its questions that might cause it to decide
to prosecute Jones criminally. 10 6 Because the district court's obligation in
the self-incrimination inquiry is solely to determine whether answers would
tend to incriminate the witness, the court acted incorrectly in attempting to
speculate whether the witness would in fact be prosecuted. 10 7 The court
noted that the government's legitimate interest in collecting judgments can-
not be allowed to override legitimate fifth amendment claims, and that if the
government was in fact interested only in collecting the civil judgment, it
could grant Jones immunity in exchange for the privileged information. '0 8
4. Derivative Claim of Immunity
Although Mrs. Jones was never herself the target of an IRS criminal
investigation, she was both a target of the civil investigation relating to the
1973-79 tax years and a party to the judgment debtor action relating to the
1963-69 tax years.' 0 9 The Tenth Circuit vacated the contempt order against
Mrs. Jones, holding that she shared her husband's reasons for fearing crimi-
nal prosecution for tax evasion.1 10 Because she had filed jointly with her
husband, questions relating to her husband's assets would tend to incrimi-
nate both spouses."' Therefore, she too could validly claim the protection
afforded by the fifth amendment.
112
C. Contrastzng Mertsching and Jones
In comparing the results in Mertsching and Jones, it is crucial to recog-
nize that in Mertschbng the fifth amendment claim was asserted under a stat-
ute which provided only civil penalties. 1 3 No potential for criminal
prosecution under any other statute could have resulted from Mertsching's
102. d. at 477.
103. Se id.
104. Id.








113. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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compliance with the discovery order. In contrast, the Joneses' fifth amend-
ment claims were asserted with specific reference to a statute providing crim-
inal penalties for conduct which might be revealed by their answers.1 "4Jones
highlights the need for attorneys to be aware of the potential for prosecution
under criminal statutes when representing clients in civil tax proceedings.
V. THIRD-PARTY RECORDKEEPER CASES
Cases involving third-party recordkeepers' '5 are of great current inter-
est in the tax context as well as in the securities context.1 16 They involve
significant privacy issues. The Tenth Circuit considered a number of these
cases in the period covered by this survey.
Sections 7601-7611 of the Internal Revenue Code' 17 contain the provi-
sions for examination and inspection of tax records held by third parties.
The IRS is empowered to make such examinations and inspections as a
means of determining the tax liability of any person.'' 8 Pursuant to this
authority, the Internal Revenue Service may cause a summons to issue re-
quiring the taxpayer or any person having "possession, custody, or care of
books of account containing entries relating to the business of the taxpayer
to produce such records for inspection."' 19 Special procedures are provided
for third-party summonses.' 2 0  Where the summons does not identify the
person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued, a so-called
"John Doe summons" is used. 12 ' To obtain a John Doe summons, the IRS
must establish, in a court proceeding, 1) that the summons relates to an in-
vestigation directed at a particular person or group of persons; 2) that a
reasonable basis exists for believing that such person or group either has
failed, or may fail, to comply with the provisions of the internal revenue
laws; and 3) that the information sought to be obtained from an examina-
tion of the records, including the identity of the taxpayer, is not readily
available from other sources.1
22
A. Taxpayer Challenge to Validity ofjohn Doe Summons Permitted
United States v. Brigham Young Universty 123 is an especially interesting case
in this area of the law even though it has no precedential value.' 2 4 Brigham
114. See supra note 100 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 110-11.
115. A third-party recordkeeper is a person having possession, custody, or care of account-
ing books containing entries relating to a taxpayer's business. See I.R.C. § 7602(a)(2)(1982).
116. See Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. S.E.C., 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983).
117. I.R.C. §§ 7601-7611 (1982).
118. See I.R.C. § 7601 (1982).
119. See I.R.C. § 7602(a)(2) (1982).
120. See generaly I.R.C. § 7609 (1982).
121. See generally Friedland, Internal Revenue Service Investigations of Unidentified Persons, 60 DEN.
L.J. 573 (1983).
122. See I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1982).
123. 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. granted and decision vacated and remanded for considera-
tion ofmootness, 103 S.Ct. 713, decision vacated and appeal dtsmissed on remand, No. 80-1508 (10th Cir.
April 13, 1983).
124. See infa text accompanying notes 146-48.
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Young University (BYU) is a tax exempt institution of higher learning.
125
Gifts to BYU are considered charitable contributions deductible from the
donor's income. 126 In the case of gifts in-kind, donors are allowed a deduc-
tion equal to the fair market value of the gift.'
27
The IRS had audited the returns of 162 donors of gifts in-kind to BYU,
and in every case discovered that the donor had overvalued his gift.' 28 The
IRS, after complying with statutorily required procedures, was granted a
John Doe summons. 129 BYU refused to comply with the summons1 30 and
the United States instituted enforcement proceedings. 13' At the enforce-
ment hearing, BYU asserted that the IRS had failed to establish a reason-
able basis for believing that the in-kind donations of the taxpayers whose
records were sought had been overvalued,' 32 and that the government had
therefore failed to comply with the statutory requirements for obtaining the
John Doe summons served on BYU.' 33 The district court agreed with BYU,
and refused to enforce the summons.
134 The United States appealed. 1
35
On appeal, the government asserted that BYU could not challenge, in
an enforcement proceeding, the determination made in the ex parte sum-
mons hearing that the IRS had established the required reasonable basis for
believing potential or actual violations of the tax laws existed. 136 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed, holding that although the initial determination of the gov-
ernment's reasonable basis could be made on an ex parte basis, a taxpayer
subject to an enforcement proceeding could challenge the summons on "any
appropriate grounds."' 137 Thus, BYU had the right to challenge the reason-
ableness of the IRS's belief that BYU's in-kind donors might have violated
the revenue laws.'
38
The Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the IRS had in fact estab-
125. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982), which exempts from taxation corporations organized and
operated exclusively for educational purposes.
126. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(l), (c)(2) (1982).
127. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(1), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 108, 116.
128. 679 F.2d at 1348.
129. Id at 1346-47. I.R.C. § 7609(l) (1982) requires a showing of relevance and necessity to
obtain a John Doe summons. I.R.C. § 7609(h)(1) (1982) provides that such a summons may
issue after an ex parse hearing in which the court may determine the facts solely on the basis of
the IRS's petition and supporting documents.
130. 679 F.2d at 1347.
131. Id I.R.C. § 7402(b)(1982) and I.R.C. § 7604(a)(1982) both grant federal district courts
jurisdiction to enforce an IRS summons.
132. 679 F.2d at 1347.
133. Id. As noted above, under I.R.C. § 7609(0(1982) a John Doe summons will not be
issued unless the IRS shows it has a reasonable basis for believing the object of its investigation
may fail, or may have failed, to comply with the internal revenue laws. See supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
134. 679 F.2d at 1347.
135. Id. at 1346.
136. Id. at 1347.
137. Id at 1348 (citing Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446 (1964)). Accord United States
v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981). The Tenth Circuit also indicated
that the district court had the power, in an enforcement proceeding, to challenge a John Doe
summons sua sponte. See 679 F.2d at 1348 (citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58
(1964)).
138. 679 F.2d at 1348.
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lished the required "reasonable belief." 139 The government had audited the
returns of 162 contributors in kind to BYU, and every contributor had
claimed a deduction for more than the fair market value of his gift.' 40 The
government argued, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that this constituted a
reasonable basis for believing that BYU's other contributors of gifts in-kind
might also have overvalued their gifts.14 1 The court cited decisions in the
Third' 42 and Sixth' 4 3 Circuits to support its holding that the test the IRS
must meet in order to enforce a John Doe summons is one of "reasonable-
ness," not of certainty. 14
4
Pending Supreme Court review of a petition for certiorari, BYU pro-
duced the names of the contributors of gifts in-kind, whereupon, pursuant to
the procedure mandated by the Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Munsingwear,'145 the government moved to dismiss the appeal on grounds of
mootness. 14 6 The Supreme Court then vacated the Tenth Circuit's decision
and remanded the case for the Tenth Circuit to consider the issue of moot-
ness. 147 The Tenth Circuit then vacated its judgment, withdrew its opinion,
and dismissed the appeal. ' 48 The author has included the discussion of this
case not for its precedential value, but rather to illuminate the Tenth Cir-
cuit's analysis in this important area of law.
B. Limiting Recordkeeper Summonses on Relevancy and Undue Burden Grounds
In United States v. Southwestern Bank & Trust Co. ,149 the Tenth Circuit
considered the standards for judicial enforcement of a third-party record-
keeper summons.
1. Standard of Relevancy
In Southwestern Bank, the IRS was investigating the 1977-78 tax liability
of three individual taxpayers and five corporations in which the individual
taxpayers had an ownership interest. 150 Recordkeeper summonses sought
bank records, including checks, loan records, and deposit records, pertaining
to individual and corporate transactions from February 1, 1976 through
May 31, 1979.151 The IRS asserted a need for the documents in order to
determine whether corporate distributions to the individual taxpayers dur-
ing 1977 and 1978 were properly characterized as dividends or as return of
capital.' 52 The taxpayers intervened' 53 and instructed the bank not to com-
139. Id. at 1350.
140. Id. at 1349.
141. Id The Tenth Circuit emphasized that the IRS was only required to establish that a
taxpayer might have failed to comply with the tax laws. Id.
142. United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981).
143. In re Tax Liability of John Does, 671 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1982).
144. 679 F.2d at 1349.
145. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
146. See United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 103 S.Ct. 713 (1983).
147. Id.
148. United States v. Brigham Young Univ., No. 80-1508 (10th Cir. April 13, 1983).
149. 693 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1982).





ply with the summons.154 When the IRS sought judicial enforcement of the
summonses, the taxpayers objected on the basis that the information sought
was not relevant to the IRS investigation.' 5 5 The district court refused to
order enforcement of the entire summons, finding some of the requested
records and checks not relevant to the IRS's investigation.1
56
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying enforce-
ment in part, holding that a summons seeking records must be enforced
upon a showing that the IRS has complied with proper administrative pro-
cedures, that the information sought is not in IRS possession, and that the
material sought may be relevant to a proper purpose.' 5 7 Material is relevant
for summons enforcement purposes if it tends to shed light on the accuracy
of a taxpayer's return. 1
58
An IRS agent testified that the corporate bank records for the entire
corporate year would aid the IRS in ascertaining the accuracy of the taxpay-
ers' returns.' 59 The court found that this uncontroverted testimony satisfied
the relevancy standard, and reversed the district court order denying pro-
duction of specified corporate records.'16
The district court's denial of IRS request for production of all checks
cashed by taxpayers during the periods in question was mooted on appeal
when the intervenors agreed with the government that the materials sought
were relevant.' 6 ' The Tenth Circuit pointed out, however, that the judici-
ary had discretion to limit the required compliance to protect the third-party
recordkeeper from excessive burden or expense in complying with the sum-
mons.' 6 2 The court then remanded the case to allow the district court to
consider appropriate limitations and procedures for enforcing the
summons. 1
6 3
VI. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER PERIODIC PAYMENTS ARE
ALIMONY OR PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
At issue in Gammill v. Commzsszner 16 4 was whether periodic payments
made to an ex-spouse were tax deductible alimony payments or non-deducti-
153. Under I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (1982) the person(s) whose records have been summoned is
entitled to notice of that fact after service of the summons. Under id. § 7609(b)(2) that person is
entitled to intervene in any proceeding with respect to enforcement of the summons and to
request the recordkeeper not to comply with the summons. If the taxpayer instructs the
recordkeeper to withhold the records, the IRS must either obtain the individual's consent or a
court order before it can force the recordkeeper to provide the requested information. Id.
154. 693 F.2d at 995.
155. See id at 995-96.
156. Id at 995.
157. Id (quoting United States v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 642 F.2d 388, 389 (10th Cir.
1981) (quoting United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964))).
158. 693 F.2d at 996 (citing City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 642 F.2d 388, 389 (10th Cir. 1981)
(quoting United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996, 1000 (2d Cir. 1976))).





164. 710 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1982).
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ble installment payments made pursuant to a property settlement.
165
A. The Tax Court Decision
The IRS assessed tax deficiencies against Gammill because he had
treated payments to his ex-spouse, Marjorie, as deductible alimony rather
than as non-deductible payments pursuant to a property settlement. ' 66 The
Tax Court held that the payments were not alimony but were part of a
property settlement, and ordered Gammill to pay the amount of the disal-
lowed deductions.' 6 7 The Tax Court determined the nature of the pay-
ments by reference to general characterization principles and by reference to
the law of Oklahoma, 68 where the Gammills were divorced. 169 The Tax
Court noted that Oklahoma law permitted a court granting a divorce to
designate, in the divorce decree, the dollar amount of any periodic payments
which were for support. 170 The Tax Court found it significant that lan-
guage requiring the payments to be regarded as alimony was absent from
the Gammills' divorce decree. 17 In light of the language of the decree, the
amount of the total payments, and Mrs. Gammill's contribution to the mar-
riage, the Tax Court held that the payments did not constitute alimony. '
72
B. The Tenth Circuit Deciszon
In reviewing the Tax Court's determination, the Tenth Circuit noted
that under the Internal Revenue Code payments which are "periodic" and
"arise out of a family or marital obligation to support" are includible in the
recipient's taxable income,' 7
3 and are therefore deductible as alimony.
174
Since Gammill's payments extended over a period of more than ten years
they were periodic.' 75 Thus, the issue was whether the payments constituted
a support obligation.1
76
In affirming the Tax Court's determination that the payments were a
property settlement, rather than a support obligation, the court enumerated
five factors as guides to determine the nature of periodic payments made
following a divorce: 1) whether there was a fixed sum, 2) whether the pay-
ments are related to the obligor's income, 3) whether the payments continue
despite the obligee's death or remarriage, 4) whether the obligee gives con-
sideration for the payments, and 5) whether the obligor provides security to
165. Id. at 608. Alimony payments are deductible under I.R.C. § 215 (1982).
166. 710 F.2d at 608.
167. Gammill v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 921, 926 (1980), a~fd, 710 F.2d 607 (10th Cir.
i982).
168. 73 T.C. at 926-30.
169. 710 F.2d at 608.
170. 73 T.C. at 927 & n.4 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289(B)(1971) (recodified as
amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289(A)(1981))).
171. 73 T.C. at 927.
172. 73 T.C. at 926.
173. See I.R.C. § 71(a)(1982).
174. 710 F.2d at 608-09. See I.R.C. § 215 (1982) (providing deduction for alimony
payments).




ensure payment. 17 7 If these factors are present, payments are to be consid-
ered a property settlement.17 8 The Tenth Circuit found the payments to be
in satisfaction of a property settlement on the basis of the following facts:
1) at the time of the divorce, the.Gammills entered into an agreement enti-
tled "Property Settlement Agreement" under which a lump sum was paya-
ble in equal monthly installments over a twenty-year period, 2) the amount
was secured by a lien against a portion of stock owned by Mr. Gammill,
3) the divorce decree referred to the lump sum amount as "part of" property
and assets set over to Marjorie Gammill, 4) the entire amount unpaid was
due upon the death of Gammill or if he was in default more than thirty days,
and 5) the property settlement would inure to the benefit of Marjorie's heirs
and assigns, should she die prior to the complete payment of all
installments. "9
VII. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING TIME OF A STOCK REDEMPTION
In Barton Theater Co. v. Commzssioner,180 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
United States Tax Court's determination that a stock redemption had oc-
curred in 1966 rather than, as Barton alleged, in 1967.181 The court noted
that a decision on the timing of the redemption is not fixed by the time the
shares are transferred, but is based on a practical consideration of all the
facts surrounding a transaction.182 The factors which persuaded the Tax
Court, and the Tenth Circuit, that the redemption took place in 1966 were
the presence of: 1) formal agreements covering the redemption and all its
details, signed and notorized in January, 1966; 2) 1966 accounting entries on
the books of both corporations involved reflecting full consummation of the
agreement; 3) audited balance sheets for both corporations reflecting the fact
that the redemption was completed in 1966; 4) a 1969 proxy agreement and
a 1970 letter declaring that Barton had acquired the shares of Atlas Corpo-
ration in January, 1966; and 5) Barton's Board of Directors minutes adopt-
ing the stock redemption agreement at a January 1, 1966 meeting. 18 3 All
these factors, stated the court, reflected the intention of the parties that the
redemption occur in 1966.184
Jennifer K. Stern
177. Id at 610. These five factors were first listed in Riley v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 768
(10th Cir. 1981).
178. 710 F.2d at 610.
179. Id. at 608-09.
180. 701 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1983).
181. Id at 128.
182. Id. The following factors were listed as significant: passage of legal title; transfer of
possession; fixed sales price; timing of transfer of consideration; the parties' intention; the lan-
guage of the agreements; and whether the parties have chosen a particular effective date for the
agreement. See id.
183. Id. at 128-29.
184. Id. at 128.
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COMMENT, UNITED STATES V PTASYNSKI:
A WINDFALL FOR CONGRESS
I. INTRODUCTION
[The power of Congress to collect taxes from the states] is a power,
sir, to burden us with a standing army of ravenous collectors-har-
pies, perhaps, from another state, but who, however, were never
known to have bowels for any purpose but to fatten on the life-
blood of the people. In an age or two, this will be the case; and
when the Congress shall become tyranical, these vultures, their ser-
vants, will be the tyrants of the village, by whose presence all free-
dom of speech and action will be taken away.'
This fear, stated so vitriolically in 1787, no doubt constituted a proph-
ecy fulfilled when viewed through the eyes of the plaintiffs challenging the
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 19802 (Act) in United States v. Pasyn-
ski.3 Substantively, the complaint paralleled the prophecy by accusing Con-
gress of stepping beyond its constitutionally limited power to tax.4 The
Supreme Court, by unanimously reversing the opinion of the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming and upholding the constitutional-
ity of the Act,5 further extended the already broad discretion of Congress to
impose taxes pursuant to its constitutional power. Following Ptasynski, Con-
gress may frame an excise tax in geographic terms as long as the geographic
classification used does not in fact discriminate against specific geographic
areas. 6 This comment will analyze Pasynski's consistency with previous
Supreme Court interpretations of the uniformity clause's 7 limitation on Con-
gress' taxing power, and will discuss the decision's practical and legal
consequences.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION
A. The Alaskan Oil Exemption
On April 2, 1980, President Carter signed the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 1980,8 thereby setting into law a means for the federal govern-
1. P. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION A DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIVE HISTORY 242
(1980) (quoting William Symes, delegate to the Massachusetts State Assembly on the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution).
2. I.R.C. §§ 4986-4998 (1982).
3. 103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983).
4. Set Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Wyo. 1982), ,evld, 103 S. Ct.
2239 (1983).
5. See United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983), rev'g, 550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo.
1982).
6. See 103 S. Ct. at 2245.
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. This section provides in relevant part that "Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and Excises . . . but all Duties,
Imports and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.)
(1982)).
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ment to capture billions of dollars of revenue by taxing the "windfall profit"
realized on the production of decontrolled domestic oil.9 Pursuant to Title I
of the Act,' ° different classifications of domestic oil are subject to tax rates
ranging from thirty to seventy percent. Il Each classification, or "tier," con-
tains oil types defined by manner of production, quality of oil, or date pro-
duction began from a well. 12 Essentially, though, four categories of crude oil
exist for purposes of the Act: taxable oil in tiers 1, 2, and 3, and exempt
oil.' 3 This last category contains six classifications of oil which are exempt
from "windfall profits" taxation, one of which is "exempt Alaskan oil."14
The Alaskan oil exemption is the only exemption delineated solely by geo-
graphical terms.15 For domestic crude oil to be classified as exempt Alaskan
oil it must be obtained from a reservoir from which oil is being produced in
commercial quantities through a well located north of the Arctic circle, or
from a well located on the north side of the divide of the Alaskan-Aleutian
Range and at least seventy-five miles from the nearest point on the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline System. 16
B. The District Court's Decision
Six months after the effective date of the Act, independent oil producers
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming
alleging that the windfall profit tax was unconstitutional.' 7 The basis for
this claim was the uniformity clause,' 8 which prohibits excise taxes (such as
9. The "windfall profit" is the difference between a statutory base price and the higher
price at which domestic crude oil can be sold as a result of the gradual decontrol of crude oil
prices which began on June 1, 1979. See I.R.C. §§ 4988(a), (c)(1), 4989 (1982). This "windfall
profit" is the amount the Executive Branch believed would accrue to oil producers once domes-
tic oil was deregulated; both President Carter and the Congress supported the imposition of an
excise tax on the production of domestic crude in order to divert the large profits created by
decontrol into a national energy program. See S. REP. No. 394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,1 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 413; H.R. REP. No. 304, 96th Cong., 2d Sess 2,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 589.
The government estimates that the net windfall profit tax revenue collected on domestic oil
from the inception of the tax through the end of the 1987 fiscal year will be approximately 76
billion dollars. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 8, United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct.
2239 (1983).
10. Title I of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, §§ 101-
103, 94 Stat. 229, 230-56 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 4986-4998, 6076, 6050C, 7421 (1982)).
11. See I.R.C. § 4987 (1982).
12. See id § 4991.
13. See id
14. See id. § 4991(b)(3). The other categories of exempt oil are: oil from qualified govern-
mental or charitable interests, Indian oil, front-end oil, exempt royalty oil, and exempt stripper
well oil. Id § 4991(1), (2), (4)-(6).
15. Compare id. § 4994(e) (defining exempt Alaska oil) with id. § 4994(a)-(d), (f, (g) (defin-
ing other categories of exempt oil).
16. Id. § 4994(e). Exempt Alaskan oil does not include production from the Sadlerochit
reservoir on the Alaskan North Slope, an area rich in oil reserves and production. Id See also id.
§ 4996(d) (3).
Legislative history reveals that the Alaska exemption was enacted because Congress was
concerned that "taxation of this production would discourage exploration and development of
reservoirs in areas of extreme climatic conditions." JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. No. 817, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 642, 656.
17. See 103 S. Ct. at 2242.
18. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. I.
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the windfall profit tax) which are not "uniform throughout the United
States." 19 Plaintiffs claimed that inclusion of the Alaskan oil exemption pre-
cluded the geographical uniformity required of an excise tax, rendering the
Act unconstitutional and entitling them to a refund of windfall taxes already
paid.
20
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court concluded the issues
were ripe for review 2 1 and held that the "exempt Alaskan oil" provision ren-
dered the Windfall Profit Tax Act unconstitutional when measured against
the uniformity clause. 22 The court recognized Congress' extensive power to
tax, but held that geographical uniformity, the constitutional limitation ex-
pressly and "unequivocally" applicable to excise taxes, was violated by the
Alaskan oil exemption. 23 Although the production and removal of crude oil
did not take place at the same time or in the same fashion in every state, that
fact was irrelevant because the uniformity clause's underlying principle of
geographical uniformity required that the Act operate "with the same force
and effect in every place where the subject of it is found."'24 The court con-
cluded that the subject of the Act was the removal of domestic crude oil,
2 5
and that the uniformity clause required that the removal of crude oil be
taxed at the same rate regardless of where that activity took place.26 The
Act violated this requirement because "[t]he Act, on its face, says that one
state, Alaska, is not subject to the same tax, at the same rate as all the other
states. "27
The district court rejected the United States' contention that a "ra-
tional justification" for the Alaskan oil exemption supported its validity.2 8
The court emphasized that to be legitimate, an exemption from a tax must
satisfy constitutional requirements. 29  Because the proposed exemption
would violate the constitutional requirement of geographical uniformity,
30
the proposed exemption was constitutionally unacceptable.
3 1
The court also rejected the United States' alternative argument that
19. See supra note 7. See Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Wyo. 1982),
rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983).
20. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Wyo. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2239
(1983). Plaintiffs also alleged that the Act was an unconstitutional taking, and was irrational
legislation violating the due process clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
550 F. Supp. at 552. These issues were not decided by either the district court, td at 555, or the
Supreme Court, see 103 S. Ct. at 2240.
21. The United States contended that because no exempt Alaskan oil had been produced
during the period for which the refund was requested, the windfall profit tax had been uni-
formly applied during the relevant time frame. The court rejected that argument and said that
the absence of production was irrelevant. Rather, "[t]he lack of uniformity, in the Act itself,
exists now, and has existed since the Act was passed. This alone is sufficient for a finding that
the controversy before the Court is now appropriate for adjudication." 550 F. Supp. at 552.
22. Id. at 553.
23. Id
24. Id. (quoting The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 584 (1884)).





30. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
31. 550 F. Supp. at 553.
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even if inclusion of the exempt Alaskan oil provision violated the uniformity
clause, that provision was severable, allowing the remaining sections of the
Act to stand as constitutionally valid.32 The government maintained that
the general separability clause set forth in section 7852(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code3 3 effected the validity of the remaining provisions in the
Act. 34 The court observed that it would have given a separability clause
specifically written into the Act "more deferential consideration,'35 but held
that the general separability clause did not itself provide a suitable basis
upon which the rest of the Act could stand.36 The court invoked legislative
intent as the acid test determinative of the exemption's separability, 37 and
concluded that because the Act would not have been passed without the
constitutionally infirm provision intact, the Act was void in its entirety.
38
The district court stayed the effect of its adjudication awaiting appellate
consideration. 39 Hence, no refunds were issued to plaintiffs and the windfall
profit tax continued to be collected pendente lite until a higher court ruled
upon the correctness of the trial court's decision. 4°
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
On direct appeal, 4' the Court reversed the district court and held the
Act constitutional. 42 In reversing the district court's opinion, the Court
sanctioned the government's argument that Congress' decision to character-
ize apparently similar activities as distinctive for taxation purposes is an im-
portant factor when considering a tax's constitutionality under the
uniformity clause. 4 3 The Court held that the relevant inquiry under the
32. See id. at 555.
33. I.R.C. § 7852(a) (1982). This section provides that "[i]f any provision of this title, or
the application thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the
title, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be af-
fected thereby." Id




38. Id The court stated:
[I]t is. . .clear that the Alaska exemption was the result of negotiations and compro-
mise, and that the Act as it exists today would not have been passed without the
invalid Alaska provision.
[ . . T]he exemption does carry sufficient import to justify a finding that its in-
validation renders the entire Act void.
Id at 554-55.
The court also cited another basis for its decision, the impermissibility of judicial legisla-
tion. If the Act was permitted to stand, the tax would have extended to all crude oil producers
in Alaska, which was a decision legislative in nature and beyond the scope of the judicial func-
tion. Id at 555.
39. Id at 556.
40. See Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 7 n.l 1, United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S.
Ct. 2239 (1983) (setting forth the Court's final amended judgment).
41. The Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction over this case by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1252
(1982). This statute authorizes an appellant to appeal directly to the Court from a final judg-
ment of a United States court which holds an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional in a civil
action to which the United States is a party. Id
42. United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983), rev'g 550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo.
1982).
43. See 103 S. Ct. at 2245-46.
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uniformity clause is not the words used to describe a tax classification, but is
whether "actual geographic discrimination" occurs when the classification is
framed in geographic terms.44 Therefore, although Congress may frame an
excise tax classification in geographic terms, it must still adhere to the stric-
ture that the tax must, in fact, operate with uniform effect in every state
where the subject of the tax is found.
4 5
The Court's rationale was dependent on both prior uniformity clause
decisions, and on its recent interpretations of the uniformity requirement in
the bankruptcy clause. 46 The Court began its analysis by observing that the
Head Money Cases 47 and analogies had established beyond peradventure the
basic contours of uniformity clause analysis.4 8 At issue in the Head Money
Cases was the constitutionality of a duty levied against transportation com-
panies carrying foreign passengers entering the United States by boat.
49
Plaintiffs argued that unless the tax was also applied to foreign passengers
entering the United States by railroad or other land transport the tax was
unconstitutional for failing to operate with intrinsic equality, z~e. for failing
to act uniformly on all states and on all persons engaged in the business of
transporting passengers. 50  The Court squarely rejected this argument by
ruling that although an excise tax might operate unequally and thus be in-
trinsically disparate, a tax was constitutionally uniform when it operated
"with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is
found."'51  Defining the "subject" of the tax was, without question, the pre-
rogative of Congress. 52 Consequently, although geographical considerations
played a role in determining which foreign passengers were to be subject to
taxation, 53 the tax was constitutional because it operated with precisely the
same effect in every place in the United States where the subject of the tax
(foreign passengers arriving by sea) was found. 54
In light of the principles of geographic uniformity and congressional
discretion announced in the Head Money Cases and reaffirmed in Knowlton v.
Moore,5 5 the Court framed the issue in Ptasynski as whether the uniformity
clause precluded the use of geographical terms to define a class of taxable
44. Id at 2245.
45. Id
46. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 provides that Congress shall have the power "To establish
.. .uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
47. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
48. See 103 S. Ct. at 2244.
49. 112 U.S. at 589.
50. Argument for Cunard Steamship Co., The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 583-84
(1884).
51. 112 U.S. at 594.
52. See id at 595 (citing State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 612 (1875) (holding that in
enacting tax statutes legislatures can draw distinctions between apparently similar classes)). Ac-
cord Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 521 (1899) (under the uniformity clause, classifications are
valid when they are based on reasonable ground and are not "arbitrary, based upon no real
distinction and entirely unnatural").
53. See 112 U.S. at 594 (recognizing that the "evil to be remedied . . .has no existence on
our inland borders, and immigration in that quarter needed no such regulation").
54. Id
55. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
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activities. 56 Although dictum in Downes v. Bizwel 5 7 unequivocally stated
that the uniformity clause proscribed tax statutes explicitly limiting their
operation to a specified geographic area,58 the Court chose not to follow
Downes.59 Having eliminated Downes as controlling precedent, the Court
acknowledged that although the purposes underlying the uniformity and
bankruptcy clauses were "not identical," the Court would look to the inter-
pretation of one to aid in the interpretation of the other.
6 0
The Regional Razl Reorganization Ac! Cases6 1 (3R Act Cases) were invoked
for the proposition that Congress may resolve geographically isolated
problems by enacting legislation applicable to only one region of the coun-
try. 62 In the 3R Act Cases one of the issues was whether a reorganization
statute,6 3 which subjected bankrupt railroads undergoing reorganization in
a specified geographical region 64 to a unique set of reorganization laws, 6 5
violated the uniformity requirement of the bankruptcy clause. 66 The Court
held that the statute did not violate the uniformity requirement because
there was no pending railroad reorganization proceeding outside the defined
region during the period that the Act applied.6 7 Thus, the Act in fact oper-
ated uniformly throughout the United States upon all members of the class
of debtors and creditors affected: no creditor's right to obtain relief was re-
stricted by the regional limitation.
68
In explaining its decision to allow the legislation to stand despite the
limited class of debtors and creditors affected and despite the reorganization
act's limited geographic scope, the Court stated that the uniformity require-
ment did not deny Congress the power to take into consideration the differ-
ences that exist between different parts of the country when it attempts to
tailor bankruptcy legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems. 69
The Head Money Cases were cited to support this conclusion; 70 the Court read
56. 103 S. Ct. at 2244. See also id. at 2245 (observing that the Alaskan exemption was
merely a geographic description of an otherwise permissible tax classification).
57. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
58. Id at 249 (Brown, J., concurring). In Downes the Court was asked to consider whether
the Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 48
U.S.C.), which imposed a duty only on goods brought into the United States from Puerto Rico
and vice versa, was violative of the uniformity clause. The Court upheld the tax, without a
majority opinion, on the ground that for purposes of the uniformity clause Puerto Rico was a
territory and therefore not a part of the United States. See generally 182 U.S. at 247 (Brown, J.,
concurring); id at 287 (White, J., concurring); id. at 345 (Gray, J., concurring). Justice Brown's
statements in Downes are therefore clearly dictum.
59. See 103 S. Ct. at 2244 n.12.
60. Id at 2244 n.13.
61. 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
62. 103 S. Ct. at 2245.
63. Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1982).
64. See id. § 702(17).
65. Seeid. § 717; 3R Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 109-10.
66. 419 U.S. at 122. For text of the bankruptcy clause, see supra note 46.
67. Id. at 159-60. The Act's exclusive reorganization provisions could only be applied for a
180-day period following the Act's effective date. See 45 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982).
68. 419 U.S. at 160. Cf Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471
(1982) (legislation affecting only creditors of a single railroad violated the uniformity require-
ment of the bankruptcy clause).
69. 419 U.S. at 161.
70. See id. at 160 (citing The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)).
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the Head Money Cases as interpreting the uniformity clause to permit geo-
graphically restricted legislation. 7 Because the Rail Act was also designed
to solve a geographically limited "evil," and had in fact been applied uni-
formly to all persons falling within its purview, the mere use of a geographic
term did not violate the uniformity requirement of the bankruptcy clause.
72
Applying the principles of the Head Money Cases and the 3R Act Cases to
the Alaskan exemption, the Court held that the use of a geographical term to
describe the subject of an exemption did not violate the uniformity clause.7
3
The Court pointed to legislative history which showed that there were
unique technological and ecological problems associated with drilling for oil
in certain regions of Alaska.' 4 Congress was responding to a "geographically
isolated problem,"'75 and enacted an exemption for oil wells subject to the
identified problems. Those wells were located above the Arctic Circle, or
north of the Alaskan-Aleutian Range and 75 miles from the nearest point on
the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline. 76 Because no other subjects which fell into this
category existed in any other state, the Act did not discriminate between
places where the subject of the classification was found. Therefore, the geo-
graphic uniformity test as articulated in the Head Money Cases had been met
and it mattered not that Congress had used a geographic term to identify the
tax classification; the classification was constitutional because its application
was znfact geographically uniform.' 7 The end result was couched in cau-
tious terms, however. While the uniformity clause permits Congress "wide
latitude in deciding what to tax and does not prohibit it from considering
geographically isolated problems,' ' 7 8 geographically-framed tax classifica-





By upholding the validity of a geographically-described tax classifica-
tion, Ptasynskzi-to the federal government's immense relief-put the Court's
stamp of approval on the collection of enormous amounts of revenue. The
government estimated that the net windfall profit tax revenues would exceed
twenty-six billion dollars by the end of the 1982 fiscal year and that approxi-
mately fifty billion dollars in net revenues would be collected during the
71. See 419 U.S. at 161 (citing The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 594 (recognizing that
the "evil" addressed by statute was geographically limited)),
72. 419 U.S. at 161.
73. 103 S. Ct. at 2245.
74. Id. at 2242 (citing JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMiTFEE OF CON-
FERENCE, H.R. REP. No. 817, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 642, 656).
75. See 103 S. Ct. at 2245 n.14.
76. See id. at 2245.
77. Id The Court stated: "[h]ad Congress described this class of oil in nongeographic
terms, there would be no question as to the Act's constitutionality. We cannot say that identify-
ing the class in terms of its geographic boundaries renders the exemption invalid." Id. at 2246.




fiscal years of 1983-1988.80 This section, while noting the practical political
considerations which may have played a role in the Court's decision, will
concentrate on the decision's legal analysis.
B. Geographic Uniformity Requirements in the Uniformity and Bankruptcy Clauses:
The Problems with Ptasynski
1. The Bankruptcy Clause is not Analogous to the Uniformity
Clause
The Court in Ptasynski agreed that the general purpose of the uniform-
ity clause is to limit the federal government's exercise of its commerce
power.8 ' Conversely, the purpose giving rise to the bankruptcy clause was
the protection of discharged debtors in the federation of states.8 2 Thus, the
bankruptcy clause is a measure designed tofacilitate, rather than limit, Con-
gress' power to promote commerce between states with different laws. 83 A
fortiori, the interpretation of one clause as a guideline for the interpretation
of the other is not altogether desirable.
While it is natural that the uniformity requirement in the bankruptcy
clause has been construed liberally in light of the clause's purpose, 84 it is not
proper to assume that the parameters of that clause's uniformity require-
ment conform with those of a uniformity requirement imposed as an express
limitation on Congress' power to tax. The fact that Congress may "fashion
legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems" when enacting bank-
ruptcy laws, as long as the effect of the legislation is uniform throughout the
country,8 5 comports with the broad construction of the clause needed to ac-
commodate American commercial needs. The flexible standard of construc-
tion appropriate for the bankruptcy clause does not necessarily withstand
80. See supra note 9.
81. 103 S. Ct. at 2243 (citing Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 103-06 (1900); 2 M. FAR-
RAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 417-18 (rev. ed. 1937)).
82. See Nadelman, On the Origbi ofthe Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 224-25
(1957) (comprehensive review of the history and purpose of the bankruptcy clause).
83. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Madison's
discussion of the clause, in its entirety, reads:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with
the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their
property may lie or be removed into different states, that the expediency of its seems
not likely to be drawn into question.
Id
84. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 158-59 (1974) (the Court
recognized the "flexibility inherent in the.., provision" and stated that "the uniformity clause
was not intended 'to hobble Congress by forcing it into nationwide enactments to deal with
conditions calling for remedy only in certain regions.' " (quoting In re Penn Central Transp.
Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 915 (Sp. Ct. R.R.R.A. 1974)); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 668 (1935) ("[qrom the beginning, the tendency of
legislation and . . . judicial interpretation has been uniformly in the direction of progressive
liberalization . . . of the bankruptcy power"); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122,
195 (1819) ("[t]he bankrupt law is said to grow out of the exigencies of commerce... (i)t is...
(a subject) on which the legislature may exercise an extensive discretion").
85. Compare Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 158-61 (1974) (upholding
statute giving equal treatment to similarly situated classes of creditors and debtors) with Rail-
way Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (striking down statute giving
special treatment to one segment of a group of similarly situated creditors).
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constitutional muster when applied to the uniformity clause, however. As
revealed by the clause's legislative history, the Framers were concerned that
either one state or a combination of states might muscle their industries (vis-
a-vis congressional intervention) into a position of power at the expense of
another state's industries.8 6 To prevent that situation from occurring, the
uniformity clause was enacted expressly to limit Congress' ability to impose
indirect taxes upon targeted regions or states.87 The purpose and history of
the clause therefore reveal an intention to make the limitation on Congress'
taxing power absolute, without any circumstances suggesting the necessity or
propriety of an "inherent flexibility" in its application. Historically, rulings
by the Court have embodied this strict construction without exception, in-
cluding the Head Money Cases so heavily relied upon by the Ptasynski Court.
88
2. Ptasynski is not Justified by Existing Uniformity Clause Precedent
The Court in Ptasynskt" correctly cited the Head Money Cases for the prop-
osition that an excise tax must apply at the same rate throughout the United
States wherever the subject of the tax is found.8 9 The Court then decided
that three significant factors reconciled the Alaskan exemption with the rule
of the Head Money Cases: 1) the Alaskan classification, although classified in
geographic terms, did not encompass the whole of Alaska; 9° 2) no other sub-
jects of the group were found to exist in any other state;9' and 3) the effect of
the statute in the Head Money Cases was to distinguish between geographic
regions, thereby giving that practice the imprimatur of constitutionality.
92
86. See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 570-74 (2d ed. 1937). See also 2
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 428 (lst ed. 1833):
[The purpose of the clause] was to cut off all undue preferences of one state over
another in the regulation of subjects affecting their common interests. Unless . . .
excises were uniform, the grossest and most oppressive inequalities, vitally affecting the
pursuits and employments of the people of different states, might exist. The agricul-
ture, commerce or manufacture of one state might be built upon the ruins of those of
another; and a combination of a few states in congress might secure a monopoly of
certain branches of trade and business to themselves, to the injury, if not to the de-
struction, of their less favoured neighbors.
Id
87. 2 J. STORY, supra note 86, at 428. Mr. Justice Story's interpretation of the uniformity
clause echoed a statement made by North Carolina's Hugh Williamson after the ratification
debates:
The clear and obvious intention of the (uniformity clause) . . . was, that Congress
might not have the power of imposing unequal burdens; that it might not be in their
power to gratify one part of the Union by oppressing another . . .. I do not hazard
much in saying, that the present constitution had never been adopted without thlis
preliminary [guard] in it,
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 379 (1792).
88. See 103 S. Ct. at 2244.
89. Se Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 589, quoted in 103 S. Ct. at 2244.
90. See 103 S. Ct. at 2246.
91. See id. at 2241-42. The Court noted that certain exempt Alaskan oil was located in
offshore territorial waters not part of Alaska, and that the exemption was therefore not drawn
along "state political lines." Id. at 2242. Because Congress' taxing power is not subject to the
uniformity clause when applied to activities outside the United States, Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244 (1901); Mercury Press v. District Court, 173 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1948), the practical
effect of the exemption, for Purposes of applying the uniformity clause, was to exempt only oil
found within Alaskan borders.
92. 103 S. Ct. at 2244.
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In this case the subjects of the Windfall Profit Tax Act were different
classifications of domestic crude oil, one of which was "exempt Alaskan
oil." '93 One cannot quarrel with the conclusion that because the subject of
the classification was contained solely within Alaska, the tax operated with
"geographic uniformity." Such an approach, however, appears to beg the
question; by precise definition of classifications taxes can be restricted to par-
ticular states, with geographical uniformity following as a necessary result of
the classification.
Further, although the uniformity clause does not bar Congress from
choosing as a subject of a tax an activity which, as a matter of geographical
locus, exists only in certain states94 (as long as the requirement of geographic
uniformity is met), it seems to violate the purpose of the uniformity clause to
allow the subject of a tax or exemption to be chosen because of its geography.
Thus, the reasoning used in Pasynsk, although superficially consistent with
prior uniformity clause limitations, appears on a deeper level to deviate from
prior decisions.
3. Ptasynski's "Rational Justification" Test Must Include a
Substantive Standard
A most critical development in Pasynski was the Court's implied accept-
ance of Congress' "rational justification" for a geographical designation as a
standard for measuring the constitutionality of a tax under the uniformity
clause. 95 Prior uniformity clause opinions have examined legislative consid-
erations in order to arrive at "the evil to be remedied" by an indirect tax,
but have always based their determination of a tax's constitutionality solely
on whether the tax adheres to the principle of geographic uniformity.
96
Neither the legislative history nor purpose of the clause suggest that legisla-
tive considerations are permitted to justify the imposition of geographically
non-uniform taxes. Deference to congressional consideration, however,
clearly played a significant role in the outcome of Plasynski,9 7 and it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the "rational justification" test will assume increas-
ing importance in future decisions involving the uniformity clause.
The importance attributed by the Court to congressional considerations
in Plasynski is reminiscent of the deference with which Congress' rational
justification is treated in cases dealing with the constitutionality of legisla-
tion challenged as violating equal protection guarantees. A fundamental
distinction exists, however, between the constitutional restrictions imposed
through the uniformity and equal protection clauses. The uniformity clause
requires that geographic uniformity be used as the exclusive standard to test
93. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
94. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,109 (1900).
95. See 103 S. Ct. at 2246 (where Congress has exercised its "considered judgment" in
determining proper classifications in a complex field, the Court is reluctant to overturn a con-
gressional decision).
96. E.g., Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927); Knowlton v. Moore, 173 U.S. 41 (1900);
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
97. See 103 S. Ct. at 2244 (the uniformity clause does not restrict congressional power to
draw tax classifications); id at 2246 (the Court is reluctant to disturb congressional classifica-
tions addressing complex taxation problems).
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the constitutionality of an arguably rational indirect tax. 98 The equal pro-
tection clause only requires that a classification scheme have some arguable
relation to the purpose for which it is made "and does not contain the kind
of discrimination against which the equal protection clause affords protec-
tion." 99 The uniformity clause, unlike the equal protection clause, therefore
includes a substantive standard against which congressional exercise of the
taxing power must be measured. The Court's treatment of that standard as
practically analagous to the equal protection standard subverts the purpose
of the uniformity clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The major legal consequence arising out of Ptasynskz is an expansion of
Congress' power to impose indirect taxes. Concededly, the ability of Con-
gress to frame tax classifications in geographic terms may not be a benefit of
enormous magnitude, given the Court's statement that it will scrutinize the
practical application of the tax to prevent geographic discrimination.10 0
The practical advantages of this new rule, however, are exemplified by the
billions of dollars in revenue which Congress is now able to reap despite the
faulty draftsmanship which endangered the Act and its operation.
Plasynski also leaves Congress less encumbered in its taxing power as a
consequence of the Court's reluctance to review legislative decisions. The
Court's deference has spawned a rational basis test of sorts which will very
likely be significant in future uniformity clause challenges. Essentially, the
interests of the congressional majority may now play a determinative role in
the outcome of such challenges.
Finally, Pasynski left no doubt that the Court will continue to apply the
liberally construed uniformity standard of the bankruptcy clause to uniform-
ity clause cases. This trend will be responsible for a movement away from
the absolute geographic uniformity requirement which has characterized the
uniformity clause standard in the past.
Ellen Eggleston
98. E.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1901); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580
(1884).
99. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
100. 103 S. Ct. at 2245.
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
APPELLATE AND DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. NEW MEXICO V. MESCALERO APACIE TRIBE-AFFIRMED
In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,' the Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision 2 that the application of New
Mexico's game licensing laws to on-reservation hunting and fishing by non-
members3 of the Mescalero Apache tribe (Tribe) was preempted by the op-
eration of federal law.
4
The Supreme Court's holding was based on evidence that the governing
body of the Tribe, working closely with the federal government under the
authority of federal law, had exercised its lawful authority to develop and
manage the reservation's fish and game resources for the benefit of Tribal
members.5 In light of the Tribe's unquestioned authority to regulate the use
of its own resources by members and non-members, 6 the state did not have
exclusive jurisdiction over licensing game activities on Tribal lands. 7 Weigh-
ing the federal interest reflected in the comprehensive tribal game manage-
ment program established pursuant to federal law8 against the state's
attenuated interests in licensing game activities on Tribal lands, concurrent
jurisdiction was precluded. 9 Hence, the state laws were preempted. 10 Al-
though the precise issues presented in this decision seem relatively unimpor-
tant, the Court's decision clearly reflects its commitment to determine the
difficult issues raised in claims of concurrent jurisdiction by carefully balanc-
ing the interests of each of the concerned parties.
A. Background
With the aid of extensive federal assistance and supervision, the Tribe
has established a comprehensive scheme for managing reservation fish and
1. 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983).
2. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982), a d, 103 S. Ct.
2378 (1983). The Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's original opinion in this litigation
for reconsideration in light of Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). See New Mexico
v. Mescalero Apache Indian Tribe, 450 U.S. 1036 (198 1),vacattg 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980).
3. Both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court occasionally interchange the terms
"non-members" and "non-Indians". The important distinction, however, is between Tribal
members and non-members, including non-Mescalero Indians. Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 726 n.l (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
4. 103 S. Ct. at 2381, 2391.
5. See id at 2386-91.
6. Id at 2387-88.
7. Id at 2388.
8. See id at 2387-89.
9. Id at 2391.
10. Id
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wildlife resources. " Tribal ordinances, subject to approval by the Secretary
of the Interior, carefully regulate the conditions under which both tribal
members and non-members may fish and hunt so as to attend to the neces-
sary conservation needs of reservation wildlife.' 2 Frequently, New Mexico's
fishing and gaming regulations have conflicted with the tribal regulations. 13
New Mexico, through its Department of Game and Fish, sought to enforce
its regulations by arresting hunters 14 possessing game killed on the reserva-
tion in violation of state hunting regulations.1 5
In 1977,16 the Tribe, seeking to prevent state regulation of on-reserva-
tion hunting and fishing, filed suit against New Mexico in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, asking for declaratory and
injunctive relief.17 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's order enjoining the state from applying its
game laws to Tribal lands.' 8 Following New Mexico's petition for a writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment' 9 and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Montana v. United States.
20
On remand, the Tenth Circuit once again held that New Mexico did not
have jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing on the tribal lands.2 ' The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari and affirmed the Tenth Circuit.
22
B. The Tenth Circuit's Decision on Remand
On remand, the Tenth Circuit found that Montana v. United States 23 was
inapposite. Montana addressed the question of an Indian tribe's power to
11. Id. at 2382. For example, development of the reservation's fishing and wildlife re-
sources has taken place through stocking fishing ponds, establishing a federal fish hatchery on
the reservation, and managing and developing a herd of elk donated by the National Park
Service. Id The Tribe has also constructed a large resort complex financed principally with
federal funds. Id. at 2382 n.3.
12. The Tribal Council, after consultation with professional conservationists, annually
adopts hunting and fishing ordinances pursuant to the Tribal constitution. These ordinances
have always been approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 2383.
13. For example, the Tribe permits both a buck and a doe to be killed; the state permits
only a buck to be killed. The Tribe, unlike the state, permits the purchase of an elk license in
two consecutive years. Additionally, Tribal seasons for both hunting and fishing do not always
coincide with state imposed seasons. Finally, Tribal ordinances have specified that state hunt-
ing and fishing licenses are not required by members or non-members who hunt and fish on the
reservation. Id
14. It is unclear whether only non-Indians (as opposed to non-members) were arrested. See
supra note 3.
15. 103 S. Ct. at 2383.
16. Prior to 1977, the Tribe had consented to the state's application of its hunting and
fishing regulations to the reservation. Id. at 2383 n. 10. As the Tribe sought to create an exten-
sive tourism program to attract income and create employment on the reservation, it became
clear that the state's regulations could adversely affect that plan. Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 776 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
17. 103 S. Ct. at 2383.
18. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450
U.S. 1036 (1981).
19. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
20. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
21. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982),af'd, 103 S. Ct.
2378 (1983).
22. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983).
23. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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regulate hunting and fishing on reservation land which had been trans-
ferred, in fee, to non-members of the tribe. 24 The Court held that neither
treaty nor statute had granted the tribe such powers, 25 and that the non-
members' hunting and fishing activities were not of a type justifying the ex-
ercise of the tribe's inherent sovereign power.26 Hence, the tribe did not
have authority to regulate game activities on alienated land even though
that land was within reservation boundaries.2 7 The Tenth Circuit found
Mescalero readily distinguishable from Montana because over ninety-nine per-
cent of the lands subject to tribal regulation in Mescalero were owned by the
Tribe.
2 8
After rejecting the application of Montana, the Tenth Circuit noted that
subsequent to Montana the Court had decided Merrion o. Jcarilla Apache
Tribe.29 Merrion, in holding that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe had the power to
tax non-Indians doing business on the reservation, recognized that a tribe's
sovereign authority included the power to control economic activity on tri-
bal lands. 30 Because the Tribe's fishing and hunting ordinances related to
economic activities conducted on Tribal lands, the Tenth Circuit held that
Merrion, and not Montana, was the controlling precedent.3 1 In light of the
state's demonstrated lack of interest in the Tribe's economic development,
and the interference with that development which would have resulted from
permitting state regulation, the Tenth Circuit held that there was no basis
for concluding that New Mexico had the power to interfere with the Tribe's
power to regulate economic activity conducted on Tribal lands. 32 The
Tenth Circuit therefore reaffirmed the district court's grant of injunctive and
declaratory relief.
C. The Supreme Court's Opinzion
The Supreme Court, having earlier remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion in light of Montana v. United States, agreed with the Tenth Circuit that
Montana was not controlling. Unlike Mescalero, Montana concerned land
within the tribal reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians. 33 The
Court in Montana held only that the Crow Tribe could not prohibit hunting
and fishing by non-members on reservation land no longer owned by the
24. Id at 557.
25. Id at 557-63.
26. Id at 563-65.
27. See id at 557, 567.
28. 677 F.2d at 57 & n.l.
29. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
30. See id. at 141-44.
31. 677 F.2d at 57.
32. Id. The court stated:
Dual regulation of the use of these resources would interfere with the Tribe's
efforts to manage, preserve, and improve wildlife resources on its reservation. The
state, therefore, cannot interfere by attempting to control non-Indian hunting and
fishing conducted exclusively on reservation land held by the Tribe any more than it
could do so if the activities in question took place in one of New Mexico's neighboring
states.
33. 103 S. Ct. at 2384.
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tribe. 34 Thus, Montana had not considered whether a state could exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over the hunting and fishing activities of non-mem-
bers on Indian-owned reservation land.
35
The Court then acknowledged that it has long ago departed from the
exclusive tribal sovereignty concept reflected in its early Worcester v. Georgia
36
decision. In Worcester, the Court had recognized Indian tribes as sovereign
nations-independent governments, within whose boundaries state laws
"can have no force."'3 7 The Court's review of decisions following Worcester
revealed that those decisions had clearly limited the scope of tribal sover-
eignty,38 and had recognized a state's authority to exercise concurrent juris-
diction over the on-reservation activities of non-members unless state
jurisdiction was preempted by federal law39 or conflicted with a tribe's in-
herent sovereign power.40  In White Mounlain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 41 the
Court emphasized that the presence of federal preemption does not depend
"on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or Tribal sovereignty."'4 2
Rather, the presence of federal preemption is determined by a "partcu/arzed
inquizy into the nature of the state, federal, and Tribal interests at stake."
'43
Inquiring into the federal and Tribal interests first, the Court's preemp-
tion inquiry focused on the strong federal policy of encouraging Tribal self-
sufficiency and self-government; 44 federal laws embodying Congress' intent
that the Secretary of the Interior and the Tribal Council manage reservation
resources; 45 and the Tribal interest in self-government as reflected by its con-
34. Se 450 U.S. at 557-67. Accord 103 S. Ct. at 2384.
35. 103 S. Ct. at 2384.
36. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
37. Id at 561.
38. A tribe's power to prescribe the conduct of tribal members remains unquestioned. 103
S. Ct. at 2385. Absent governing congressional acts, a state's actions may not infringe on those
rights. Id Tribes have been implicitly divested of their exclusive sovereignty because of their
dependent status, however. Id; see, e.g., Oliphant v. Susquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978) (Indians have no criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-members within
the reservation's boundaries); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-68
(1974) (possessory right of Indian tribes to their aboriginal lands is a matter of federal law,
extinguishable only with federal consent). Under certain circumstances, states may validly ex-
ercise jurisdiction over on-reservation activities of non-members. See, e.g., Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (imposition and
enforcement of state's cigarette excise tax to non-Indians on a reservation is valid); Moe v. Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (state may require Indian proprietor of on-reservation
"smoke-shops" to add cigarette sales or excise tax to articles sold to non-Indians). Furthermore,
under exceptional circumstances, states may even exercise jurisdiction over the on-reservation
activities of tribal members. See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S. 165,
175 (1977) (state may regulate the on-reservation activities of tribal members who exercise their
right to take steelheads (fish) from the waters passing through the reservation when that right
must be exercised "in common with all citizens of the Territory").
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2385. Accord Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S.
832 (1982).
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2386 n.16.
41. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
42. Id at 145.
43. Id. (emphasis supplied).
44. See 103 S. Ct. at 2387. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982) (vesting power to manage
reservation's resources in tribal council selected pursuant to tribal constitution).
45. See 103 S. Ct. at 2388 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b)(1982) (criminalizing entry on Indian
lands for purpose of hunting, fishing, or trapping without tribal consent); 25 U.S.C.
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stitution, ordinances, and particularly by its clearly established intention
and ability to manage, preserve, and improve reservation wildlife for pur-
poses of economic self-sufficiency. 46 The Court noted that concurrent juris-
diction would effectively nullify the Tribe's jurisdiction to regulate its own
reservation wildlife, because such dual jurisdiction would effectively permit
the state to override the Tribe's power to dictate the terms on which non-
members could utilize reservation resources. 47  Concurrent jurisdiction
would also interfere with the comprehensive scheme of federal and tribal
management established pursuant to federal law, allowing the state to sup-
plant the scheme with an inconsistent dual system which could severely im-
pede the ability of the Tribe to conduct a sound management program. 48
Finally, the Court noted that concurrent jurisdiction would threaten Con-
gress' overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and self-gov-
ernment, by allowing enforcement of regulations which would "seriously
'undermine the [government's and the Tribe's] ability to make the wide
range of determinations committed [by Congress] to [their] authority.' 49
Evaluating the weight of the state interest, the court emphasized that
New Mexico had neither contributed any significant funds or services to the
maintenance, preservation, or improvement of reservation resources, nor was
able to point to any off-reservation effects that would warrant state interven-
tion.50 New Mexico therefore had no interest sufficiently weighty to justify
the deleterious effects created by recognizing concurrent jurisdiction.5 1 Ac-
cordingly, the Court's "particularized inquiry" into the nature of the as-
serted federal, state, and Tribal interests led to its determination that the
State's exercise of jurisdiction over the on-reservation hunting and fishing
activities of non-members was preempted by the operation of federal law.
52
D. Consequences
It seems clear that the Supreme Court granted certiorari following its
remand in reliance on Montana v. UnitedStates to attempt to clarify the troub-
lesome issues arising from conflicting exercises of state and tribal authority
over resources located on Indian lands. Indeed, Mescalero gives every indica-
tion of the Court's interest in shoring-up, to some meaningful extent, the
eroding concept of tribal sovereignty while at the same time assuring all af-
fected parties (federal, state, and Indian) of fair and equitable consideration.
§ 1321(b)(1982) (preempting state authority to regulate Indian hunting, trapping, or fishing
rights granted by federal treaty or statute)); ste also 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982).
46. See 103 S. Ct. at 2382-83.
47. 103 S. Ct. at 2388. For example, the Tribal ordinance permitting the killing of both a
buck and a doe is based on the recommendations of a Bureau of Indian Affairs range conserva-
tionist and is intended to curb effectively the excessive growth of the on-reservation deer popula-
tion. The state regulations do not reflect this objective, and because killing a doe would violate
state law, Tribal authority would be effectively abrogated. Id. at 2389.
48. Id See also supra note 47.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2389 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
149 (1980)).
50. 103 S. Ct. at 2390-91.




It remains to be seen, however, if the Court's "particularized inquiry" ap-
proach will accomplish this task.
It is, indeed, a reality that certain resources are becoming scarce. When
some of those resources are located on or run through Indian lands (e.g.,
wildlife, minerals, or water), bordering states are likely to assert or attempt
to assert some degree of jurisdiction over the use or dispensation of those
resources. Affected Indian tribes, very much wary of state encroachment on
their tribal jurisdiction, are just as likely to resist through litigation. Simi-
larly, the federal government, responsible for establishing and protecting the
scope of tribal jurisdiction, has an interest in conflicts between state and
tribal authority. Fair determination of such tripartite interests will surely
challenge the Court's ingenuity.
Because the analysis of federal preemption recognizes the strong federal
policy toward tribal self-government, the Court's "particularized inquiry"
analysis, at least superficially, reduces the probability of an unbalanced
weighing of tribal interests. The concern, however, is for those situations
when a case arises where, unlike Mescalero, the asserted interests are not so
clearly de minimis in relation to each other. For instance, it will be interest-
ing to follow the Court's application of its particularized "inquiry" to cases
where states are able to show a substantial interest. It remains to be seen
how weighty an asserted state interest must be in order to tip the scales in
favor of concurrent jurisdiction.
Susan N. Harris Dixon
II. WAT V. WESTERN NUCLEAR CORP. -REVERSED
Under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act' (SRHA), over thirty million
acres of public land were transferred to private ownership. 2 Although the
lands were transferred in fee, 3 the title acquired was limited by a reservation
to the United States of "all the coal and other minerals in the lands so en-
tered and patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and re-
move the same." 4 The question presented to the Supreme Court in Watt v.
Western Nuclear, Inc. 5 was whether the Tenth Circuit had properly excluded
gravel from the ambit of the SRHA's mineral reservation. 6 In a five-four
decision, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and held that gravel was a
reserved mineral under the SRHA.
7
The question of gravel's reserved mineral status arose following fifty
years of administrative practice in which gravel was not treated as a mineral
reserved pursuant to the SRHA.8 Notwithstanding that prior practice, an
1. 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302 (1976).
2. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 & n.4 (1983).
3. See 43 U.S.C. § 293 (1976).
4. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976).
5. 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
6. Id. at 2222-23. See Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 234 (198 1), re'd sub noma.
Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
7. 103 S. Ct. at 2232.
8. See id. at 2238 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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administrative trespass action was brought against Western Nuclear, Inc.,
alleging that Western Nuclear's removal of gravel from land originally pat-
ented under the SRHA impinged on the government's mineral rights.9 The
administrative tribunals ruled that gravel was a mineral reserved under
SRHA, and that Western Nuclear's removal of this mineral without the
United States' consent constituted an involuntary trespass. 10
Hearing an appeal from the administrative order, the district court
noted that although the SRHA mineral exemption was to be construed ac-
cording to Congress' intent at the time of enactmentI there was no clear
evidence of Congress' intent to include or exclude gravel. 1 2 There was, how-
ever, clear evidence that by including the mineral reservation Congress had
intended to sever the mineral estate from the surface estate. 13 The purpose
of this severance, according to the district court, was to provide settlers with
free land while simultaneously ensuring that undiscovered valuable sub-
stances remained the property of the government.' 4 Thus, it was irrelevant
whether a particular substance was considered a mineral at the time of
SRHA's enactment. Congress' intent was not to tie the severed estate to a
particular set of defined substances, but was to reserve ownership of all sub-
surface substances which experience proved were "of commercial value."'
15
Hence, because gravel had become a valuable subsurface substance, it fell
within the SRHA mineral reservation.
16
The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's flexible definition of the
term "mineral" in the SRHA reservation, and instead examined whether
Congress had specifically intended to include gravel in the reserved mineral
estate.' 7 The court noted that at the time SRHA was enacted, the Interior
Department's interpretation of the term "mineral" excluded gravel. 18 Simi-
larly, gravel was not an energy source of the kind Congress clearly intended
9. Id. at 2221.
10. Western Nuclear, Inc., 85 Interior Dec. 129 (1978), aj'd, 475 F. Supp. 654 (D. Wyo.
1979), rev'd, 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
11. Western Nuclear Corp. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D. Wyo. 1979), rev'd, 664
F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'dsub noma. Watt v. Western Nuclear Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
12. See 475 F. Supp. at 662 (concluding, after examination of authorities, that the term
"mineral" did not have a "closed, precise meaning" at time of SRHA's enactment).
13. Id at 658.
14. Id at 662-63. The district court observed that the entire concept of a patent reserving
mineral rights to the government was a response to the fraudulent claims and unintended trans-
fers which had become rampant under the prior system of categorically classifying land as min-
eral or nonmineral, and then transferring all the rights to the land, regardless of the land's
actual mineral content. See id at 657. See generally P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 503-19 (1968).
15. 475 F. Supp. at 662-63. The district court relied on United States v. Union Oil Co.,
549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977), which held that geothermal resources
fell within SRHA's mineral reservation because Congress had not intended to transfer any sub-
surface energy resources to SRHA homesteaders. Id at 1274, quoted in Western Nuclear, 475 F.
Supp. at 662.
16. 475 F. Supp. at 663.
17. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 234, 239 (10th Cir. 1981),rev'd sub noa. Watt
v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
18. See Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310 (1910), overruled, Layman v. Ellis,
52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714 (1929). The SRHA was enacted in 1916. Stock Raising Homestead
Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 862, ch. 9 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302 (1976)).
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to reserve,19 nor was it a substance normally associated with prospecting and
mining.20 Further, to include gravel within the SRHA reservation would,
given the nature of most of the terrain subject to the SRHA, effectively nul-
lify SRHA's grant of land ownership: "[i]f such common substances [as
gravel] were considered to be included within the mineral reservation, then
under all the many patents issued pursuant to the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act, the patentees would own only the dirt, and little or nothing more."' 2 1
The Tenth Circuit concluded that, in light of all the above factors, gravel
was not a reserved mineral under the SRHA.
22
In reversing the Tenth Circuit, a majority of the Court concluded,
under a flexible analysis similar to that used by the district court, that gravel
fell within the SRHA's mineral reservation. 23 The majority found that there
was no prevailing legal understanding of the term "mineral" at the time of
SRHA's enactment.2 4 Although the Interior Department's construction of
the term "mineral" when classifying lands as mineral or non-mineral had
indeed excluded gravel, 25 a contemporaneous Supreme Court construction
of the term "mineral" had approved a definition which included gravel as a
mineral. 26 Hence, there was no basis for assuming that Congress had neces-
sarily adopted the Interior Department's construction of the term
"mineral." 27
Having rejected a solution based on the importation of meaning
through contemporaneous constructions of similar Acts, the Court investi-
gated the degree to which the purposes underlying the SRHA would illumi-
nate gravel's status as a reserved mineral. 28 Reviewing the genesis of the
reserved-right patent, the Court concluded that Congress had been attempt-
ing to prevent abuse of the homestead land grant program and ensure that
the homestead program did not prevent mineral exploitation of homestead
lands. 29 Thus, Congress' purpose in severing the mineral estate was to assure
the "concurrent development of both the surface and subsurface of SRHA
lands."
30
Next, echoing the district court, the Supreme Court examined the ap-
propriate characterization of gravel in light of Congress' functional purpose
in severing the mineral estate from the surface estate.3 t The Court found
19. 664 F.2d at 241 (distinguishing United States v. Union Oil Co., 547 F.2d 1271 (9th
Cir.), cert. dented, 434 U.S. 930 (1977)).
20. 664 F.2d at 242 (quoting State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 408 P.2d 707,
708 (Utah 1965)).
21. See 664 F.2d at 242.
22. Id
23. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983), rev'g Western Nuclear Corp. v.
Andrus, 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981).
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2223.
25. Id at 2224 (citing Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310 (1910), overmled,
Layman v. Ellis, 52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714 (1929)).
26. 103 S. Ct. at 2224 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 536
(1903)).
27. 103 S. Ct. at 2224.
28. Id at 2225.
29. See id at 2225-26.
30. Id at 2226.
31. Ste id at 2227. The Court stated that "[slince Congress intended to facilitate develop-
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that because Congress' primary intention in enacting the SRHA was to per-
mit families to support themselves through farming and ranching, 32 Con-
gress had not contemplated that homsteaders would exploit the subsurface
estate for commercial purposes. 33 In reserving the mineral estate Congress
had therefore reserved ownership of all inorganic subsurface substances
which were commercially exploitable and which were not necessary to effect
the ranching and farming surface uses contemplated by the SRHA.34 Be-
cause gravel was part of the reserved mineral estate under the Court's func-
tional definition, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and affirmed the
district court. 35 To buttress its conclusion, the Court noted that gravel had
traditionally been characterized as a mineral under federal mining laws,
36
and that case law had established a principle of construction disfavoring
conveyances of rights not explicitly set forth in a government patent.
37
The dissent, like the Tenth Circuit, focused on the fact that at the time
of SRHA's enactment the Interior Department had concluded, after many
years of experience with materials of a quasi-mineral character, that gravel
was not a mineral for purposes of classifying public lands.38 Given the Inte-
rior Department's important role in drafting the SRHA and testifying in its
favor, 39 it was reasonable to conclude that Congress had not included gravel
within the SRHA's mineral reservation. 40  Reference to other statutes also
supported the conclusion that Congress did not generally include gravel
when using the term "mineral."' Finally, Congress had not enacted SRHA
solely for economic reasons; there was an overriding civic interest in making
persons independent landowners. 42 In light of this intent, Congress surely
did not intend to "destroy that sovereignty by reserving the commonplace
substances that actually constitute much of [the granted land]."'4 3 Thus, the




ment of both surface and subsurface resources, the determination of whether a particular sub-
stance is included in the surface estate or the mineral estate should be made in light of the use of
the surface estate that Congress contemplated." Id.
32. See id. at 2228.
33. Id at 2228-30.
34. Id. at 2228 & 2229 n.14. Under the Court's functional approach to defining the scope
of the SRHA mineral reservation, the homesteader has the right to use otherwise reserved min-
erals for homestead purposes. Id at 2229 n.15.
35. Id at 2232.
36. Id. at 2230-31.
37. Id. at 2231 (quoting United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S, 112 (1957)).
38. &e id. at 2233-35 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 2235 & n.9.
40. Id at 2235-36.
41. Id at 2236-37.





III. SILKWOOD V. KERR-McGEE CORP.-REVERSED
In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Stlkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. '
which held that certain punitive damage awards were preempted by federal
regulation of nuclear plant safety. 2 The Court held that Congress, in enact-
ing and amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,3 had not intended to
preclude victims of nuclear power plant radiation incidents from pursuing
state-authorized tort remedies. 4 An award of punitive damages imposed
under state tort law, although having a regulatory effect on plant safety, was
therefore not preempted.5
A. Facts
Karen Silkwood, a worker at a Kerr-McGee nuclear fuel plant in
Oklahoma, had been contaminated by plutonium during a three-day period
in November, 1974.6 Shortly thereafter, she was killed in an unrelated auto-
mobile accident. 7 Silkwood's estate brought common law tort actions in fed-
eral district court against Kerr-McGee to recover for the personal injuries
and property damages caused by the contamination. 8
B. Lower Court Treatment of Silkwood
The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding the es-
tate $505,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive dam-
ages.9 Kerr-McGee appealed to the Tenth Circuit, alleging, inter alia,10
that recovery for Silkwood's personal injuries was confined to workers' com-
pensation limits and that imposition of punitive damages was preempted by
federal law. I '
The Tenth Circuit agreed that, in the absence of contrary evidence, a
worker's injuries should be presumed to have occurred during the course of
employment.' 2 Thus, Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act 13 provided
1. 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
2. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4. 104 S. Ct. at 625.
5. Id at 626.
6. Id at 618.
7. Id
8. Id
9. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
10. Kerr-McGee also claimed that the verdict was excessive and contrary to the weight of
the evidence, that the trial court had erred in rulings and instructions, and that prejudicial
publicity, misconduct of opposing counsel, and errors in the court's rulings and instructions had
denied it a fair trial. Brief of Appellants at 20-30, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908
(10th Cir. 1981), reo'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
11. Id For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit Court's decision, see Comment, Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp.: Workers' Compensation and Federal Preemption Rescue the Nuclear Tortfeasor, 60
DEN. L.J. 291 (1983).
12. 667 F.2d at 917.
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 1-180 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
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the sole basis to recover damages for Silkwood's personal injuries. 14 Con-
versely, compensatory damages for Silkwood's destroyed property were re-
coverable under state tort law because such recovery was not preempted by
either the state workers' compensation laws or by the federal nuclear regula-
tory scheme.
15
In assessing Kerr-McGee's argument that punitive damages were pre-
empted by federal regulation of nuclear plant safety, the court of appeals
focused on the deterrent, and therefore regulatory, effect of punitive dam-
ages.16 Relying on Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,'17 the court stated
that the usually strong presumption against preemption must yield when the
federal government extensively occupies a regulatory area, as it had done in
the area of radiation hazards created by nuclear development.i 8 Writing for
the majority, Judge Logan reasoned that a judicial award of punitive dam-
ages was as intrusive upon the federal regulatory scheme as a direct legisla-
tive act of the state.' 9 The regulatory effect of punitive damage awards
therefore conflicted with federal control over nuclear safety.20 Further, the
power to punish nuclear plant operators for violation of nuclear safety stan-
dards was vested in a federal agency, 2' indicating the superfluousness of pu-
nitive damages in the context of existing federal regulations.2 2 These factors
led the court to conclude that punitive damage awards were preempted for
tort claims involving radiation hazards associated with nuclear power
plants.
23
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Doyle contended that preventing imposi-
tion of punitive damages in a case such as Silkwood "carries the preemption
concept far beyond anything that could have been intended or could ever be
implied [by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954]."24 The proper test, Judge
Doyle wrote, is whether an award of punitive damages impedes the accom-
plishment of congressional purposes and objectives.2 5 Under this test, pre-
emption did not apply to Silkwood.26 Judge Doyle characterized tort actions
as "a far cry" from the explicit statutory regulation found preempted in
Northern States.27 Tort claims, including punitive damage claims, did not
collide with the federal regulatory scheme, and therefore were not
preempted.
28
14. 667 F.2d at 919.
15. Id. at 920.
16. Id at 922.
17. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affdmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
18. The nuclear industry was initially developed by the federal government, and is closely
linked with national security; the overall industry, especially in the area of radiation hazards, is
extensively regulated by the federal government. Silkwood, 667 F.2d at 923.
19. Id at 923.
20. Id. at 922-23.
21. Id. at 923.
22. Id
23. See id.
24. Id. at 929 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
25. Id at 930 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
26. 667 F.2d at 930 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
27. Id at 929.
28. Id Judge Doyle emphasized that Congress' purpose was to preempt state licenstig au-
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C. Silkwood in the Supreme Court
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court apparently agreed with Judge Doyle's analysis.
Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that the test for preemption in
radiation injury cases is not, as the Tenth Circuit held, whether the federal
government has occupied the field.29 Rather, the test is whether the state
law in question conflicts with or frustrates the objectives of federal law.
30
The Court explained that its holding in Pacifw Gas and Electri'c Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission,3 t decided only nine
months earlier, was inapplicable to Sdlkwood. 32 In Paczfc Gas, the Court held
that the federal government had occupied the entire field of nuclear safety
regulation, and that states were therefore prohibited from regulating the
safety aspects of nuclear development. 33 According to Justice White, the
preempted field did not include traditional state tort law remedies. 34 This
conclusion was based on an analysis of legislative history relating to the
Atomic Energy Act. Conceding that the regulatory effect of state tort law
arguably justified a finding of preemption under Pacif# Gas,35 the majority
held that Congress had nonetheless intended that state remedies be left
intact.
36
First, there was no legislative evidence that Congress, in deciding to li-
cense private nuclear plants, had intended to prevent recovery for injuries
caused by plant operations. 3 7 Congress' failure to provide any federal reme-
dies for nuclear incident injuries was further evidence that state tort reme-
dies were not preempted; the Court refused to find a congressional intent to
"remove all means of judicial recourse for victims of illegal conduct." 38 Fi-
nally, the only congressional discussion about the relationship between the
federal law and state tort law remedies indicated that Congress believed that
state remedies would be available.
39
Although conceding that an award of damages based on state law was
regulatory in the sense that a nuclear facility could be threatened with liabil-
thority, not to preempt general state laws which merely affected nuclear plants. See id. at 929-
30.
29. 104 S. Ct. at 626.
30. d.
31. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
32. See 104 S. Ct. at 622-26.
33. 103 S. Ct. at 1726.
34. See 104 S. Ct. at 625.
35. Id
36. Id.
37. The Court found that "there is no indication that Congress even seriously considered
precluding the use of such remedies ...." Id. at 625.
38. Id (citing United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64
(1954)).
39. 104 S. Ct. at 623-26. The legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act did not contain
any discussion of the interaction between federal licensing and state tort law. Legislative history
from the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976), which limits the direct liability of nu-
clear plant operators in the event of catastrophic nuclear occurrences, revealed that Congress
believed that state tort law remedies survived the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act. See 104
S. Ct. at 623-26.
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ity for failing to conform to state standards, the Court found that this "regu-
latory consequence was something Congress was quite willing to accept."
40
The Court therefore remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit, adding that
Kerr-McGee could reassert any claim not addressed by the Tenth Circuit,
4 1
including its claim that the punitive damage award was excessive and un-
supported by the evidence.
4 2
2. Justice Blackmun's Dissent
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, saying that the
decision "tortures [the Court's] earlier decisions" and "wreaks havoc with
the regulatory structure that Congress carefully created." '43 According to
Justice Blackmun, Pacific Gas mandated the Court to find that state laws
intended to regulate nuclear power safety were preempted. 44  Because
Oklahoma's state-authorized punitive damages award was intended to deter
a nuclear facility from operating in a particular manner, such an award was
regulatory, and was preempted. 4 5 Compensatory damages, which were not
intended to achieve a regulatory goal, would therefore be allowable under
Pacif Gas.46
3. Justice Powell's Dissent
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
dissented, saying that the majority's the decision was inconsistent with fed-
eral law, legislative history, and the Court's decision in Pacific Gas.4 7 This
dissent agreed with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the regulatory effect
of a punitive damage award would impermissibly interfere with federal reg-
ulation. 48 After Si/kwood, nuclear operators would no longer be able to rely
on the agency expertise embodied in federal safety standards. 49 Similarly,
the public would be denied the benefits of a unitary program of safety regu-
lation.50 Szikwood, according to Justice Powell, opened the door for ad hoc
jury regulation of the nuclear industry, which would clearly interfere with
the congressional purpose of creating an exclusive federal prerogative to reg-
ulate the radiation hazards associated with nuclear plants.5 ' Further, per-
mitting ad hoc jury regulation was unfair to operators complying with
stringent federal standards52 and could discourage investment in a vital
40. 104 S. Ct. at 626.
41. See supra note 10.
42. 104 S. Ct. at 626-27.
43. Id. at 627 (Blackmun, j., dissenting).
44. id. at 627-28.
45. Id. at 628. Justice Blackmun stated: "[T]he punitive damages award in this case deters
a nuclear facility from operating in the same manner as Kerr-McGee. Authority for a state to
do so, however, is precisely what the Court held to be pre-empted [sic] in Paific Gas." Id
46. Id at 629.
47. Id. 634-41 (Powell, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 635.
49. Id. at 640.
50. See id at 639.
51. See id. at 639-40.
52. Id at 640.
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source of energy. 53 For all these reasons, Justice Powell and his fellow dis-




I. BROWN V. THOMSON-AFFIRMED
In Brown v. Thomson, 1 the Supreme Court affirmed the determination of
a three judge district court panel 2 upholding the constitutionality of Wyo-
ming's most recent reapportionment statute.3 The statute was upheld by
virtue of a concurring opinion, with three Justices dissenting. 4 The Court's
reasoning is questionable in light of previous reapportionment decisions, and'
is at best of little precedential value because of the very narrow issue the case
decided. Instead of reviewing the constitutionality of Wyoming's reappor-
tionment plan as a whole, the Court limited its decision to the issue of
whether Wyoming's policy of preserving county boundaries justified the de-
viations from population equality 5 resulting from the provision of a state
representative to Niobrara County, which would not have been entitled to a
representative on the basis of population equality. 6 The basis for the Court's
decision to uphold the statute was that providing the additional representa-
tive effected a state policy lacking any hint of arbitrariness or discrimination
against population centers while simultaneously having only a de minimus
53. Id
54. Id at 640-41.
1. 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983). Brown v. Thomson was the third unsuccessful challenge to Wyo-
ming's apportionment of its House of Representatives in the last 20 years. The first challenge,
Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247 (D. Wyo. 1964),supplemented, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D. Wyo.
1965), afd sub noma. Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966), was decided shortly after Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the seminal decision in the area of state legislature apportion-
ment. Sims included two important holdings. First, the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, required that state representatives be
elected through a system reflecting the principle of equal representation for equal numbers of
people. 377 U.S. at 577. Second, deviations from perfect equality were permissible if such
deviations resulted from "legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational
state policy." Id. at 579. Schaefer upheld Wyoming's apportionment of its House of Representa-
tives because the deviations from population equality did not dilute the voting strength of popu-
lation centers, and because the deviations resulted from the legitimate state policy of seeking to
provide representation for all counties. 240 F. Supp. at 251. Cf Sims, 377 U.S. at 580 (recogniz-
ing that provision of representation for political subdivisions is a legitimate basis for deviations
from population). Thompson v. Thomson, 344 F. Supp. 1378 (D. Wyo. 1972), the second chal-
lenge, rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments on the same grounds articulated in Schae-
fer. Id at 1380.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1982) requires that a three judge district court hear federal court
challenges to state apportionment statutes.
3. WYO. STAT. § 28-2-109 (Supp. 1983). See Brown v. Thomson, 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983),
afg 536 F. Supp. 780 (D. Wyo. 1982).
4. Justices Stevens and O'Connor concurred in Justice Powell's opinion. Brown v. Thom-
son, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 2699 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's dissent. Id at 2700 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. "Population equality" is a shorthand phrase describing the situation in which equal
numbers of people elect equal numbers of representatives. See 103 S. Ct. at 2693. See also supra
note 1.
6. See 103 S. Ct. at 2693-95.
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dilutive effect upon the voting strength of Wyoming's electorate. 7
A. Background
Wyoming's Constitution requires that each of the state's counties "shall
constitute a senatorial and representative district"8 and that "each county
shall have at least one senator and one representative." In addition, the
constitution requires that the representatives be apportioned among the
counties as equally as possible on the basis of population.' 0
As the district court pointed out, Wyoming is unique in that it has al-
ways had a very small population distributed through a large area. I Conse-
quently, counties have always been the major political subdivision within
the state, and in fact act as the major administrators of state government
programs.' 2 Historically, this central role of counties in Wyoming's political
structure has been manifested by requiring that each county have at least
one representative in Wyoming's House of Representatives.' 3 As noted, the
challenge in Thomson was limited to the application of this policy to Nio-
brara County. 14
Following the 1980 census, Wyoming reapportioned its state legisla-
ture. 15 The new apportionment statute' 6 provided for a maximum of 64
representatives,' 7 making the ideal apportionment one representative for
every 7,337 persons.' 8 Because Wyoming's constitution required allocation
of at least one representative to each county,' 9 including Niobrara, the
state's least populous county with only 2,924 people,20 the distribution of
7. Id at 2698.
8. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 3.
9. Id
10. Id
11. Brown v. Thomson, 536 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Wyo. 1982), af'd 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983).
12. 536 F. Supp. at 784.
13. Id
14. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
15. 103 S. Ct. at 2694.
16. WYo. STAT. § 28-2-109 (Supp. 1983). This statute provides in relevant part:
(a) The ratios for the apportionment of senators and representatives are fixed as
follows:
(ii) The ratio for the apportionment of the representatives is the smallest number
of people per representative which when divided into the population in each represen-
tative district as shown by the official results of the 1980 federal decennial census with
fractions rounded to the nearest whole number results in a house with sixty-three (63)
representatives;
(iii) If the number of representatives for any county is rounded to zero (0) under
the formula in paragraph (a)(ii) of this section, that county shall be given one (1)
representative which is in addition to the sixty-three (63) representatives provided by
paragraph (a)(ii) of this section;
(iv) If the provisions of paragraph (a)(iii) of this section are found to be unconsti-
tutional or have an unconstitutional result, then Niobrara county shall be joined to
Goshen county in a single representative district and the house of representatives shall
be apportioned as provided by paragraph (a)(ii) of this section.
Id.
17. Id § (a)(ii), -(iii).
18. 103 S. Ct. at 2694.
19. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 3.
20. 103 S. Ct. at 2694.
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representatives among the state's population became unequal. In fact, the
plan as enacted had an average deviation from the ideal number of residents
per representative of sixteen percent and a maximum deviation between the
largest and smallest number of residents per representative of eighty-nine
percent. 2 1 Those deviations were very similar to the deviations present in
two prior decisions upholding Wyoming's apportionment of its House of
Representatives.
22
Plaintiffs, the League of Women Voters and citizens from Wyoming's
seven most populous counties, alleged that providing one representative to
Niobrara County despite its small population impermissibly diluted the vot-
ing privileges and rights of plaintiffs and other citizens similarly situated.
23
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Niobrara
County from having its own representative, and to require implementation
of the statutory provision which was explicitly designed to be effective if
provision of a representative for Niobrara County was declared
unconstitutional.
2 4
B. The District Court Decision
Because of the nature of the plaintiffs' allegations, the district court de-
cided the case on the very narrow issue of the dilutive effect of the one repre-
sentative granted to Niobrara County.2 5 The court found that the presence
of Niobrara County's representative in the state legislature had a statistically
insignificant dilutive effect on plaintiffs' voting rights. 26 In light of the de
minimus effect of providing the representative for Niobrara County, the
state's legitimate and nondiscriminatory desire to maintain the integrity of
counties as the state's operative political subdivisions was a sufficient basis
for concluding that the statute was constitutional.
27
C. The Supreme Court's Opinion
1. The Majority
Like the district court, the Supreme Court refused to review the consti-
tutionality of the statute as a whole, despite the blatant deviations from
population equality. 28 The majority reasoned that although previous appor-
tionment decisions had considered aspects of apportionment plans not di-
rectly challenged by the parties,29 there was no constitutional mandate that
the Court undertake such a sua sponte inquiry. 30 Accordingly, the court
21. Id
22. Id See supra note 1.
23. 103 S. Ct. at 2695.
24. Id See WYo. STAT. § 28-2-109(a)(iv) (Supp. 1983).
25. 536 F. Supp. at 781.
26. Id at 783.
27. Id
28. 103 S. Ct. at 2698 & n.9.
29. Id. at 2698 n.9. See Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 735 n. 27 (1964);
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
30. 103 S. Ct. at 2698 n.9 (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 739 n.5 (1973)).
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restricted its inquiry to those challenges explicitly raised by the plaintiffs. 3 1
Whether or not the Court's decision to narrow the issues was justified, a
majority was obtained through the concurrences of Justices O'Connor and
Stevens, who joined the opinion on the understanding that it made no com-
ment on the reapportionment plan taken as a whole, which they doubted
could survive constitutional scrutiny.
32
The Court supported its decision to uphold the statute by relying on a
series of cases that justified deviations from population equality because of
legitimate state objectives.33 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, noted
that Reynolds v. Sims 34 held that a state must make an honest and good faith
effort to construct districts of equal population,35 but that because perfect
equality was impossible, legitimate state policies, such as preservation of
political subdivisions, could justify deviations from equality. 36 The Court
then pointed out that decisions following Sims had established that an ap-
portionment plan with a maximum deviation of greater than ten percent
created a prima facie case of discrimination, and was therefore unconstitu-
tional unless justified by the state.37 Proof that the legislative plan reason-
ably advanced a rational state policy and did not result in unconstitutional
population disparities among the districts satisfied the state's burden ofjusti-
fication. 38 Justice Powell conceded that the challenged portion of Wyo-
ming's plan exceeded the acceptable minimum deviation, 39 but he found
that the plan's provision of a representative for Niobrara County was none-
theless constitutional, in light of the state's proffered policy justification and
the minimal systemwide population disparities resulting solely from provid-
ing a representative for Niobrara County.4°
There were several factors the Court weighed in favor of the reappor-
tionment statute. First, through the years Wyoming had consistently ap-
plied its county-oriented representation policy without discrimination or
arbitrariness. 4' Second, the statute ensured that "population deviations are
no greater than necessary to preserve counties as representative districts."
'42
Finally, no evidence indicated that the legislative plan reflected a bias tend-
ing to favor "particular political interests or geographic areas."' 43 The Court
noted that Thomson could be distinguished from many prior decisions invali-
dating apportionment plans based on political subdivisions, because those
state defendants failed to prove the deviations resulted from the good faith
31. 103 S. Ct. at 2698 n.9.
32. Id. at 2700 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328 (1973); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440,
444 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-80 (1964).
34. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
35. Id at 577.
36. Id at 580-81.
37. 103 S. Ct. at 2696 (citing Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967)).
38. See 103 S. Ct. at 2696 (citing Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328 (1973)).
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2696.
40. Id at 2698-99.
41. Id at 2696.
42. Id
43. Id at 2697 (quoting Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 187 (1971)).
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application of a legitimate state policy.4 4 Justice Powell buttressed his con-
clusion as to the legitimacy of Wyoming's plan by quoting language from
Sims stating that the character, as well as the degree, of deviation from strict
population equality must be considered in evaluating an apportionment
plan's constitutionality.
45
Having established the legitimacy of Wyoming's reasons for districting
by political subdivision, the Court analyzed the dilutive effect of providing a
representative for Niobrara County, and agreed with the district court's that
any dilutive effect was de minimus. 46 To support its conclusion, the Court
observed that considerable population variations would remain even if Nio-
brara County did not have its own representative: the average deviation
would be thirteen percent and the maximum deviation would be sixty-six
percent.4 7 In addition, the only difference resulting from granting plaintiffs
their requested relief would be that plaintiffs' class of voters would elect
44.44% of the legislature rather 43.75%.48 In view of the minimal effect Nio-
brara's one representative had on the statewide allocation of voting power,
and because Wyoming's county-oriented policy was applied neither discrimi-
natorily nor arbitrarily, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment
49
was not violated by providing a representative for Niobrara County.
50
2. The Dissent
In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, questioned the majority's decision and rea-
soning on several points. The dissent began by emphasizing that Thomson
was essentially lacking in precedential value because it was decided on such
a narrow issue. 5 1 Thomson could provide precedential value only in cases
challenging the incremental dilutive effect of similar reapportionment
plans.
52
Justice Brennan accused the majority of using two false premises in or-
der to avoid considering the plan in its entirety. 53 First, the majority had
presumed that the only aspect of unequal representation that matters is the
degree of individual vote dilution .54 This premise was clearly wrong, because
the Constitution's protections were not limited to preventing dilution of vot-
ing power; the Constitution also barred infgating voting power. 55 Thus, just
as a state could not effectively give two votes to persons named Niobrara, the
44. 103 S. Ct. at 2697 n.6 (citing Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 25 (1975); Kilgarlin v.
Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 124 (1967) (per curiam); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1967)).
45. 103 S. Ct. at 2697 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964)).
46. 103 S. Ct. at 2698.
47. Id.
48. Id. Under the alternative plan, see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text, the seven
counties represented by plaintiffs would elect 28 of 63 representatives instead of 28 of 64. 103 S.
Ct. at 2698.
49. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
50. 103 S. Ct. at 2699.
51. Id at 2700 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Se id. See also supra note 16.
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state could not effectively give two votes to persons living in Niobrara
County. 56 The Constitution barred both "exalted classes" of voters. 5 7 Sec-
ond, the majority had reasoned that Niobrara County's representation could
be severed from the rest of the scheme and evaluated in terms of its incre-
mental effect on the equality of the system as a whole. 58 According to Jus-
tice Brennan, precedent did not justify the consideration of just one seat in a
legislative body as though it had no connection to other seats; in order to
adjudge the constitutionality of any one seat, the Court was required to eval-
uate a plan's total effects. 59 Moreover, adopting the majority's approach led
to the perverse result ofjustifying a discriminatory feature of a plan through
demonstrating that discrimination "otherwise inherent in a plan was not en-
hanced by the challenged feature."
6
Turning to the merits, the dissent found Wyoming's plan manifestly
unconstitutional.6 1 Determinative was the fact that, despite the rationality
of the state policy, the plan's proposed deviations from population equality
were so large as to be intolerable under the Constitution. 62 Accordingly, the
district court should have been reversed.
6 3
Linda K. Hammacher
II. EEOC v. WYOMING-REVERSED
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyomitg (EEOC v. Wyomtig)
addressed the constitutionality of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act2 (ADEA) as applied to the states. Specifically, the Court examined the
extent to which the tenth amendment's 3 affirmative limitation on Congress'




59. Id at 2704-05.
60. Id
61. Id at 2701-03.
62. Id at 2701-02. Justice Brennan pointed out that of Wyoming's 23 counties, only 9
were within as much as 10% of population proportionality, that the plan's average deviation
from ideal district size was 16%, and that the maximum deviation was 89%, all figures exceeding
previously permitted deviations. Id at 2702-03.
63. See id. at 2705.
1. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). ADEA makes it unlawful for any employer to make em-
ployment decisions on the basis of age unless age is a bona fide occupational qualification. Id.
§ 623(l)(1). In 1974, ADEA was amended to include state and local governments within its
definition of employer. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (1982)). The amendment provided that the term "employer" included "a State or
political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdi-
vision of a state .. " Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. X. This amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." Id.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: "The Congress shall have Power . .. To regu-




tidiscrimination principles to state governments. 5 The Court reversed the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, 6 and held that
because ADEA did not seriously impair a state's ability to function autono-




Bill Crump, a fifty-five year old District Game Division Supervisor for
the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, initiated this action by filing a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
challenging his involuntary retirement. 8 The retirement was based upon the
state's interpretation of a Wyoming statute9 whereby a law enforcement of-
ficer was mandatorily retired at age fifty-five unless the officer accepted an
administrative position.l 0 Crump claimed that because the Game and Fish
Department's mandatory retirement policy was limited to game wardens,
the state had engaged in discrimination in violation of ADEA.t" The EEOC
filed suit in the district court on behalf of Crump, seeking damages as well as
injunctive and declaratory relief.
1 2
The district court dismissed the action, 13 reasoning that the tenth
amendment immunity analysis recognized in National League of Cities v.
Useg 14 and refined in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &P Reclamation Association,
Inc. 15 precluded application of ADEA to state retirement programs for law
enforcement officers.' 6  Under the National League of Cities/Hodel analysis,
states cannot be required to comply with federal laws which operate on the
states qua states, 17 which implicate matters that are beyond peradventure
attributes of state sovereignty,' 8 which will impair a state's ability "to struc-
ture integral operations in the area of traditional governmental functions,"' 9
5. 103 S. Ct. at 1057. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) was the
first decision to recognize that the tenth amendment would, in specified circumstances, act as an
affirmative limitation on Congress' power to regulate state governments pursuant to the com-
merce power. Id at 841-46.
6. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983), rev'g 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981).
7. 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
8. Id. at 1059.
9. WYO. STAT. § 31-3-107 (1977). The statute, which is part of Wyoming's retirement
plan for highway patrol persons and game wardens, see id §§ 31-3-101 to -121, states in relevant
part: "An employee may continue in service on a year-to-year basis after.., age fifty-five (55),
with the approval of employer and under conditions as the employer may prescribe." Id. § 3-
107(c).
10. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 597 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983).
11. 514 F. Supp. at 596.
12. Id at 595.
13. Id at 600.
14. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
15. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
16. 514 F. Supp. at 600. See also id at 596 (state limited tenth amendment claim to pro-
gram for retirement of law enforcement personnel).
17. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 (1976). Accord Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 287 (1981).
18. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845. Accord H'odel, 452 U.S. at 288.
19. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. Accord Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
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and which do not reflect a supervening federal interest. 20 The district court
observed that ADEA clearly acted on the states qua states,21 that structuring
the employment relationships incidental to providing park and recreation
services was a traditional attribute of state sovereignty, 2 2 and that structur-
ing retirement programs for law enforcement officers was an integral state
legislative function which would be impaired by ADEA.23 The court re-
jected the idea that a supervening national interest preempted state preroga-
tive in this area, pointing out that Congress had itself imposed a mandatory
retirement age for federal law enforcement personnel. 24 This inconsistency
tipped the balance of interests in favor of Wyoming and required a finding
that ADEA could not be applied to the state insofar as it affected Wyoming's
employment relationship with its law enforcement personnel. 25 The EEOC
appealed the district court's opinion directly to the Supreme Court.
2 6
B. The Majority Opinion
The majority concluded it was "unnecessary . . .to override Congress's
express choice to extend ADEA to the states." 27 In reaching this decision,
the majority rejected the district court's conclusions concerning Wyoming's
tenth amendment immunity.
Although the federal statute involved in EEOC v. Wyoming clearly met
the first requirement of regulating the "states as states," a28 the Court ques-
tioned whether the mere fact that an employment relationship was involved
satisfied the National League of Cities requirement that ADEA effect an essen-
tial attribute of state sovereignty.2 9 The Court did not decide this issue,
however, because it found that ADEA did not "directly impair" Wyoming's
"ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.' "30
Recognizing that management of state parks was a traditional state
governmental function, 3' the majority's decision rested on its conclusion that
ADEA minimally affected this integral function. The statute merely re-
quired Wyoming to test its retirement requirements against a "reasonable
federal standard."'32 Under ADEA, Wyoming was not required to abandon
20. 1-odri, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29.
21. See 514 F. Supp. at 596-97.
22. Id at 600. Accord National League of Cties, 426 U.S. at 851.
23. 514 F. Supp. at 600.
24. Id
25. Id
26. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1057 (1983). See 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1
9 8 2
) (any
party may appeal directly to Supreme Court from any decision of any court of the United
States holding an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional).
27. 103 S. Ct. at 1062. The Court also noted that prior to the district court's decision in
EEOC o. Wyoming federal courts had consistently held that application of ADEA to the states
was constitutional. Id at 1059 n.6.
28. Id at 1061.
29. Id at 1061 & n. il.
30. Id at 1062 (quoting National League of Citis, 426 U.S. at 852).
31. 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
32. Id See 29 U.S.C. § 623() (1982), which provides in part that "it shall not be unlawful
for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization . . .to take any action otherwise
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its policy of ensuring competent game wardens; ADEA only required that
the fitness of game wardens be determined on a particularized basis.
33
Therefore, the requirements of ADEA did not unduly infringe upon Wyo-
ming's ability to effect its law enforcement policies.
34
Having evaluated ADEA's direct policymaking effects, the majority
then evaluated the degree to which ADEA would limit Wyoming's ability to
effect policies over a broad range of state decisions. 35 This inquiry was held
to be primarily legal, rather than factual, limited to evaluating the "direct
and obvious effect of federal legislation on the ability of the States to allocate
their resources." '36 Because ADEA lacked any obvious deleterious impact on
state finances or on state social policies implicated by the game warden hir-
ing system, the federal program did not indirectly impair a state's constitu-
tionally protected decision-making prerogative. 37  Therefore, the tenth
amendment did not preclude application of ADEA to state retirement pro-
grams for law enforcement personnel.
C. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens concurred in the result, but disagreed with the Court's
reasoning. 38 Justice Stevens stated that the power provided by the com-
merce clause was sufficient to support federal statutes applying to both pub-
lic and private employers. 39 It was upon this rationale, rather than the tenth
amendment immunity approach, that he concurred with the Court's hold-
ing.40 Justice Stevens characterized National League of Cities as "judicial fiat"
deserving prompt rejection.
41
D. ChiefJustice Burger's Dissent
The dissent by Chief Justice Burger 42 concluded that ADEA was un-
constitutional as applied to the states.43 The dissent applied the National
League of Cties/Hodel analysis44 and found that the statute involved satisfied
prohibited . . .where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business.
33. 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
34. Id
35. Id at 1062-64. National League ofCites recognized that courts must consider a federal
statute's consequential effects on state decision-making in order to fully evaluate the degree of
impairment resulting from application of the statute to a state. In National League ofCities, the
Court specifically examined the extent to which financial consequential effects would seriously
affect a state's ability to pursue its social and economic policies. 426 U.S. at 846-52.
36. 103 S. Ct. at 1063.
37. Id at 1063-64.
38. Id. at 1065 (Stevens, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 1068.
40. Id.
41. Id at 1067. Justice Stevens dissented in National League ofCities, and would have held
the challenged statute to be a valid exercise of Congress' commerce power. 426 U.S. at 880-81
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 1068 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor joined in Chief Justice Burger's dissent. See id Justice Powell also wrote a separate
dissent, joined only by Justice O'Connor. See id. at 1075 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1068-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1069. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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each of the requirements necessary to invoke tenth amendment immunity. 45
Disagreeing with the majority, the dissent argued strongly that ADEA sub-
stantially impaired Wyoming's ability to structure delivery of integral state
services. 46 Chief Justice Burger observed that among the detrimental im-
pacts were increased employment costs due to mandatory employment of
older workers, limitations on a state's ability to hire those most physically
able to do the job, and decreased promotional opportunities.4 7 The dissent
also rejected the conclusion that the nature of the federal interest justified
state submission to the federal law, arguing that Wyoming was "setting stan-
dards to meet local needs," and that this interest reflected very real concerns
for public safety outweighing any interest the federal government asserted.
48
E. Justce Powell's Dissent
In his separate dissent, Justice Powell chose to address Justice Stevens'
view of the historical development of the commerce power, and hence the
extent of political power inhering therein.4 9 Justice Powell, expanding upon
the history and the purposes of the Constitution, emphasized the importance
of federalism as a constitutional principle50 and criticized Justice Stevens'
analysis, which implied that any state function could be preempted.
5 1
F. Conclusion
EEOC v. Wyoming is another example of the Supreme Court's obligation
to balance federal and state interests. 52 National League of Cities articulated
the concept of tenth amendment immunity, which provides an affirmative
limitation on national powers by requiring judicial review of their effect
upon state decision-making prerogatives. 53 In addition to states' rights con-
cerns, federal statutes interfering with state decision-making affect certain
individual rights to government services, especially in areas of public health
and protection, providing another basis for invoking National League of Ctlzes
protections. 54 Although EEOC v. Wyomig did not find ADEA to be an in-
fringement on the state prerogative protected by the tenth amendment, it is
clear that the policies underlying National League of Cties will be implicated
45. 103 S. Ct. at 1072 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1070.
47. Md at 1070-71-
48. Id at 1069.
49. Id at 1075. (Powell, J., dissenting).
50. Id at 1080.
51. Id at 1081.
52. Other recent decisions involving state assertions of tenth amendment immunity in-
clude FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) and United Trans. Workers Union v. Long
Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982). The propriety of Supreme Court balancing of federal and
state prerogative remains a subject of some dispute. Compare Howard, The States and the Supreme
Court, 31 CATH. U.L. REv. 375, 434 (1982) (court has legitimate role in balancing state and
federal interests) with Choper, The Scope of National Power Vz -a- Vis the States. The Dispensability of
Judiciatl Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1600 (1977) (the national political branches should be relied
upon for protecting the states' rights).
53. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
54. See Tribe, Unraveting National League of Cities: The ew Federalism and 4flirnative Rghts
to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1102 (1977).
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in future challenges involving application of similar statutes to the states.
The strong split in the Court regarding the scope of the tenth amendment's
affirmative limitation on the exercise of congressional commerce power, and
the problems in applying the test of immunity, indicate that National League
of Ciizes will continue to breed controversy.
Janet A. Buxton
